Geopolitics

State, strategy, power & policy: China and India
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Issue Vol 23.3 Jul-Sep 2008 | Date : 30 Jun , 2011

The grand strategy of a state may be described as a long–term plan to accomplish its domestic and external objectives. Policies flowing from the grand strategy must aim to promote the vital interests of the nation while preventing other nations from interfering with such interests. The power that a state wields and its foreign policy orientation are important in this regard. James Rosenau, in an article in the Free Press published 1971, describes foreign policy strategy as “any pre-designed set of moves, or a series of decisions, in a competitive situation where the outcome is not governed purely by chance.”

In international politics, over 100 nation-states, each pursues interests that conflict with that of other states, in a game where rules are largely unwritten and informal, evolving mainly through the wishes of the stronger players. In a broad sense, a foreign policy strategy is a plan for advancing ones own national interests (as one defines these interests) while preventing other players from impinging on them.

Like India, China too has undergone many internal convulsions leading to break-ups. But after each such event a strong leader emerged who was able to rally the others around, by force or persuasion, and the process of coalescence started all over again.

To analyse the dynamics of contemporary international politics, it would be necessary to understand the essentials of a ‘state’, the culture of ‘strategy’, the ingredients of ‘power’ and the orientation of ‘foreign policy’. The context of this analysis would be the current status of China and India and the requirements for India to address the negative asymmetry that has developed between the two nations.

State

Both China and India are very old civilisations. Both have a long history replete with successes, surrenders and subjugations. Both have witnessed victories and defeats, unifications and break-ups, and slavery and freedom. There are many differences also between the two countries and among these, perhaps the fundamental difference has been the understanding and realisation of being a ‘state’.

The consciousness of being a ‘state’ has existed in China and the Chinese for many centuries. And they believe in the centrality of the Chinese state. Despite the fluctuations of history this belief has survived. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, during a speech in the Lok Sabha on November 25, 1959, put it thus, “from fairly early in history, they have had a sensation of greatness. They call themselves the ‘Middle Kingdom’, and it seemed natural to them that other countries should pay tribute to them. Their thinking was that the rest of the world occupied a lower grade. That has made it difficult for us to understand the working of their mind, and what is more to the point, for them to understand the working of our mind.”

A similar consciousness of being a ‘state’ has not existed in India or Indians. Here, a clear distinction must be drawn between India the civilisation and India the state. India has the essentials of a ‘state’, it has a defined territory, it has a population, a government and it has sovereignty. But India does not display the attribute of toughness where its vital interests are concerned. After the Kandahar hijack episode, India was termed variously as a ‘soft’, ‘disjointed’ and ‘directionless’ state.

Also read: Army: A Need for Introspection

China’s cohesiveness as regards language, ethnicity and culture (900 million Chinese belong to the Han grouping and speak Mandarin) is compared with India’s multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-religious status and offered as the reason for this widely differing perceptions of being a state, between the two countries. This is only partially true. Like India, China too has undergone many internal convulsions leading to break-ups. But after each such event a strong leader emerged who was able to rally the others around, by force or persuasion, and the process of coalescence started all over again.

Sun Tzus strategic principles were continuously updated by subsequent Chinese strategists over the centuries to keep them relevant to the changing technologies and environment. Kautilyas Arthshastra has become the object of historical studies.

Thus, the centripetal forces prevailed on most occasions. In India it was the opposite. On the occasions that unity was achieved, centrifugal forces came into play and the process of disintegration began. Foreign forces took advantage of the situation, played one against the other and achieved their objective of domination. Distrust became endemic, severely hampering unity or the consciousness of being a state. It is only now, in modern India, that the younger generation, unencumbered by the baggage of the past, is developing a consciousness of pan-Indian unity. Perhaps cricket, connectivity and the media are hastening the process. Technology is transcending borders and it is China that is now feeling the pressure of centrifugal forces.

