Indian Defence Review

The activities of the Islamic State for Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic State (IS), which is its most recent avatar, have brought into sharp focus the schisms in the Islamic world. The most apparent aspect of the fault line in this is the fresh resurgence of the Shia-Sunni divide, with the Sunni militant IS seeking to undermine the Shia influence in both Iraq and Syria by professing a markedly anti- Shia agenda. As a corollary, the territorial ambitions of the IS, those of setting up a Caliphate in these countries, puts this organization in conflict with the traditional monarchies of the Arab Gulf, since the principles of the IS question the legitimacy and legality of these monarchies.

Paradoxically the initial funding of the IS has come from these very Sheikhdoms, notably from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, countries which have a decidedly dual role in the United States’ (US) war on “terrorist” and fundamentalist organizations of the Middle East. Wealthy individuals from these countries, (supposedly US’s close allies in the Gulf) have, in the initial years of the IS, been major donors to the organization. The funding, at times, was with the tacit acquiescence of the regimes in these countries and on occasion, due to the weak money laundering checks in the sheikhdoms.

Individual donors in these Sheikhdoms, according to information available on the internet, have extended financial support to the ISIL and to its former faction In Syria, the al-Nusra Foundation, which is now reputed to be the Syrian chapter of al Qaeda. It is very much part of the fractured politics of the Middle East and a supreme irony that US allies in the region are, at the individual level at least, backing an arm of al Qaeda, currently one of America’s deadliest enemies.

The US, in an effort to ring in regime change in Syria (which opposes and is the biggest stumbling block to US-inspired efforts at reaching a satisfactory conclusion to the Middle East Peace Process-MEPP), has backed the formation of the Syrian Free Army, by way of training, funding and equipping, to oppose the Bashar al Assad regime. Elements of the Syrian Free Army, which include a significant element of foreign mercenaries, are of late reputed to have defected to join the IS. US-trained and equipped militants are in effect, therefore, operating counter to US regional interests. In addition, the IS has been acquiring American warlike stores abandoned by the US equipped Iraqi army, as well as getting money from looting banks in areas which they capture in fighting in Iraq.

The US has the specific aim of ringing in regime change in the Middle East, in an effort to realise the establishment of regimes which favour the strengthening of US foreign policy and national security objectives. A US State Department document of October 2010 vintage, entitled “Middle East Partnership Review: an Overview”, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Orient Advisory Group, a Washington based research and risk assessment company, makes it clear that the US had a regional programme known as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), aimed at empowering citizens of the Middle East and North Africa to develop “more pluralistic, participatory and prosperous societies”.

The programme was originally conceived in 2002, with the aim of extending ‘direct support to civil society that mainstreams that support into the daily business of US Government policy’. The programme has evolved subsequently into an effective means of the US extending support to all countries of North East Africa where US AID offices exist, which interact with MEPI, to ensure a coordinated regional programme. The aim of the programme has been to “build a network of reformers to learn from and support one another and to catalyse progressive change in the region”.

The deliberate initiation and existence of programmes under the MEPI give rationality to the “spontaneity” of the much heralded “Arab Spring” a decade later.

Under significant US pressure on the one hand and the ISIL challenging the legitimacy of the traditional monarchies of the Arab Gulf on the other, these monarchies had, perhaps, little option but cracking down on individual funding to Sunni extremist groups. At the same time the Gulf sheikhdoms face domestic pressure to back the Sunni elements in the largely inevitable and unavoidable Shia-Sunni regional war, which is becoming more acute as time passes. The IS and to some extent, al-Nusra, are seen as part of the Sunni forces fighting opposing Shia forces, represented by both the Assad and the Maliki (now Abadi) regimes in Damascus and Baghdad, diligently backed by Iran.

The Shia-Sunni confrontation makes it unavoidable for Saudi Arabia, the home of Islam’s holiest shrines at Mecca and Medina, to feel it has a rightful place as leader of the Muslim world. In such circumstances, support for the Sunni Forces fighting the Shia point of view, represented by Iraq and Syria, even if some of these forces question the legitimacy of existing monarchies in the Arab World, is inevitable. This also puts Riyadh on a cleft stick, balancing its own position as leader of the (Sunni) Islamic world, with the pressure applied by the US to be more proactive in fighting forces like the IS.

A driving force for the Saudis and the other Gulf monarchies in this conflict is their common desire to see Shia Iran cut to size. A degradation of Iranian power and influence in the region would be an attractive proposition: to this end they tend to support the regional efforts of the IS. Their joining the US coalition is, however, largely meaningless; they would be, at best, unreliable partners in the coalition. A force Saudi Arabia helped create (the IS) now threatens its very existence; it is, from Riyadh’s point of view, politically expedient to side with big brother US to ensure that the threat from the IS to the existing system does not become more serious and real, threatening the continued reign of the House of Saud,

This conundrum is further complicated by the fact that the threat to Shia interests inevitably has brought Riyadh’s rival for leadership of the Islamic world, Tehran, into the equation. Also, since an armed conflict is under way in the region in which Shia interests are specifically targeted, the entry into the melee of necessary pro-Shia military muscle in the shape of the Lebanon-based militant group, Hezbollah, is also totally foreseeable.

