Military & Aerospace

Securing the Eagle’s Nest: Airfield and Infrastructure Security
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Issue Vol. 28.1 Jan-Mar 2013 | Date : 06 Apr , 2013

Rafale

Foolproof security of an operational base has been a vital prerequisite for the successful conduct of war. History of warfare reveals that neglect of this vital aspect has invariably led to disaster. What was true in the time of the Roman Legions is valid in principle even now in the era of high technology warfare involving a wide variety of forces engaged in combined and coordinated operations whether on land, at sea and in the air.

Military operations, be they on land, at sea, in the air or even in space, have to be launched from bases that provide security and sanctuary for the participating military forces, before, during and after operations. Foolproof security of an operational base has been a vital prerequisite for the successful conduct of war. History of warfare reveals that neglect of this vital aspect has invariably led to disaster. What was true in the time of the Roman Legions is valid in principle even now in the era of high technology warfare involving a wide variety of forces engaged in combined and coordinated operations whether on land, at sea and in the air.

Indian military airfields in the vicinity of international borders are vulnerable to long-range artillery or unguided rocket attack…

Unfortunately, upgrading the security of an airbase is not the most glamorous aspect of a modernisation programme and hence is generally accorded a low priority being usually addressed as an afterthought. Security of infrastructure is not associated with expensive and glamourous high technology that modern aerial weapon systems and combat aircraft are. After all, an effective access control system does not generate primetime media frenzy when compared to combat aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft or ballistic missiles.

During conflicts in the past, airfields and associated assets were often targeted for take-over by enemy forces to deny the facilities to own forces and subsequently to be used by the enemy. The example of the invasion of the island of Crete in World War II comes to mind. German airborne forces consisting of glider-borne light infantry and paratroopers attacked and captured the airfield in Crete to deny its availability to the British forces and then used it as a bridgehead to land German troops to capture the whole of the island. Such a situation could well be faced at airfields in the island territories of India in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. Denial of these assets will cut military reach considerably and if these assets were to be used by hostile forces, air, sea and amphibious operations in the island territories will be disrupted, own forces based there cut off and even efforts at evacuation compromised.

US forces in the Pacific during World War II attacked Japanese-held islands with carrier-based air power followed by amphibious assault. One of their aims was to use the islands to base strategic air assets to target the Japanese islands. At that time, it was only strategic air power that could mount attacks against the heart of Japan. However, all these examples were in the context of an all-out global war. Advances in technology have now extended the range of the entire spectrum of weapon systems such that capabilities exist to launch attacks from one’s own heartland against enemy targets worldwide. Such threats will be recognised and hopefully catered for in contingency plans for an all-out war in the future. It is safe to assume that there will be fewer restrictions on the rules of engagement, barring the major dilemma of crossing the nuclear threshold.

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

In the Cold War era, with opposing forces always on high alert, the aim was to degrade enemy first strike capability prior to start of the war. For the Warsaw Pact forces, degrading the operational capabilities of NATO air power was the primary aim so that the intensity of air attacks on their massive mechanised thrusts could be minimized. Accordingly, their special forces were trained to infiltrate, often disguised as civilians, behind the lines of NATO forces well before the commencement of hostilities to attack airfields, missile sites as also command, control and communication centres. In terms of results for efforts expended these were softer and more attractive targets than armoured or infantry concentrations. In the war in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese forces attacked softer infrastructure targets, especially those in the insurgency prone areas of South Vietnam. Repeated attacks on bases in South Vietnam by lightly armed sabotage teams certainly degraded the operational capabilities of these bases as well as those of ground forces in the field who were heavily dependent on tactical air power for reconnaissance, troop deployment, fire support, evacuation and logistics support.

