Geopolitics

Solving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: One Million Indians for a Road
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Issue Vol. 30.2 Apr-Jun 2015 | Date : 14 May , 2015

If we look at recent history, an encouraging pattern emerges. In 2003, the BJP bid for a settlement of the border and achieved Chinese recognition of Indian sovereignty over Sikkim. It was not appreciated at the time what a step this was for China, as the focus eventually shifted to the relatively insignificant but nevertheless irritating decision to issue special visas to Indians from Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir7. Nevertheless, the gradual improvement continued. The next breakthrough came in Beijing on October 23, 2013, when Manmohan Singh and Chinese Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, oversaw the signing of the Border Defence Co-operation Agreement (BDCA), a sensible arrangement that provides rules of engagement in case of confrontation between the two sides, thus accepting that such confrontations might still happen. The BDCA also provided for a hotline to be set up between the two heads of government.

Thus, while the last three years have seen more friendly exchanges between the two sides, they have also seen more confrontations, viewed by India as being Chinese incursions across the LAC. There have been two significant incidents in 2013 and 2014, although no shots were fired. It is unlikely that 2015 will be different, even though it has started well.

Chinese overconfidence also shows itself in discussions on Aksai Chin…

In each case, the incursions happened around the time China’s leaders were meeting their Indian counterparts at top-level summits. It is still unclear if the 2013 and 2014 incursions into Indian territory were deliberate statements of intent by the Chinese government or gigantic errors of judgment by the PLA commanders on the ground. Chinese estimates claim that their troops are outnumbered five to one along the border, with 60,000 troops against India’s 300,000, with another 89,000 Indian troops to come.8 If this is true, it should be weighed against China’s ability to bring troops up rapidly along the expressways that extend to the frontlines on Southern and Western Tibet. India does not yet have the capability to bring up supplies so easily but this has improved.

India plans to double its forces in Arunachal Pradesh, much to the annoyance of the Chinese media9. It also plans to resettle people in the border areas and since there is no infrastructure, local residents have been pushed as far as 50 kilometres from the border, which in itself makes the region vulnerable to Chinese forces. A key problem has been cash, according to the Daily Mail of India10, the ITBP was sanctioned Rs 2.6 billion for the period between 2012 and 2017, but the Home Ministry is yet to release this money. India has also sought to pad out its deployment in both Western and Eastern Arunachal Pradesh by moving troops around.

Re-ordering the Indian Army’s ORBAT itself does not intimidate the PLA, but certain aspects of Indian military development do have the potential to cause the PLA to rethink its strategy. India’s border force has upgraded the road to Tawang11, and a new rail link to Itanagar was opened in 2015.

The demarcation process between India and China should mirror the carefully constructed solution to the Sino-Vietnamese border question…

What is the PLA’s strategy? To read international media one would not think so, but the traditional core missions of the PLA are predominantly defensive. China’s military is geared towards various ‘missions’, among which the relevant ‘mission’ from India’s standpoint is that of “border and coastal safeguarding”, which is characteristically defensive but does include one key offensive element, the “joint border counter attack campaign” which is an “offensive campaign against local invading armies… to destroy and expel the invaded enemy and restore territorial sovereignty”12. The PLA can use active defense to preempt an opponent’s impending attack13. This was the strategic concept that was demonstrated against the Indian Army in 1962. Chillingly for India, the “joint border counter attack campaign” is still the likely type of campaign to be used along its border.

The PLAAF does not, however, have capacity to conduct missions away from its borders against India proper. To do so it would need sufficient in-flight refueling capabilities, which it probably does not yet have,14 and a much greater strategic airlift facility15. However, it maintains a significant quantitative (and qualitative advantage) over India in tanks. However, the PLAAF does not have a significant advantage. Although India’s air fleet is not up-to-date, China suffers from multiple aircraft generations and insufficient special mission aircraft which could result in a high risk of failure of any mission against India. Meanwhile, India has improved its air bases in Assam and has deployed Sukhoi Su-30MKIs there, posing a threat to China’s logistics operations in Tibet.

PLA strategic thinking is at its most aggressive when it perceives Indian resolve as wavering…

The governments of both India and China have a shared problem in that while they have shown admirable restraint over the decades, they both have volatile and impassioned nationalism among the ordinary populace. For example, many Chinese believe that Sikkim should never have been recognised as part of India, let alone the disputed areas along the actual border.16,17 And many in India, where there is a free press, are more than happy to demand a much more aggressive response from the Indian Army than its capabilities would allow.

In addition, there are those in the military on both sides who benefit from the prolonging of the dispute. William Egerton of Aegis Advisory points out that to solve the border question, there needs to be actual commitment from both sides to do so, and at present, there are advantages to factions in each country in keeping the dispute unresolved.

