Homeland Security

Specialised Force for Internal Unrests
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Vol 25.4 Oct-Dec 2010 | Date : 24 Oct , 2014
  • Manpower. There should be no direct recruitment to ISF. The complete manpower should consist only of ex-servicemen. As a matter of policy, no one other than an ex-serviceman should be inducted in this force to ensure that it develops a military-like ethos without any dilution. Short Service Commission (SSC) officers, after completing their tenure with the army could be offered absorption into ISF. To man senior ranks initially, suitable officers could also be taken on permanent secondment from the army. Once the initial inductees rise in ranks, they should man the complete structure. As regards the other ranks, medically fit personnel after the completion of their tenure of duty with the army, should be offered absorption on analogous posts in ISF with full protection of pay fixed in the pay band and the grade pay. However, military personnel should have the option to decline lateral shift to ISF and retire with standard pensionary benefits.

ISF would need no training facilities of its own. Induction of fully trained soldiers would obviate need to impart recruits training.

  • Training. ISF would need no training facilities of its own. Induction of fully trained soldiers would obviate need to impart recruits’ training. Further, it should have arrangements for subscribing to vacancies on various courses run by the military.
  • Size and Structure. To start with ISF should consist of six battalions, grouped under two sector headquarters. Organisation structure should be modular and platoon-centric.

Skeptics and their Likely Reservations

Although the suggested proposal cannot be faulted on any legitimate grounds, skeptics would certainly raise subjective questions. Clarifications to some of the major anticipated reservations are as follows:-

  • With existing abundance of central police forces, ISF would be a wasteful duplication.

ISF will be a paramilitary force, first of its kind in the country and not duplicating existing police forces. Two points need to be borne in mind. First, as stated earlier, real strength of a fighting force lies in the development of correct ethos and mindsets. Once ingrained, it becomes well nigh impossible to modify them. A police force cannot be converted into a paramilitary force simply by extra training and equipment – normal police functioning and counter-insurgency operations require totally dissimilar attributes. Secondly, once ISF is well established and relieves CRPF of counter-insurgency operations, the strength of CRPF can be correspondingly reduced in a calibrated manner – by reducing intake and not retrenchment.

  • Age profile of ISF will be hit adversely by the lateral shift.

Presently the average age of recruitment in the army is 19 years while in central police forces personnel up to the age of 26 years are recruited and thereafter trained for at least one year. If the army soldiers are laterally shifted after seven years in the services, average age of fully trained inductees will be 26 years. As such, the age profile of ISF will remain totally unaffected.

  • Army personnel are trained to kill while in internal security duties considerable restraint has to be exercised.

Army personnel are highly disciplined. Since Independence, the army is increasingly involved in counter-insurgency operations as also rendering aid to the civil authority in the maintenance of law and order. Its record has been exemplary. Soldiers are trained to use minimum force and act in good faith. Therefore, it is totally incorrect to say that soldiers are only trained to kill. In any case, fighting armed insurgents requires use of considerable force, much beyond the capability of regular police forces.

  • Side-stepping would curtail employment opportunities for new entrants.

Through lateral move to ISF, army retirees would get gainful employment up to 60 years of age. Therefore, no real loss in employment opportunities will occur.

Presently, soldiers retire from the army after completing a maximum of 17 years of service. Another employment has to be found for them. Through lateral move to ISF, army retirees would get gainful employment up to 60 years of age. Therefore, no real loss in employment opportunities will occur. It is just that employment would be provided to ex-servicemen rather than raw personnel.

Incidentally, CRPF issued a notification on 05 Apr 2010, offering contractual engagement to 1950 ex-servicemen of age less than 40 years in the post of constables for a period of 5 years (extendable to 7 years).

Benefits of the Suggested Proposal

Currently, the army is facing a shortage of officers close to 24 percent of its authorised strength. Due to steep pyramid-like hierarchical structure, the only solution lies in making SSC attractive. Presently, insecurity about future prospects deters many youth from applying for SSC. They fear that failure to get Permanent Commission will make them jobless in the prime of their lives with full family responsibilities to boot. As financial remunerations and hand-shake packages can never compensate for uncertain future, youth has to be assured of a life time career to be motivated to opt for SSC. Lateral shift to ISF will provide a highly attractive avenue. It would also help keep the age profile of the defence forces young.