Threats Before And During Overt Hostilities

In the Indian context, it would be necessary to consider the threat of armed action from adversaries and the situation that exists at present and in the near future. Airfields and associated infrastructure in the island territories are vulnerable because they are isolated and the sea offers an opportunity for stealthy ingress, a lesson driven home the hard way in Mumbai on 26/11. Covert action by small bodies of trained forces provides a low-cost and effective alternative to overt acts such as bombardment from the sea or air strikes with the added advantage of a chance of plausible denial in case the operation goes sour. Such attacks would disable the facilities for a short time, destroy aircraft assets on the ground and create enough confusion in the prelude to a full-scale take-over bid if that is envisaged in the context of a larger conflict.

Airfields and associated infrastructure in the island territories are vulnerable because they are isolated…

Indian military airfields in the vicinity of international borders are in any case vulnerable to long-range artillery or unguided rocket attack, both of which are cost-effective when compared to air strike. No amount of radar guided anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles and combat air patrol will be able to fully neutralise these threats. Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) can launch rockets from ranges of 70km or more and saturate airfield defenses. Systems akin to the Iron Dome will always be in short supply and will only be deployed to defend a few strategic high-value assets. A similar threat from submarine-based sea-to-surface guided missiles exists for bases close to the sea. Fortunately, India’s principal adversaries are, as of now, not strong in this area of weaponry. However, infiltration of bases by saboteurs arriving by sea is a real threat.

Realistic threat assessment has to cater for degradation of such airfields and aircraft assets on the ground at the very start of hostilities. The Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) along the Northern borders, which are crucial for logistics support to Army units deployed in forward locations, can be expected to be put out of action at the commencement of hostilities. The ALGs will be crucial in the period before the start of hostilities for rapid concentration and augmentation of forces. Employment of offensive air power from ALGs by way of fixed wing aircraft, in all probability, will be a difficult proposition. However, given the fact that modern fixed wing aircraft have larger radius of action as compared to those of earlier generation, it would be prudent to base these in depth even at the cost of a higher response time. Slower response is better than no response at all.

Threat from Peacetime Covert Action

Immediately prior to the commencement of large scale armed conflict between regular military forces, there is always a threat of covert action. Such attacks may sometimes be undertaken only to degrade hard-to-replace crucial assets and are not aimed at initiating full-fledged war.

Realistic threat assessment has to cater for degradation of such airfields and aircraft assets on the ground…

Terrorist attacks against India till now have targeted mostly civilian, paramilitary and military personnel engaged in counter insurgency activities. However, the regular armed forces are increasingly being drawn into this conflict. Beginning with providing back-up to para-military forces and logistics support in insurgency-afflicted areas, this involvement is likely to increase. When it does, insurgents who are in conflict with other organs of the state such as the police and administrative systems will make military assets their targets. This has already happened with Indian Air Force helicopters being fired upon when engaged in logistics support to para-military forces during counter-insurgency tasks.

Rules of engagement are also vague. If such insurgencies escalate, the need to catch the attention of the public on a grander scale and to show up the weakness of the state will lead to attacks on military infrastructure. The armed forces are already being targeted by terrorism sponsored from abroad. The aim at first may be to highlight the weaknesses of the state but attacks can and will be used by the sponsors of such organisations to weaken Indian military capabilities and attract public attention. 26/11 achieved the latter objective at minimal cost to the sponsors.

Attacks on air bases near major population centres are worthwhile options for propaganda value alone and if military capability is degraded in the process, it is an added advantage to the enemy even if escalation to a full-scale war is not planned.

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MRLS)

As combat equipment gets more lethal and sophisticated, it is inevitable that there will be a decline in their numbers. The flipside of having ‘force multiplier’ weapon systems is their vulnerability. One modern fighter aircraft or airborne radar and control system may exceed the capabilities of half a dozen or so older generation fighters or static radars, but a single loss decreases force capability in the same proportion. Quantity has a quality of its own. Aircraft are extremely delicate especially when compared to other weaponry such as ships, tanks and artillery and are most vulnerable when on the ground. There is, however, no option but to put fewer and vastly more expensive eggs in flimsy baskets. The Eagle’s Nest is far more vulnerable now and the eagles are far fewer to boot.

