Indian Defence Review

China’s Assisstance in the Realm of Missile Technology Transfer

In the realm of missile technology transfer, China’s missile sales have been a continuing source of discord as concerns doubled when the Sino–Pak nuclear cooperation during the 1980s further spilled over to cooperation in the field of ballistic missile development in the early 1990s. It was revealed that China had supplied M-11 missiles to Pakistan – the result of a suspected 1987 deal, but these were left in their crates at an air force base west of Lahore to try and avoid sanctions as international pressure grew vis-à-vis Chinese WMD proliferation activities.

In fact, the US objected to Chinese sale of M-11 technology to Pakistan in 1991 and, for the first time, on May 27, 1991, President George HW Bush declared sanctions against China for transferring to Pakistan technology related to the M-11 short-range ballistic missiles in accordance with the newly passed Missile Technology Control Act.

On the one hand China transferred M-9 and M-11 nuclear capable ballistic missiles to Pakistan in fully assembled mode as well as their related technologies, and on the other, was fully aware when North Korea transferred its Nodong and Taepo Dong ballistic missiles to Pakistan.

Soon after the US sanctions, Beijing agreed to observe the MTCR guidelines, although in December 1992, reports surfaced yet again that China had transferred 34 complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan and also allegedly built a turnkey missile plant for Pakistan at Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi, in violation of its 1991 pledge. Consequently, in May 1993, the Clinton Administration re-imposed MTCR-related sanctions against China.

The challenge for the existing geo-strategic equations in South Asia came in the form that on the one hand China transferred M-9 and M-11 nuclear capable ballistic missiles to Pakistan in fully assembled mode as well as their related technologies, and on the other, was fully aware when North Korea transferred its Nodong and Taepo Dong ballistic missiles to Pakistan. North Korea was known to be willing to sell pretty much anything for hard cash, of which it was desperately short. This was also the time when Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto declared that the deal with the North Koreans was for cash and said: “When I went to North Korea, AQ Khan told me we could get their (missile) technology (so) that we can compare (it) to our own. So I took (it) up with Kim Il Sung…December ’93 I talked to him, he agreed…and it was in cash, they needed money and so it was done for cash, with no exchange of nuclear technology. Exchanging nuclear technology for missiles was never even discussed during my visit.”

As a result of the deal, Islamabad got the Nodong missile and rechristened it ‘Ghauri’.

The Peoples Republic of China has strategic, energy and economic interests in Pakistan with both sharing a free trade agreement including $6 billion in bilateral trade”¦

However, in spite of assurances to the US during China’s President, Jiang Zemin’s 1997 visit, Chinese proliferation of missile components and technology to Pakistan continued. Additionally, in February 2000, the CIA reported to the US Congress that despite its promise to stop ballistic missile and nuclear assistance to Pakistan in May 1996, China continued such assistance during the first half of 1999.

The People’s Republic of China has strategic, energy and economic interests in Pakistan with both sharing a free trade agreement including $6 billion in bilateral trade in 2008. Beijing and Islamabad consider each other critical to energy security. The Gwadar port – 400 kms from the Straits of Hormuz – along with a network of rail and roads through Pakistan assures the convenient transport of Middle Eastern oil and gas to China through Xinjiang province.

Thus it becomes amply clear that the continued proliferation of WMDs and advanced weapons technologies coupled with the constant fear of a possibility that they might fall in the wrong hands and further destabilise vulnerable regions in South Asia is extremely worrisome. Beijing is carefully choosing not to comment on the issue of its “hand in glove” ally Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal safety.

This is primarily aimed at deflecting attention away from the “proliferating role” it has played towards Islamabad laying its hands on such weapons and their means of delivery in the first place. This is not a very encouraging situation as China aims to put forth a strong case at being a regional stakeholder and play a greater role in stabilising the region – as securing security and maintaining stability assumes vital centrality in this turbulent part of the world.