Geopolitics

Strategic perspectives on China’s South Asian connectivity
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Net Edition | Date : 13 Jan , 2015

Strategic concerns on Northeast connectivity

China has been keen to promote its direct connectivity to India’s northeast through two major routes. These are the Chumbi Valley route (from Lhasa-Shigatse-Chumbi Valley-Natula) and the Burma-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor. Both have significant economic and strategic implications for both India and China. These are related to China’s dispute over the alignment of Mc Mahon Line which forms the Indo-Tibet border in Arunachal Pradesh as well as China’s claim over the entire Arunachal Pradesh (termed as Southern Tibet by the Chinese).

 In case of a military confrontation with India, development of China’s road and rail access through Chumbi Valley in conjunction with the opening up of BCIM corridor will increase China’s strategic options cut off India’s Northeast from the rest of the country.

The Chumbi Valley geographically forms a wedge between Sikkim and Bhutan. India’s traditional trading route runs through the Chumbi Valley to Shigatse, an important communication centre. After the Lhasa-Shigatse road was developed Shigatse has become a strategic communication hub as it connects the roads from North, South, West and East increasing PLA’s logistics and mobility to Indian border.

Sikkim is strategically situated astride the narrow land corridor linking Northeast states with the rest of India. In case of a military confrontation with India, development of China’s road and rail access through Chumbi Valley in conjunction with the opening up of BCIM corridor will increase China’s strategic options cut off India’s Northeast from the rest of the country. It could also compromise India’s control over Arunachal Pradesh.

BCIM Corridor

The BCIM is a multi-modal infrastructure initiative to increase sub-regional economic cooperation among the member nations (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar). It envisages the development of the infrastructure facilities and road, rail, water and air connectivity to improve interconnectivity for free movement of goods and promote trade among the four member nations. It is estimated to benefit approximately 440 million people from Yunnan Province of China to Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India’s eastern states including Bihar.

India had been reluctant to join China in promoting Northeast connectivity. On the other hand land connectivity with China looks inevitable as it will trigger economic development of Northeast states contributing to the neutralisation of separatist insurgencies in this neglected region of India.

This has induced India to agree in principle to join China to promote the BCIM Economic Corridor after Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Le Keqiang met in May 2013. They signed a MoU to establish their own study groups on the BCIM economic corridor to promote this initiative.[ii]

India has concerns about the BCIM corridor because it would open up a direct eastern axis from Yunnan to support China’s large territorial and border claims in Arunachal Pradesh.

India’s Northeast states as well as Bangladesh have been upbeat about the BCIM corridor. The BCIM concept also fits in well with India’s ‘Look East Policy’ as well as its multimodal connectivity projects to link north eastern states with ASEAN region and to provide them sea access to Myanmar’s  Sittwe port.

However, India has concerns about the BCIM corridor because it would open up a direct eastern axis from Yunnan to support China’s large territorial and border claims in Arunachal Pradesh. The BCIM passes through vital communication bottlenecks astride logistic routes of all the seven states in the region. China had in the past supported separatist insurgencies of this region. Though it has ceased to do so since 1989, it will have the option to do so easily when the BCIM corridor comes up. Moreover, the progress of the BCIM corridor as well as its optimal use could be affected unless separatist conflicts are neutralised. So the BCIM may take some time to come to fruition.

Reviving the Maritime Silk Route

In October 2013, President Xi Jinping announced China’s intention to launch the 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road (MSR) plan to link the Pacific and Indian Ocean during a visit to Southeast Asia. After Premier Le Keqiang announced the setting up a $ 495 million (Yuan 3 billion) maritime cooperation fund to support MSR, its promotion has become China’s key diplomatic initiative. China has sounded most of the nations of Asia-Pacific including Malaysia, Singapore, India, Sri Lanka and the Gulf countries on the initiative.

Though details of the MSR came out much later China’s intentions in taking up this project in South Asian perspective appear to be three fold.

China has developed a large network of roads both to the border and laterally between key communication centres of Xinjiang and Tibet while India has lagged behind in doing so in its border territories.

  • To assist China’s increasing profile in South Asian countries and protect China’s growing economic and strategic interests in the region.
  • To profitably use maritime assets created with Chinese investment in developing port infrastructure in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota and Colombo (Sri Lanka) and Myanmar. It is poised to develop Chittagong port (Bangladesh) also. The MSR would enable China to promote its interests among Indian Ocean littorals

The MSR could facilitate the PLAN’s ambitious plan to assert its strength in Indian Ocean as well to protect China’s sea lanes of communication in the region

Though MSR will also promote India’s economic activity it would increase China’s threat to India’s maritime power projection in Indian Ocean Region. It could also enhance China’s electronic snooping and human intelligence capabilities.

