Military & Aerospace

The Debilitating Politico-Military Disconnect
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Vol. 30.2 Apr-Jun 2015 | Date : 02 Sep , 2015

The politico-military nexus being untouchable, everything was hunky dory. However, there was one problem – the intelligence agencies, in particular, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), all manned primarily by police officers. So the bogey of military coup was created and repeated in the minds of politicians and the idea of creating a parallel police force no matter how disjointedly expanded, equipped and trained. It was a beautiful blueprint that was readily accepted by Nehru and his lineage that followed – military kept away, arms mafia flourishing, money in billions of dollars.

In India, the civilian control over the military is exercised by the bureaucracy in the MoD, which itself is not accountable…

The army had war-gamed the possibilities of the Chinese invasion of 1962, predicting Chinese advances the way they turned out to the Defence Minister as Exercise ‘Lal Qila’. Attendees at the National Defence College at New Delhi too had questioned Krishna Menon about possible Chinese attacks but Krishna Menon shut them all. To the bureaucracy, it did not matter that China occupied 38,000 sq. km. of Aksai Chin, usurped the Shaksgam Valley and nibbled away some 640 sq. km. in Eastern Ladakh alone as long as long as the military could be kept away from the MoD and decision making concerning matters military. The most damaging part has been the deliberate campaign launched to keep the military ‘subdued’ by not only keeping them under-equipped but through hitting at their status, pay and allowances even of disabled soldiers, widows, and vilification of the military using the media.

Current Scenario

The IAS maintains that politicians come and go but their control will remain for generations. T.C.A Srinivasa-Raghavan in a recent article titled ‘Prime Minister Modi Ban Gaya Gentleman’ dated March 05, 2015, warns the Prime Minister that the bureaucracy is already getting back at him and given a few more months and “…He (the PM) will become indistinguishable from the people he professes to despise.” But the situation is much worse in the MoD where the bureaucracy has complete control.

The Service Chiefs can reportedly meet the Prime Minister once a month and the PM has told the MoD to seek military advice on issues but all this is akin to the US actions trying to eliminate the ISIS or Al Qaeda through aerial attacks, so deep is the arms mafia rooted in the MoD and the DRDO-DPSU-OF combine. Witness the state of equipment in the armed forces and the level of indigenisation in the defence industry despite Joint Secretary – level officers being on all the boards of the government’s defence-industrial complex.

Witness how the AgustaWestland Helicopter scam was deflected on to a former Chief of the Air Staff of the Indian Air Force and the Service who stand completely vindicated while the intelligence team that went to Italy made no inquiries whatsoever about the bribes received by politicians and the MoD bureaucrats mentioned in Haschke’s diary. To this end, it was hardly heartening to receive the statement by Manohar Parrikar on assuming the charge as Defence Minister that he would have a set of advisors from within the MoD. As with all his predecessors, is he content with bureaucrat advisors who lack basic military knowledge? As it is, it has been acknowledged by senior bureaucrats that they get to understand military matters only after the second or third tenure in the MoD.

The most damaging part has been the deliberate campaign launched to keep the military ‘subdued’…

The effect of the bureaucratic control and keeping the military away has resulted in major void of defining a National Security Strategy (NSS). We are embarking on the indigenisation of defence equipment in a major way but has any thought been given as to why despite the liberalisation of in Defence in August last year, media reports of March 11, 2015, show that FDI proposals of a paltry Rs 96 crore ($15.3 million) have been received with only two of them for 49 per cent FDI despite the fact that India is poised to spend $120 billion over the next decade. The answer is simple; our defence procurement procedures are yet to be simplified, as admitted by the Defence Minister on the sidelines of Aero India 2015. But the question is ‘Why is it taking that long when the Prime Minister had given the call for ‘Make in India’ on August 15 last year?’ The fact is that the arms mafia wants to keep control through the MoD-DRDO-DPSUs-OF. It is for the same reason that while the DRDO’s focus should be R&D, it remains focused on commercialisation, and is establishing technology clusters for expanding commercial activity.

Bridging the Disconnect and Streamlining Defence

The manner in which defence of India has been neglected, it will take focused effort to address and clean the system that has become hollow from within over past decades. The Defence Minister should take charge of Defence of India from the Defence Secretary and seriously consider replacing the MoD (like shutting the Planning Commission) with a Department of Defence (DoD) manned by military professionals (serving, on deputation or on permanent absorption) with appropriate civilian cells under the Defence Minister instead of an MoD – akin to the Railway Board manned by railway professionals.

