Military & Aerospace

Space: The New Battle Zone
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Issue Vol. 30.2 Apr-Jun 2015 | Date : 01 Oct , 2015

Ground Segment Vulnerabilities

As mentioned earlier, the Ground segment of a SATCOM can be physically or electronically attacked. It is possible to seize control of a satellite by either gaining access to the network within a satellite control centre or by spoofing control signals using an independent uplink. This is evident from the fact that on two different occasions in 2008, NASA’s Terra EOS AM–1 satellite experienced interference and hackers achieved all steps required to command the satellite but did not issue commands. There have also been other failed attempts to commandeer US satellites, presumably by Chinese hackers.

Sensor Jamming

Surveillance equipment – radio frequency or optical – fitted on military satellite can be rather easily jammed, blinding a satellite. Take the case of an Elint satellite. It can be overwhelmed with signals that it is painstakingly eavesdropping for! SAR satellites can be similarly jammed with spurious radar returns, and optical sensors can be blinded with IR or Laser.

GPS Spoofing

A GPS receiver can theoretically be spoofed by counterfeit GPS signals structured like a normal GPS signal or by re-broadcasting an authentic GPS signal captured elsewhere resulting in a navigation error. A navigational drift can be caused by first broadcasting a signal synchronised with the actual GPS signal and then introducing a progressively increasing error. It is believed that such spoofing led astray a Lockheed RQ-170 drone aircraft in North-eastern Iran in December, 2011, resulting in the drone’s capture.

The Indian Armed Forces, especially the Indian Navy, need to carefully calibrate their dependence on satellites…

Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs)

Directed energy – high-powered microwave, particle beam, laser, can be used to directly attack military satellites, frying their electronics and sensors. DEWs could be based on the ground or on high flying airborne platforms. They could even be placed in orbit. The performance of DEWs is adversely affected by atmospherics. Turbulence and temperature variations in the atmosphere tend to dissipate a focused high energy beam. One way to counter the problem is to pre-distort the beam using adaptive mirrors such that atmospherics causes it to get focused! Adaptive mirror technologically is widely used in modern telescopes and within China’s grasp.

Placing ASAT DEWs in orbit has the advantage of not having to deal with atmospherics but energy requirements call for a heavy satellite and a powerful launcher, pushing up costs. The impossibility of upgrading DEWs placed in orbit further dampens enthusiasm for such weapons. ASAT DEWs placed on high flying manned or unmanned platforms would be less impaired by atmospherics, involve lower costs and be more amenable to upgrades.

The US made impressive technological advances with its Boeing YAL-1 Airborne Laser Testbed. The modified Boeing 747-400F featured a megawatt-class Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL). It was primarily designed to destroy enemy Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) in boost phase, but its laser didn’t prove powerful enough for the task. It is believed a YAL-1 like aircraft could effectively target orbiting satellites when flying above the weather. Russia and China too are working on ASAT DEW technology though no country has, so far, fielded an operational system. China is reported to have used a ground laser to dazzle an American reconnaissance satellite.

US Assessment of Chinese Counter-space Capabilities

Highlighting Russian and Chinese capabilities, the head of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Navy Admiral Cecil D. Haney, said in February 2015, “Both countries have acknowledged they are developing or have developed counter-space capabilities. Both countries have advanced directed energy capabilities that could be used to track or blind satellites, disrupting key operations and both have demonstrated the ability to perform complex maneuvers in space.” According to Haney, Russia and China and a number of other nations are working to take away America’s strategic advantage in space by using military jamming capabilities to interfere with satellite communications and global positioning systems.

Indian military planners need to carefully audit the use of GPS…

China’s ASAT Capabilities

China’s ASAT capabilities span the entire spectrum of threats – hard kill, soft kill and deception. On January 11, 2007, China successfully destroyed its obsolete Fengyun 1C weather satellite using a Long March 1C interceptor that collided with the satellite. In 2011, China launched some maneuvering satellites as part of a suspected ASAT test. In May 2013, a high altitude Chinese sub-orbital space launch – claimed to be a scientific mission – was likely the first test of an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) interceptor capable of reaching geosynchronous earth orbit. As mentioned earlier, China has in the past temporarily taken control of US satellites through uplink hacking and blinded a satellite using laser. In 2014, a US government report stated that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had successfully jammed GPS signals of US satellites.

Kinetic Attack Limitations

At first glance, China’s kinetic attack ASAT ability appears most threatening and understandably draws maximum media attention. However, the ability is beset with some limitations and needs to be seen in the correct perspective. The exact circumstances of the 2007 Chinese interception of its meteorological satellite are not known. Did the interceptor target a pre-calculated interception point, or was it Command guided to an interception through active tracking?