Conclusion

China has developed a large network of roads both to the border and laterally between key communication centres of Xinjiang and Tibet while India has lagged behind in doing so in its border territories. This gives China a definite advantage in protecting and securing its territorial interests relating to India. Conscious of this China had objected when India embarked upon development of road infrastructure in border areas.

This situation has continued even after both the countries signed a Border Defence Agreement (BDA) to manage such differences. Thus India’s vital border communication development continues to be subject to the vagaries of China’s interpretation of the agreement. This has to be borne in mind while handling China’s desire to increase connectivity to India and the rest of South Asia.

In spite of this, India should encourage and foster cooperation with China to improve road and transportation connectivity because it would contribute to the rapid development of trade and commerce between the two countries.

The PEC on completion would give China strategic access not only to Arabian Sea through Gwadar port but also to the sensitive areas of POK and India’s border with Pakistan.

However, there is a need to exercise caution to ensure the projects do not increase our strategic vulnerability. Suitable caveats should be included in any agreements on such projects to ensure that they do not compromise either the security of sensitive areas or assist China in giving form to its territorial claims over Indian Territory.

There are a whole lot of strategic security concerns for India on the Western sector bordering Pakistan ever since China started implementing the PEC project.  The PEC on completion would give China strategic access not only to Arabian Sea through Gwadar port but also to the sensitive areas of POK and India’s border with Pakistan. As Pakistan is China’s close strategic ally, the PEC can give form and content to bring greater convergence in their strategic interests relating to India.

There are similar concerns about China’s growing connectivity and linkages with Nepal also. However, Nepal-India relations are age-old and bound by each other’s interest. While Nepal’s desire to take advantage of China for its own development is understandable and improvement in connectivity is inevitable, India needs to factor this while shaping its Nepal policy.

There is no doubt that the BCIM corridor would enable the backward regions of both India and China to join national developmental mainstream. It would tremendously increase two-way trading opportunities of both China and India, benefitting Yunnan province of China and Northeast Indian states, apart from Burma and Bangladesh.

China would also gain a more convenient and direct land access avoiding Himalayan passes to reach the huge Indian market and also the under exploited markets of other South Asian countries. On the other hand, India would be able to add more vigour to the Look East Policy by gaining speedier land access to the markets of ASEAN and Southeast Asia. This could result in increasing economic opportunities for Indian youth in troubled North-eastern states, providing them incentive to give up extremism.

India should be strategically ready to factor these aspects while opening up the BCIM corridor for China.

On the other hand, BCIM opens up a strategic axis from Chinese mainland to enter Northeast India. It cuts across chokepoints on the lines of communication to India’s disputed border areas in Arunachal Pradesh. In the past China had provided arms and military training to separatist insurgents from the North-eastern states in the corridor. While China has given up this policy, it still retains the option to do so.

Even now extremist groups from Nagaland, Manipur and Assam deal with Chinese gun runners. Such clandestine activities would be made easier when the BCIM corridor is wide open. India should be strategically ready to factor these aspects while opening up the BCIM corridor for China.

Overall the issue of China’s strategic connectivity to South Asia is directly related to India’s security interests in the region. Building greater understanding and credibility between India and China is the only way to take advantage of the opportunities it offers to develop India. This process could take time and present global and regional strategic climate augurs well for India and China to embark upon this.

Courtesy: http://col.hariharan.info/

Notes

[i]  http://news.xinhuanet.com/English/indepth/2013-04-29/c_132349167.htm

[ii] Joint Statement- A vision for future development of India-China strategic and cooperative partnership, October 23, 2013 http://mea.gov.in

1 2
Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Col R Hariharan

Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. Courtesy: Hariharan’s Intelligence Blog.

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left

One thought on “Strategic perspectives on China’s South Asian connectivity

  1. China has realized its potential while India, which was great power and invited to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1957 (and which Nehru turned down in favour of China) is now a third rate power below Sub Saharan Africa on the Human Development Index. “Democracy” has been sentenced to several lashes for it though India is neither a democracy (it has enshrined inequality under law in the Indian Constitution) nor a Nation (it has enshrined exceptions to the rule of law and a “many nations” theory in the Indian Constitution). India’s real fatal flaw is its unwillingness to face the truth and learn from past mistakes. A natural out come of India’s veneration of the least worthy for who they are rather than what they did which is, mildly put, criminal.

More Comments Loader Loading Comments