To bridge the vital void of integration, HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) should be completely merged with the MoD as recommended by many study reports, or more appropriately, form part of the proposed DoD. This will also fill the absence of an institutionalised strategy formulation set up in the existing MoD and kill the civil-military divide that is officially not acknowledged but actually has been growing drastically. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) needs to be appointed on priority more to synergise the military rather than the single point advisor to the political authority. It is the CDS who can accelerate the Indian Military’s capacity building for Network Centric Warfare in line with the Prime Minister’s wishes to see a digitised military. The need for a CDS is distinct from the PM meeting Service Chiefs every month. All this would need the ‘Rules of Business’ to be amended, in addition to let the CDS speak in a single voice for the military rather than have generalist bureaucrats arbitrate on matters military.

The chasm of military equipping and modern technologies needs to be bridged expeditiously…

Defence Ministers in the past have defined India’s strategic interests extending from the Persian Gulf in the West to the Strait of Malacca in the East and from the Central Asian Republics in the North to the Equator in the South. Where we have failed is in terms of strategic transformation. A priority task should be to define a National Security Strategy (NSS) followed by a Strategic Defence Review (SDR).

The foremost need is to enunciate the NSS to shape the environment in India’s favour. In doing so, organisations and entities such as the MoD, MHA, Military, Economic Ministries, Department of S&T, DAE and ISRO need to be closely integrated. Threats and vulnerabilities need to be taken into account. While threats are mostly identifiable, vulnerabilities may not be clearly identifiable as latter are only indicators. Challenge of implementing NSS lies in preventing vulnerabilities transforming into threats using non-military elements of national power.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) must immediately follow up from the NSS though work on both can progress simultaneously. The SDR should state present military strategy as derived from NSS and project into the future. The NSS could be broadly relevant up to next 15 years and the thinking into period beyond that may be termed as vision. The SDR should comprise analysis of present military strategy and revised goals, related emerging technologies and consequent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), mesh future conflict spectrum and the battlespace milieu, compare above with roles and individual responsibilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force, leading to development of joint force capabilities including for Network Centric Warfare (NCW).

In terms of the defence-industrial complex, we also seem to be going wrong in further ‘commercialising’ the DRDO…

Future military perspective (short, mid and long terms) or joint military vision and military missions so developed would lead to formulation of LTIPP based on integrated systems dynamics and force development imperatives. The classified portion of the SDR should include adversaries or countries that are in security competition, cooperation and friends, comparative evaluation of the nature of threats or competition, threat from competing strategic and security alliances, goals and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and international defence cooperation, policy on role of armed forces in asymmetric threats and internal conflict, strategy for protection of critical infrastructure from cyber threats, defence related aspects of cyber-space, space and perception warfare, and strategy for energy, water and food security. Axiomatically, appropriate Core Groups would need to be established to work out the NSS and SDR.

There has been debate in the media about the need for a National Security Commission. We have a National Security Council that barely met under the previous government while the NSAB was also working part time until recently. Whether a new National Security Commission is appointed or the existing National Security Council is reorganised (acronym for both being NSC), it has to be a dynamic organisation working on 24×7 basis. Besides being headed by the Prime Minister himself as the ex officio Chairman, a Deputy Chairman on a permanent basis, CCS and NSA as members, with full time members and staff from all required fields would be required.

Simultaneous to the NSS and SDR, we need to holistically review Comprehensive National Security to include personal security, community security, food security, health security, military security, economic security, energy security, political security and environment security. The Comprehensive National Review would also address all non-traditional threats.

The chasm of military equipping and modern technologies needs to be bridged expeditiously. We should not be making the mistake of only looking at big ticket projects only. What we actually need is a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) spanning the military and matters military vertically and horizontally. An RMA under the directions of the Prime Minister would be facilitated with the personal equation that Parrikar has with Prime Minister Modi.

Indigenisation must be given a boost with a dynamic roadmap…

In terms of the defence-industrial complex, we also seem to be going wrong in further ‘commercialising’ the DRDO. This has been the problem all along. What is needed is the DRDO focusing on R&D synonymous with their name whereas the commercial part needs to be left to the civil industry under guidance of the government. Manning of decision making and management level appointments in DRDO, Defence PSUs, and Ordnance Factories by military professionals (military being the user) is a must, which has been avoided by these organisations for vested interests.