Strategy

Strategy has been defined as a plan designed to achieve a particular long term aim. It is also the art of planning and directing military activity in a war or battle. Sun Tzu, of China, authored the Art of War, sometime between the 8th and 5th Century BC, three or four centuries earlier than our own Kautilya, who wrote the Arthshastra during 4th-3rd Century BC. Both wrote broadly about strategy. They discussed statecraft, diplomacy, relationship with other nations and a host of other topics in their respective books. The prevalence of ‘strategic culture’ in the two countries can be gleaned from the fact that Sun Tzu’s strategic principles were continuously updated by subsequent Chinese strategists over the centuries to keep them relevant to the changing technologies and environment. Kautilya’s Arthshastra has become the object of historical studies and no serious attempts were made, either by the military analysts or other strategists to evaluate its practical applicability and pertinence to developmental changes in India.

The near absence of a strategic culture in India is further driven home if one scrolls down the Wikipedia listing of military strategists /writers over time. While Chinese names like Jiao Yu, Shen Kuo, Sun Bin, Sun Tzu, Wu Qi, Liu Ji, Wang Xiangsui, Zhuge Liang and Mao Zedong leap out at you, the only Indian in the list is Kautilya. China’s push to become a global power is based on a modern interpretation of Sun Tzu’s classic and Chinese scholars rely on historical strategic lessons and Art of War to develop strategies of the Chinese State and its leaders. In contrast, the strategic lessons India has learnt from its previous wars or international engagements lie locked in ‘Top Secret’ cupboards and Indian strategists and military analysts are denied opportunities to study the past and bring out lessons for the future.

Chinas policy in South Asia”“imposing deep national humiliation on India by exposing its strategic shortcomings in 1962

The contrasting strategic cultures of China and India have strongly influenced bilateral relations in the past. The relations between the two countries will always have elements of competition and contest. Many international relations analysts maintain that given their geographical proximity and sheer sizes, China and India are natural rivals. Nancy Jetley, in her analysis of Sino-Indian relations, in an article written in 1992 stated that, “It needs to be clearly recognised that China’s claims to vast tracts of Indian land are related in the main to ideological intent. The Chinese strategy, as it unfolded after 1959 was designed not so much to gain possession of a few sq thousand miles of mountainous territory–not all of which was strategically vital to China–as to eliminate India as a power of consequence from the Asian scene.

China’s policy in South Asia–imposing deep national humiliation on India by exposing its strategic shortcomings in 1962, tarnishing its image as a great Asian country, systematically eroding its special ties with its Himalayan neighbours, exploiting sub-continental dissensions by embarking on a deliberate policy of collusion with Pakistan and above all weakening the political stability of India through its clandestine support to Mizo and Naga insurgents–has been essentially an exercise in isolating India and eroding its influence in the region.” India regained some of its lost stature displaying superior military strategy in 1971.

The relations between the two countries have improved over the years but land issues are yet to be resolved. China is a patient country with a long memory and Deng Xiao Ping with the usual Chinese farsightedness stated in 1986 that it would perhaps be better if the Sino-Indian border problem is left to be solved by future generations. Much can be read into this statement. Later, in early 1990s, Deng expounded his ‘24-Character Strategy’:

“observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

Later the phrase, ‘make some contribution’, was added.

 The strategy suggests both a short-term desire to downplay China’s ambitions and a long-term strategy to build up China’s power to maximise options in the future. There is an ominous ring to this 24-character strategy and India would do well to take heed, even though China may have articulated the strategy with the superior power of USA in its sights.

India’s strategy of ‘non-alignment’ collapsed along with the Soviet Union and the country floundered about without policy moorings for a period. In the recent past measures like the economic liberlisation, declaring itself a nuclear-weapon state and the ongoing strategic nuclear deal have given India a semblance of strategic focus.