During times of war, ISF units could be put under army formations to control internal situation and secure lines of communications.

Approximately 40,000 young, well trained and physically fit soldiers are released from the defence forces every year. This highly disciplined and trained pool of manpower is lost to the country without being put to any productive use. ISF will get trained manpower with rich experience in anti-terrorist and counterinsurgency duties. Further, as the trained manpower of the defence forces will remain engaged in a life time employment, no subversive elements will be able to misguide them for anti-social activities.

The pension bill of the Government will get significantly curtailed as pension will be due to the retiring servicemen only after 30/33 years of service as against 17 years of service at present. Additionally, ISF would save on recruitment and training costs of personnel. SPC had also recommended similar lateral movement to CPO.

During times of war, ISF units could be put under army formations to control internal situation and secure lines of communications. Thus, India’s war effort would get augmented.

Conclusion

In utter disregard to their safety, it has inducted ill-equipped and inadequately trained CRPF forces to battle Naxalites, making them easy fodder for the elusive insurgents.

The Government will do well to learn from the declaration made by the US Secretary of Defence Robert M Gates at the Naval Academy in April 2010. He pledged, “And when I send you in harm’s way, as I will, I will do everything in my power to see that you have what you need to accomplish your mission – and come home safely”. Contrast the above pledge with the attitude of the Indian Government. In utter disregard to their safety, it has inducted ill-equipped and inadequately trained CRPF forces to battle Naxalites, making them easy fodder for the elusive insurgents. It is a grave and criminal dereliction of duty, grossly unfair to CRPF personnel and their hapless families.

As seen above, embroilment of the army in counter-Naxalite operations is the worst thing that can happen to the country. Creation of ISF is an extremely viable scheme that harnesses the expertise and experience of ex-servicemen. It will not only result in substantial financial savings to the Government but will also guarantee life time employment to scores of ex-service personnel. Therefore, it should be implemented in its entirety without any delay.

A word of caution would not be out of place here. The fundamental strength of ISF would lie in its ex-servicemen character and it should not be diluted. Authorities must resist temptation to use higher appointments in ISF to park police officers. ISF should not go National Security Guard way, wherein the real punch is provided by the military component but ironically, the Director General is a police officer.

1 2
Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Maj Gen Mrinal Suman

is India’s foremost expert in defence procurement procedures and offsets. He heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Services Group of CII.

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left

6 thoughts on “Specialised Force for Internal Unrests

  1. from 66 battallions the RR FORCE MUST BE RAISED TO OVER 200 BATTALLIONS WITH CORESPONDING DECREASE OF 50 CRPF ,50 CISF30 BSF OVER 130 BATTALIONS AND THE ENTIRE INTERNAL SECURITY , COUNTER TERROR , MAOIST CHALLENGE BE HANDLED BY THEM . FROM POSITIONING BATTALLIONS IN J&K , PUNJAB , UTTRAKHAND , HARYANA , UP , BIHAR , WEST BENGAL ORRISA , CHATISGARGH , JHARKHAND , ANDHRA , KARNATKA , MAHRASTRA , MADYA PARADESH , ALL SEVEN EASTERN STATES THE RR SHOULD AND CAN FINSH THE MAOIST PROBLEMS . TO IMPROVE THE CISF , CRPF AND OTHER POLICE AND PARA ORGANISATIONS , OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS FROM ARMY AND ALL POLICE , PARA ORGANISATIONS BE SECONDED TO RR RIFLES . EX DEPUTATION TROOPERS FROM NSG , SPG SHOULD ALSO BE MADE TO SERVE FOR OVER TEN YEARS IN RR RIFLES AFTER COMPLETION OF THEIR DEPUTATION IN NSG AND SPG . THIS WAY 20 SPECIAL FORCES COUNTER TERROIST BATTALIONS OF RANGERS AND STRIKE GROUPS EQUIPPED AND TRAINED TO NSG STANDARDS WILLBE AVAILBLE FOR MEETING THE THREAT .