Indigenisation must be given a boost with a dynamic roadmap for R&D, producing state-of-the-art arms, equipment and technologies to be developed in accordance specified time lines. Relaxation of FDI in defence beyond 49 per cent for state-of-the-art technology is a welcome step but concurrently the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) too needs to be simplified to make it unambiguously attractive to investors, both indigenous and foreign.

We also have largely neglected ‘military diplomacy’ to promote national security interests that is distinct from coercive diplomacy and implies peaceful application of resources from across the spectrum of defence to achieve positive outcomes in developing the country’s bilateral and multilateral relationships. Although application of national power is through domains of diplomacy, information operations, military and economic, military diplomacy can contribute in all the four.

The security imperatives for India are multiple and dynamic with a volatile neighbourhood including an aggressive China and an irrational Pakistan that refuses to stop following a state policy of terrorism. The last decade has been characterised with utter neglect of the defence sector and we need to take focused corrective actions. For this, a major reason has been the politico-military disconnect. Only time will tell if the Defence Minister can take the bull by the horns.

1 2
Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

is Former Director General of Information Systems and A Special Forces Veteran, Indian Army.

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left

6 thoughts on “The Debilitating Politico-Military Disconnect

  1. South Indians need to wake up and unite against the racist bigots like Prakash Katoch. If someone hurls the kind of filth and slander against a North Indian like the kind Katoch hurls against Krishna Menon, it would be considered blasphemy. I don’t blame North Indians like Katoch as much I blame South Indians who prostrate before likes of Katoch and help perpetuate their racist North Indian agenda. Krishna Menon gave us freedom from British. Krishna Menon secured Kashmir from evil designs of Pakistan. Krishna Menon added Goa to Indian Territory. Krishna Menon built housing soldiers and families. Yet Katoch wishes Nehru “castigated” and “reprimanded” Krishna Menon. How insulting is it to this poor bigot North Indian to salute while a lowly South Indian’s statue is garlanded? How humiliating is it to this racist North Indian to carry on with life knowing there is a road named after a black and ugly South Indian? There has never been any Jeep Scandal except sabotage and betrayal. The Jeeps were bought at HALF the price and NOT 3 times and claimed by lying Katoch. Those Jeeps were bought for ‘Kashmir and Hyderabad campaigns’ in 1948 which ignorant Katoch claimed Nehru never pursued. But the Jeeps were held back in Madras and could not be used for intended purpose because of saboteurs like Prakash Katoch deprived Army of much needed Jeeps. Then this same crook Katoch turns around and accuses Krishna Menon of “keeping the military, particularly the army, starved of basic equipment”. Due to just concluded WWII there was acute shortage Jeeps and hence Krishna Menon bought 2nd Jeeps. India needed Jeeps in a hurry because of Kashmir and anticipated Hyderabad campaigns and hence Krishna Menon dealt with middlemen to expedite the process. Krishna Menon did not make a single rupee and hence there was no booty for Nehru to share. When the dust settled, the Army retrieved the Jeeps, cleaned the rust and used them for 10 Years. THAT was the ugly truth.

  2. If Nehru was a mountain, Sardar Patel was a blade of grass. Jawaharlal Nehru becoming Prime Minister was never in question after 1929 when Congress declared Purna Swaraj under his Presidency at Lahore. In Congress, the only person who could win elections across the country was Jawaharlal Nehru and he swept every election from 1937 till his death. Claim of Mahatma Gandhi deciding PMship between Nehru and Patel exposes Katoch’s ignorance of history and Indian political process. He claims it “common knowledge” which probably is true in his own parallel universe. It is sad that our generals neither have book sense nor common sense. Nehru became Prime Minister since Congress won 70% seats in Parliament (Constituent Assembly) under Nehru’s own Presidency and leadership. Even if Gandhi chose Patel, it would still be up to Nehru to win him enough MPs to become PM. Nehru became Congress President in June 1946 and Congress won election in August 1946. Even after Congress winning elections hands down, Muslim League went on “Direct Action” and killed a million people just to prove that League will not play second fiddle to Congress. If Gandhi really decided on PM just to save Congress Party, neither Muslim League nor any other party would sit back and clap. Nehru formed his first government on September 1946. At that time the post of Prime Minister did not even exist. Further, it was National Government and NOT a Congress Government. Non-Congress leaders like Ambedkar, Baldev Singh and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee were in Nehru cabinet while Liaquat Ali and other Muslim League members joined later.

