Indian Defence Review

Alongside the troubles concurrent and brewing, there are hopeful signs of matured realisation and some improvements in the situation. History proves that such improvements in inter-state tolerance are best nurtured under an incentive of deterrence. For the near future however, it is certain that India will continue to be tormented by proxy war and terror acts emanating from Pakistan, while being needled by China’s over territorial claims and land-sea encirclement. There is no doubt that when these inimical forces orchestrate to stalk conjointly, it cannot portend well for the Indian nationhood. As a corollary, it would be an abject failure of her state policies, diplomatic as well as military, if India is unable to deter these inimical powers to desist from their compulsive mission of undermining her.

“One sided pursuit of peace and disarmament is a powerful incentive to the adversary to intensify its own pursuit of war”                —Luttwak

The Algorithm of Defence Investment

The leaders of newly independent India had undertaken a noble mission – to once again make India a ‘Soney ki Chidiya’ (Golden Bird) as it was referred to in earlier times while bestowing upon her enslaved and emaciated people the joy of freedom and prosperity. There was a roadmap to that destination which, contrary to the current fashion of levelling simplistic insinuations against the ‘Nehruvian’ policies, did take off steadily, instilling pride among all Indians of that era. That was a path of progress, catalysed by an environment of peace and non-alignment and guided by the noble principles of ‘Panchsheel’ in devising healthy neighbourly relations.

As it appeared to the Indian intelligentsia of the 1950s, Tagore’s prophecy, “India would once again assume her exalted seat in the comity of nations ….” was coming to fruition. Indeed, in such a sublime scheme of regional solidarity, India’s military institution was seen merely as a burden upon the exchequer. But alas, the script went awry. Predatory neighbours just could not resist that temptation which had in the past enticed many marauding hordes to divest India of her prosperity.

As it had happened in the 10th century, the post-independence aggressions were instigated by the Indian State’s naive propensity of remaining defenceless and proclaiming that as a virtue! Territorial ambitions and an urge to put a chirping India ‘in her place’ thus provoked the Chinese aggression in 1962 and that by Pakistan in 1965, first in Kutch and then in Jammu & Kashmir. That chastised India to invest in her military empowerment. Thus, for the next two decades, any further anti-India adventurism remained deterred. But in the 1990s, when the world order brought the nation to a brink of economic disaster, defence preparedness had to be the first to be jettisoned. Admittedly, that had to be the worst among all the difficult options that confronted India at that time.

That set the predators on the prowl again. Our Western neighbour, devoted to the sole agenda of destroying Indian nationhood even if it meant going naked, now adopted new strategies – proxy wars in Punjab and Kashmir, subversion of Indian youth, aggression in Kargil and when nothing worked, terrorist attacks upon our defenceless civil society. The Northern neighbour, having gobbled up all lands and seas which she thought had always been under her formal, notional or imaginary suzerainty, now engaged fulltime in boosting Pakistan’s capacity to create nuisance. This was an “all-weather friendship” between an autarchic nation and its unscrupulous lackey with the sole purpose of biting chunks of flesh off India while she remained militarily vulnerable.

Not that India was oblivious to the importance of military preparedness within the overall ambit of national security. So even if constrained by the excruciating challenges of strengthening the nationhood through investments in the fields of education, health, poverty eradication and economic development, India remained as the world’s seventh highest spender in defence. But as India marches into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the question remains whether our investment of over two lakh crore rupees per annum to maintain the world’s fourth largest defence forces is paying the right dividends. Does it deter those compulsive aggressors from their intuitive pursuit of dismembering India? Is India’s equation of investment against achievement of deterrence even? We owe this examination to the thirty per cent Indians who live in poverty and yet contribute to national security, while much of our defence allocation goes to keep the arms-exporting developed world in good health.

Adversarial Neighbourhood

Hard-nosed strategic analysts opine that India is central to an adversarial neighbourhood. Two of the largest, China and Pakistan, are overtly animus. Nepal and Bangladesh view India as the potential threat; Myanmar keeps its distance and Sri Lanka often plays truant. In building mutually beneficial inter-dependency, Bhutan is the only saving grace, analysts point out. Without delving into investigation over the alleged failings of our state-policies, the fact remains that a facade of bonhomie apart, ours is a most lovelorn region and that given an opportunity, there would be none to resist taking bites off India with due self-justification of course.

