Indian Defence Review

Indian Navy and its Chinese counterpart conducted a joint exercise for the first time in the seas off the Shanghai coast in November, 2003. The latest naval exercise between the two navies was held off the Kochi coast in November, 2008, just prior to the terrorist attack in Mumbai. Chinese naval ships returning after a joint exercise with the Pakistan Navy carried out naval manouvres with Indian naval vessels. India and China agreed on defence co-operation in 2006. The first joint exercise between the land forces of the two countries was held in December, 2007. This exercise, conducted at ‘company’ level, took place in the south western Chinese province of Yunnan.

The objectives of the exercise were — to enhance understanding and mutual trust, strengthen exchanges in anti-terror areas and to deter the three evil forces, i.e. separatists, extremists and terrorists. A repeat exercise was held at Belgaum, India in December, 2008. 130 People’s Liberation Army personnel drawn from an infantry battalion of the Chengdu Military Area Command, including 40 officers, participated alongside soldiers of the 8 Maratha Light Infantry. While there have been no joint air exercises between the two countries, Indian Air Force’s Surya Kiran Aerobatic Team covered 11,000 km to perform at the ‘Airshow China’ held at Zhuhai in Gwangdong Province from 04 November to 09 November 2008. The IAF Chief and the Indian Ambassador to China witnessed the SKAT performance.

Which China are we to believe? The one that wants joint exercises to fight terror or the one that makes belligerent noises and forays into Indian territory? Perhaps the question needs to be rephrased as, “˜Which China do our politicians take as the authentic one?

While these military exercises have been in progress, exchanges of another type have also been taking place. These have been verbal ones following Chinese incursions into Indian territory. The border between India and China extends to nearly 3500 km. Much of it has not been clearly marked either actually on ground or in maps authenticated by both the nations. So the line dividing the two countries is euphemistically called ‘the line of actual control’ or LAC. India claims 40,000 square km of territory currently under Chinese control. This is in the Aksai Chin area adjacent to the state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Additionally, an area of over 5000 sq km, originally part of J & K, lying adjacent to the Siachen Glacier, has been illegally ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963. China too claims nearly 90,000 sq km of Indian territory, including the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. This claim runs counter to the 2005 agreement between the two countries that, “in reaching the boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas”.

In the year 2008 there have been nearly 70 incursions by the Chinese into Indian territory, mainly Sikkim. This is perhaps to force India into conceding the Chinese demand regarding Arunachal Pradesh, or more precisely, Tawang, which the Chinese consider as the ‘doorway’ between Tibet and the Brahmaputra valley, and therefore is of critical strategic value to India. The Chinese are also probably rattled by the Indian Prime Minister’s recent statement that ‘Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India’. The PM was in Arunachal Pradesh to inaugurate the commencement of major infrastructural and developmental projects.

Which China are we to believe? The one that wants joint exercises to fight terror or the one that makes belligerent noises and forays into Indian territory? Perhaps the question needs to be rephrased as, ‘Which China do our politicians take as the authentic one?’ This question is important because our politicians are reluctant to bring the military on board while taking policy decisions that have long term strategic implications. Perhaps India is the only democracy that virtually shuts its policy room to the military. This trend has been evident from the time Jawahar Lal Nehru was the PM. A

n unexpressed and unfounded but palpable fear grips our political class when it comes to including the military in decision-making. The most recent example of this has been the reluctance of the political class to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff as strongly recommended by the Kargil Review Committee’s panel that analysed higher defence organisation in the country. Our military has vast experience in dealing with our difficult neighbour to the west and with China. But the military is deliberately kept out of the policy making loop. And it is in the relative military capabilities of India and China that sharp differences have become starkly evident.

Also read: Indian Navy: Challenges beyond the horizon

India spends $ 20 billion annually on its military. China’s budget is $120 billion. At 2.3 million the Chinese armed forces are twice the size of India’s military manpower, which is about 1.2 million. Assume India incurs an expenditure of $8 billion on pay, allowances and upkeep of its forces and China’s outflow, giving them the benefit of better conditions, would be four times as much at $32 billion. That would leave India $12 billion for modernization while the Chinese would have $88 billion, more than seven times an amount India can muster. Thus China has established a lead which is increasing every year. While some of the figures indicated may be notional, the grim reality is that China is striding away from us in the realm of strategic capability and force projection.

The Chinese, unlike their western counterparts, do not subscribe to the theory that the longer range guns, better tanks, airpower or higher levels of technology alone would contribute to winning wars.

The military modernization processes of the two countries are sharply contrasting. India has not articulated a vision for its armed forces. Sure, the army, navy and the air force have futuristic plans, not necessarily based on committed funding or a comprehensive and joint approach. Yearly budgets are apportioned on a ‘traditional’ basis, occasionally resulting in wasteful expenditure. An example of deficiency in joint planning is in the field of communications, where each service is creating independent infrastructures, whereas real-time requirements of C4 ISR during future conflicts will be a system based on a ‘common backbone’ to ensure seamless integration. China, on the other hand, is focussed. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Government, in its annual report to the Congress has stated that “ China pursues a long-term comprehensive transformation of its military forces to improve its capabilities in power projection, anti-access and area denial.” China has laid down a time bound three-step developmental strategy in modernizing its national defence:

Chinese military now emphasises integrated joint operations, joint logistics and long range mobility.

