Fast changing strategic environment has necessitated remodeling of long out dated structure of our armed forces. Major military reforms have been the subject of discussion for long. It was the Kargil episode that finally triggered the process. Its most positive outcome was the government’s resolve to review the national security system in its entirety. The Review Committee led by K Subramaniam thus made a number of significant recommendations. Mr Arun Singh, Minister of state for Defence who later headed the task force on management of defence went in for major revamp of defence establishment, Introduction of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), a concept adopted by most modern forces the world over was considered crucial by it. And yet it remained a subject of mere discussion for all these years.
…it was the air force that resisted the creation of a CDS. It feared that such an arrangement would pave the way for institutional domination by the army as was experienced during 1965 and 1971 wars.
Whilst it is desirable to encourage national debate on issues as important as defence but to allow them to linger on indefinitely is not in the long term interest of national security. Whatever be the reason, lack of consensus between different groups of people or lack of adequate understanding of the concept, the protracted delay has only put off the overall reform process.
Lack of consensus within the services has its roots in the past. To start off, it was the air force that resisted the creation of a CDS. It feared that such an arrangement would pave the way for institutional domination by the army as was experienced during 1965 and 1971 wars. Notwithstanding, towards the end of UPA II government, the three service chiefs jointly wrote to the prime minister expressing their support for the creation of the CDS. The discord between the services provided an alibi to the politicians and the -bureaucrats to hide their own unwillingness to institutionalize the system. They had their own apprehensions about it. The CDS with unprecedented powers placed above the Chiefs was viewed as a potential risk.
However, the concept needs to be looked into dispassionately before deciding what exactly it should entail. There are any number of countries around the world who subscribe to this concept and each has evolved it depending upon its own compulsions. What we have to find out in our context is what ails our higher defence management and how the introduction of the CDS, often seen as a panacea of all ills that beset the defence forces can remove those infirmities. However, whilst working out the mandate, past biases must not be allowed to creep in as a justification for a truncated version of the CDS. That will not serve the desired purpose.
The war fighting has become so complex that it is no more possible for a single service to achieve national goals all by itself. The multi dimension complexity of the battle field today renders single service fighting almost impossible. Each service fighting for its own glory and providing limited support to the others as hitherto is a passé. It is imperative that the services coordinate with each other, pool their resources and plan together to fight jointly. The concept of Chief of the Defence Staff as adopted by almost all the armed forces provides the mechanism to achieve these objectives.
…most of the defence analysts are skeptical about the theatre command concept as it would not only require dedicated military resources but also absolute synergy.
The American armed forces were equally vulnerable to these narrow service loyalties like the rest. The US had to finally resort to legislative action by introducing famously known Goldwater-Nichol Act during President Reagan’s time in 1987. This resulted in the formation of joint organizations and structures in the American armed forces which further led to what came to be known world over as ‘Theatre Commands’. In this system, the service chiefs are responsible only for training, procurement and non-operational logistics. They however, remain in regular touch with the government. The ‘Theatre’ on the other hand comprises the mix of forces including the resources from all the four services. The commander however could belong to any of the four services. And he reports directly to the President through the Secretary {minister} for defence even on matters beyond defence and security. The American president is a functioning supreme commander of the US armed forces where as the Indian president is merely a constitutional head of the armed forces. Also, the Indian armed forces are nor vested with politico-military autonomy like that of the US forces. However, these exceptional procedures are relevant to the theatre command concept only.
In our context, ideally placed Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) islands were tried out for Theatre Command concept. These are located far from the main land and have forces deployed from all the services. The command was made rotational between the three services However, in the end, the navy was able to prevail against the rotational concept of command. Perhaps, in view of the marine nature of threat and its dominant role in the islands, it felt that the command of the mixed forces must rest with the navy only. Thus, after decade and half long trial, the command responsibility was handed over to the navy on permanent basis last year.
Only other area that could be considered so is the present Northern Command. The commander who will take turns on rotational basis will control all military and air force assets in the region. But then the same argument would apply here too, for the threat is army oriented and the sector army dominated. In fact, most of the defence analysts are skeptical about the theatre command concept as it would not only require dedicated military resources but also absolute synergy.
The introduction of the CDS would entail a range of reforms in the format of the MOD. The government will have to look into the way the entire defence set up works.
The US has global responsibilities and earmarks dedicated land, air and naval assets accordingly for the theatre. The US forces are in fact tailored for expeditionary type of role. There is no such compulsion in respect to us. In our context, the CDS would ensure desired level of coordination, joint planning and operations for optimal results and bring about economy by precluding duplication in the procurement of assets. He would also provide one man contact to the political authority. The government would deal with one person for advice as against three now.
The question however is who will the CDS inter act with, the prime minister or the defence minister? The fear is that the bureaucracy will not relish being bypassed and the CDS may sooner or later find himself dealing with anyone but the prime minister. It may be mentioned here that during post independence era the service Chiefs used to interact with the defence minister directly. It was during Mr Katju’s tenure as defence minister that the practice was abandoned. Thus, the Chiefs though placed above the defence secretary in the warrant of precedence began to deal downwards with him only.
Where do the service chiefs stand in this new arrangement? The Chiefs, unlike the US would in all probabilities continue to function with their multiple responsibilities including operations as hitherto. In order to streamline the jointship, the government will have to define the roles and the responsibilities of each service without ambiguity or overlap. Even in the US, constant turf battles go on between the USAF and the air wing of the army, the Navy and the Marines and so also between the army and the Marines. Despite the Gulf operations being unprecedented in synergy, bordering on the miracle, these were not without quarrels or dissensions.
The introduction of the CDS would entail a range of reforms in the format of the MOD. The government will have to look into the way the entire defence set up works. Presently, the service head quarters operate outside the government and have to deal with uninitiated bureaucracy, a lacunae which could be overcome by requisite level of integration between the services and the bureaucracy.
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