But that is the reality of international politics, a nation so central to the region is expected to have such issues. What however renders the regional situation stand out is the adversarial combination of many poisonous factors – territorial ambitions, religious and ideological bigotry, neighbourhood nuclearisation, collusive proliferation, terrorism and high spending on conventional military muscle, all directed at India. The situation is further exacerbated when every neighbouring nation is embroiled in internal revolt in one form or another and each of them finds some excuse to ascribe their problems to India. In light of India’s proclaimed abhorrence of any offensive intent, she is but a state besieged from within and out as she is constantly undermined by internal rebellions, usually instigated externally. India’s future will be decided by the manner in which she deals with that siege. Meanwhile, there is no escape from building up effective military deterrence to keep the predators at bay.

Theology of Deterrence

Strategists define ‘deterrence’ as a form of ‘negative incentive’ to control an adversary from actuating his hostile intent, aggressive or preventive. Consequently, it addresses the adversary’s psychology, beckoning him to understand that actuation of his hostile intent would fail to bring the intended profit as commensurate to the trouble taken. Truly, it is but a factual algorithm that is to be backed up by ‘convincing credibility’ of imposition of ‘deterrence of punishment’. Credibility, in turn, must emanate from demonstrated capability (like a snake bite) to defeat the adversary’s aggression or defensive opposition (like a porcupine’s quill) as the case may be. This is the easier, tangible part of deterrence but costly to achieve in measurable terms. The real complexity, however, lies in fine-tuning the ‘intangible factors’ that decide its effectiveness in convincing the adversary to desist from undertaking inimical acts even if ritualistic sabre-rattling goes on. To succeed, persuasions of this nature require in-depth knowledge of the target society’s values and the construct of its rationalities as well as delusions.

For the developed – nay, dictating world, deterrence is aimed at keeping their advantages secured from potential obstructionists. This they are in position to do through the imposition of political, economic and military deterrence, the last recourse being considered to be the most immediate and effective. In rest of the situations, deterrence subsists on the powerful adversary’s ‘self-deterrence’ which may be borne out of political compulsions, civilised sentiments or fear of falling into a sticky cesspool of unending hostility. Here, the weaker party’s propensity of unleashing overt or covert insurgency and terrorism to deny the intended objectives of aggressive behaviour also plays its part, i.e. ‘deterrence of denial’ of, so to say.

Experience tells us that military deterrence has to be case-specific, to be construed in terms of the particular mode of warfare that it aims to prevent – conventional, sub-conventional and nuclear modes, for example. In other words, deterrence has to be addressed specifically to every adversary identified and further, to each modes of threat posed by such adversaries. For example, Pakistan’s hostility against India needs to be deterred at the conventional, proxy war, nuclear as well as terrorism levels. This one is an example of ‘complex deterrence’ that involves firstly, deterring each of the players, state as well as non-state, who sets the agenda in Pakistan, and secondly, institution of credible measures to defeat hostile acts in all of the above mentioned modes. With a perpetually adversarial China also in the fray, it is India’s unkind obligation to subscribe to this kind of complex deterrence.

Little, however, is discussed of what we may refer to as the ‘reverse deterrence’. This one causes the threatened party to arm itself to catch up with the power differential or to devise asymmetric means to prosecute its hostile designs. India’s nuclearisation after being hemmed-in from the North and West, is a fallout of the first category of reverse deterrence, while Pakistan’s official sponsorship of terrorism in India after failing to wrest Kashmir through conventional wars, is a result of the second. Presenting a despised prospect of getting stuck in a long-drawn mass uprising and irrationality of nuclear brinkmanship, are other example of reverse deterrence.

