Indian Defence Review

Mrs. Indira Gandhi with Manekshaw

The security imperatives for India are multiple and dynamic with a volatile neighbourhood including an aggressive China and an irrational Pakistan that refuses to stop following a state policy of terrorism. The last decade has been characterised with utter neglect of the defence sector and we need to take focused corrective actions. For this, a major reason has been the politico-military disconnect. Only time will tell if the Defence Minister can take the bull by the horns.

Much has been written about the politico-military disconnect in India. British India had no such qualms. To start with, in the British Indian Army, British officers were disconnected with the native rank and file even at the lowest echelons. And so, the rank of Junior Commissioned Officers (Indians) was introduced to bridge that disconnect. The question of politico-military disconnect did not arise. But then came the steadily increasing influx of King’s Commissioned Indian Officers. The British, who never trusted the Indians, therefore, termed the Services Headquarters as “Attached Offices” in the ‘Rules of Business’ of the Government. This was a masterstroke of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) that preceded the Indian Administrative (IAS) as they could keep the military on a tight leash while reaping all the benefits – power, pelf et al. It helped the British deprive India of its wealth and bring the industrial complex to nix while keeping the military aloof and do their bidding.

Much as the British trumpet the Commonwealth today, their disdain for undivided India was more than evident when barrister Radcliffe arrived in British India for the first time on July 08, 1947, given exactly five weeks to draw the borders between an independent India and the newly created Pakistan, chairing two Boundary Commissions (one for Punjab and one for Bengal) with two Muslims and two non-Muslims lawyers. None of these five including Radcliffe had obviously seen a map earlier.

Many would not know that the resulting boundary award was announced on August 17 while Mountbatten had announced Independence two days earlier because the latter was obsessed with August 15 – the date of Japanese surrender in World War II. Radcliff sailed back for England on August 18 and it didn’t matter a thing to the British that Partition along the Radcliffe Line ended in violence that killed one million people and displaced 12 million, not to talk of the British deceit at Skardu that gave Pakistan control of Gilgit-Baltistan and a border with China.

Nehru’s Legacy

India does not lag behind in political machinations. It is common knowledge that Nehru forced Mahatma Gandhi to coerce Sardar Patel to withdraw his nomination for the Prime Ministership of Independent India; threatening otherwise that he would split the Congress. While this indicated the wily and stubborn character of Nehru, unfortunately he turned out to be quite naïve in matters of military strategy, geopolitics and diplomacy. The 1,000-strong ICS to start with was completely British but by 1905, about five per cent Indians had joined the ICS, mostly from Bengal.

At the time of Partition in 1947, the ICS consisted of 322 Indians and 688 British but bulk of the latter chose to get back to England. While the ICS was divided between India and Pakistan, what remained with India was renamed IAS. It was the same brood that had enjoyed keeping the Services away at arms distance and divided. The question of military equipping did not go beyond provision of rifles that were considered enough to quell rebellion and were bonanza in situations such as Jalianwala Bagh where unarmed natives could be cruelly and effectively massacred.

To the joy of the newly formed IAS in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), new developments were taking place. To the Western educated, scotch sipping, Mountbatten’s friend Nehru, the military was an anathema that he said should be disbanded because as per him, police forces were more than adequate to safeguard the country. He had even gone to the extent of stating later that NEFA (now Arunachal) could be guarded by the Chinese friends. IAS officers were no different from the Radcliffe Boundary Commission who had probably never seen or more importantly never understood a map, and any training for strategy formulation was out of question.

The issue of making any strategic advice did not arise when the basic understanding of military matters was missing in the first place. So, when Nehru made his first strategic blunder in stopping the Indian Army from pursuing the fleeing Pakistani infiltrators in 1948 and going to the UN, the bureaucracy simply applauded. But what happened in the bargain is that by not making Pakistan vacate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), Nehru gave away the following:

• Pakistan got a border with China, it never had
• Pakistan got an opportunity to continue occupying 78,114 sq kms of Indian territory (POK) legally acceded to India by the Maharaja of Kashmir in 1947
• Pakistan illegally ceded 5,080 sq. km. of Shaksgam Valley (part of POK) to China getting nuclear technology and defence equipment in return
• India lost a border with Afghanistan and in turn, land corridor to Afghanistan and CAR through the Wakhan Corridor
• China favoured Pakistan for land route to the Indian Ocean whereas it would have wooed India instead
• Provided handle to Pakistan to wage a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir
• Changed the course of Sino-Indian relations, Indo-Pak relations and the future history of the sub-continent forever

It is obvious that India’s response to newly established Pakistan occupying 78,114 sq. km. of Indian territory would have emboldened China to invade Tibet, carry out the massive invasion of 1962 and claim large swathes of India territory including 90,000 sq. km. of Arunachal Pradesh.

