Indian Defence Review

During the recently held Air Force Commanders conference in New Delhi, Raksha Mantri AK Antony, while admitting that the armed forces had been depending on outside suppliers for their defence requirements, stated that it was now time to stop this practice. A country like India, he said, could not indefinitely continue to rely on such outside suppliers and the priority should now be on self-reliance and indigenisation.

How often in the past have we heard Raksha Mantris espouse the cause of self-reliance and indigenisation only to see that nothing substantial happens where it is most supposed to, that is in the labs, on the shop floors and perhaps Armed Forces HQ.

If you got the feeling that you were seeing a rerun of an old script, you would be right. How often in the past have we heard Raksha Mantris espouse the cause of self-reliance and indigenisation only to see that nothing substantial happens where it is most supposed to, that is in the labs, on the shop floors and perhaps Armed Forces HQ. The call for indigenisation and self-reliance remains mere rhetoric, repeated at conference after conference for some sound bytes in the evening news.

What does an average person make of all this? All he sees and senses is smoke without any fire. Are there indeed evil forces at work to see that we remain dependent on outside powers for our defence needs? Sell our souls to the devil so to speak. Are we ignoring the DRDO and its many arms, each holding a gleaming weapon system like some mythological figure, or is there more hype than substance to the DRDO claims?

This article does not even pretend to suggest that it will have answers for any of the woes that befall self-reliance issues in India. All it aspires to do is put into perspective some of the problems related to indigenisation and self-reliance in the field of design, development and production of new weapon systems for India’s defence.

Frequent Changes to Qualitative Requirements

DRDO has always complained that the armed forces frequently change the General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) or the Air Staff Requirements (ASR) and this adversely affects specified timeframes. Without such changes, they maintain that they would largely be able to meet PDCs. I heard this when I was serving at Air HQ in the Directorate of Air Staff Requirements in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the same view is prevalent today in articles written by stalwarts of DRDO, both retired or serving. Nothing seems to have changed in the decades gone by. The Advanced Light Helicopter would be a good start point to see if revised ASRs are indeed the cause of delays in DRDO projects.

 It has taken 26 years, and it will be many more years before the LCA enters squadron service in any viable numbers.

The IAF started inducting a large number of helicopters post the Indo-China border clash of 1962. The use of the helicopter by the USA in the Vietnam War, however, created a wider interest in this unique machine. ‘Wider interest’ means that not only was the IAF keen on exploiting the helicopter flying envelope as being witnessed in Vietnam, but Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) also expressed a desire to design and manufacture helicopters in India. This was a follow up to the CS Subramaniam Report on building up the aeronautical industry in India, including the manufacture of aircraft.

Accordingly, in the mid 1970s Air HQ issued an Air Staff Requirement for an Advanced Light Helicopter. Air HQ envisioned it as a single engine helicopter. However, with more detailed battlefield damage and crashworthiness analysis of the Vietnam War suggesting that twin-engine survivability was essential, Air HQ decided to incorporate twin engines in the helicopter. It should be remembered that in the 1970s the Indian Armed Forces had very little or no experience in the use of battlefield helicopters. US studies brought out statistics that twin engines and enhanced crashworthiness afforded greater survivability, which was an essential prerequisite for battlefield helicopters.

Consequently, a revision was made to the ASR to include twin engines and enhanced crashworthiness, and ASR 2/79 became the standard for manufacturing the ALH. Now you can call this a revision of an ASR but with more awareness and greater technology such a change was mandatory. While many in DRDO understood the rationale for the change, there were and always will be elements who attribute ‘pig-headedness’ to all such changes

The point to note however is that after the revision to the ASR to incorporate the twin engines there were no further revisions. Yet the production of the helicopter was delayed well beyond the stipulated PDC.

Not only has the ALH not entered service in large enough numbers, but also there has been no report on the light helicopter that was to be designed separately.

Take the case of the LCA, another aircraft project delayed considerably even though no changes were made to the ASR. There was a seminar at Air HQ in late 1981 or early 1982 on the requirement for a MiG 21 replacement. An Air Superior Fighter (ASF) was projected as the replacement. Everyone who was anybody in the aeronautical think tank from Bangalore attended the seminar. Air Force C in Cs and all relevant Directorates and Branches at Air HQ were attendees. The aim was to discuss the requirement for a type of aircraft that would be most suited as a MiG 21 replacement, to be available in a timeframe that would make it contemporary to anything flying in the world. From all the design and development claims that were discussed at the seminar that day, one came away convinced, somewhat naively it now seems, that India would very soon build an LCA that would be the envy of the world.

Today in 2007, we still do not have an LCA that is in production. It has taken 26 years, and it will be many more years before the LCA enters squadron service in any viable numbers. The aircraft that the IAF hopes to induct at the end of this decade or at the beginning of the next, and that will be in service for some decades, cannot any longer just be a replacement for the MiG 21; it needs to be a replacement for the SU 30! Had production of the LCA started in the 1990s as envisioned at the seminar then a MiG replacement would have been just fine. Today when we have big plans of transforming ourselves from a regional to a global power, then we must also have capability matching those plans. A capability of just crossing our borders to deliver a few tonnes of ordinance will not suffice.