Political theorists argue that in the contemporary era of mass empowerment, it is unnecessary, even forbidding, to capture territories to sustain national progress. One, the urge of tapping economic advantages that prompted one nation to capture another’s territory, can be better met today by surrogate means. Two, the cost of keeping a hostile population suppressed is so heavy that it undermines rather than strengthening the aggressor’s society. Notwithstanding the fact that the determinants of deterrence in our part of the world are somewhat different, it is important to note that the act of being deterred has cultural connotations. Therefore, the Western ideals of sanctity of life and liberty, preservation of societal assets and most of all, the expected norms of rationality in decision making, may mean differently to the power-wielders in this part of the world. Having been agitated by provocative perceptions, many of them have given themselves over to fanatic delusions. To them, chastising an inferior intransigent, revenge against humiliation and defence of religion, ideology or culture, may take precedence over preservation of life and property and the profit-loss equation or even their own existence as an individual, group or a nation. Obviously, Western norms may not be fully relevant here. We have to devise our exclusive formulae to deter hostility in our neighbourhood.

Presently, India’s investment in imposing military deterrence has kept the Sino-Indian border-line quiet…

Interplay of Deterrence in South Asia

In the South Asian context, the key agents of instability besides the usual power-game of developed nations are – one, the common curse of internal instability; two, a fanatically obsessed Pakistan and three, a power hungry China. The latter two are bent upon possessing parts of India even if that means poisoning their own society. Thus, we find this predatory duo relentless in their mission to add new territories and control even more yonder. Yes, neither will Pakistan remain content with the possession of Kashmir nor will China rest with Aksai Chin taken. To go about that business, the duo have colluded to strike at the only nation that might some day, be capable of biting into their piece of the claimed pie.

Obviously, therefore, in a neighbourhood wherein xenophobia and predatory urge are so celebrated, there must exist the seeds of war. The other forms of deterrence having little significance in the regional context – so limited the mutuality of political and economic stakes are – the sole recourse left for India to prevent such seeds from sprouting is to impose military deterrence against both. There is little India can do to change such a situation. To protect her existential integrity, therefore, she must remain obliged to commit substantial resources from her meagre kitty to deter the duo from keep launching schemes to dismember her with military might.

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Obviously, India’s deterrence has to be comprehensive, credible and cost-effective. Presently, India’s investment in imposing military deterrence has kept the Sino-Indian border-line quiet. It has even attracted China’s endorsement but tardy adherence to various Confidence Building Measures. India’s military deterrence, therefore, has worked so far. But since China is emerging from her quietude that she had adopted as a state policy to nurture modernisation and some trailers of her regional hegemonies are already in evidence, there are three issues which need deep consideration. These are: one, whether her current mood of military tranquillity on the borders will continue; second, given the feverish development of logistical infrastructure in Tibet, for how long will the tranquillity last; and third, how strong must India’s military deterrence be for China to keep the issue of borders settlement reserved solely for a politico-diplomatic solution.

With Pakistan, India’s conventional deterrence has been a success wherein the former has reconciled to the fact that her dream of having breakfast in Srinagar and flying her flag over the Red Fort would never come to fruition. It was thus that the case of asymmetric proxy war found favour in her strategy to satisfy her anti-India obsession. Here we may take note of two facts. One, India’s conventional military power was enough to prevent Pakistan from capturing Kashmir but it was inadequate to impose a deterrence of punishment, thus allowing Pakistan the freedom to persist and two, through nuclear posturing, Pakistan communicates her belief that by her nuclearisation she has blocked India’s conventional retaliation while continuing to prosecute proxy war with impunity. Thus, while Pakistan’s deterrence over India has worked beautifully, the same may not be said about the reverse, annual investment of over two lakh crore rupees notwithstanding. The matter is not helped when we examine the possibilities of Pakistan turning into China’s surrogate nuclear arsenal in the same spirit as ‘outsourcing’ her Northern Areas and the Gwadar Port. Helpless Emperor Shah Alam II’s lease of the dewani of Bihar, Bengal and Odhisa to the East India Company in 1765 comes to mind.

Finally, we also need to appreciate as to how the colluding duo, in their anti-India machinations, manage to have the world’s power-group down-playing their pronouncements of blatant lies and nonchalant violations of international treaties and conventions, while humouring India’s hanker for just a ‘good boy pat’ is considered to be enough of a reward for the latter to stay in line. The obvious inference is that in international relations ‘naughty boy’ is better attended to than a sober one. It therefore makes sense for us to be ‘sober with a sabre at hand’.

There are many chinks in our armour that need strengthening for military deterrence to pay dividends.

