However, securing the lifelines against the common non-state threats would accrue mutual benefit, not to one at the expense of the other. Prima facie, direct cooperation among maritime security forces does not seem to be feasible since China and India are not maritime neighbours. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to explore if a coordinated approach is possible in that direction.
The Way Forward
The unstable Persian Gulf and consequent threat to the Hormuz Strait is of concern to both India and China in terms of their energy imports, but neither can envisage a direct security role therein. Notwithstanding, both may play an indirect role through their naval interactions with Gulf-littorals and occasional naval presence. Considering the high probability of their navies operating in the same waters in future, it would be necessary for them to harmonise their activities, evolve confidence-building measures and maybe even complement each other.
While the Malacca Straits encloses Chinas principal energy sea-line, Indias stakes in it lie predominantly in trade interests in the East, which are rapidly gathering momentum. Despite the fact that the primary motivating factors of the two do not coincide, the security of this waterway is equally important to both for economic development.
Notwithstanding China’s ‘String-of-Pearls’ strategy, it is not conceivable for the Chinese Navy to maintain a continuous presence, let alone control, along the widely flung sea-lines of NSR. India could be of much help; geography has bestowed on it a favourable disposition for monitoring almost the entire NSR. The Indian maritime forces also have adequate reach and sustainability. In addition, the maintenance of ‘good order at sea’ is of much importance to India. This includes responding to all contemporary non-state threats including natural disasters. For example, the ’spontaneity’ of the Indian Navy in providing Tsunami assistance to the affected areas in India as well as in the neighbouring littorals simultaneously has been particularly noted in the region.
While the Malacca Straits encloses China’s principal energy sea-line, India’s stakes in it lie predominantly in trade interests in the East, which are rapidly gathering momentum. Despite the fact that the primary motivating factors of the two do not coincide, the security of this waterway is equally important to both for economic development. As in case of the Persian Gulf, China has been concerned about the overbearing US military influence here through its ‘War on Terror’. In April 2004, the US even sought military intervention in the form of Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI).
Fortunately for China, the US operational involvement has been averted for the time being due to RMSI’s rejection by Indonesia and Malaysia. Their sensitivities over issues of sovereignty are genuine and the legitimate right of any nation. India is no different – having itself expressed this sentiment on numerous occasions. However, when a state wilfully accepts a ‘cooperative-mode’ for countering common non-traditional threats, it does so with a reasonable measure of trust and ought to forego extreme national sentiments.
The patrolling assets of the littoral states are grossly inadequate as the states themselves admit.14 The current coordinated patrol, MALSINDO has also been inadequate – after a brief lull following the December 2004 Tsunami, there has been a spate of violent pirate attacks. Hence, the acceptance of extra-littoral operational involvement in the security of these straits would be the prerequisite to any viable security arrangement. Using the naval bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India has been coordinating its patrols with the Indonesian Navy in the six-degree channel.
The Indian ships could easily extend its responsibility further southwards into the Malacca Straits to assist the littorals. In order to cater for the sensitivities of these states, alternatives could be explored. One of these may be patrolling by extra-littoral naval/coast guard vessels with law-enforcement officials of littorals embarked onboard.
During the ARF summit in July 2004, the littoral states informally discussed India’s possible security role in the Straits with the Indian External Affairs Minister, but this has not yet been followed up with a formal request. The discussions nevertheless indicated that the littorals are more at ease with the Indian, rather than the US role. In view of the current insecurities in this vital waterway, this ought to be acceptable to China too since the RMSI could become more assertive in future if the security deteriorates further. A major terrorist strike in the Straits or the need to intensify PSI activities could easily fuel a US military presence. China has never voiced its aversion to India’s involvement – but it could encourage the Malacca Straits littorals to accept it.
The patrolling assets of the littoral states are grossly inadequate as the states themselves admit. Using the naval bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India has been coordinating its patrols with the Indonesian Navy in the six-degree channel. The Indian ships could easily extend its responsibility further southwards into the Malacca Straits to assist the littorals.
Considering, the periodic shift of piracy, either westward into the Indian Ocean, or into the South China Sea, China and India could coordinate their efforts to combat the menace. The November 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy (ReCAAP) against ships in Asia15 is a significant step towards this. Such a comprehensive approach would also secure India’s energy imports from the East, viz. the Russian Far East (Sakhalin) and Vietnam, which are expected to commence in the next few years.
Following the precedence of Indian Navy’s escort operations for the US high-value ships transiting through the Malacca Straits in 2002, some countries are also contemplating such escort of their vital shipping through the Straits. It is important to note that such missions through ‘international straits’ are well within the ambit of international law. If the insecurities In the Malacca Straits increase in the future, Indian and Chinese maritime forces could even escort each others’ selected vessels carrying vital commodities, the Indian Navy in Indian Ocean/Southeast Asian straits and the Chinese Navy in East/South China Sea.
At close examination, there may be many other convergences between India and China in the domain of maritime security. The two being important players in global security, their coherent voice in the new legal instruments could be useful to combat other non-traditional threats too. Their maritime security forces could conduct joint anti-piracy and disaster-relief exercises, probably alternately in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. The WPNS is a major forum wherein the regional navies share their views on maritime security issues. India presently attends the meetings as an observer. China could play a useful role towards facilitating its full membership.
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