In this scenario, there are the Shi’ite forces, comprising pro Saddam Hussein and Bashar Assad elements, supported by the Hezbollah, confronting the anti-Shia agenda of the IS. The efforts of the IS are also ‘opposed’, if the word can be used, by Government forces in Iraq and the Syrian Free Army on the ground. In addition there is also the coalition cobbled together by the US, comprising roughly 60 European, Balkan and Sunni Arab States, notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan (it must not be forgotten that the original threat of the ISIL was to the Jordanian monarch), responsible for the air campaign against the IS.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Shia militia in Iraq has checked the depredations of the IS against the state more effectively than the US trained Iraq Army which, in the face of determined military action by the IS, has proved to be more like Matthew Arnold’s description of the poet Shelley, a ‘beautiful and ineffectual angel’, than a modern fighting force. The Iraq Government has relied more on the Shia militia to successfully counter the IS that they did on their own army. Ironically therefore, the coalition forces and the Shia militia have a common agenda of opposing the IS in Iraq.

The role of the US “allies” in the current campaign against the IS is obscure, very limited and undefined: the US seems to be doing the lion’s share of the work in the air strikes in Syria. It is not entirely a coincidence that the consequent degrading in the military ability of the Assad regime is serving the interest of the US in securing regime change in Syria. The US goal, after having forced regime change in Iraq, is to undermine Bashar Assad in Syria and ultimately depose him, hopefully replacing him with a more ‘pliable’ government, before attempting to effect similar destabilising against America’s main rival in the region, Iran. Iran has never been forgiven by the US for the takeover of their embassy in Tehran, way back in 1979.

The military successes of the IS against the US trained and equipped Iraqi army led to the rapid disintegration of the latter force, which promptly abandoned large quantities of weapons, generously supplied by Uncle Sam. Consequently, the IS benefitted by gaining access these modern weapons. The collapse of the Iraqi Army and the professed anti-Shia agenda of the IS also caused the emergence of the Shi’ite militia in Iraq to confront the IS and to prevent the entire country being overrun by the IS.

This force is increasing in strength and its ferocity and brutality matches that of its rival force, the IS. For the time being, the Iraqi government requires this Shia militia to contain the IS and the militia, which seems to enjoy local support, have effectively checkmated the IS for the time being. At the same time, the military successes of the IS in its campaign against the Syrians gave the former access to the spoils of war, considerable Chinese and Russian weaponry, sold by these countries to the Syrian Government earlier.

The adverse effects of repeated efforts by the United States to implement and foist their own version of a free world on the orthodox and formalized societies of the Islamic world have, without exception, met with failure. This, however, has not discouraged the US from its well-meaning, but often misguided and bumbling efforts to bash on regardless with their version of political reform, based on their mistaken impressions about there being a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ Taliban and there being in existence a group of ‘moderate’ Islamists; this after leading Arab luminaries have denied there being any moderate Islamists: according to them, a person either believes in the precepts of Islam does not. There is no half way house in the religion.

Further, one of the principal backers of the Taliban, i.e. Pakistan, have belatedly realised that there is no “good” Taliban; unfortunately only after the recent massacre of schoolchildren in Peshawar, after the Taliban has moved fully out of the sphere of influence of Islamabad. More importantly, this has been after Islamabad had temporarily ‘convinced’ the US of the existence of the self-same “good” Taliban.

In the case of the Syrian Free Army, for example, the underlying US principle has been of undermining and degrading the viability of the Bashar al Assad regime. Towards achieving this end, the US has, in 2014 alone set aside $ 5 Billion for anti IS efforts, including earmarking a sum of $1.6 billion for training “moderate” rebel forces in Syria. An additional sum of $ .5 billion has been set aside for the training of such forces. The ‘Cromnibus Bill’ set aside for this purpose authorises the US Secretary of Defence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide ‘assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, sustainment and stipends, to ‘appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian Opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals’. Parts of this generous funding has, inevitably reached the IS and al Nusra.

Press reports indicate that IS jihadists had signed a non-aggression pact with Syrian rebels in a Damascus suburb recently. According to this both sides had agreed not to attack each other and to consider the Nussayri regime as their principle enemy. The term Nussayri is a pejorative used to describe the sect of Islam to which Syrian President Bashar al Assad belongs. Some commanders of the Free Syrian Army had even admitted collaborating with IS and al Nusra Front. Syrian Army sources also admitted elements of the Free Syrian Army had formally joined the IS and al Nusra. US senators claimed that there was no mechanism to ensure rebel groups did not join the IS, which has led to the decidedly embarrassing situation of the IS being provided with arms funded by US taxpayers.

