Geopolitics

Rising China: The Middle Kingdoms Aspirations for Global Power Status
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Issue Book Excerpt: China: Threat or Challenge? | Date : 09 Feb , 2017

“It is China’s intention to be the greatest power in the world.”
— Lee Kuan Yew, 20111

“China’s peaceful development has broken away from the traditional pattern where a rising power was bound to seek hegemony.”
— China’s White Paper on Peaceful Development, 20112

“China does not see itself as a rising, but a returning power…. It does not view the prospect of a strong China exercising influence in economic, cultural, political and military affairs as an unnatural challenge to world order – but rather as a return to a normal state of affairs.” — Henry Kissinger, 20123

It would be worthwhile to briefly dwell on the origin of China as the country’s name and the genesis of the term “Middle Kingdom”. Through the ages China has been referred by many names. After Marco Polo popularised China in the West it was referred to as Cin. Other names it has been called are Cina, Sina, Sinea, Cathay, and Seres some of which were derived from one of the western-most kingdoms as the Qin (Chin), one of the early ruling dynasties4.

Traditionally the Chinese have called their country Zhongguo or the Middle Kingdom. This reference appeared in the 6th century BCE in texts by the Zhou Dynasty.5 Zhongguo is the most common name for China. The first character Zhong means ‘central’ or ‘middle’ while guo means ‘state or ‘states’ and in modern times ‘nation’, often translated as ‘Middle Kingdom’ or ‘Central Kingdom.’ In ancient usage, the term referred to the ‘Central States’ of the period before the unification of the empire. The connotation was due to the primacy of a culturally distinct core area, centred on the Yellow River valley, as distinguished from the tribes of the periphery who were only paying tribute to the Emperor.6 In later periods, however, Zhonggou was not used in this sense; rather, the country was called by the name of the dynasty, such as the “The Great Ming,” “The Great Qing” as the case might be. Some western writers use the translation of ‘middle kingdom’ or ‘central kingdom’ to imply that China has a deeply rooted self-centred psychology as the centre of the universe. Endymion Wilkinson denies that the Chinese were unique in thinking of their own country as central, although China was the only culture to use the concept of their name.7

To understand post modern China, another intrinsic part of its modern history needs some indulgence – a factor that predicates their world view even to this day. It is the ‘Century of Humiliation’. The term rose in 1915 in the atmosphere of rising Chinese nationalism. The beginning of the Century of Humiliation is usually dated to the mid-19th century, on the eve of the First Opium War amidst widespread opium addiction and the political unravelling of Qing Dynasty that followed.

The other major events often cited as part of the Century of Humiliation (1839-1949) are the unequal Treaties of Whampoa (1844) and Aigun (1858), the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), the Second Opium War (1856-1860), and the sacking of the Old Summer Palace (1860 and 1900), the Sino-French War (1884-1885), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the British invasion of Tibet (1903-1904), the Twenty-one Demands by Japan (1915), and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). In this period, China lost all the wars it fought, often forced to give major concessions to great powers in the subsequent treaties.8 The time for an end of this Century of Humiliations has been open to different interpretations. Both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong declared the end of the Century of Humiliation in the aftermath of World War II, with Chiang promoting his wartime resistance to Japanese rule and China’s place among the victorious Allies in 1945, while Mao declared it with the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949. The idea of an end of the Century was similarly declared in the repulsion of UN forces in the Korean War, the 1997 reunification of Hong Kong, and the Macau in 1999, and even the hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. Some still say that the Century will not end until Taiwan is reunified with the mainland. By this aggressive irredentist bent of mind it will not be farfetched that Diaoyu/Senkaku, Spratly and Paracel Islets and Arunachal Pradesh would also figure in its ‘unfinished agenda’ of China’s Century of Humiliation!!

Since 1949, the government in Beijing has undoubtedly made huge progress in improving the living conditions of the Chinese people. Life in China has changed enormously for the better. There were, of course, the trying times, especially during the “Lost decade” of the Cultural Revolution, in the Mao era when the country faced the abyss of political and economic breakdown. Since its economic reforms launched in 1978, however, China has sustained the most rapid and protracted economic growth in modern history. Its economy has grown at about 10% annually in real terms in the years that followed – meaning that it has increased more than thirteen times in just over three decades.9 This economic expansion has increased China’s technological and military capabilities. China’s comparatively high growth rates, combined with its large size, have caused concerns abroad about a power shift in regional and even global political economy.