Aggressive exhortations to act against India litter Chinese commentary on these issues, and Chinese military bulletin boards are often very dismissive of Indian military capability18. The nature of China’s media – with the bulk of online articles being anonymous – mean that it is very difficult to identify whether the writer is in a position of authority or is simply a teenager letting off steam. However, it is generally accepted that any article that stays online for more than a month has at least some form of official approval. Articles that offend one of a myriad, written and unwritten rules are that they are generally removed quickly, and yet these articles are kept online. In these pieces, India is warned that it “has to face a China that might strike at any minute”19 and that “India seems to be asking for war.”20 It is also argued that China must go to war with India because that would ensure the territory is disputed for the purposes of the so-called “fifty year rule”, which requires that any territory in respect of which there is no dispute is deemed to belong to the actual holder.21 War with India is considered advisable because if China ‘gives in’ to India, Japan (viewed by China as a stronger enemy) will push back harder against China.

Chinese strategic thinking has for decades subscribed to the belief that countries gauge each other’s strength by the extent to which they behave aggressively. Following this line of thinking, a country that does not bully must be weaker than one that does. This view examines only the practicalities of projection of force, not the desirability of doing so.

Chinese overconfidence also shows itself in discussions on Aksai Chin…

Another problem for China’s military is that it has seen so little action. The soldiers of the 1962 generation have retired or died. Yet that generation of soldiery respected their Indian adversaries. In Aksai Chin, Chinese soldiers admired the tenacity of the Indian soldiers who held out against great odds even when there was no hope of relief, and gave them an honourable burial. The present generation of Chinese soldiery has little or no experience of combat and is much more casual about the risks of provoking other nations – and thinks the 1962 War was a walkover.

Many in China seem unaware that Arunachal Pradesh is settled by an Indian population and continue to use the phrase “Take back”22 when discussing it, as if there is a downtrodden population there yearning to be Chinese.

Chinese overconfidence also shows itself in discussions on Aksai Chin. Some claim that because China controls Aksai Chin, its army needs only to descend the other side of the Himalayas to find itself in the Gangetic plains and thus able to threaten Delhi itself.23 In fact, hundreds of kilometres of high mountains separate Aksai Chin from the Indo-Gangetic plain, mountains where it would be easy to lose an army of 100,000 men. Even Arunachal Pradesh offers an easier route to Delhi than Aksai Chin – but there, it is the Indian Army that is in control. The logistical advantage the PLA might gain from its ability to receive reinforcements from the cross-Tibet supply lines would be lost as soon as they found themselves on the border with Assam – assuming they could even penetrate the larger state to the North.

A more thoughtful Chinese paper on the subject appeared in the South Asian Studies Quarterly in 2013. Taking the opposite tack to the fiery rhetoric of China’s online commentators, this report was so cautious that it almost denied the existence of hostility, instead referring in detail to the various agreements between the Indian and Chinese governments and military, expressing confidence that these would defuse tensions.24 Yet this has not happened. Indeed the Chumar and Demchok crises happened more than a year after the joint statements, proving that treaties of that kind are not sufficient to end incursions. They did establish protocols for patrol conflicts, and it is worth noting that no solider died or was injured in either the 2013 or the 2014 stand-offs, but the point of establishing rules for conflicts on the ground is not to give soldiers free reign to carry out ever more aggressive patrols. It is thus more important for the politicians to come to an agreement on the borders.

The demarcation process between India and China should mirror the carefully constructed solution to the Sino-Vietnamese border question. First, the methods of deciding on the border should be agreed upon, after which those methods should be applied, preferably by international observers acting with the two interested countries, in order to demarcate the border. A basic principle must be to follow approximately the Line of Actual Control, which would at least solve the question of tens of thousands of square kilometres. The resolution of the dispute regarding the remaining dispute, which rests largely on different interpretations of where the LAC runs, covers a much smaller area and should not – indeed cannot – be solved until there is an agreement on the basic principle set out above.

In this respect, each country would have the opposite problem. China can control its media, and should be able to suppress populist demands not to give away an inch of territory in Arunachal Pradesh. India, however, cannot muzzle its press. Its media, especially opposition media, might well try to portray any release of territory in Aksai Chin as a craven surrender to Chinese bullying, even though India has exerted no control in the area since 1962 and has no population there. Yet gradually, the obvious benefits of security on its Northern border would become apparent, as would the economic benefits of private investment in the Northeast that would follow the lifting of the Chinese threat.

Until such resolution, both countries, unfortunately, need to maintain their strength on their own sides of the border. In particular, a show of weakness by India would make negotiations much more difficult, because nearly all Chinese sources on the subject show that PLA strategic thinking is at its most aggressive when it perceives Indian resolve as wavering. In this context, India’s current strategy of economic development in Arunachal Pradesh, military reinforcement, and most importantly, development of an efficient logistical chain to the region, is one that will help Beijing face down the hawkish element in the PLA, as well as improving security for the Indian population in the region.

