India needs to prepare and be ready to meet a Chinese military challenge in the near future. Chinese military strategists consider preemption as logical and valid means when confronting a powerful enemy. Chinese doctrinal writings stress that static defences are insufficient to defend territory because of the speed and destructive power of modern forces. As a result PLA operational concepts seek to prevent enemy forces from massing and to keep the enemy off-balance by seizing the initiative with offensive strikes. According to the PLA an effective defence includes destroying enemy capabilities on enemy territory before they can be employed.
As per modern Chinese military strategists the functions of war have changed irrevocably. War can no longer be termed as “using armed forces to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will”, but war today is “using all means, including armed forces and non-armed forces, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” Seen in the light of this new definition of war, the 26/11 attack on Mumbai falls into perspective.
Indian political leadership has been apparently gullible to the extent of entering headlong into “˜friendship pacts without taking measures to guard the countrys flanks. Examples are the 1962 fiasco and the deception of 1999. And the one time the military was given a reasonably free hand resulted in the division of Pakistan.
Pakistan, a near-failed state, a haven for terrorists, home to the 26/11 terrorists and a potential economic basket case and in all probability the brain behind the attack, can dismiss it as one by ‘non-state actors’, while succeeding in its aim of of hurting India by ‘any means’ and partially gaining its own objective of pulling its troops back from the Afghan border. And Indian politicians, in the aftermath of the attack, as on earlier similar occasions, make all the right noises without learning any strategic lessons. Yet these same politicians, with support from the bureaucracy, will desist from bringing the military on board on the high table of policy formulation.
The Chinese are understandingly arrogant that they will not depend on anyone else to help them to achieve their objectives. They are on the path to create capabilities in their country and their armed forces, in their opinion, will accomplish those objectives. And what they already have achieved is impressive and a reading of these will indicate how far ahead of India they have gone.
China has 2.3 million active troops spread over seven ‘Military Regions’(MR). The MRs are Lanzhou, Chengdu(both biased to the west and Indian border)—Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, Guangzhou and Nanjing — these five are biased towards the east coast. The Central Military Commission(CMC) exercises leadership over these Military Regions. Within a military region the three service branches — army, air force and navy are co-ordinated in battle operations under the unified command of the Military District. The Second Artillery, comprising strategic and nuclear forces , operate directly under the leadership of the CMC. The army units in a Military Region are under the leadership of that Military Region. The navy and air force units in a Military Region are under the joint leadership of the Military Region and their service branch.
The Army has 1.4 million soldiers and spread over the Military Regions as army groups, divisions, brigades, armoured divisions and independent brigades and artillery divisions and regiments. The PLAAF has 250,000 personnel distributed over 24 air divisions in the Military Regions. Newer aircrafts make up a growing percentage of the PLAAF inventory. F-10, Su-27, Su-30, AAH, tankers and other aircrafts are part of the force which has 1550 fighters, 775 bombers, 450 transport a/c, 90 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with 450 older fighters employed as training aircrafts in PLAAF flight academies. The Chinese Navy (PLAN) comprises 72 principal combatants, 58 attack submarines, 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift vehicles and 41 coastal patrol vessels.
China is building and testing its own guided missile frigates, Jin-class nuclear submarines and Shang-class nuclear attack submarines. China has a formidable array of IRBMs and ICBMs and it has been reported that some are deployed in Tibet targeting Indian vulnerable areas and vulnerable points.
China is building and testing its own guided missile frigates, Jin-class nuclear submarines and Shang-class nuclear attack submarines. China has a formidable array of IRBMs and ICBMs and it has been reported that some are deployed in Tibet targeting Indian vulnerable areas and vulnerable points. China has 35 satellites in orbit which can be utilised for military purposes. While there are not many fighter compatible airfields in the military regions adjacent to India, the fact that China has built up an impressive heavy-lift and long-range capability as part of its power projection programme should engage the attention of our military planners.
As compared to China, India’s military capability is significantly lower. And our military-industrial complex while promising a lot has been unable to deliver hardware of requisite quality and in reasonable time periods. In comparison to China, the disturbing aspect is that we are not doing enough to try and prevent the imbalance from increasing. It is also somewhat alarming to note that our combat potential is eroding and sufficient replacements, leave alone accretions, are not in the pipeline. It is a given fact that India will not move any forces away from the western border because our neighbour is waiting for just such an opportunity to make amends for the humiliation of 1971, Siachen and Kargil 1999. Our force levels are nowhere close to requirements of a two-front war.
Given the disadvantage of terrain vis-a-vis China, our army will have a difficult task of maintaining status quo during hostilities. The obvious option would be to employ the air force and surface to surface missilies. The thinking in this regard in the minds of people who formulate our strategy should be clear. The Integrated Defence Staff are the ones charged with such responsibility, but they are handicapped without a CDS in place. The National Security Advisory Board(NSAB) constituted to advise the NSA meets rarely and its contribution to national security till date, remains a mystery.
Indian political leadership has been apparently gullible to the extent of entering headlong into ‘friendship pacts’ without taking measures to guard the country’s flanks. Examples are the 1962 fiasco and the deception of 1999. And the one time the military was given a reasonably free hand resulted in the division of Pakistan. In a democracy it is vital to keep military under political leadership but there should be an essential bond of trust between the two. This has been missing in India. The military must be included firsthand in the business of formulating policy as should be the intelligence agencies. Development of a national strategic policy needs to be undertaken on priority and issues concerning China and other neighbours brought out in strategy papers which could be circulated among our political class.
Developing friendly relations with China does not mean that we can discount them as strategic rivals. Development of relations must go hand in hand with improving our capabilities in the military field. Capability has a long gestation period while intentions of a country can change overnight. We do not know and cannot forecast when China with vastly greater capability, will decide to reclaim disputed territories. When that happens India will have to fight its own battles with whatever capability we possess at that time. It should not be a case of ‘for the want of a nail…
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