Post Mao era, China has witnessed political stability and period of consolidation. The “Four Modernisations” enunciated by Deng Xiaoping, coupled with US change in policy after the Nixon visit in 1972, brought China out of isolation. Deng became the acceptable face of Chinese Communism and gave currency to holistic reforms and a reinterpretation of Socialism in China. Following Deng was Jiang Zemin, from 1992-2002, with his theory of “Three Represents.” His “Three Represents” can be summarized as – Represents China’s advanced social productive forces (importance of economic development); Represents the progressive course of China’s advanced culture (development of cultural identity); Represents the fundamental interests of the majority (maintenance of people’s mandate).

Next in line was Hu Jintao (2002-2012). Like the previous leaders he too made his contribution to extending the founding principles of the Peoples Republic. His “Eight Honours and Eight Shames” have been widely promoted. Love the country; do it no harm. Serve the people; never betray them. Follow science; discard ignorance. Be diligent; not indolent. Be united, help each other; make no gains at others expense. Be honest and trustworthy; do not sacrifice ethic for prosperity. Be disciplined and law abiding; not chaotic and lawless. Live plainly, work hard; do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures.

Xi Jinping took over the reins in March 2012, and has propounded his theory of “Four Comprehensives.” Xi Jinping is moulding a different image where he is seen to pet calves, cup babies’ cheeks, and kick footballs. He laughs and smiles in public. He holds his own umbrella, shuns a limousine, carries his own bowl of dumpling to a restaurant table, and sits cross-legged in a farmer’s hut. Such behaviour is standard among modern politicians. But in China, Xi Jinping’s common touch and courting public opinion are a striking departure.

Xi Jinping first mentioned the “Four Comprehensives” theory in December 2014, and said the first step in the strategy was “achieving the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.” This political theory envisages to comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing the country according to the rule of law, and enforcing strict party discipline.10

As would be evident, the Party continuity and the resulting regime stability have enabled setting long-term development goals which in turn has enabled steady growth of the economy. The Four Modernisations were, though little known, set forth by Zhou Enlai in 1963 but were enacted by Deng in 1978. The order of priority was given to Agriculture, Science and Technology, followed by Industry, and finally National Defence. It was aimed to rejuvenate China’s economy, make China a great economic power, and make it economically self reliant. In practical terms, it translated to providing electricity in rural areas, industrial automation, a new economic outlook and greatly enhanced defence strategy. Former Red Guard, Wei Jingsheng posted on the Xidan Wall, (the ‘Democracy Wall’) that the “fifth modernisation” should be democracy if China was to truly modernise. He was jailed for 15 years. Deng referred to the economic reforms as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” and believed that China was in the early stages of socialism. 1979, ushered in the first strands of diplomatic relations with US, that year was also marked by the end of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Science and Technology modernisation was hard to put into effect due to lack of resources. Opening of markets increased foreign trade. Party loosened control and communes were disbanded. Chinese Communist Party promoted the creation of a civilized society with citizens all working towards modernisation. The modernisation of Science and Technology, although understood by Chinese leaders as being the key to the transformation of industry and the economy, proved to be more of a theoretical goal versus an achievable objective. This was primarily due to decades-long isolation of Chinese scientists from western international community, outmoded universities, and an overall lack of access to advance scientific equipment, InfoTech and management knowhow.

China’s success in achieving internal stability, a sustained high rate of economic growth since the post-Mao reforms has given rise to speculation that China would rise as a great power in the Twenty-First Century. Since the mid-1990s, the western media has begun to report on China as the “coming power, an economic centre of gravity in Asia, a military mover and shaker, and a peer of any of the western powers that once nibbled at China’s fringes and brought emperor’s low.”11 China’s move towards becoming the centre of the World’s post-cold war security calculus has raised once again – the oldest problem in diplomacy – how can the international community manage the ambitions of a rising power.