  2. Unless the civil services the ias and ips are abolished from all civilmiltary defence , internal security functions the state of affairs will not improve and substandard forces whether police , paramiltary or even armed froces will continue to exist . Time has come to remove the civil service babus from education , health , agriculture , railways , defence , internal security and all major minstries of india . WIELDING AUTHORITY WITHOUT RESPONSIBILTY HAS MADE THEM UNACCOUNTABLE , RENT SEEKERS OR SIMPLY COULDNOTCARE LESS AS LONG AS THEIR AGENDAS ARE FULFILLED . WITH RAMPART CORRUPTION AND SELLING OF POSTINGS PROMOTIONS THE STEEL FRAME OF INDAI IS ROTTEN UNCHANGED AND CANNOT DELIVER .

  3. Do Wonder, How the Major General could write such a BS Article considering the Fact that Our republic already have a Specialized Counter Insurgency Force in the name of ASSAM RIFLES to deal with MAOIST kind of Situation.
    ASSAM RIFLES are not only, Highly Trained in Counter Insurgency/Jungle Warfare and in Semi Urban Warfare but are actually Trained for this Kind of Scenario and on top of that they are commanded by officers of the Services and few from Assam Rifles.
    What we need is proper Guidelines and Strong Leadership from the Political Class to deploy ASSAM RIFLES in maoist Infested Areas (as for AR Deployment we need to Introduce AFSPA in Maoist Infested Areas) and start establishing new Formation of AR (at present they have 42 Odd BN) to look after the Counter Insurgency op of our republic (on PAN INDIA Basis) instead of we trying to form New Formation. CRPF have done well by Introducing COBRA but they too have been diluted in their Outlook as COBRA Formation r being Mis Utilized.
    Hope in days to come common sense will prevail and the Political Class will have the Guts to Introduce AFSPA and ASSAM RIFLES in Maoist Infested Areas after giving a Careful though to the Strategic Implication of MAOIST Problem and the Effect of this Internal Stability which has the Potential to Wreck havoc in regard to Internal Security of our Republic instead of Forming a New Formation which will be a HUGE LOSS to the nation and not gain anything substantive which ASSAM RIFLES cannot achieve.
    Above all, The Major General is well aware of the fact that, for any New Formation to be of real value to the nation’s Security, It takes Decades of Moulding, Training and Building up the Formation to its Optimum level of Efficiency and Not few years.
    To end my Note, Do get the Feeling that the Article have been written with some other Motive then just MAOIST problem of our Motherland!
    ~ One penny Thought Off Course! ~
    Deepankar Roy
    Guwahati, Assam

    • I value Deepankar’s views. Deployment of Assam Rifles has two major disadvantages.

      One, as this force operates under the Army and is manned by serving army officers, it will amount to handing over the Naxalite problem to the army. Suction of army will be a highly counter-productive move as stated in the article. It must be avoided at all costs.

      Two, a visit to the official website of the Assam Rifles shows that its real potential is in the north east. It calls itself as the ‘Sentinels of North East’. The website further states – “Assam Rifles is a region specific force with its operational role in the North East” – “As on today, it has a dual role of maintaining internal security in the North-Eastern region and guarding the Indo-Myanmar Border” – “Through its long deployment in the tribal belt, the Assam Rifles have developed an ethos primarily based on friendship with the people of the region” – “It is designated by the GoM committee as the Border Guarding Force for the Indo – Myanmaar border and is also its lead intelligence agency”. Thus Assam Rifles is ill-equipped to operate in Naxalite areas.

      It is agreed that raising of a new force should be avoided as far as possible. This aspect has been discussed in the article at length. But the situation has turned extremely grave and needs drastic action.

      Any suggestion that can help India solve the Naxalite problem deserves due consideration. An informed debate will certainly throw up some brilliant ideas.

      Mrinal

      • I agree with the General. AR is best suited for the north-east. Naxalism is a different cup of tea altogether. One cannot apply the Punjab formula or Kashmir formula for the north-east insurgency problems or for countering maoists. A different approach is needed. General, IRB is being deployed to fight Maoists. articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-08-19/news/52983522_1_bastar-raman-singh-crpf.
        Ideally, like in Punjab, one needs personnel recruited from the affected region to effectively finish the extremists.

More Comments Loader Loading Comments