Also, the test didn’t go beyond demonstrating China’s ability to target LEO satellites using an IRBM-sized interceptor. To target satellites in Geostationary or Geosynchronous orbits, China would need ICBM-sized interceptors pushing costs to near irrational levels.

China’s ASAT capability is also constrained by the lack of global satellite tracking infrastructure, without which it cannot accurately predict the orbit of a satellite and target a predetermined interception point. If the exact orbital parameters of a satellite are known, its orbital path can be predicted, but ISR satellites such as RISAT and CartoSat have the ability to alter their orbital paths using thrusters. Without global tracking, a Chinese interceptor missile would need to be Command guided along an interception track. Considering the high speed of an orbiting satellite (approximately 7.5 km/sec) and the limited boost phase of a ballistic missile (approximately three minutes) satellite interception poses more challenges than exo-atmospheric interception of an enemy missile warhead following a predictable ballistic trajectory.

Countering Threats to Indian Space Assets

The threat to Indian space assets can be countered by technology and best practices.

Electronic Threat

Following are some of the measures adopted by the new generation Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) series of communications satellites fielded by the United States Air Force Space Command to make SATCOM jam resistant:

  • Narrow spot beams
  • Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) Transmission with Separate encryption devices
  • Phased-array antenna that can vary radiation patterns in order to block out potential sources of jamming

SATCOM Terminals are best secured by eliminating backdoor, hard-coded credentials, undocumented and/or insecure protocols and weak encryption algorithms. Access to terminal firmware must be secured.

The current generation ISRO communication satellites are not jam resistant…

Physical Threat

Physically attacking and destroying satellite tracking and control centres is a very effective way of degrading or crippling enemy satellite operations. ISRO installations need to be secured to the same extent as sensitive military installations if hostilities become imminent.

DEW Threat

To counter heat-to-kill weapons, ISRO satellites must be able to detect a directed energy attack and take evasive measures such as changing orbit, going into safe mode and shielding sensors from the energy source.

Satellite System Fallbacks

In case of an attack on satellites, communication relay, optical or SAR reconnaissance, Elint and ISR can to some extent be performed by High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Airships. The Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is already working on these technologies but perhaps not with as much vigor as is mandated by the urgency. A quick launch ability would allow critical satellite-based communication links to be restored within hours of being taken out.

As to accessing navigation signal, India already has an agreement to access the military signal of the Russian Glonass network and could enter into similar agreements with the US and the European Union. Indian military planners need to carefully audit the use of GPS. Our aircraft, ships, boats, submarines, UAVs, weapons and communication terminals must not get locked out in the absence of satellite-based navigation signals. They should automatically revert to inertial mode combined with manual position fixes.

Integrated Space Cell

Recognising the military importance of space based assets, the Government of India (GoI) has set up the Integrated Space Cell, which operates under Integrated Defence Services Headquarters. The cell is tasked with efficient utilisation and security of the country’s space-based military assets. The formation of the Cell was announced on June 10, 2010, by Defence Minister A.K Antony citing “the growing threat” to India’s space assets.

India’s Space Warfare Capabilities

India is developing capabilities to:

  • Defend its satellites against disabling attempts through kill vehicles, laser or other beam weapons
  • Disable enemy satellites in orbit using kinetic and directed energy weapons
  • Launch micro satellites on demand at short notice

The DRDO says it is building capabilities to protect Indian satellites against electronic or physical attack. Presumably, future ISRO satellites would incorporate these capabilities.

ASAT Capability Development

India is developing anti-satellite capability but has no plans to field test an anti-satellite weapon because of space debris concerns. Interception and destruction of satellites would be tested electronically only. Indian ASAT capability is being built around the following technological components that have already been developed and tested.

  • Target satellite would be tracked using the Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) developed for the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system with a current range of 600 km that is being extended to 1,400 km.
  • First stage of Agni-V which can inject a warhead into a 600 km high orbit will serve as the interceptor.
  • The Interceptor will use the kill warheads developed for BMD missiles, featuring Infra-Red and Radar frequency seekers to home on to and destroy the target satellite.
  • Communication and control systems developed for the BMD program would be used for the ASAT capability also.

DRDO scientists have also claimed that the ASAT hit-to-kill vehicle will use an imaging infra-red seeker and a 3-D laser image of a target satellite in LEO to guide itself to impact.