The armed forces are already being targeted by terrorism sponsored from abroad…

In the context of force levels, loss of one AWACS platform or an aerial tanker aircraft would be a major blow. Destruction of such assets while on the ground in peacetime, would cost the enemy much less and would pose far lower risk than in the air during war, especially if the task is outsourced to a brainwashed proxy with rudimentary training. Attacks on military installations in the neighborhood such as the attack on the naval base at Karachi, have paid off in publicity and propaganda benefits. It cost the Pakistan Navy the bulk of its airborne maritime surveillance and anti-submarine assets. It could well happen in India.

Capability of Adversaries

The attackers who paralysed Mumbai were not a part of Special Forces. They were armed with just AK-47 automatic weapons. If their aim was to create publicity or to expose vulnerabilities, they succeeded. If they had chosen to attack an airbase instead, it is probable that they would have been able to gain access and using light weapons, damage critical assets. Similarly, equipped attackers carried out the assault on the naval facility in Karachi and they continue to target airbases in Afghanistan.

The prime targets are bases near a city that provide anonymity and support to attackers. This renders majority of the bases suitable targets as location of aircraft can be observed visually with relative ease. Breaching of the perimeter barbed wire fencing can be done by night at multiple points with the help of simple cutters and commercially available night vision equipment. The base may be infiltrated by terrorists disguised as support personnel. Weapons employed by insurgents could be AK-47 type automatic assault rifles, fragmentation grenades, explosive charges and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG). The last of these is an effective short-range anti-armor weapon and its fragmentation effect on hitting the inside of a hardened shelter will disable aircraft inside the shelter.

Rocket Propelled Grenades (Courtesy: www.wikipedia.org)

A high trajectory weapon like a mortar can be devastating but it is as difficult to carry. It can be vehicle mounted and fired from outside the base. This method was employed in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980s and against US coalition forces in recent times. A weapons storage area or a bulk fuel storage if hit, will provide graphic video news footage that will have profound impact and immense propaganda value for terrorist groups. Early warning radars and observer posts located in the vicinity of the tactical battle area but not embedded with the Army are more vulnerable. Undoubtedly, safe egress after the attack for the terrorists is the most difficult part of the exercise. However, experience indicates that this is a low priority issue for them.

Infrastructure Deficiencies and Remedies

Today in India, 21st century weaponry is housed in early 20th century infrastructure. This is a national malaise. Even air and road transportation support infrastructures are equally ancient. A privately owned IT company perhaps has better security arrangement than an average military airbase. The latter is guarded by people, some of whom may be technical specialists but are not trained or equipped to defend against even poorly equipped attackers.

Attacks on military installations in the neighborhood have paid off in publicity and propaganda benefits…

Air Warriors must be able to defend the Eagle’s Nest as failure to do so will kill the Eagle for all its technical sophistication. There are manpower constraints but this must be compensated for by technology and better training. Employing for garrison duties, highly trained and specialised manpower that is invariably in short supply, detracts from the purpose for which such personnel are recruited. Required technology for security is not rocket science or expensive when compared to the assets that are to be protected. Devices for surveillance, night vision and detection of intrusion, backed up by trained quick reaction mobile teams using vehicles protected against small arms fire and equipped with automatic light infantry weapons, are a must. For someone trying to make a statement, softer targets will be the preferred choice. There is an imperative need to make assets harder targets.

For a start, areas that house critical assets need to be demarcated and access be restricted to only those who work there. Currently, restricted access exists mainly on paper. The system of having non-military personnel gaining access to such areas must be stopped. Some of the members of the support staff are not subject to military law; they spend their whole service in one area, are usually not vetted by the military installation they support and have intimate knowledge of activities, location of assets. Hence, they would be prime targets for recruitment by hostile agencies.

Aircraft dispersal areas have to be covered by surveillance devices as they are too widespread for monitoring by guards alone. Large aircraft cannot be accommodated in hardened shelters and the only way to protect them is to ensure that there is a large sterile zone around them. Trade-offs between concentrating assets to guard against sabotage versus dispersal to guard against air attack is a hard choice.