As things stand today, the LCA is a long way off from being what it was touted to be when first conceptualised. At present, there is a problem with the multimode radar and the Kaveri engine, thereby adversely affecting the induction schedule. ELTA radars and GE 404 IN 20 engines are sought to be their replacements to inject some urgency into the project. A further delay in the LCA induction would mean that we would not even be getting a ‘current generation’ aircraft leave alone a ‘next generation’ one at the time of induction. In light of these delays, it would be catastrophic if at the end of the enormous time and cost expended on the LCA programme all we get is a limited series induction.

Lack of Clear Vision

The armed forces are accused of lacking a clear vision of what they want; that they lack a research temper and simply demand what they see or read about in brochures. This is what DRDO calls BBC or simply put means ‘best of brochure claims’.

“¦the fact remains that the Navy has been more successful in indigenisation than its sister services.

There is an element of truth in this accusation. The flip side, however, is that the armed forces have yet to see in Indian scientific journals or in PSU development work any original work on the design of futuristic weapon systems. Nor do they get to see any indigenous work on new equipment that would revolutionise warfare or have a force multiplier affect. What one sees is imitation work on equipment that is already under production in the West. In the absence of such original work, it is but natural for those responsible for honing a fighting force, to look elsewhere. DRDO too must introspect because every time the Services want a new system, DRDO offers to make the equipment available indigenously, at low cost and attractive timeframes. Experience would suggest that such self-assurance is usually misplaced. Just because the Armed Forces are required to first turn to DRDO to check on availability of new systems it need not ‘accept’ all challenges. They could be honest and say that a particular system would be beyond their capability or capacity or that it would take much too long for the system to fructify. Such honesty would enhance mutual trust and encourage a healthier relationship between the Service HQ and DRDO.

Let us look at another facet of the ALH collaboration in terms of vision. At the time of the finalisation of the collaborative agreement, Air HQ had forecast a requirement for a Cheetah helicopter replacement. It was decided to take advantage of the collaboration for the ALH to design a completely indigenous light helicopter.

When the ASR for the ALH was being finalised, Ministry of Defence (MOD) had specified that the helicopter built in India would be a de-novo design and not a copy of any existing model. Technologies employed would need to be futuristic. As HAL did not have the necessary wherewithal to design and develop the ALH by its self, it was necessary to go to renowned helicopter manufactures for a tie up. After many deliberations/presentations/visits, German manufacturer MBB was preferred over Aerospatiale of France. The high level committee comprising the MoD, Dept of Defence Production, SA to RM, FADS, HAL and Air HQ that was to select the collaborative partner, felt that the French proposal was very close to the SA 365 Dauphin that was then coming into production, and hence there would not be too great a learning curve for HAL’s design personnel. The committee decided to select the MBB proposal, which was a completely new design.

When new officers takeover they bring new ideas, and over a period of some years, coupled with advances in technology, these ideas become mandatory requirements.

Ministry of Defence decided that once HAL’s design personnel had gained adequate experience working on new technologies with MBB, a core group of designers would be detached from the ALH project to design separately a small helicopter for the Indian Armed Forces. This helicopter would be a lightweight reconnaissance helicopter or a Cheetah replacement. It has been nearly 25 years since HAL started work on the ALH. Not only has the ALH not entered service in large enough numbers, but also there has been no report on the light helicopter that was to be designed separately.

So what are the Armed Forces to do now for their requirement of small helicopters? These helicopters, besides carrying out numerous and multifarious tasks, are the eyes in the battlefield. There is no option but to import another helicopter. Current reports say that the government has invited Eurocopter to negotiate for 197 AS 550 Fennec helicopters for the Army in a deal worth $600 million. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited will make 137 of these helicopters under licence. It would appear that everyone will come away pleased, especially HAL as it will get more work load, but no one is asking as to what happened to the small helicopter that HAL was to start designing independently way back in the late 1980s. Most in the Armed Forces would not even be aware that such a stipulation existed.

IAF Killed DRDO Programmes

At present, there is a big gap between the image that DRDO projects and the reality as it exists on the ground.

Recently an eminent DRDO personality was quoted as being critical of the censure being focused on DRDO by a spate of articles in the Indian Express, and by retired Service Officers. Predictably, this person has tried to turn the criticism back on the Services. While there may be a measure of truth in what he had to say, his insinuation that the IAF killed some DRDO projects is misplaced. He has talked about the IAF not wanting the HF 24, which all agree was an excellent design by Kurt Tank. The aircraft, however, was grossly underpowered and while the IAF with a sense of pride in indigenous design utilised the aircraft in squadron service for some years, they could not continue for long with an aircraft that was not technically advanced, especially when there was no alternative power plant replacement in sight. As its induction was delayed, it was only a matter of time before the aircraft would have to be phased out, a similar situation now obtaining with the LCA. The trainer version of the aircraft was better than the fighter, but to suggest that the aircraft would have made a good advanced jet trainer (AJT) is perhaps asking too much of one’s imagination.