Notes

  1. Greater Kashmir News, 27 January 2015 http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2015/Jan/27/exchange-of-sweets-on-loc-lac-23.asp
  2. 中印边境元旦当天不寻常一幕:感动亿万中国人 (New year’s day: An unusual scene on the Sino-Indian border: moving a thousand billion Chinese) posted on China Net Military Matters 2 (中华网军事2) 4th January 2015 http://www.junshi2.com/junshi/forum/26584-6.html
  3. India-China: A Water War over the Brahmaputra? by Roomana Hukil, 30 April 2014, in the journal of the IPCS (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/india-china-a-water-war-over-the-brahmaputra-4415.html
  4. Territory, Roads and Trans-boundary Rivers: An Analysis of Indian Infrastructure Building along the Sino-Indian Border in Arunachal Pradesh, by Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, in Eurasia Border Review (Vo.5, No.2, Spring 2014) https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/BorderStudies/en/publications/review/data/ebr51/V5_N1_04Rahman.pdf
  5. “以经济手段控制中印边界争端的发生,使经济合作成为中印边界争端危机控制的重要手段”2013年第4期No.42013南亚研究季刊South Asian Studies Quarterly 总第155期Sum No. 155 中印边界争端的危机控制机制探析 (Analysis of crisis control mechanisms in the Sino-Indian border dispute)*张世均 (Professor Zhang Shijun) (西南民族大学旅游与历史文化学院教授) (Southwestern University for Nationalities Institute of Tourism and Historical Culture) http://www.coldwarchina.org/uploadfiles/2014-09-30-20-23-5749003.pdf
  6. Xinmin Wanbao, September 11, 2014, B6.
  7. The Economist Aug 20th 2010 Taking the high ground
  8. 印度突然向藏南增兵一万 解放军迅速做出反击 (India suddenly reinforces in Tibet South – PLA hits back speedily) posted 2014-12-07 on Mier Shequ 米尔社区http://bbs.miercn.com/201411/thread_381958_1_3.html
  9. “印度突然向藏南增兵一万 解放军迅速做出反击 (India suddenly reinforces 10,000 in Tibet South – PLA hits back speedily) posted 2014-12-07 on Mier Shequ 米尔社区http://bbs.miercn.com/201411/thread_381958_1_2.html
  10. Article “Grand plan to double Arunachal Pradesh border force ‘on hold despite being cleared in April” by Abhishek Bhalla, 23 September 2014
  11. The Economist Oct 20th 2012 Unsettled for a long time yet
  12. “边境地区联合反击战役”, Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 264), quoted on P29 China’s Incomplete Military Transformation – Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, Samuel K. Berkowitz, published by the RAND corporation, 2015
  13. 中国武装力量的多样化运用 (The diversified operation of China’s armed forces) 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室 (PRC State Council Information office) , April 2013 http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2013-04/16/content_2618550.htm
  14. See Global Security’s report on HY-6 (Hongzhaji You-6) Aerial Refueling Tanker at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/hy-6.htm
  15. China Develops Its Strategic Airlift Capability, in Stratfor Global Intelligence, January 29, 2013
  16. 锡金是怎样被印度吞并的?(How did India annex Sikkim?), 14 July 2014, http://tibet.woeser.com/?p=39196
  17. “Sikkim is part of China because it paid tribute to Tibet…why did China recognize it?!” in 中印边境谈判最新动向:印曾吞并中国一属国 (A new direction in Sino-Indian border talks: India’s annexation of a Chinese vassal state) posted on 霸血军事 (Ba Xue Military Matters) 25 November 2014 http://www.baxue.com/guojijunqing/39579.html
  18. For example, army bloggers commenting on Iron and Blood (http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_4131145_1.html) regarding the purchase by India of BM-30 Smerch rocket launchers from Russia, under the heading “阿三在中印边境与咱比远程火箭炮那不是在找死吗” (If A-san [a rude name for Indians] wants to try long-distance rockets against ours, he’s got a death wish.)
  19. 中印边境谈判最新动向:印曾吞并中国一属国 (A new direction in Sino-Indian border talks: India’s annexation of a Chinese vassal state) posted on 霸血军事 (Ba Xue Military Matters) 25 November 2014 http://www.baxue.com/guojijunqing/39579_2.html
  20. 中印边境谈判最新动向:印曾吞并中国一属国 (A new direction in Sino-Indian border talks: India’s annexation of a Chinese vassal state) posted on 霸血军事 (Ba Xue Military Matters) 25 November 2014 http://www.baxue.com/guojijunqing/39579_2.html
  21. 中国要想再拖五十年,就只有在藏南发动一场战争,胜也好,败也好,至少证明了该地区是存在争议的!” China musters 500,000 troops: Modi in shock 中国集结50万军队:莫迪吓惨了http://m.milnews.com/article/8670 posted on 25th November 2014
  22. 印度突然向藏南增兵一万 解放军迅速做出反击 (India suddenly reinforces in Tibet South – PLA hits back speedily) posted 2014-12-07 on Mier Shequ 米尔社区http://bbs.miercn.com/201411/thread_381958_1_3.html
  23. 印度突然向藏南增兵一万 解放军迅速做出反击 (India suddenly reinforces in Tibet South – PLA hits back speedily) posted 2014-12-07 on Mier Shequ 米尔社区http://bbs.miercn.com/201411/thread_381958_1_3.html
  24. 2013年第4期No.42013南亚研究季刊South Asian Studies Quarterly 总第155期Sum No. 155 中印边界争端的危机控制机制探析 (Analysis of crisis control mechanisms in the Sino-Indian border dispute)*张世均 (Professor Zhang Shijun) (西南民族大学旅游与历史文化学院教授) (Southwestern University for Nationalities Institute of Tourism and Historical Culture) http://www.coldwarchina.org/uploadfiles/2014-09-30-20-23-5749003.pdf
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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Nicolas Groffman