Deterrence in Sino-Indian Context

Despite the occasional affront posed by hardliners in Beijing, the Sino-Indian equation is currently on a rational keel. That relationship with a great neighbour should be nurtured. The key factor in India being able to do so is the imposition of a healthy military deterrence to convince China to desist from attempting to satisfy her quest by military aggression. However, considering the high and ever increasing capability gap, India’s deterrence over a much stronger neighbour, a none-too-pleased super-power in the making, would have to be rather extraordinary.

It would be banal to expect China to be deterred from her goal of ‘liberating’ her self-sanctified territories by the opposition posed by a dozen or more, of army divisions, naval men-o-war and air squadrons, the first being decidedly obsolescent in composition while the other two are partially so. Similarly, a dozen or two missiles of self-certified test-bed capabilities are unlikely to make China lose her ‘will’ to fight. As demonstrated during the war in Korea, the Cultural Revolution and building of the great dam over the Huang He, in securing her controversial goals, China could not care less about triggering innumerable casualties and widespread devastation. Even if faint voices of dissent are heard these days, the situation has not changed substantially.

Meanwhile, the Chinese autarchy has wisely stoked a sense of nationalistic fervour to its territorial aspirations that makes it a patriotic duty to support. Further, by coupling her economy to that of the developed nations, the Chinese leadership while repudiating international concerns, may not find any threat of economic sanctions too fearsome to deal with. Therefore, after a Deng-inspired ‘lie-low’ period of modernisation, as she gears up to flex her muscles in her traditionally methodical style, something more substantial has to be devised to deter China from ‘teaching us another lesson’.

Conversely, the aura built up by China is a perfect example of existential deterrence over India. This is so that contesting her, diplomatically or militarily, is practically unthinkable amongst the Indian policy makers. The deterrence is so effective that the latter feels it necessary to take up the cudgels of rationalising with its citizens, the former’s diplomatic provocations and regular intrusions across the border Line of Actual Control. In contrast, all that China does to keep her border inviolable is to make occasional visits, while India can neither for a moment leave that line unattended, nor set foot across, let alone stoke trouble in Tibet.

For India to pose a workable deterrence against a severely unfavourable power differential, asymmetric methods may have to be adopted to exploit China’s sensitivities. We are aware that China’s goal is to retain power in the Party’s domain, which is considered imperative to its second priority that is securing her superpower aspirations. Both objectives are contingent upon her internal stability. Therefore, an Indian military capability that does not permit China to proclaim a clear-cut victory in a short period, ties down the People’s Liberation Army in a long drawn stalemate and provokes instability in Tibet, would dissuade China from seeking a military solution to her problems with India. China’s entrapment in such a quagmire might encourage Taiwan and other external and internal victims of her high-handedness to incrementally undermine her quest for greatness. That kind of gathering alliance of the tormented weak, as history tells us, is a sure formula for greatness to dissolve. China knows that.

Our cause is nurtured by the fact that in conventional military conflicts, smaller powers have in the past, and may in future, genuinely hope to defeat larger powers. However, a determinant to note here is that a weaker contestant is certain to lose if it adopts a strategy that is symmetrical to that of the stronger opponent; Belgium-Germany 1914, Falkland 1982, Iraq-Coalition Forces in both the Gulf Wars are a few examples. Conversely, smaller powers do better by adopting asymmetrical strategy to contest their more powerful opponent – French Indo-China, Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan, for example. To contest aggression from the North therefore, India could adopt a strategy that would hinge upon strong defence, offensive riposte and Special Operations deep into the Tibetan hinterland to present a prospect of, as discussed earlier, the aggressor falling into a deep and sticky cesspool – deterrence by denial.

The recent posture adopted by China indicates that she articulates her nuclear power in the form of an existential deterrence. Being a nuclear state more in form rather than in substance, that is good for us since it is difficult to visualise India ever inviting a nuclear exchange with China. Danger, however, still lurks in the form of covert support to insurgents and to trouble-maker lackey – Pakistan. Thus, the conventional deterrence by denial will have to be complimented with reverse deterrence in two aspects. One, it has to be demonstrated that puppets stand no chance of success and that the assistance rendered to them would be but a sheer waste if not downright embarrassing. Two, such covert support would free India to pay back in Tibet.