Satellite Launch on Demand

On March 31, during DefExpo 2012, the DRDO first announced that it is building a capability to launch small satellites on demand to support the Armed Forces at a press conference. The capability will provide communication, navigation and guidance support to the armed forces during crises and will be based on Agni 4 and Agni 5 missiles. The DRDO will be able to launch mini and micro satellites within hours of demand.

Future Indian Space Based Assets

The ISRO has given the Indian Armed Forces a bonus edge with space-based surveillance, communications and navigation. New projects are underway to further empower our war fighters.

Communication-Centric Intelligence Satellite (CCI-Sat)

The Defense Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL) under the DRDO is developing this Elint and Surveillance satellite. The satellite will feature SAR for imaging with the capability of detecting conversations and espionage activities in the region. It will be launched in LEO, about 500 km above the earth, using the PSLV. The satellite will reportedly also serve as a test bed for Anti-Satellite weapon development.

GEO Imaging Satellite (GISAT)

The GEO Imaging Satellite (GISAT) will be placed in geostationary orbit of 36,000 km to facilitate continuous observation of the Indian sub-continent and quick monitoring of natural hazards and disasters. The GISAT will carry a GEO Imager with multi-spectral (visible, near infra-red and thermal), multi-resolution (50m to 1.5 km) imaging instruments. It will provide pictures of the area of interest on near real time basis including border areas.

The remote sensing satellites launched by ISRO so far revisit the same area once in every two to twenty-four days and acquire images of a geographical strip (swath) at different spatial resolution (360 metre to better than a metre). The GISAT will provide near real time pictures of large areas of the country, under cloud free conditions, at frequent intervals. That is, selected Sector-wise image every five minutes and the entire Indian landmass image every thirty minutes at 50m spatial resolution.

Cartosat-3

The ISRO is developing Cartosat-3 advanced remote sensing satellite with a resolution of 0.25 m for cartographic applications and high-resolution mapping. The Cartosat-3 will be the successor to the Cartosat-2 series of satellites – Cartosat-2, Cartosat-2A and Cartosat-2B – capable of 0.8 metre resolution imaging. Currently, the American satellite GeoEye-1, launched in September 2008 and owned by DigitalGlobe, has the best resolution of 0.41 m among commercially available satellites. Another DigitalGlobe satellite, WorldView-2, offers a best resolution of 0.46 metre. DigitalGlobe degrades its commercial imagery to 0.5metre to conform to US regulations. Cartosat-3 featured in the Notes on Demands for Grants, 2013-2014 from the Department of Space, which formed part of the budget documents presented to Parliament in February 2013, against a request of Rs 10 crore.

Conclusion

The most potent threat to the Indian military and dual use satellites in Low Earth Orbit (RISAT, CARTOSAT, TES) comes from Chinese hit-to-kill ASAT interceptors. However, the debris resulting from large-scale kinetic attacks on Indian satellites could potentially damage scores of satellites belonging to other countries over a period of time leading to global disruption of services. Such debris could make access to large tracts of orbital space hazardous. It is unlikely that China would consider using kinetic ASAT weapons against India unless faced with ignominious defeat. The threat to Indian space assets will mostly come from jamming, spoofing and perhaps DEWs. China has demonstrated its ability to attack satellites and is likely far ahead of the defensive measures that Indian satellites currently incorporate.

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The Indian Armed Forces, especially the Indian Navy, need to carefully calibrate their dependence on satellites to avoid getting ahead of the curve and introducing potentially crippling vulnerabilities. The current generation ISRO communication satellites are not jam resistant to an extent that rules out disruption by Chinese ship-based satellite jammers. Finally, the DRDO has, in the past, introduced vulnerabilities in Indian defense by making over-the-top claims about weapon systems that it is developing. The DRDO’s claims on its ASAT, quick launch ability and Directed Energy Weapons need to be taken with the proverbial pinch of salt.

References

1.http://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_SATCOM_Security_WhitePaper.pdf

2.Defense.gov News Article: Stratcom Chief: U.S. Must Maintain Space Dominance Annual Report to Congress 2014

3.China’s Deceptively Weak Anti-Satellite Capabilities | The Diplomat

4.file:///C:/Upload%20Area/Knol%20Documents/IDSA%20Papers/OP_ThreatstoSpaceAssets.pdf

5.http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/USAFreportweb.pdf

6.Anti-satellite Weapons Pose Major Cyberthreat | SIGNAL Magazine

7.An Assessment Of China’s Anti-Satellite And Space Warfare Programs, Policies And Doctrines

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Sqn Ldr Vijainder K Thakur

Former Fighter Pilot with extensive flying experience on IAF Jaguar and HF-24 Marut.

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