The almost careless insouciance shown by the US in its dealings with the Islamic world began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the realisation of the Reagan Administration, duly supported by ‘Iron Lady” Thatcher, that this was the opportunity of a lifetime for mortally wounding the Communist entity. Technically speaking, the Carter Administration was responsible for beginning limited covert military assistance to the Mujahidin against the Soviet Union’s presence in Afghanistan and the implementation of the Reagan Doctrine saw the United States providing full-scale overt and covert aid and training to anti-communist resistance movements and guerrillas not only in Afghanistan but also in Africa, Latin America and other places in Asia to diminish Soviet influence in these regions, as part of America’s Cold War strategy.

The current backing and funding of the Syrian Free Army is horribly evocative of the training and arming of the mujahidin for confronting the Soviet forces in Afghanistan earlier; there are already signs that the forces being unleashed from the conflict in Iraq and Syria are developing a mind of their own and going the same way as the Afghan mujahidin.

In Afghanistan, the US/UK role was to extend support and create myriad militant groups opposed to the Soviet incursion. Saudi Arabia, due to its financial clout for this effort and Pakistan, due to its geographical contiguity with Kabul, were important partners in this plot to arm, train and indoctrinate mujahidin to fight the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. American weapons largesse flowed into Pakistan for the new mujahidin and the diversion of some of such aid by President Zia and his henchmen, as also by later governments of Pakistan, to equip and train their own terror outfits for Kashmir was natural. Tacit legitimacy was accorded by US to this practice, in exchange for Pakistan’s help in training the mujahidin for Afghanistan. Any claim that the US was unaware of the diversion of such aid by Pakistan to meet its own insidious agenda on Kashmir is, at best, disingenuous and naive. Clearly, Washington did not worry too much about decided impetus being given by Pakistan to the Kashmir militants, as long its own agenda on strengthening the insurgency in Afghanistan against the Soviet Army was being fulfilled.

The Unites States has since continued on a unilateral policy of encouraging regime change in the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East, of regimes which are not amenable to the American view of the world. Like Phoenician Prince Cadmus and also Jason in search of the Golden Fleece in Greek mythology, the US has sowed the dragons’ teeth in the region with panache, taking care since the Iraq war, to function under the fig leaf of “coalition” action.

The agenda and training given to the mujahidin was more to “kill Russians” rather than to ‘liberate’ Afghanistan. It is ironic that the licence to kill was given by the same countries which claim to be in the forefront of the fight against terror. The nature of the mujahidin opposing the Russian army in Afghanistan became increasingly ferocious and feral and it was not long before the warlords were involved in fighting among themselves in an internecine war where morals and ideals soon took a backseat. These developments led to the creation of a new ogre, the Taliban.

By now, the genie was well and truly out of the bottle. Guerrilla warfare tactics taught these mujahidin to kill more effectively; knowledge of improvised explosive devices and the effective use of modern explosives was imparted to mercenaries and mujahidin who flocked to the new hotspot, led to the proliferation of this knowledge among the mujahidin ranks. It also led to the creation of a fighting force of mercenaries and mujahidin, who, once the Afghanistan war had wound down, were available as guns for hire for a variety of causes, many of which seriously challenged peace and political stability in Arab countries from where these individuals had originated.

Despite the instability resulting from the sudden availability of a large body of jihadis looking for a cause that would give them gainful employment, the US kept fishing in the troubled waters of the region. It is not coincidental that both Omar Abdul Rahman, responsible for the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre, as also Osama bin Laden, had initial connections in some manner or the other, to American intelligence. Self-confessed “war” President George Bush merely increased the intensity of something that was begun by his predecessors. The results were indeterminate, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

In the former case, the war by US coalition forces did not succeed in the primary aim of destroying the Taliban; the latter moved away from even Pakistan’s control and a new Frankenstein in the al Qaeda was also born. The US intervention in Iraq did succeed in the goal of deposing Saddam Hussein, but the much touted US search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq turned out to be a dud: no such weapons existed in the first place. Also, the prolonged US, sorry Allied, presence in Iraq only created unrest in the country and created conditions which are being exploited by entities like the IS today. A continuation of the unrest in the area is inevitable, till the struggle, throws up its own regional leader.

The agenda of regime change being followed by the US in Syria has created al Nusra: there is no assurance this group will not develop political ambitions in the time to come, which may run counter to the US plans for the region. The US-led coalition aerial bombing against the Islamic State group in Syria has already antagonised al Nusra, the Syrian franchise of al Qaeda, which has described the air strikes as a “war against Islam” and threatened to attack the worldwide interests of the participating countries. Developments seem headed to a new confrontation between the Islamists and the US and its “allies”.