Realists argue that the rising economic and military power of China, would, by its own momentum, make China a threat to Asian and global security. An economic and military giant would upset the balance of power in Asia and spark realignments by China’s neighbours. As a rising power, China would tend to use force rather than consultation in disputes with other nations.12 Whether China will become a military threat to its neighbours, a systemic challenge to the global order, or a cultural-ideological challenge to the West remains an open question. There are indicators already suggesting the altering of contours of Asian security, international commerce, and the global balance of power. The uncertainties about China’s future capabilities and intentions and the debate about alternative policy options have gripped the entire spectrum of analysts.13

It is a moot point that China’s conduct and motivations are influenced by others whose actions impinge on Chinese interests and perceptions. Thus, China’s foreign policy clearly cannot be viewed in isolation, more so considering its sensitivity linked to the “Century of Humiliation.” As a matter of fact, when it comes to balance-of-power dynamics in Asia, the US is the proverbial “elephant in the room.” While balance-of-power theories based primarily on Europe’s or America’s experience cannot be automatically assumed to be applicable to Asia or China counter-intuitively, at the same time, Asia’s or China’s experiences are also not necessarily unique.14 To paraphrase Karl Marx, – “people make choices even if they make them under circumstances not of their choosing”. As a consequence how China’s neighbours react to China’s emergence or ‘re-emergence’ as a major regional power depends in large part on what Beijing does with its power, and the outcome is hardly preordained. Official policies may be constrained but are not likely to be determined by the structural conditions. Just as China is seen to pursue its national interests so are its neighbours. That these competing interests will clash or are on a collision course may be the realists’ weakness. As yet, China’s neighbours are not balancing against its rising power. There are sound reasons for the non-occurrence of this outcome expected from the balance-of-power perspective. The fundamental one is that officials are not myopic. They realise that balancing policies – by increasing their country’s armament or seeking foreign allies – are at best short-term solutions, because in the long run, the fundamental drivers of a country’s economic growth – and thus its national power – are located within it and external attempts to bend its developmental trajectory are likely to have only a limited transient effect.15 Balancing policies can be self-defeating because they entail important opportunity costs and induce reactions that trigger cycles of escalated recriminations.16

One may argue that military capabilities and security – the so-called “strategic vision” of national interest – cannot be created overnight. Thus, militaries world over, make worst-case scenario assumptions about other’s intentions despite the prevailing environment. However, out of sheer compulsion China’s neighbouring East and South-east Asian countries are adjusting to the geo-strategic reality as best as their independent existence allows. Their engagement with China has been variously described as engagement, enmeshment or entanglement – or to employ liberal terms, collaboration, cooperation, and integration. The key distinction is between organising countervailing power to balance against a country on one hand and instituting networks of shared interests and interlocking relations to defuse its power on the other hand.17 According to Robert Ross, “If China is growing stronger in East Asia then there is necessarily a relative decline of US power. This is balancing.”18

However, “If China is engaged merely in a general increase in its military capabilities, with no specific adversary in mind, and if these changes result in enhanced Chinese military power in East Asia at the expense of the US then China is offsetting and thereby balancing US power, even if it did not explicitly design its efforts to do so. Increases in a states’ power relative to other states have consequences for the balance of power among them irrespective of the states intentions.”19 On ground, the US announced its ‘Pivot to Asia’ – a measure by which 60 percent of US forces will be aligned to the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. Such a move has a built-in escalatory dynamic. India has to assess as to how it should respond in terms of military modernisation/deployment and diplomatically.

David Shambaugh, a China specialist, opines that realists’ school of international relations seem to “deductively apply a theory to a situation rather than inductively generate a theory from evidence.” He further states that there is no evidence of ‘Chinese hegemony’ thesis and rejects any prescription of “pre-emptive containment.” He concludes, “Asia is currently witnessing an emergence of a regional community with a multilateral institutional architecture that is based on a series of increasingly shared norms about interstate relations and security.”20 He also succinctly observes that “the evolving Asian system is oriented not around security affairs or major power relations, but around the increasingly dense web of economic, technical, and other ties being forged among Asian nations in the era of accelerating globalisation.”21 However, an increasingly modernised and capable Chinese PLA would not be merely for ceremonial purposes. Deducing from the political statements, the Chinese PLA modernisation will continue till full and final resolution of the “unfinished agenda of unification.” The recent vocal Chinese pronouncements on Arunachal Pradesh being “disputed territory” is likely to become more prominent in India-China bilateral relations. While Aksai Chin, which is not being pursued vigorously by India as being its integral part, or even term it as disputed territory, will, in course of time wither away as if it never was even an issue.