A query can be asked here. Who are they preparing to fight against? The present Chinese posture is Taiwan-centric, with most of its military might deployed on the eastern coast facing Taiwan. The emphasis on modernizing its air force and navy and focussing on long range mobility indicates an intention to create an overlapping area denial capability in the event of conflict in that part of the world. The second area of interest for China is the Spratley group of islands, reportedly rich in energy resources. To China’s advantage, force projection requirements in this area are similar to the demands in the Taiwan sector.

The military modernization processes of the two countries are sharply contrasting. India has not articulated a vision for its armed forces.

The third field of possible combat is along the border with India. Currently, tension in this sector is low. But that could be a ploy for China to attend to more pressing problems in other areas. It should not be forgotten that China is a country long on memory and refers to itself as ‘The Middle Kingdom’. And as recently as October 2006, on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India the Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi stated, “the whole of what you call Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory — we are claiming all of that — that is our position”. Yet the Chinese engage India in endless ‘discussions’ to solve the territorial issues. Is this a strategem being used by the Chinese to buy time? Most probably yes, as stratagem is integral to Chinese strategy. And Sun Tzu, the ancient strategist whom the Chinese hold in reverence has stipulated that ‘ War is above all the art of deceit’.

The Chinese, unlike their western counterparts, do not subscribe to the theory that the longer range guns, better tanks, airpower or higher levels of technology alone would contribute to winning wars. To them strategy is more important than any other military attribute. The Chinese believe that with the advent of nuclear weapons and expansion of potential battlefields to a global scale, the world has reached a point where decisive force is increasingly difficult to achieve. This gels with the Chinese approach to warfare which stresses the limits and hazards of depending too heavily on force alone. To them attacking the enemy’s strategy is of supreme importance. That is why the Chinese acquisition programme is generating capabilities for regional contingencies, such as conflict over resources or territory. The Spratley Islands and India-China border fit the bill. Taiwan, as is now becoming apparent, will be dealt with ‘softly with a silken touch’ till finally assimilated into the ‘One-China’ concept, but without lowering guard on the eastern front.

At present China’s overarching strategy is the intention to sustain the continuous grip over power of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP). An underlying apprehension of losing political power drives the leadership’s strategic view and its decision choices. The transition from communist ideology to economic performance and nationalism is part of the strategy. Nationalism is promoted and individual achievements that bring laurels to the country are honoured.

 An economic downturn may force the CCP to exploit the nationalistic energy by displaying a more aggressive behaviour in foreign affairs and security matters with adverse effects on relations with countries like India.

The 2008 Olympics held at Beijing is an example. But there are simmering social tensions kept under control mainly due to a booming economy. An economic downturn may force the CCP to exploit the nationalistic energy by displaying a more aggressive behaviour in foreign affairs and security matters with adverse effects on relations with countries like India. India would need to watch carefully how the current world economic meltdown impacts on China and should generate options now to deal with resultant changes in behaviour of our northern neighbour.

China’s reliance on energy imports has shaped its strategy and policy in important ways. It has signed long term energy agreements with countries in Africa and Asia and with Russia and Venezuela. It has used the carrot of economic aid, military hardware and diplomatic favours to sweeten such deals. It has looked the other way at human rights violation or military proliferation records of the supplying countries. It has shown a willingness to defend its supply line by its recent decision to despatch three warships to the Gulf of Aden to protect its energy supplies from the marauding Somali pirates. In contrast the Indian Navy, neglected for long, barely has enough reserve fighting platforms to carry out a similar task while there is an alert of sorts at home.

India needs to prepare and be ready to meet a Chinese military challenge in the near future. Chinese military strategists consider preemption as logical and valid means when confronting a powerful enemy. Chinese doctrinal writings stress that static defences are insufficient to defend territory because of the speed and destructive power of modern forces. As a result PLA operational concepts seek to prevent enemy forces from massing and to keep the enemy off-balance by seizing the initiative with offensive strikes. According to the PLA an effective defence includes destroying enemy capabilities on enemy territory before they can be employed.

As per modern Chinese military strategists the functions of war have changed irrevocably. War can no longer be termed as “using armed forces to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will”, but war today is “using all means, including armed forces and non-armed forces, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” Seen in the light of this new definition of war, the 26/11 attack on Mumbai falls into perspective.

Indian political leadership has been apparently gullible to the extent of entering headlong into “˜friendship pacts without taking measures to guard the countrys flanks. Examples are the 1962 fiasco and the deception of 1999. And the one time the military was given a reasonably free hand resulted in the division of Pakistan.