writes on China, practised law in Beijing and Shanghai and conducted the first ever enforcement of a Hong Kong court judgment in Mainland China.

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9 thoughts on “Solving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: One Million Indians for a Road

  1. Thank you for the interesting comments below. I did not go into detail about the historical background to the claims of the respective countries to the disputed territory. I would comment, however, that in contrast with China’s maritime claims in the Pacific and the South China Sea, its claims to the territory on the Indian border do have some basis in international law. India cannot simply laugh them off as ludicrous, however much it may feel that China is a bully (even if it is). India’s own claims to much of the territory in the north are based on British adventurism, and it is unsurprising that China challenges such claims. The way forward for India is to beef up its defences and to be ready to compromise. This is more or less what China is doing, and doing very well.

  2. China has a favourable trade balance with India to the tune of nearly $40 billion. It is China which is dependent on India for its export market. It would help India if China stops trading with India ; then the domestic markets would empower themselves to meet the domestic markets. Unfortunately for China its economy has become export oriented. If she cannot maintain her exports Chinese warehouses with finished goods would beoverflowing and factories would layoff workers. She could face internal turbulence and law and order problems in the overcrowded cities and towns on her Eastern Coast.
    There is no need to yield to China on the Ladakh front. India should build up her military capacities and wait for the ripe time to reclaim her lands.

  3. There is no need for India to solve the Indo-Tibetan border with China. China has been bullying around cause they think there are powerful, or present them to be powerful. India should just wait it out and send China back out of territories it has occupied after building the great wall, and if necessary send the people that claim to have 5000 years of superior culture to kingdom come.

  4. A thoughtful article with interesting views from the Chinese army. We seldom hear that. I am not sure, however, that our soldiers and theirs yet treat each other as gallantly as is implied above. Would like to hear first hand from the soldiers themselves – maybe the author has spoken to them on the Chinese side?

  5. Does the PRC have a pressing need for Aksai Chin for accessing Tibet (illegally occupied) now, as compared to the 1950s-60s-70s-80s)?
    It has direct rail access to Tibet now.

    The fact of the matter is that the areas of influence of the Indian and Chinese kingdoms had shifting borders basis the ebb and flow of the fortunes of these kingdoms.

    The British also had a forward and a ‘non-forward’ policy basis their threat perception from Tsarist Russia and the kingdoms/warlords that controlled the Tibetan plateau.

    The British did not ‘persuade’ the Chinese enough for the borders which we hold as correct.

    So the Chinese can argue that the border as shown by us is a border thrust upon them by an imperial power.

    The blunder that we did (maybe we did not have many options then) was our weak opposition to the occupation of Tibet by the PRC in 1949/50.

    The subsequent Nehruvian ‘forward policy’ with no military planning and support to support it was another blunder.

    The foreign policy during the Nehruvian era was an era of strategic blunders.

  6. As stated in the opening sentence, India’s claims in Aksai Chin involves land mass “greater than Belgium” but with negligible settled population unlike Assam & Arunachal which have large settled population. The strategic importance of Aksai Chin for China due to the road linking it to TAR has diminished considerably over the last 50 years due to rapid communication infrastructure development through other routes into TAR. As such, China may relent on its rigid stance on the LAC in the Western Sector, provided we make minor concessions on the Eastern sector like providing access to Tibetians to pray at Tawang monestry etc.

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