Deng Xiaoping had enjoined that China should always “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at manipulating a low profile; never claim leadership.”22 With this policy outlook, Beijing joined the other East Asian countries which had earlier pivoted their regime survival and leadership legitimacy on economic performance. As a result, China had accumulated the world’s largest reserve account to finance a variety of plausible programs. That it has not used this money for military expansion to the extent that it could have is highly significant. The question is whether it could have ratcheted up its armament even more than it has. It could have, but it has not. This non-occurrence is significant.23 China, Japan, and other East Asian countries have kept their defence burdens at relatively low levels because they lack the capability to finance it. Will the situation change with US policy of ‘Pivot to Asia’ and Chinese assertive belligerence in South China Sea? It may. If it does it will usher in an ‘arms race’ and greater security cooperation between South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the US. Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam may keep a balance between China and US but could easily tilt to US if China ‘bashes on regardless’ in South China Sea.

Historical precedent suggests that nations in economic transition tend to be assertive externally and that accommodating a rising power into the established order has proved difficult and disruptive. Moreover, scholars correlate war with transition from one system to another: “Challengers [to the existing international system] are those powerful and dissatisfied nations who have grown in power after imposition of the existing order. Their elite face circumstances where the main benefits of the international order have already been allocated. The conditions for conflict are present. Peace is threatened when challengers seek to establish a new place for themselves in the international order; a place to which they believe their increasing power entitles them.”24

Western analysts describe China as a dissatisfied and non-status quo power which seeks to change the existing international order and norms of interstate relations. Nor is it satisfied with the norms and “rules” created by the West in the international system. In fact, the 2008 financial crisis indicated a failure of the “Washington Consensus” and increased the credibility of the “Beijing Consensus.” This gave China’s confidence a major boost. China itself has made concerted efforts to diffuse apprehensions raised by the “China Threat Theory” which has circulated along with its rise. Professor Liu Xiaoying of the Communist Research Institute of Communist University of China rebuts: “China is just regaining its lost right to have a say in world affairs…Historically, the rise of a country has created controversies and raised the concern of its neighbours and above all the existing powers. It is natural for the West to nurse such views as the China Threat Theory. But it should not deny China from having its say.”25

According to him, the Chinese people can have their say by solving their problems, building the country’s image and ridding the rest of the world of its misunderstandings and prejudices through transparency. These explanations notwithstanding, Chinese leaders believe that assertive, even threatening language and provocative action can have beneficial effect by inducing others to negotiate long unresolved outstanding issues, which they may even be ready to do in a conciliatory manner; this belief, moreover, has deep cultural roots.26

India’s political security strategy of restraint is not factored into its military calculus. While restraint may be misperceived as a sign of weakness (not only by the adversary but by domestic audiences as well), therefore reinforcement is a vital adjunct; by undertaking reciprocal steps in response to the other’s restraint, a virtuous cycle can be initiated that will build confidence.27 A case in point being India’s ‘Mountain Strike Corps.’ By raising such a force India has indicated its intention to take the war across its boundary into Tibet if need be. It has prompted China to strengthen its forces in TAR and relocate its strategic assets around TAR. However, this raising of the Corps has not given ground forces the capability to overcome the immense constrains presented by terrain and lack of infrastructure. Had the resources been more pragmatically deployed to augment the reserves at each tactical level (brigade and division) and operational level (Corps and Theatre), including fire power, a realistic purely defensive military posture would have achieved a viable scenario of local ‘deterrence by denial’ without provocative signals. The decision has been a major strategic short-sightedness and a decision which adds only to the paper exercise of bean counting.

