Indian Defence Review

Coupled with the impressive economic growth over the last decade, the eye-catching naval expansion of China is being directed by a clearly defined maritime strategy. Initially it was thought that the naval expansion was a result of the hurt felt by China in the third Taiwan Strait incident3, and was intended only for imbibing the capability of offensive defence against any future US adventure in the Western Pacific. This was of course true; but simultaneously the Chinese also had the Indian Ocean in mind. After all the Indian Ocean maintains all the crucial sea lanes for Chinese import of raw material including oil, gas, and iron ore, and, export of its manufactured products to the Western hemisphere.

China’s interest in the Indian Ocean also stems from its locational advantage for tracking its satellites. Starting with the early part of the last decade, the Chinese used to station special “research” vessels with huge parabolic antennae in the Indian Ocean, to track their satellites, and to monitor, and conduct telemetry for ballistic missiles from these floating earth stations.

Another reason for frequenting the Indian Ocean is China’s newly acquired real estate here. In 2011, a big piece of the ocean, measuring 10,000 sq. km area on the South West Indian Ocean Ridge (SWIOR) was allocated by the International Seabed Authority to China for exploration and production of polymetallic sulphides. Now the pieces in the jigsaw are clearly falling in place. The Chinese are known to be long term thinkers and planners. Their strategy for presence in the Indian Ocean was scripted more than a decade ago. The allocation of area by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) – a UN body – itself came as a surprise to many including India. The Chinese had done their homework, lobbied hard at the ISA, and received approval in record time. That was a huge bonanza to legitimize one more interest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), while simultaneously securing their future with promise of precious metals like gold, silver, and other strategic minerals including rare earths.

The string of pearls was initially appreciated by some, to serve the purpose of securing China’s energy lines of communication, in fact its “strategic” lines of communication in the IOR; but it is now becoming abundantly clear that China had crafted a strategy that hinges on force projection – as correctly appreciated by India – aimed at building its stock outside home waters, as also of building its deterrence threshold beyond the Pacific.

There is no doubt in any one’s mind now, that China craves a permanent strategic presence in the IOR. After all, the various ports and other infrastructure projects she has established in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and in a number of East African countries over the past decade, were planned only with the purpose of “enabling” presence in this ocean.

In other words, China has executed a carefully crafted plan of creating for itself, places which, in time of need, could also double as bases – tweaking the methodology of creating, and dictating the utilization rights of such ports, as distinct from the cold war models of the two sides which had their own problems of uncertainty of lease or offer by the host countries. Having learnt from the cold war experience, China had made such lucrative propositions to the host countries that they could not think of refusing because of the openly lavish funding incentives that accompanied these proposals.

So, Gwadar in Pakistan (a half Billion Dollar port project in Phase1) was almost entirely funded and built by the Chinese, and now the Chinese have even taken over management of that port by edging out the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) which had stood guard for the first couple of years. Now, the Chinese are also in the process of expanding the port further (Phase II), at another Billion Dollars in direct funding.

In Sri Lanka’s case, the story is even more interesting. Hambantota’s first phase was built by the Chinese, with 85% of the 361 Million dollars having been financed by the EXIM Bank of China. It is located on the East-West trade route and was intended as a transshipment hub. Till recently, it was reported 80% underutilized except for an odd car ferry-a-week that brought vehicles from India’s Mudra Port, for transshipment (on larger vessels), destined for other countries. Phase Two of Hambantota Port too is now under construction, and will be much more expansive and deeper than Phase I. Its cost – almost a Billion dollars – is once again being financed by the Chinese, on long-term-low-interest basis. This would obviously mean that the Chinese will have a fair say over utilization of Hambantota, for its own forces – whenever required. But much more significant is the case with the Colombo South Port Project. The Colombo Port is old, and has limited capacity for handling general cargo, and particularly, containerized cargo.

Therefore, in the year 2008, a US $ 360 Million project (majority funding by ADB), was executed to extend the old port, by building two long breakwaters to provide additional terminals, and tranquil waters for what is now known as the Colombo South Port. These breakwaters were built by M/s Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in well under the contracted period of four years, and the infrastructure created with these, including congruent perimeter roads, a Port Administration and Operations Control Building, and a unique 5 metre high concrete barrier wall along the Main Breakwater – to provide shelter against rough weather – can all be described as of contemporary global standards in terms of design/quality. Then in mid-2011, it was time to award a contract for making the Container Terminals on the Main Breakwater of this extension. Hyundai, it is learnt, sought preferential rights to build the Container Terminals, but they were denied the bid. It was once again a case of “Hobson’s Choice”.