Power

Power has been described as the ability to exercise influence over others within the international system.This influence can be coercive, attractive, co-operative or competitive. Thomas Hobbes interprets power as the present means to obtain some future good. US diplomat Charles W Freeman has defined power as “the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact and irresistibility of power. It guides the way the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage….”

The term power is highly elastic and flexible but its importance and centrality in the relations between nations cannot be ignored. Here ‘soft power’ (as opposed to hard power whose constituents are mainly military muscle and economic clout) is not being discussed. ‘Soft power’ is a term coined by Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard to describe how a country can influence others through its culture, values and media. Ray Cline in his work ‘Power Strategy and Security’ has tried to quantify the power of a state mathematically through an equation:

 Pp= (C+E+M) x (S+W)

where Pp is ‘perceived power’ of a state,

C = critical mass which includes population and territory,

E = economic capability,

M = military capability,

S = strategic purpose, and

W = will to pusue national strategy.

If nations are evaluated by applying this equation it would reveal, roughly, the perceived power of that country. Nations, however, are complex entities and when a generalised model like this is applied to them, some amount of descriptive narration would have to be included. Even then the outcome, will at best, be a comparitive order of perceived power of the countries analysed.

China has its share of problems. It is a net importer of foodgrains and energy. It has serious environmental issues and pollution of air and water is rampant along the eastern coast, which is the hub of industrial production and home to a vast majority of labour.

Before applying the equation to China and India, it would be interesting to evaluate USA, the only superpower today and Russia, the successor state to an erstwhile superpower.

If the model is applied to USA, the dominant power in the world today, it would score very high in ‘critical mass’. It has a vast area of 9.8 million sq km and an optimum population of 304 million. The quality of the manpower, with a median age of 36.7, is very good with 99 per cent literacy and high skill levels in science, technology and R&D. The US has a GDP of $ 13.84 trillion when calculated against purchase power parity (PPP) or official exchange rate (OER) and a growth rate of 2.2 per cent. It has the most potent military in the world with a budget of $ 700 billion or 4.06 per cent of GDP per year.

The strategic purpose of the USA is to maintain well being of all its citizens, sustain the forces of democracy and protect its vital interests wherever they lie on the globe. The US has demonstrated on many occasions that it is willing to use all means to pursue national strategy. USA scores very high on all counts and its perceived power is very high. Despite the recent slowdown of its economy or the loss of credibility due to its messy and unwinnable status in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is likely to remain the predominant power in the world for the foreseeable future.

Russia, the successor state of an earlier superpower which had challenged USA for global leadership, presents a study in contrast.Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia remains the largest country in the world with an area more than 17 million sq km. It has a population of 140 million whose median age is 38.3. It has a major problem with its population shrinking by 0.5 per cent (700,000 this year) annually. Despite a literacy rate of 99.4 per cent, the labour force has begun to reduce and this will impact on all aspects of the Russian state. On the economic front it has managed to pull itself out of an abyss due to it being the prime energy exporter in Europe. Its GDP(PPP) is $ 2.088 trillion and GDP(OER) is $ 1.286 trillion. It has a healthy growth rate of 8.1 per cent but 22 million of its shrinking population is below the poverty line.

Russia’s military and military industrial complex had been very negatively affected post the collapse and it is only now that the rebuild process has gathered momentum. Russia spends $50 billion or 3.9 per cent of its GDP(OER) on its military. Russia’s strategic leverage and will to pursue national strategy have been seriously undermined. The creeping NATOisation of its backyard and Russia playing second fiddle to USA are indicative of its diminishing clout in the world. Consequently its perceived power has degraded. If the negative population growth can somehow be stemmed, then the massive energy reserves will enable Russia to regain some of its power status.