Pakistan, a near-failed state, a haven for terrorists, home to the 26/11 terrorists and a potential economic basket case and in all probability the brain behind the attack, can dismiss it as one by ‘non-state actors’, while succeeding in its aim of of hurting India by ‘any means’ and partially gaining its own objective of pulling its troops back from the Afghan border. And Indian politicians, in the aftermath of the attack, as on earlier similar occasions, make all the right noises without learning any strategic lessons. Yet these same politicians, with support from the bureaucracy, will desist from bringing the military on board on the high table of policy formulation.

The Chinese are understandingly arrogant that they will not depend on anyone else to help them to achieve their objectives. They are on the path to create capabilities in their country and their armed forces, in their opinion, will accomplish those objectives. And what they already have achieved is impressive and a reading of these will indicate how far ahead of India they have gone.

China has 2.3 million active troops spread over seven ‘Military Regions’(MR). The MRs are Lanzhou, Chengdu(both biased to the west and Indian border)—Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, Guangzhou and Nanjing — these five are biased towards the east coast. The Central Military Commission(CMC) exercises leadership over these Military Regions. Within a military region the three service branches — army, air force and navy are co-ordinated in battle operations under the unified command of the Military District. The Second Artillery, comprising strategic and nuclear forces , operate directly under the leadership of the CMC. The army units in a Military Region are under the leadership of that Military Region. The navy and air force units in a Military Region are under the joint leadership of the Military Region and their service branch.

The Army has 1.4 million soldiers and spread over the Military Regions as army groups, divisions, brigades, armoured divisions and independent brigades and artillery divisions and regiments. The PLAAF has 250,000 personnel distributed over 24 air divisions in the Military Regions. Newer aircrafts make up a growing percentage of the PLAAF inventory. F-10, Su-27, Su-30, AAH, tankers and other aircrafts are part of the force which has 1550 fighters, 775 bombers, 450 transport a/c, 90 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with 450 older fighters employed as training aircrafts in PLAAF flight academies. The Chinese Navy (PLAN) comprises 72 principal combatants, 58 attack submarines, 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift vehicles and 41 coastal patrol vessels.

China is building and testing its own guided missile frigates, Jin-class nuclear submarines and Shang-class nuclear attack submarines. China has a formidable array of IRBMs and ICBMs and it has been reported that some are deployed in Tibet targeting Indian vulnerable areas and vulnerable points.

China is building and testing its own guided missile frigates, Jin-class nuclear submarines and Shang-class nuclear attack submarines. China has a formidable array of IRBMs and ICBMs and it has been reported that some are deployed in Tibet targeting Indian vulnerable areas and vulnerable points. China has 35 satellites in orbit which can be utilised for military purposes. While there are not many fighter compatible airfields in the military regions adjacent to India, the fact that China has built up an impressive heavy-lift and long-range capability as part of its power projection programme should engage the attention of our military planners.

As compared to China, India’s military capability is significantly lower. And our military-industrial complex while promising a lot has been unable to deliver hardware of requisite quality and in reasonable time periods. In comparison to China, the disturbing aspect is that we are not doing enough to try and prevent the imbalance from increasing. It is also somewhat alarming to note that our combat potential is eroding and sufficient replacements, leave alone accretions, are not in the pipeline. It is a given fact that India will not move any forces away from the western border because our neighbour is waiting for just such an opportunity to make amends for the humiliation of 1971, Siachen and Kargil 1999. Our force levels are nowhere close to requirements of a two-front war.

Given the disadvantage of terrain vis-a-vis China, our army will have a difficult task of maintaining status quo during hostilities. The obvious option would be to employ the air force and surface to surface missilies. The thinking in this regard in the minds of people who formulate our strategy should be clear. The Integrated Defence Staff are the ones charged with such responsibility, but they are handicapped without a CDS in place. The National Security Advisory Board(NSAB) constituted to advise the NSA meets rarely and its contribution to national security till date, remains a mystery.

Also read: Harvest of Hate

Indian political leadership has been apparently gullible to the extent of entering headlong into ‘friendship pacts’ without taking measures to guard the country’s flanks. Examples are the 1962 fiasco and the deception of 1999. And the one time the military was given a reasonably free hand resulted in the division of Pakistan. In a democracy it is vital to keep military under political leadership but there should be an essential bond of trust between the two. This has been missing in India. The military must be included firsthand in the business of formulating policy as should be the intelligence agencies. Development of a national strategic policy needs to be undertaken on priority and issues concerning China and other neighbours brought out in strategy papers which could be circulated among our political class.

Developing friendly relations with China does not mean that we can discount them as strategic rivals. Development of relations must go hand in hand with improving our capabilities in the military field. Capability has a long gestation period while intentions of a country can change overnight. We do not know and cannot forecast when China with vastly greater capability, will decide to reclaim disputed territories. When that happens India will have to fight its own battles with whatever capability we possess at that time. It should not be a case of ‘for the want of a nail…