In Dec 2011, the Chinese firm, M/s China Merchants Holding International (CMHI), was awarded the contract to build only one large terminal of 1200 mts length x 300 mts width along the Main Breakwater. (The entire breakwater is 5.1 km long, and has provision for creating three such terminals of 1200 mts each, with up to four berths on this length). Construction of the terminal (including massive reclamation) was commenced in Dec 2011, and the terminal was ready by Apr 2014, as per schedule.

This is the terminal that is named the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT).

The CICT has the capacity to add 2.74 Million TEUs (20 ft containers) to the existing throughput of the old Colombo port. The deal with the Chinese was concluded with a 35 year Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) model. Even though the international norm is to offer a lease of 30 years in projects financed by the builder, this terminal will be operated by the Chinese for 35 years. This is because the Chinese have 85% stake in financing the project and therefore must have dictated the lease terms. The balance 15% has been provided by the Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA). The Chinese Song Class boat had docked at this very terminal in Sep and Nov 2014. So, is there any analysis needed on the give-and-take equation in this project? The Chinese were obviously very clear about their long term plans. Undoubtedly, they are going to extract every pound that they have pooled in to this port.

In so far as China’s use of submarines as messengers of deterrence is concerned, one has to remember that the first offensive arm to be raised by China was its submarine arm – right from the days of Chiang Kai Shek! Mao went a step further by introducing nuclear submarines from the Soviet Union, and insisting on indigenization – for the sake of self-reliance. What the PLA thought at the time to be an instrument of power projection, was actually intended for sea denial against bigger powers whose surface and air forces could not be matched. Today, however, China has so many of them (conventional, as well as strategic boats), that it is able to send them on reconnaissance patrols in the Indian Ocean – its secondary area of interest (after the Pacific). It finds the timing right, as clients in the IOR are now “hosts” who have no choice but to offer port facilities at the asking. But these countries do not realise the implications on their own security, and on their political independence, while accepting infrastructural largesse.

In so far as International Law goes, as an independent nation, Sri Lanka did not flout any rule in providing a temporary (transit) home to the submarine and the accompanying tender. Men-o-war routinely visit foreign ports – after obtaining diplomatic clearances – whether on goodwill visits, or on transit to another area. The only condition in which Sri Lanka could be found legally at fault is, if it had allowed these actions while India and China were at war. That would have meant violating the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). However, between India and Sri Lanka, there is a clearly spelt out agreement under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, that makes it obligatory upon Sri Lanka, against making any of its ports available “for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests.”4 Sri Lanka has, of course, cited the international norm of permitting warships on goodwill visits, and not bothered about the 1987 accord, as it kept another answer up its sleeve (as already used by China): that the Chinese submarine was on its way to the Gulf of Aden – for the anti-piracy mission (!!) and that apart from goodwill, the submarine being conventional, required a “rest and replenishment” (R&R) halt!

The good thing is that with the new dispensation in Sri Lanka, there has been a lot of course correction. First, the new President had mentioned that Sri Lanka will not allow relations with China to be strengthened at the expense of India. Then, during a visit to China earlier this year, the new Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Mangala Samaraweera noted that Sri Lanka would not allow visits by Chinese submarines to its ports. “I really don’t know under which sort of circumstances that led to some submarines… to [visit] the port of Colombo… we will ensure that such incidents, from whatever quarter, do not happen during our tenure.”5 However, India must remember that the other pearls in the string, namely Pakistan (Gwadar), Myanmar, Bangladesh will also be used by China soon enough. While Pakistan cannot be tamed (and is a “gone” case), it is time for India to start interacting with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and East African countries with more than those frugal “Lines of Credit”. These countries that have had the benefit of Chinese largesse will need to be rerouted through the soft power route so that they are fully aware of the dangers of falling prey to the game of give-and-take.

For India, not conducting this “education” in time for friends in the IOR could mean hanging the albatross around its neck! Simultaneously, India’s Navy must be spruced up fast enough, with larger force levels so that sufficient numbers are available to patrol areas of interest, and are “visible” to the others.