Indian Defence Review

To undertake offensive operations in such terrain, PLA formations have to confine to constricted valleys that are hemmed-in by successive ridge lines, thus limiting the scope for tactical level lateral manoeuvre. At the operational level, axes of offensive have to remain isolated from each other, while envelopment and turning movement, besides inviting risks of entrapment, would entail such heavy logistic back up as to be prohibitive in terms of resources and time. Further, some distance down the Southern slopes into Indian territory, the terrain subsumes the advantages that heavy weaponry and high-technology might bring to PLA’s offensive. Indeed, the ground is heavily biased towards defensive operations – if conducted with aggressive intent.

We have reasons to believe that mother earth has not been overly supportive of aggression from Tibetan Plateau across the Himalayan Passes into India. Indeed, any PLA offensive across the Indo-Tibet Border has to contend with an adverse terrain anomaly : its build-up and spring-board areas straddle a ground that exposes its war machine to disruption by inhospitable elements as well as air and ground attack, while its offensive across the watershed passes would be beleaguered by a ground that favours classically conducted defensive operations. Indeed, PLA’s offensive across the passes would have to fight ‘friction of terrain’ and ‘tension of logistics’ before engaging Indian forces – with “General Snow” ever ready to cut off its lifeline.

Therefore, even if  PLA commits overwhelming number of formations to its offensives, as to how many of these could actually be employable  –  along limited, narrow axes, and against successive lines of defences, remains a moot point to consider.

China’s declaration of unilateral ceasefire in 1962 may be seen in this light. Only if Indian leadership had not lost its nerve and continued the state of war, matters would have been different.

PLA’s Achilles` Heel ?

With superior weaponry, missile arsenal, airborne forces, reconnaissance, communication, navigational and logistic capabilities, all of which are under continuous modernisation, we are well aware of  PLA’s overwhelming superiority over Indian Armed Forces. Yet, the current state of Sino-India peace will be better fostered by factoring China’s innate vulnerabilities in order to devise affordable military deterrence.

Firstly, the ‘hawks’ Chinese establishment do not seem to be able to hide their hegemonic instincts till  completion of the last phase of her ‘four modernisations’, as Deng Xioaping had advised. They have already started repudiating international norms on diplomatic, territorial, proliferation, economic and human rights issues. Reinforced with her past record of inciting trouble in the neighbourhood, this development has caused China to be seen as a predatory threat by most of her neighbours. In fact, the undercurrent of wariness of China’s military build up is already evident by signs of emergence of common-cause groupings among the Austro-Asian nations – with US participation. Possibly therefore, India’s joint military exercises could gradually be elevated to the status of  ‘military co-operation’ and bonded by a corresponding diplomatic understanding. The wise Chinaman certainly realises that in the contemporary international dispensation, such grouping among her target countries can not be to her advantage. May be that consideration would curb her militaristic urge.

Secondly, build up and war logistics of the PLA could be vulnerable to severe disruptions in Tibet. If they can be rebellious even when under the grip of a ruthless state, the discontented  Uighurs in the North-West and Tibetans in the South-East could also play a highly debilitating role on PLA’s war-effort. Indian Army could leverage this vulnerability of the PLA by means of direct as well as indirect attacks on its rear echelons and thereby choking sustainability of its offensive across the watershed.

Thirdly, even as the modernisation programme imparts quantum empowerment to the PLA, there are intrinsic vulnerabilities too. Having propagated the doctrines of  “Informationalisation” and “War Zone Campaign”, it has embarked upon adaptation of unfamiliar and complex concepts and practices of warfare. Therefore, its transition from a manpower intensive, low technology ‘people’s army’ to a modern army of high-technology, heavy weaponry and logistic-intensive formations cannot be free of complex glitches. The fact that its military leadership is relatively inexperienced and yet untested against spirited opposition, adds to the PLA’s burden. These vulnerabilities could afford opportunities to topple PLA’s apple cart in the fog of war.