Also read: Blueprint for Indian Aerospace Industry

China is the most populous country in the world with its population at 1.33 billion whose median age is 33.6. It has the world’s fourth largest territory of 9.59 million sq km. It has a literacy rate of 91 per cent and its population growth rate has been brought under control by a state enforced policy of ‘one family one child’. It has the fastest growing economy in the world with an average growth rate of 9.4 per cent for the past 25 years. China’s economy has increased tenfold since 1978. It has a GDP(PPP) of $ 6.991 trillion and GDP(OER) of $ 3.251 trillion and is second only to the USA in the world. It has a labour force of 803 million which is ageing. The People’s Liberation Army of China is the largest in the world, numbering 2.3 million and includes land, naval, air and strategic forces.

There is a wide gap between the perceived power status between China and India and India will have to take tough strategic decisions with maturity and pragmatism to reduce the gap.

In the last decade or so China has modernised its armed forces by acquiring state-of-the-art weaponry from Russia, improving its own military industrial complex and adopting new training and personnel policies. It is the pre-dominant military power in the region with realistic intentions of becoming a superpower. Though China claims to spend only $ 60 billion on its military, most analysts agree that actual expenditure on its military is around 4.3 per cent of its GDP(OER) or $ 140 billion annually. The increasing economic and military clout has further strengthened China’s will to pursue its strategic national interests. It is best demonstrated by the ‘One China’ policy which lays down that Taiwan is a part of China, temporarily estranged. China has made it clear that it will brook no interference in this regard and even the USA walks warily around this issue. China’s perceived power is high and rising rapidly.

China has its share of problems. It is a net importer of foodgrains and energy. It has serious environmental issues and pollution of air and water is rampant along the eastern coast, which is the hub of industrial production and home to a vast majority of labour. The ‘one child’ policy has begun to skew the age profile of the population and the productive labour force. The totalitarian type of governance in China may, in the future, clash with rising affluence of individuals and desire for greater personal liberty. The regionally lopsided development with the interior, home to most of China’s 110 million below poverty line population and largely unaffected by the economic boom will fuel discontent. Repression of Tibetans and denial of human rights to many are festering sores that China will have to confront with soon.

India has an area of 3.28 million sq km, nearly half of which is arable.It has a population of 1.15 billion of which 61 per cent are literate but a huge 25 per cent or 280 million are living below the poverty line. The median age of the population is only 25.1 indicating that a large reservoir of productive work force will be available for many years in the future provided the basic requirements of health and education are met. India’s GDP(PPP) is $ 2.989 trillion and GDP(OER) is $ 1.099 trillion. The real growth rate is a healthy 9.2 per cent. The economy could grow faster but the balancing acts in the country’s fractious democracy have necessitated compromises.

India has a sizeable military but the pace of modernisation has been slow. Most of the weapon platforms, some dating back to the Soviet era, need replacements but a torturous decision process keeps injecting delays into acquisition programmes. India military budget is $ 19 billion or slightly less than 2.5 per cent of GDP(OER). An increase to about 3.5 per cent is warranted but difficult to achieve as there are many other competing demands.

As far as China is concerned, India appears to have accepted their “˜Middle Kingdom status and the relations between the two countries, perhaps because of the 1962 humiliation heaped on India, is that of a superior and a supplicant.

But not doing so would further widen the military capability gap vis-a-vis China. India has yet to articulate its strategic national interests. Its strategic military victory over Pakistan in 1971, the Maldives operation in 1985 and the decision to go nuclear in 1998 are India’s few strategic high points. The Indian polity has rarely risen above personal or party objectives to achieve a national unity of purpose. The planned Indo-US nuclear deal is mired in controversies arising from rigid ideological positions camouflaged as strategic security concerns.

India’s perceived power, very low for a long time, has improved in the past 15 years. India has to develop the quality of its population while simultaneously modernising its armed forces. There is a wide gap between the perceived power status between China and India and India will have to take tough strategic decisions with maturity and pragmatism to reduce the gap.

