Indian Defence Review

Washington however warned: “There are strong reasons why the United States should not appear to be the point of the spear in assisting India in this situation. The most impelling of these is that our role might force Moscow to support Peiping [Beijing]. We shall be considering here whether there is anything we can constructively say to Moscow about China’s reckless and provocative action because there is some reason to believe that Moscow is also very much worried about the dangerous possibility. I would emphasize, however, India must mobilize its own diplomatic and political resources, seek the broadest base of support throughout the world and, more particularly, enlist the active interest and participation of the Commonwealth.”

Already on November 19 (in the cable quoted earlier), Rusk had defined the possible help Washington could immediately provide to Delhi: “We are prepared to dispatch twelve or more C-130’s at once to assist in any necessary movement of forces and equipment to Assam area or to Ladakh. This would be US operation with planes, crews support. Request your urgent advice whether Indians prepared to use this transport immediately. Also earliest estimates men and tonnage involved. Special airlift team being dispatched at once. This provides another opportunity for you to remind Indians about importance of moving troops from Pakistan border. Urgency of situation underlines anomaly of Indian reluctance in this respect.”

Part of the Harriman’s mission was also to make peace between India and Pakistan.

Washington was keen to rope in the British in the operation.

As mentioned by The US Secretary of State in the same cable: “This as far as we can see to go on basis of facts now available here. However, supply actions urgently needed and assessed as valid need not be delayed despite lack of clear picture Indian capabilities. View possibility India now ready use tactical air, one airlift requirement may be bombs request of UK. London should raise this and ascertain availability and British air shipment capabilities.”

This is for the overt assistance; we have another source of the events, which mentions the covert support (minus the U-2’s reconnaissance flights).

Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their ‘The CIA’S Secret in Tibet’ (University Press of Kansas, 2002) recounts:

On 21 November, Harriman’s entourage departed Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. Although the Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire while the group was en route, the situation was still tense when it reached New Delhi the following day. Without pause, Ambassador Galbraith ushered Harriman into the first of four meetings with Nehru. The end results of these discussions were plans for a major three-phase military aid package encompassing material support, help with domestic defense production, and possible assistance with air defenses.

Convoy and Morrison, who are more interested by the covert aspect of the US-India collaboration (particularly the US support to the Tibetan guerilla), continue:

As a covert aside to Harriman’s talks, the CIA representatives on the delegation held their own sessions with Indian intelligence czar [Intelligence Bureau Director B.N.] Mullik. This was a first, as Galbraith had previously taken great pains to downscale the agency’s activities inside India to all but benign reporting functions. As recently as 5 November, he had objected to projected CIA plans due to the risk of exposure. But in a 13 November letter to Kennedy, the ambassador had a qualified change of heart, noting that [Defence Minister V.K. Krishna] Menon’s departure was a turning point to begin working with the Indians on ‘sensitive matters’.

Both the CIA and the Intelligence Bureau were quick to seize the opportunity. “I went into a huddle with Mullik and Des [FitzGerald, head of CIA’s Far East Division],” recalls Critchfield [James Critchfield of the CIA’s the Near East Division], “and we started coming up with all these schemes against the Chinese.”

Most of their ideas centered around use of the Tibetans. “The Indians were interested in the Tibet program because of its intelligence collection value,” said [India’s] station chief David Blee, who sat in on some of the meetings. “Mullik was particularly interested in paramilitary operations.” There was good reason for this: following Menon’s resignation, and [Dalai Lama’s elder brother] Gyalo Thondup’s stated preference, the Intelligence Bureau had been placed in charge of the 5,000 Tibetan guerrillas forming under Brigadier [Sujan Singh] Uban [first Inspector General of the Tibetan Special Frontier Force].

Convoy and Morrison analyse: “Mullik was cautious as well. Although he was well connected to the Nehru family and had the prime minister’s full approval to talk with the CIA, he knew that the Indian populace was fickle, and until recently, anti-Americanism had been a popular mantra. It was perhaps only a matter of time before the barometer would swing back and make open Indo-U.S. cooperation political suicide.”

According to the American authors: “By the end of the Harriman mission, the CIA and Intelligence Bureau had arrived at a rough division of labor. The Indians, with CIA support from the Near East Division, would work together in developing Uban’s 5,000-strong tactical guerrilla force. The CIA’s Far East Division, meantime, would unilaterally create a strategic long-range resistance movement inside Tibet. The Mustang contingent would also remain under the CIA’s unilateral control.”

But this is another story.

To come back to the U-2 operation in India, it is doubtful that a full-fledged use of the U-2s was permitted on November 11, though V.K. Krishna Menon, the arrogant Defence Minister and stumbling block for a closer collaboration between India and the US, had resigned on November 8.

It is also true that the CIA History of the U-2s mentions only the ‘permission for refueling’ given on November 11.

It is however certain, that the main thrust of the covert operations over the Himalayas was decided during Harriman’s Mission to India, when the CIA’s senior officials accompanying Kennedy’s envoy met with their Indian counterpart, particularly B.N. Mullik.

Though not mentioned in the CIA’s history, it would be interesting to probe the role of Biju Patnaik, the Oriya politician, who was instrumental in offering Charbatia as a base the U-2s’ operations in the Himalayas and Tibet.

Early 1961, Patnaik became president of the Odisha’s State Congress. Under his leadership, the Congress Party won 82 of 140 seats in the Assembly election and on 23 June 1961, he became the State Chief Minister (he remained in the post until 2 October 1963 when he resigned from the post under the Kamaraj Plan to revitalise the Congress party). Patnaik was then 45-year old.

He played an important, though not recognized as yet, in the covert operations against China.

Courtesy: http://claudearpi.blogspot.in/