Fourthly, China is at a stage of  ‘wannabe superpower’, when she is precariously open to losing her way by even stray developments, internal or external. Therefore, a conflict that fails to conclude with clear victory within a specified time frame will entail a serious setback to China’s standing. Then there is the tactical vulnerability of the Chumbi Valley as well as across the passes in North Sikkim, Kailash Range and Aksai Chin, which present opportunities of  potent riposte. Even if limited, such reverses can besmirch PLA’s success  elsewhere. Therefore, in a period when  people’s perceptions count, China may be wary of adopting military recourse against a resilient adversary. The complex concoction of time, terrain, counter-tactics and perceptions  would not be easy for the PLA to tame in her adventure across the Indo-Tibet Border.

It may be noteworthy that the nuclear angle does not figure in the preceding discussion. This is deliberate. Firstly, because the nuclear doctrine espoused by both China and India – that of ‘No First Use’ – precludes any nuclear exchange. Secondly, should China circumvent her stated position, there is little India can do about it besides retaliation in kind to the extent of her arsenal; and then the script would be different. Lastly, beyond committing soldiers to conduct nuclear drills, Indian policy-makers  have not mandated the military institution to nuclear war. Therefore, the Indian military hierarchy may not concern itself with what has been deliberately kept out of its orbit as a matter of higher policy of the government.

The preceding discussion leads to the observation  that if not diverted from the verve of military preparations, it should be possible for India to build up credible deterrence against military attack by China to settle the contentious border issue. The question, however, is that how may that goal be secured?

The Burden of Indian Armed Forces

It needs no emphasis  that China factors military power as a pillar of her politico-diplomatic goals. Accordingly, the PLA enjoys the blessings of China’s visionary leadership and full range of support from the state, mandate in fact, to institute what restructuring and modernisation is necessary to maintain itself at the best state of operational and logistic efficiency. In contrast, in the Indian dispensation, bureaucrats and financial managers, both acting as proxies for political leaders, arrogate military-specific policy making even if remaining innocent of  what it takes to fight a war. It is under these conditions that the Indian armed forces are expected to deter the PLA, and in the event that China chooses to teach India another ‘lesson’ by recourse to military aggression, defeat that aggression. This is a popular mandate, even if the state may fail to find resources to gear up its military institution accordingly. Indian armed forces, therefore, have to devise appropriate strategies within  the  systemic  limitations to  strike  at  the  PLA’s vulnerabilities.

Certain indicators to such a possibility may be discussed next.

Standing up to the Dragon

It may be interesting to fall back upon teachings of the great masters of  strategy, including the PLA’s mentor, Sun Tsu:

“Being unconquerable lies with yourself”, Sun Tsu states. Therefore we may resolve not to accept ‘defeat’ even if military engagements do not go our way. We could be  prepared  to  remain  in  a state of hostility  for months  and years till PLA’s great power is assailed, taking in our stride the death and destruction that might befall us. Taking heart from the historical fact that those who refuse to accept defeat, cannot really be defeated, the nation may refuse to conclude the struggle unless it is on its terms. Expertise in cyber and psychological warfare strategy could add to the aggressor’s misery, and India may thus refuse him the satisfaction of  claiming  ‘victory’. That could suffice to bust her awe in the neighbourhood, strengthen internal dissent and affect her political and economic ambitions. Propagation of such a recourse may, in fact, deter military aggression;  falling into a quagmire of never ending military engagement is not an enticing prospect to any power in today’s world. China is no exception.

Robert Greene’s  prophesises  that, “strategy is not a question of learning a series of moves and follow like a recipe,  creative strategists stand out because they are able to drop preconceived notions and focus intensely on present”. To  ‘turn the table’ on a stronger adversary,  Indian military leaders have to devise asymmetric strategies to garner advantages from blending of the terrain and tactics, mix of sophisticated  and rudimentary technology and a venomous concoction of cunning, expediency and audacity. A potent combination of regular and irregular forces could be organised, equipped and trained to resist PLA’s offensive from point elements to bases  and beyond in depth, on the flanks, in simultaneity. Campaigning  season  being a limiting factor, India may continue the struggle in varying tempo and intensity to keep the aggressor bleeding till  “General Snow” intervenes.