Accolades for the Navy

The Navy comes in for many accolades from DRDO. It is held up as a shining example of what indigenisation can achieve. By no means would I like to suggest that it is easier to design ships than it is to design supersonic multi-role aircraft, but I do feel that the start points are much simpler when it comes to ships. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Navy has been more successful in indigenisation than its sister services. It has fared even better when it comes to fitment of indigenous subsystems on naval ships. The Naval Physical and Oceanographic Lab has provided the Navy with a great measure of self-reliance in sensors especially sonars of all kinds. Most Indian Navy ships are therefore fitted with indigenous sonar systems and little or no import involved.

In the years immediately after Independence, the Government did not focus as much on the Navy as it did on the Army and the Air Force. For many years the Navy was just allowed to drift (pun intended) along. I believe that as far as self-reliance is concerned this may well have been a blessing in disguise. The Navy understood the limitation of simply leaving everything to the DRDO and thus involved themselves with all stages of their indigenous projects. The Navy retains its own design personnel, and former naval officers are at the helm of the ship building yards.

Shortcomings at Service HQ

This leads me to the problem faced by Service HQ. It is a problem of limited tenure and a lack of continuity at the Headquarters. Directorates dealing with Plans normally handle stuff that have a long gestation period. As the Advanced Light Helicopter and the Light Combat Aircraft show, such projects because of delays take decades to come to fruition. Yet the officers who conceive the operational requirements have only a limited tenure of two to four years at the Service HQ as do the officers who have to monitor the projects thereafter. When new officers takeover they bring new ideas, and over a period of some years, coupled with advances in technology, these ideas become mandatory requirements. When changes are made, their impact is often not fully understood. For one it would always lead to delays, as it is not possible to freeze the design while the additional recommendations are under consideration. This, I guess, is a shortcoming that we would have to bear, as the IAF cannot afford its officers decade long tenures at Air HQ. The only solution would be to adhere to laid down PDCs. No slippage would then mean no modifications or changes being asked for.

Warfare it must be remembered is dynamic. Armed Forces the world over are accused of fighting the last war. However, to fight the next war requires visualisation of the future battlefield and development of weapons and tactics appropriate to such scenarios. While visualisation of a future battlefield is not a major problem in itself, fielding weapons for that battlefield is an onerous task, especially if last generation weapons are still on the drawing board. It is for those who are responsible for the provision of weapon systems to ensure that the armed forces are equipped with the proper weapon systems and in the right timeframes to handle futuristic security challenges facing the country.

Review Committee

The afore-mentioned eminent personality who had accused the IAF of killing DRDO projects had also stated that the next time one heard a bad report on DRDO the finger could safely be pointed at the Indian Army and the IAF. Unfortunately, the ‘bad report’ now comes not from the Services but from a series of articles in the Indian Express and from Parliament itself.

India has invested a lot in terms of money and time in DRDO but the benefits have not accrued to the extent desired.

The points that are being made are that there is a vast scope for greater coordination and interaction between the Service HQ and the DRDO and that officers from the Services should be looked upon as part of the design team and not as outsiders. Further, there is a need for more innovation in Defence and not enough is being done. Biocon’s Kiran Mazumdar Shaw has been quoted as saying that DRDO ‘should be focusing on every emerging technology and the application of new technology. At present, there seems to be only imitative effort. A lot of the research is ineffective. We need reforms in defence research that capitalises on innovation’.

Since 2004 there has been a clamour for an independent audit of the DRDO and for a review and monitoring mechanisms to be put in place. There has also been a call for a review by an independent group of experts so that DRDO could gain from outside expertise and carry out requisite reforms.

This is resisted by DRDO, which feels that as it has its own audit and review of projects; it does not consider it necessary to introduce additional audit and reviews. Understandably as things stand there is no accountability for delays and cost overruns in projects undertaken by DRDO.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence that scrutinised the working of DRDO has been less than flattering in its report on DRDO’s functioning and performance. Based on this report the Government has formed a committee to carry out a review of the DRDO. However if the review is restricted to the DRDO per se, then perhaps the recommendations of the committee may be somewhat misleading. The terms of reference given to the committee must include a review of the entire defence management system of the country, including the role of all stakeholders, if imple-mentation of its recommendations is to make a difference.

Conclusion

India has invested a lot in terms of money and time in DRDO but the benefits have not accrued to the extent desired. DRDO has not been able to achieve the country’s vision, because vision without efficiency or good management is hallucination.

There is no requirement for DRDO to take on every project. There is no need for it to try to meet every requirement of the Services. The DRDO cannot be, and must not attempt at being, an all singing all dancing organisation. Instead it should focus on consolidating in a few selective vital areas and concentrate on those for optimum results.

Earlier India did not have the capability or the capacity in the private sector to undertake defence work. India Inc has now a proven record of being innovative and aggressive. Perhaps it is now time, to pursue aggressively and with resolve, an involvement of the Private Sector in jointly working with DRDO to meet our goals of indigenisation in defence.

At present, there is a big gap between the image that DRDO projects and the reality as it exists on the ground. DRDO as an organisation has a lot of potential but unless steps are taken to make it efficient and accountable, that potential will remain just that.