Deterrence in Indo-Pakistan Context

India’s conventional deterrence has worked with Pakistan and that has led to the latter’s imposition of reverse deterrence over India through a combination of proxy war, terrorism and nuclearisation. The message is simple, “We have to keep gnawing at you. But you must not retaliate else we shall have to nuke you!” It, therefore, may be inferred that except in case of conventional war, India’s military deterrence over Pakistan fails both at the sub-conventional as well as nuclear level. The failure in the first instance is attributable to our inability to make Pakistan pay for terrorism while that in the latter case, India’s professed nuclear doctrine seems to permit Pakistan to attack in whatever manner she likes as long as the nuclear button is untouched.

Indeed it is a strange case. India, a superior power, remains deterred to the extent of watching helplessly as terrorists train within striking range, to unleash mayhem in her hinterland. Then she goes further, promulgating a military strategy that, flouting all campaigning norms, enjoins her troops to attack all over the frontline and having broken through, obviously at fearful cost, not to proceed beyond which Pakistan’s sensitivities may be troubled. Whosoever after all, has heard a superior, nuclearised military power, while being militarily tormented by a lesser adversary, taking comfort in preaching that “war is not a solution” and that “nuclear weapons are but political tools, not meant to be used”! One may wonder as to why then have these capabilities at such high cost? This kind of suggestive statements encourage the India-baiters to perceive that the Indian leadership may either be cowed down by global powers or fail to steel itself in unleashing a decimating conventional war or even actuating its professed ‘massive nuclear retaliation’. It is a strange case of a state diluting its own deterrence! One can only sympathise with our unique predicaments.

Conversely, one may admire the effectiveness of Pakistan’s deterrence over India. Here, a smaller military power, inconsequential economically and devastated socially, has waged multi-pronged war against a stronger neighbour over many decades, while the latter remains chary of administering even a token rap on its knuckles. Further, that a recalcitrant state goes on to threaten the mighty world leaders with turning itself into a ‘failed state’ unless they keep her false pretentions afloat. Obviously, Pakistan takes advantage of the theory that for a conventionally weaker nuclear power, the nuclear threshold is lower and in that equation, the combination of tactical nuclear weapons with conventional capability goes to bolster the credibility of blackmail.

To turn the equation around, India may not need to spend more on defence. All she has to do is to accept that beyond a point, it is not necessary to be impressed by nuclear tantrums. After all, India’s nuclearisation did not stop Pakistan from intruding into Kargil nor could Pakistan’s nuclear voodoo dance stop India from evicting that intrusion. Our national leadership needs to accept that military response to aggression and proxy war is an aggression that may be recessed only at own peril. Whether ‘cold start’, ‘hot pursuit’ or retribution at the ‘time and place of own choosing’ or whether limited, conventional or hybrid, India must devise strategies to punish military aggression without being self-deterred. When credibly demonstrated, that strategy would foster credible deterrence for the good of all. Our current strategic demeanour does exactly the opposite. It rewards intransigence.

Investment for Peace Dividend

Alongside the troubles concurrent and brewing, there are hopeful signs of matured realisation and some improvements in the situation. History proves that such improvements in inter-state tolerance are best nurtured under an incentive of deterrence. For the near future however, it is certain that India will continue to be tormented by proxy war and terror acts emanating from Pakistan, while being needled by China’s over territorial claims and land-sea encirclement. There is no doubt that when these inimical forces orchestrate to stalk conjointly, it cannot portend well for the Indian nationhood. As a corollary, it would be an abject failure of her state policies, diplomatic as well as military, if India is unable to deter these inimical powers to desist from their compulsive mission of undermining her.

As stated earlier, given the right impetus, it will take a decade or so to turn around India’s stagnant investment on defence. Meanwhile, to reap the benefits of investment, the national leadership may ordain India’s military transformation, allow professional merit to replace flab with muscle without hindrances contrived by nay sayers and save bureaucrats and scientists the burden of fiddling with military preparedness. India would do better by directly involving the military leadership in policy confabulations rather than through the medium of officials unqualified for that role. There is no need to be wary of that kind of charter; the same Defence Ministry had accomplished that task in the aftermath of 1962.

Then let the investments deliver dividends, let military deterrence keep the peace.