Geopolitics

The Chinese Conundrum: Friends and Foes
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Issue Vol 24.1 Jan-Mar2009 | Date : 31 Jan , 2011

The Chinese, unlike their western counterparts, do not subscribe to the theory that the longer range guns, better tanks, airpower or higher levels of technology alone would contribute to winning wars.

The military modernization processes of the two countries are sharply contrasting. India has not articulated a vision for its armed forces. Sure, the army, navy and the air force have futuristic plans, not necessarily based on committed funding or a comprehensive and joint approach. Yearly budgets are apportioned on a ‘traditional’ basis, occasionally resulting in wasteful expenditure. An example of deficiency in joint planning is in the field of communications, where each service is creating independent infrastructures, whereas real-time requirements of C4 ISR during future conflicts will be a system based on a ‘common backbone’ to ensure seamless integration. China, on the other hand, is focussed. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Government, in its annual report to the Congress has stated that “ China pursues a long-term comprehensive transformation of its military forces to improve its capabilities in power projection, anti-access and area denial.” China has laid down a time bound three-step developmental strategy in modernizing its national defence:

  • 1st step—lay a solid foundation by 2010.
  • 2nd step—make major progress by 2020.
  • 3rd step—achieve strategic goal of building ‘informatized’(net-centric warfare enabled) armed forces capable of winning wars by 2050.

Chinese military now emphasises integrated joint operations, joint logistics and long range mobility.

A query can be asked here. Who are they preparing to fight against? The present Chinese posture is Taiwan-centric, with most of its military might deployed on the eastern coast facing Taiwan. The emphasis on modernizing its air force and navy and focussing on long range mobility indicates an intention to create an overlapping area denial capability in the event of conflict in that part of the world. The second area of interest for China is the Spratley group of islands, reportedly rich in energy resources. To China’s advantage, force projection requirements in this area are similar to the demands in the Taiwan sector.

The military modernization processes of the two countries are sharply contrasting. India has not articulated a vision for its armed forces.

The third field of possible combat is along the border with India. Currently, tension in this sector is low. But that could be a ploy for China to attend to more pressing problems in other areas. It should not be forgotten that China is a country long on memory and refers to itself as ‘The Middle Kingdom’. And as recently as October 2006, on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India the Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi stated, “the whole of what you call Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory — we are claiming all of that — that is our position”. Yet the Chinese engage India in endless ‘discussions’ to solve the territorial issues. Is this a strategem being used by the Chinese to buy time? Most probably yes, as stratagem is integral to Chinese strategy. And Sun Tzu, the ancient strategist whom the Chinese hold in reverence has stipulated that ‘ War is above all the art of deceit’.

The Chinese, unlike their western counterparts, do not subscribe to the theory that the longer range guns, better tanks, airpower or higher levels of technology alone would contribute to winning wars. To them strategy is more important than any other military attribute. The Chinese believe that with the advent of nuclear weapons and expansion of potential battlefields to a global scale, the world has reached a point where decisive force is increasingly difficult to achieve. This gels with the Chinese approach to warfare which stresses the limits and hazards of depending too heavily on force alone. To them attacking the enemy’s strategy is of supreme importance. That is why the Chinese acquisition programme is generating capabilities for regional contingencies, such as conflict over resources or territory. The Spratley Islands and India-China border fit the bill. Taiwan, as is now becoming apparent, will be dealt with ‘softly with a silken touch’ till finally assimilated into the ‘One-China’ concept, but without lowering guard on the eastern front.

At present China’s overarching strategy is the intention to sustain the continuous grip over power of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP). An underlying apprehension of losing political power drives the leadership’s strategic view and its decision choices. The transition from communist ideology to economic performance and nationalism is part of the strategy. Nationalism is promoted and individual achievements that bring laurels to the country are honoured.

 An economic downturn may force the CCP to exploit the nationalistic energy by displaying a more aggressive behaviour in foreign affairs and security matters with adverse effects on relations with countries like India.

The 2008 Olympics held at Beijing is an example. But there are simmering social tensions kept under control mainly due to a booming economy. An economic downturn may force the CCP to exploit the nationalistic energy by displaying a more aggressive behaviour in foreign affairs and security matters with adverse effects on relations with countries like India. India would need to watch carefully how the current world economic meltdown impacts on China and should generate options now to deal with resultant changes in behaviour of our northern neighbour.

China’s reliance on energy imports has shaped its strategy and policy in important ways. It has signed long term energy agreements with countries in Africa and Asia and with Russia and Venezuela. It has used the carrot of economic aid, military hardware and diplomatic favours to sweeten such deals. It has looked the other way at human rights violation or military proliferation records of the supplying countries. It has shown a willingness to defend its supply line by its recent decision to despatch three warships to the Gulf of Aden to protect its energy supplies from the marauding Somali pirates. In contrast the Indian Navy, neglected for long, barely has enough reserve fighting platforms to carry out a similar task while there is an alert of sorts at home.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

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Air Marshal Narayan Menon

Air Marshal Narayan Menon

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