  3. Pres R. Venkataraman (a Defense Minister himself) credited military’s remarkable performance in 1965/71 wars to Krishna Menon’s vision. Menon began production of aircraft and high altitude goods for soldiers. The submarines, helicopters, Gnats, MIGs, INS Vikrant that won 1965/1971 wars were procured by VKKM. VKKM was instrumental in expanding HAL, BEL, Avadi tank factory and Aircraft Manufacturing plant (AVRO) at Kanpur among others. India manufactured supersonic HF-24 under VKKM. Shaktiman truck owes its birth to Krishna Menon. DRDO which produced missiles that we’re so proud of was founded in 1958 under VKKM. Menon secured UN grant for ISRO at Thumba. Menon revitalized NCC and started Sainik Schools. While ungrateful officers like Katoch demonize him today, Menon developed welfare systems for soldiers including Armed Forces Medical College at Pune. 1/3 soldiers had no housing in 1957 and VKKM built that housing. In December 1961, Krishna Menon defeated NATO Member Portugal and liberated Goa, in backdrop of warnings from none other than JFK. Katoch’s claim of “Defence Minister, not being responsible for the defence of India” is a lie. But Katoch stoops really low with accusations of VKKM “being gainfully employed to make money”. Krishna Menon did not make a single rupee. Neville Maxwell considered Krishna Menon to be the only honest and upright of all Indians he knew.
    VKKM gave his entire salary to India League and slept on a bench in its office. When someone politely asked what work he did for living, Krishna Menon replied, “I don’t work for a living. I work for India’s freedom”. Had Katoch said this nonsense about a Gujarati or Bengali, hell would break loose. But in India, South Indians don’t count as human beings. North Indians cannot stand a road being named after a South Indian nor the blasphemy of his statue being garlanded even once a year. Instead, they’ll rob our tax money and build hundreds of tall statues of their own leaders.

  4. Katoch exploits the sympathy Indians have for soldiers for a political agenda. The lies are meant to undermine the credibility of our political system. In Pakistan after Jinnah died, there has not been a single inspiring political leader while Liaquat Ali was killed by the Army. In the vacuum, the people of Pakistan turned to their Army for leadership and we know the consequences. For India, there was Nehru and that is Katoch’s problem. Katoch’s claim of “Nehru forcing Mahatma Gandhi to coerce Sardar Patel to withdraw his nomination for the Prime Ministership of Independent India; threatening to split the Congress” is laughable. Gandhi wanted entire Congress disbanded. Why would he care if Congress splits? When PM was elected, Gandhi was in Bengal busily stopping communal violence. Claim of “Nehru stopping the Indian Army from pursuing the fleeing Pakistani infiltrators in 1948” is a lie! India went to UN in Dec 1947. UNSC Resolution came in April 1948. But Pakistan refused to comply and the war continued. Timmayya deployed tanks in Draas in Nov 48. As LP Sen writes, the war was a stalemate and bilateral ceasefire was implemented in Jan 49. Sardar Patel abdicated his responsibility and busy with less important Hyderabad and Junagarh while Raiders invaded and occupied PoK. Katoch’s claim that “Sardar Patel gave orders to the military to annex Junagarh and Hyderabad” are shockingly stupid! Doesn’t a Lt Gen know that a Home Minister cannot order military to invade? Until Jan 1949, military had British commanders while Mountbatten was Governor General until June 21, 1948. Junagarh was annexed in Oct 1947. Why would military take orders from Patel? Hyderabad annexation was delayed until Sept 1948 because Kashmir had to be secured first. Hyderabad was 90% Hindu and surrounded by Indian territory hence not going anywhere. Army was ordered to Hyderabad by Gov Gen Rajaji – not Patel. How scary is to trust our borders with Don Quixotes like Katoch?

  5. The biggest problem facing India is the corrupt and incompetent politicians who wish to have the final say on matters of defense and security while not being accountable to any. Their egos have ruined possibilities of learning from other nations on how to manage the modern techno-military-industrial projects. The problems faced by India on the matter of poor industrialization, delays in approval of investments and simply bad decision making were also faced by nations like Britain, France, Germany and USA in their past history. They overcame and stood up to the need of the hour. Chances are there are expert consultants in friendly countries who can shorten the learning cycle for India. Modi’s new leadership must include leveraging from any and all resources, including beg, borrow and steal like China did, to move forward. There is not a moment to waste.

More Comments Loader Loading Comments