If Junagarh and Hyderabad remained with India, it was purely because of Sardar Patel and his orders to the military. Left to Nehru, this would have not happened. Sans any strategic military advice, Nehru brought Article 370 in to Jammu and Kashmir, terming it just ‘temporary’ when questioned by Sardar Patel, then Home Minister. There was no Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in those days and Nehru even kept his Home Minister in the dark on Article 370 on the plea that this was part of his sphere of foreign policy although the latter was totally illogical.

But had the bureaucracy analysed the long-term effects of Article 370 on the country’s security with POK adjacent to it? That India defaulted in virtually blocking Tibet’s appeals to UN in face of the Chinese invasion and occupation is well known because Nehru gave precedence to India’s chairmanship of the Neutral Nation’s Repatriation Commission in Korea, in pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize for himself. But it was yet another blunder to ignore Sardar Patel’s warnings on Chinese intentions towards India. Again, Sardar Patel being Home Minister, what was the advice of the MoD to Nehru besides absolute silence?

Then was the induction of V.K Krishna Menon, as the Defence Minister who had already broken all government rules in personally signing a contract for import of jeeps for the military as High Commissioner in London before returning to India, ostensibly with the knowledge and consent of Nehru. Between the two, they were responsible for keeping the military starved for weapons, equipment and personal clothing. More importantly, the institutional integrity of the military was broken by giving the command of an Operational Corps to B.M Kaul, an ASC officer in the face of Chinese aggression with disastrous consequences just because he was a personal favourite of Nehru.

So where was the bureaucratic advice of the MoD? V.K Krishna Menon not only kept the military, particularly the army, starved of basic equipment but initiated the arms mafia in the MoD by masterminding the infamous jeep scandal, importing jeeps at triple the actual price, procured less jeeps than the number contracted and pocketed huge profits. Whether Nehru shared the booty is unknown but Nehru did not reprimand Krishna Menon for this blatant corruption that went public.

The fact remains that the nation and the military were ridiculed in 1962 to put it mildly and Krishna Menon who should have been castigated for bringing such shame to the country was rewarded with a road named after him in the capital, replete with his statue that is garlanded annually on his birthday. This whole drama was observed well by the bureaucracy, who surmised there was much profit in continuing with this arrangement. If they could continue to rule the roost (forget military issues) and make profits like the jeep scandal, what better situation? The involvement of the political hierarchy would make the polity hostage to the bureaucracy, the latter knowing all the secrets, which aside from money making would secure equally or more lucrative, post retirement assignments. Damn strategy, the military could always be banked upon to put their lives on the line to save the honour of the country to the best of their ability. After all, why have these fellows joined the military if not to sacrifice their lives?

Civilian Control vs Bureaucratic Control

Civilian control over the military has various connotations. In China, the PLA is under the direct control of the CCP, not the Chinese government and military generals form part of the powerful Politburo. Pakistan is a different kettle of fish with the country’s political authority and administration under the military irrespective of whether the country is officially under military or civilian rule. But by and large, civilian control over the military globally alludes to the political authority having control. This is not the case in India.

Here, we have the President anointed as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces whose powers and functions hardly go beyond presiding over ceremonial parades, presentation of awards and colours, and the appointment he holds granting commission to officers as mentioned on the parchments. Being a democracy, we have a Prime Minister and a Defence Minister but the civilian control over the military is exercised by the bureaucracy in the MoD, which itself is not accountable.

An essential element for the IAS to retain control was to keep the military at bay. So no one notices that the ‘Rules of Business’ adopted from the British mentioned the Services Headquarters as “Attached Offices”. Not changing this gave the handle to not only keep the military away but also absolves the MoD of whatever happened in the Services. In British India, the Defence Secretary was charged with the defence of the country because their Defence Secretary was also the Defence Minister. This language too was not changed in the ‘Rules of Business’. So the top bureaucrat of the MoD, the ‘Defence Secretary’ to date is the person in charge of the defence of India.

The Defence Minister, not being responsible for the defence of India was more gainfully employed to make money in wake of the infamous jeep scandal, with successive scams growing increasingly larger and profitable, in sync with the arms mafia masterminded by the bureaucracy in tandem with other tentacles in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) – Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) – Ordnance Factories (OFs) and abroad. Little wonder why our defence indigenisation is so pathetic and despite the 1995 Dr Abdul Kalam-headed Review Committee laying down the target of 70 per cent indigenisation by 2014, 19 years later we are still importing over 70 per cent of our defence equipment – no inquiry for lapses, no blame apportioned, no heads rolled.