Foreign Policy

According to Wikipedia, a country’s foreign policy is a set of goals that seek to outline how that particular country will interact on an official basis with other countries of the world and to a lesser extent, with non-state actors. Besides, an entire range of factors relating to those other nations–including economic, political, social, military, etc.–is evaluated and monitored in attempts to maximise benefits of multilateral international co-operation. Foreign policies are designed to protect a country’s national interests, national security, ideological goals and economic prosperity. This can occur as a result of peaceful co-operation with other nations or through exploitation.

Also read: Nuclear capability of India and China

As far as China is concerned, India appears to have accepted their ‘Middle Kingdom’ status and the relations between the two countries, perhaps because of the 1962 humiliation heaped on India, is that of a superior and a supplicant. The relations between the two countries has been examined in great detail in an article carried by the Jan-Mar 2008 issue of this magazine. Some of the concluding sentences of the article by Mr Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary GOI, merit repetition: “The satisfaction we seem to derive from semantic play by the Chinese on the two issues (India’s permanent membership of the Security Council and the international co-operation in India’s nuclear sector) reflect our mental acceptance of an inferior status vis-a-vis China and our readiness to be patronized by that country. We should not demand equality from China, we should behave as equals. We should protect our interests more forcefully. Our border infrastructure should be developed rapidly. Our strategic programme must be accelerated…..”

Chinas territorial claims are non-negotiable and at an opportune moment would seek to reclaim what it considers as its own land. If by then India realises her true potential then a fair settlement is likely. But if not, then India will have to pay the price.

India’s policies are reactive. We have not prepared action plans to meet contingencies. Our decision makers are reluctant to consult groups/individuals outside the government to obtain inputs and views that would definitely improve the quality of our actions and responses. All democracies and even the Chinese goverment obtains inputs from ‘think tanks’, universities and other organisations specialising in international relations. We have the IDSA and the National Security Advisory Board, but both firmly under the governments thumb. The requirement is for independent and unbiased opinion from people/organisations which are completely free from governmental control.

Perhaps we should learn from the Chinese the subtleties of international behaviour partly based on deception. Sun Tzu, in his book Art of War states that “All warfare is based on deception.” Subsequent Chinese strategists have elaborated on this by laying down ‘stratagems for winning’. Stratagem means–to reach a goal unorthodoxically by masquerading the intent and doing the unexpected. A sampling of ‘six winning stratagems’ would be educative.

  • ‘Deceive the heavens to cross the ocean’– mask your goals.
  • ‘Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao’–when the enemy is too strong to be attacked directly, then attack something he holds dear, knowing that he cannot be superior in all things, there is some weakness that can be attacked.
  • ‘kill with a borrowed knife’–attack using the strength of another; trick an ally into attacking or use the enemy’s own strength against him.
  • ‘substitute leisure for labour’–choose the time and place for battle. Encourage the enemy to expend his energy in futile quests while you conserve your strength. When he is exhausted and confused you attack with energy and purpose.
  • ‘loot a burning house’–when a country is beset by internal conflicts, when corruption and crime are rampant, it will be unable to deal with an outside threat. This is the time to attack.
  • ‘make a sound in the east, then strike in the west’– feint.

From the events that are happening in the sub-continent, it can be seen that China, in collusion with Pakistan and Bangladesh and now Nepal, is employing these stratagems as part of its policy toward India, with some help from certain political groupings within the country.

By adopting the right strategies and given its current momentum and trajectory of development, India can become a formidable economic and military power capable of bringing about changes in the environment advantageous to itself. China has always attempted (and often succeeded) in keeping India in an ‘unsettled’ state and unless the power asymmetry is significantly reduced, if not eliminated, that situation will continue to exist. China is a rising power, but a dissatisfied one with a long memory. China’s territorial claims are non-negotiable and at an opportune moment would seek to reclaim what it considers as its own land. If by then India realises her true potential then a fair settlement is likely. But if not, then India will have to pay the price. As the late General Sundarji put it so succintly: “To be weak is not virtuous, to be prepared is not provocative.”

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

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Air Marshal Narayan Menon

Air Marshal Narayan Menon

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