Safe egress after the attack for the terrorists is the most difficult part of the exercise…

The Egyptian Air Force made the wrong choice in the prelude to the 1967 War with fatal results. Perimeter security cannot be ensured by strands of barbed wire alone. There has to be intrusion detection systems which are self-contained and night capable. High ground beyond the perimeter should be acquired or at least patrolled so that it cannot be used to dominate the airfield. The ground defence aspect must be kept in mind when citing future airfields. It must be remembered that the ground-based attacks on airfields did not succeed in 1965 because of the incompetence of the attackers and not because of a sound security system.

Summary

Coordinated attacks of this nature on several bases just before hostilities, will degrade capabilities significantly if systems like the AWACS, aerial tankers and combat aircraft, are hit, as these are usually few in number. It is certainly easier than attacking an airborne AWACS protected by air superiority fighters. In peacetime, successful attacks on operational bases will retard modernisation and capability enhancement efforts apart from denting the image of the armed forces. Besides, little can be done by way of retaliation, so prevention will always be the better option. Enhancement of security of bases is not glamorous and may not be attractive as no big ticket expenditure is involved. Technology and equipment is available locally off the shelf. But no war can be waged successfully without bases that are completely secure. As resources to wage war will always be scarce, it is vital that these be preserved. And for this, it is of utmost importance that the Eagle’s Nest be secured in the first place.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Gp Capt B Menon

Gp Capt B Menon, former fighter pilot, IAF

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2 thoughts on “Securing the Eagle’s Nest: Airfield and Infrastructure Security

  1. SIMPLE SOLUTION EMPLOY ONLY ARMY TRAINED SOLDERS AFTER 3TO 5 YEARS IN ARMY WITH COMBAT EXPIERENCE IN KASHMIR AND INCLUDE SMALL ARMS TRAINING IN THE SYLLABUS OF OFFICERS AND RANKS WITH REGULAR TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENT WITH ARMY IN KASHMIR , SEND A SUFFUCIENT NO OF OFFICERS AND RANKS TO NSG ON DEPUTATION FOR THREE TO FIVE YEARS AND BUILD A CADRE WITH THE AIR COMMANDOES GARUDS WHO ARE COMBAT TRAINED EXPIERENCED AND THEN DEPLOYED IN ALL AIRFIELDS IN STRENGTH TO GETHER WITH LATEST ISRAELI CUTTING EDGE AIRFIELD PROTECTION EQUIPMENT . EXCEPT THE 3750 PILOTS BULK OF THE 170000 AIRFORCE IS LIKE BABUS OF DELHI .

  2. “Indian military airfields in the vicinity of international borders are in any case vulnerable to long-range artillery or unguided rocket attack,”

    What is the plan of action when ( not if) Jamnagar is hit at the reliance refinery. A single attack will have an immediate domino effect triggering massive fires and destruction spreading across adjoining radius.
    The justification of “production or pumping of oil stopped during war is contrary to having an refinery garnering oil reserves /and also just storage or even empty lines will have enough vapor to ignite and act like a bomb of its own.

    Add to that civil chaos due to destruction and massive refugee situation that will emerge from the many wounded in a Single strike that will have a massive psychological impact. Of course no civil administration training, infrastructure to cope up with the single destruction.

    Then comes the knee jerk response that will come from political-babu nexus and also higher military echelons like the response during early stages of the Kargil conflict from the COAS and CAS. Military personnel will be then channelized to aid civil services across the region due to a non existant administration except for it working over time in denying the armed forces OROP, disability pensions and strategies that stop arms up gradation. The armed forces will be further hampered by the ongoing DRDO/HAL fracas that procrastinates its deliverance as it primarily fails in and has failed in acknowledging its failures thus for decades have not acted or improved nor improvised apart from their brochures thus making the armed forces a force of falling parts

    The top brass of the armed forces that especially have played to the political-Babu galaery citing ‘ political decissions” as if FM Manecshaw as General, or Genreal Sunderjee and many others did not have political pressure yet not sucumb to it as Malik and Tipnis did in Kargil war by not crossing LOC citing exclationation of war!

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