The politico-military nexus being untouchable, everything was hunky dory. However, there was one problem – the intelligence agencies, in particular, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), all manned primarily by police officers. So the bogey of military coup was created and repeated in the minds of politicians and the idea of creating a parallel police force no matter how disjointedly expanded, equipped and trained. It was a beautiful blueprint that was readily accepted by Nehru and his lineage that followed – military kept away, arms mafia flourishing, money in billions of dollars.

The army had war-gamed the possibilities of the Chinese invasion of 1962, predicting Chinese advances the way they turned out to the Defence Minister as Exercise ‘Lal Qila’. Attendees at the National Defence College at New Delhi too had questioned Krishna Menon about possible Chinese attacks but Krishna Menon shut them all. To the bureaucracy, it did not matter that China occupied 38,000 sq. km. of Aksai Chin, usurped the Shaksgam Valley and nibbled away some 640 sq. km. in Eastern Ladakh alone as long as long as the military could be kept away from the MoD and decision making concerning matters military. The most damaging part has been the deliberate campaign launched to keep the military ‘subdued’ by not only keeping them under-equipped but through hitting at their status, pay and allowances even of disabled soldiers, widows, and vilification of the military using the media.

Current Scenario

The IAS maintains that politicians come and go but their control will remain for generations. T.C.A Srinivasa-Raghavan in a recent article titled ‘Prime Minister Modi Ban Gaya Gentleman’ dated March 05, 2015, warns the Prime Minister that the bureaucracy is already getting back at him and given a few more months and “…He (the PM) will become indistinguishable from the people he professes to despise.” But the situation is much worse in the MoD where the bureaucracy has complete control.

The Service Chiefs can reportedly meet the Prime Minister once a month and the PM has told the MoD to seek military advice on issues but all this is akin to the US actions trying to eliminate the ISIS or Al Qaeda through aerial attacks, so deep is the arms mafia rooted in the MoD and the DRDO-DPSU-OF combine. Witness the state of equipment in the armed forces and the level of indigenisation in the defence industry despite Joint Secretary – level officers being on all the boards of the government’s defence-industrial complex.

Witness how the AgustaWestland Helicopter scam was deflected on to a former Chief of the Air Staff of the Indian Air Force and the Service who stand completely vindicated while the intelligence team that went to Italy made no inquiries whatsoever about the bribes received by politicians and the MoD bureaucrats mentioned in Haschke’s diary. To this end, it was hardly heartening to receive the statement by Manohar Parrikar on assuming the charge as Defence Minister that he would have a set of advisors from within the MoD. As with all his predecessors, is he content with bureaucrat advisors who lack basic military knowledge? As it is, it has been acknowledged by senior bureaucrats that they get to understand military matters only after the second or third tenure in the MoD.

The effect of the bureaucratic control and keeping the military away has resulted in major void of defining a National Security Strategy (NSS). We are embarking on the indigenisation of defence equipment in a major way but has any thought been given as to why despite the liberalisation of in Defence in August last year, media reports of March 11, 2015, show that FDI proposals of a paltry Rs 96 crore ($15.3 million) have been received with only two of them for 49 per cent FDI despite the fact that India is poised to spend $120 billion over the next decade. The answer is simple; our defence procurement procedures are yet to be simplified, as admitted by the Defence Minister on the sidelines of Aero India 2015. But the question is ‘Why is it taking that long when the Prime Minister had given the call for ‘Make in India’ on August 15 last year?’ The fact is that the arms mafia wants to keep control through the MoD-DRDO-DPSUs-OF. It is for the same reason that while the DRDO’s focus should be R&D, it remains focused on commercialisation, and is establishing technology clusters for expanding commercial activity.

Bridging the Disconnect and Streamlining Defence

The manner in which defence of India has been neglected, it will take focused effort to address and clean the system that has become hollow from within over past decades. The Defence Minister should take charge of Defence of India from the Defence Secretary and seriously consider replacing the MoD (like shutting the Planning Commission) with a Department of Defence (DoD) manned by military professionals (serving, on deputation or on permanent absorption) with appropriate civilian cells under the Defence Minister instead of an MoD – akin to the Railway Board manned by railway professionals.

To bridge the vital void of integration, HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) should be completely merged with the MoD as recommended by many study reports, or more appropriately, form part of the proposed DoD. This will also fill the absence of an institutionalised strategy formulation set up in the existing MoD and kill the civil-military divide that is officially not acknowledged but actually has been growing drastically. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) needs to be appointed on priority more to synergise the military rather than the single point advisor to the political authority. It is the CDS who can accelerate the Indian Military’s capacity building for Network Centric Warfare in line with the Prime Minister’s wishes to see a digitised military. The need for a CDS is distinct from the PM meeting Service Chiefs every month. All this would need the ‘Rules of Business’ to be amended, in addition to let the CDS speak in a single voice for the military rather than have generalist bureaucrats arbitrate on matters military.

