Even as the US is withdrawing, its leaders insist that they are not going to abandon Afghanistan, that they will maintain their long term commitment to it and not allow any single country to dominate Afghan affairs. The US is already discussing a long term strategic accord with President Karzai and a Status of Forces Agreement. It is widely accepted that the US will retain a sizable military contingent in Afghanistan beyond 2014 and probably four or five bases.
The West is describing the current situation in Afghanistan as one of transition. This assumes that the situation is moving from one state of things to another in a planned and controlled manner. It is clear that US and NATO want to reduce their military presence and commitment to Afghanistan. President Obama has announced a draw-down of US forces, limited in number this year, but bigger in scope next year. US forces will declaredly withdraw from an active combat role by 2014, shifting to a supportive role as the responsibility for providing security to the country devolves on the Afghan National Security Forces.
Transition should not be looked at from the security perspective alone. In that regard too the situation lacks clarity. Even as the US is withdrawing, its leaders insist that they are not going to abandon Afghanistan, that they will maintain their long term commitment to it and not allow any single country to dominate Afghan affairs. The US is already discussing a long term strategic accord with President Karzai and a Status of Forces Agreement. It is widely accepted that the US will retain a sizable military contingent in Afghanistan beyond 2014 and probably four or five bases. This has implications for regional countries, as well as Russia. President Karzai will have to allay their concerns by seeking some sovereign control over the US presence and operations in the longer term perspective, especially as US’s continued presence in Afghanistan will be integral to its Central Asian policy.
US will and finances to sustain its Afghan engagement have been visibly depleting. America has already publicly conceded that a military solution in Afghanistan is not realisable”¦
The political and economic dimension of transition is equally important. Here there is even more uncertainty. While the military transition takes place will the political situation in Afghanistan stabilize? If not, how to handle the disconnect between the military and the political situation? President Karzai is politically weak even if he has survived all these years. He is distrusted by other ethnic groups, although he has struck political bargains with some notable non-Pashtun figures. He has surrounded himself with Pashtuns, including Hizb-e-Islami elements. His policy of reconciliation is contested by powerful non-Pashtuns.
The relationship between President Karzai and the Afghan parliament remains blocked; half of his cabinet has not been approved by the parliament. In 2014 President Karzai theoretically gives up office. Who will replace him? Just when the reduced US forces would be ending their combat role, a political crisis would be surfacing within the Afghan polity.
It is well accepted that the writ of the Karzai government does not run in most parts of the country. The warlords enjoy immense power in their respective regions. There are serious questions about the viability of the form of centralized government that Afghanistan has been constitutionally saddled with.
Taliban activity has now spread beyond the eastern and southern parts of the country”¦ the policy of reintegration does not seem to have achieved any spectacular result.
While the plan to hand over security responsibilities to the ANSF may look good on paper, can the ANSF effectively assume this responsibility? How motivated are they? Reports persist that the desertion rate amongst them remains high. Will they adequately equipped, including with air power? The Pashtun representation in the Afghan National Army, especially in the officer corps, remains inadequate, which would seem to detract from its status as a national army. The creation of militias at the service of regional leaders introduces a dangerous element into the overall security situation.
The economic situation in the country remains critical. It is hardly likely that, as the West withdraws militarily from Afghanistan, it will maintain the levels of its economic assistance. Afghanistan will need very considerable budgetary support for running the government and for sustaining the size of its security forces. With the western economies in recession, the likelihood of maintaining the needed aid flows to Afghanistan remains doubtful. Afghanistan no doubt has enormous natural resources, but in the time frames under consideration these cannot be developed to provide requisite revenues to the government.
In reality, Taliban activity has now spread beyond the eastern and southern parts of the country, infecting the western and northern parts too, with some non-Pashtun reportedly joining the Taliban ranks. The policy of reintegration does not seem to have achieved any spectacular result.
The Afghan insurgents are not monolithic. There is the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani group, and those belonging to the Hekmatyar group. Supporting them are the Pakistani Taliban and the non-Afghan organisations like the LeT.
Reconciliation as a policy is now openly embraced by the US and NATO countries. Germany and the UK have been pro-active visibly, but there are other intermediaries in the fray such as Turkey, Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia etc. At what levels conversations are taking place is not clear. While Mullah Omar in a recent speech seemed to endorse some opening to the West, doubts persist about Taliban’s willingness to compromise on some of the red-lines the West has drawn.
The Afghan insurgents are not monolithic. There is the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani group, and those belonging to the Hekmatyar group. Supporting them are the Pakistani Taliban and the non-Afghan organisations like the LeT. How do you promote reconciliation with multiple power centres within the insurgents? There is of course the obvious contradiction between talking to the Taliban and simultaneously wanting to eliminate their leaders.
The brutal assassination of the former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani who was chairing the High Peace Council set up to bring about internal reconciliation in Afghanistan has dramatised the precariousness of the situation facing the country.
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