Defence Ministers in the past have defined India’s strategic interests extending from the Persian Gulf in the West to the Strait of Malacca in the East and from the Central Asian Republics in the North to the Equator in the South. Where we have failed is in terms of strategic transformation. A priority task should be to define a National Security Strategy (NSS) followed by a Strategic Defence Review (SDR).

The foremost need is to enunciate the NSS to shape the environment in India’s favour. In doing so, organisations and entities such as the MoD, MHA, Military, Economic Ministries, Department of S&T, DAE and ISRO need to be closely integrated. Threats and vulnerabilities need to be taken into account. While threats are mostly identifiable, vulnerabilities may not be clearly identifiable as latter are only indicators. Challenge of implementing NSS lies in preventing vulnerabilities transforming into threats using non-military elements of national power.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) must immediately follow up from the NSS though work on both can progress simultaneously. The SDR should state present military strategy as derived from NSS and project into the future. The NSS could be broadly relevant up to next 15 years and the thinking into period beyond that may be termed as vision. The SDR should comprise analysis of present military strategy and revised goals, related emerging technologies and consequent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), mesh future conflict spectrum and the battlespace milieu, compare above with roles and individual responsibilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force, leading to development of joint force capabilities including for Network Centric Warfare (NCW).

Future military perspective (short, mid and long terms) or joint military vision and military missions so developed would lead to formulation of LTIPP based on integrated systems dynamics and force development imperatives. The classified portion of the SDR should include adversaries or countries that are in security competition, cooperation and friends, comparative evaluation of the nature of threats or competition, threat from competing strategic and security alliances, goals and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and international defence cooperation, policy on role of armed forces in asymmetric threats and internal conflict, strategy for protection of critical infrastructure from cyber threats, defence related aspects of cyber-space, space and perception warfare, and strategy for energy, water and food security. Axiomatically, appropriate Core Groups would need to be established to work out the NSS and SDR.

There has been debate in the media about the need for a National Security Commission. We have a National Security Council that barely met under the previous government while the NSAB was also working part time until recently. Whether a new National Security Commission is appointed or the existing National Security Council is reorganised (acronym for both being NSC), it has to be a dynamic organisation working on 24×7 basis. Besides being headed by the Prime Minister himself as the ex officio Chairman, a Deputy Chairman on a permanent basis, CCS and NSA as members, with full time members and staff from all required fields would be required.

Simultaneous to the NSS and SDR, we need to holistically review Comprehensive National Security to include personal security, community security, food security, health security, military security, economic security, energy security, political security and environment security. The Comprehensive National Review would also address all non-traditional threats.

The chasm of military equipping and modern technologies needs to be bridged expeditiously. We should not be making the mistake of only looking at big ticket projects only. What we actually need is a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) spanning the military and matters military vertically and horizontally. An RMA under the directions of the Prime Minister would be facilitated with the personal equation that Parrikar has with Prime Minister Modi.

In terms of the defence-industrial complex, we also seem to be going wrong in further ‘commercialising’ the DRDO. This has been the problem all along. What is needed is the DRDO focusing on R&D synonymous with their name whereas the commercial part needs to be left to the civil industry under guidance of the government. Manning of decision making and management level appointments in DRDO, Defence PSUs, and Ordnance Factories by military professionals (military being the user) is a must, which has been avoided by these organisations for vested interests.

Indigenisation must be given a boost with a dynamic roadmap for R&D, producing state-of-the-art arms, equipment and technologies to be developed in accordance specified time lines. Relaxation of FDI in defence beyond 49 per cent for state-of-the-art technology is a welcome step but concurrently the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) too needs to be simplified to make it unambiguously attractive to investors, both indigenous and foreign.

We also have largely neglected ‘military diplomacy’ to promote national security interests that is distinct from coercive diplomacy and implies peaceful application of resources from across the spectrum of defence to achieve positive outcomes in developing the country’s bilateral and multilateral relationships. Although application of national power is through domains of diplomacy, information operations, military and economic, military diplomacy can contribute in all the four.

The security imperatives for India are multiple and dynamic with a volatile neighbourhood including an aggressive China and an irrational Pakistan that refuses to stop following a state policy of terrorism. The last decade has been characterised with utter neglect of the defence sector and we need to take focused corrective actions. For this, a major reason has been the politico-military disconnect. Only time will tell if the Defence Minister can take the bull by the horns.