There is no doubt that China wishes to be number one in the world. As patriotic Chinese, convinced that China was number one in the world order until the aberration of the last two centuries, it is natural that Chinese leaders will try to replace the USA. A few years ago the CCP got CCTV to air a series on rising powers in history. This was after the Politburo had scholars study and learn lessons from past cases of rising powers, some of which succeeded in becoming number one, like Britain and the US, and some of which failed, like Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. The CCP wanted their own people to know the results of those studies. The studies showed that rising powers that made the mistake of taking on the reigning hegemon and challenging the existing order too soon failed, like Germany and Japan. The Soviet Union, for its part, made the mistake of entering into an arms race with the USA that it could not win. China’s strategy today vis a vis the USA is not seeking direct confrontation. She privileges economy, diplomacy and force, in that order.28 David Shambaugh, the Sinologist of repute, in a recent controversial article has opined that the end game of the Communist rule has begun. As a consequence visualizes the collapse of the CCP in protracted and violent spasms. While many disagree with this controversial observation, Sinologists will be on high-alert for tell-tale signs of regime decay and decline.

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China remains very conflicted about its international identity and responsibility. Rising dependence on imported oil and other natural resources is fundamentally reshaping China’s energy security strategy. This has major implications for national security strategy, frontier defence, importance of offshore territorial claims, and development of its navy. However, China is also constrained by self-imposed policies about foreign intervention and having no military bases or forces abroad. Comparatively speaking, China possesses greater capacities to contribute to global financial and economic stability and growth, to develop assistance in developing countries, to global climate change, to global public health, to global innovation and technological development, to global energy supplies. In all these areas and others, China’s capacity to influence global patterns and global governance is greater than in the traditional patterns and global governance is greater than in traditional military security arena.29 Avoiding war and attaining one’s goals is the highest form of strategy by any tradition or book — whether Kautilya, Sun Tzu or Machiavelli. China would look more intently at its internal stability, regime security and sustain its uniform economic development. It is unlikely to create a situation where any of these priorities are destabilized or derailed. However, if it feels it is being pushed and shoved and would lose face it will act assertively both diplomatically and economically and react with force as it has done earlier.

Notes

1. Lee Kuan Yew, China’s Growing Might and the Consequences, Forbes, March 9, 2011.

2. Xinhua News Agency, Full Text of White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development, September 6, 2011.

3. Henry Kissinger, On China, 2nd Edition, New York: Penguin, 2012, p. 546.

4. https://taoofkunghu.wordpress.com/tag/chinese-history

5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Names_of_China

6              Middle kingdom http://www.inplease.com/encylopedia/history/middlekingdom.html#ix223sfbZSnAq

7. Ibid.

8. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Century_of_humiliation

9. Fred C Bregsten et al, China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008, p. 108.

10. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1723189/statemedia-starts-promotion-xi-jinpings-political-theory-four-comprehensives.

11. Lt Gen JS Bajwa, Modernisation of the Chinese PLA: Massed Militia to Force Projection, Lancer Publisher and Distributors, New Delhi, 2012, p. 292

12. Ibid, p. 293

13. Op cit, Lt Gen JS Bajwa, p. 293

14. Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2012, p. 3

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid. p. 4

17. Ibid. p. 6

18. Ibid. p. 33

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid. p. 49

21. Ibid.

22. Ching Pao, November 5, 1991, pp. 84-85

23. Op Cit, Steve Chan, p. 152

24. Op cit, Bajwa, p. 293

25. Ibid, p. 295

26. Edward N Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. The logic of Strategy, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2012, p. 10

27. James Steinberg and Michael E O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US-China Relations in the 21st Century, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford, 2014, p. 205.

28. Shivshanker Menon, India’s Security Challenges: India-China, India Conference at Harvard, 7th March 2015.

29. David Shambaugh, China goes Global: The Partial Power, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2013, p. 272.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Lt Gen (Dr) JS Bajwa

is Editor Indian Defence Review and former Chief of Staff, Eastern Command and Director General Infantry.  He has authored two books Modernisation of the People's Liberation Army and  Modernisation of the Chinese PLA

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2 thoughts on “Rising China: The Middle Kingdoms Aspirations for Global Power Status

  1. America realised that if Russia China and India get together then they can counter anglosaxon bullying of 5 evil eyes.
    So American agents inside India from the time of traitor mm singh were induced to lie about China and made many constant derogatory writings about China to Viviane the atmosphere.they have succeeded.
    Indians out of jealousy want to destroy China and want to live happily ever after I see Anglo American slavery.they like not Asian friend but a white man as tyrant

    _________________________
    China should be wars of treacherous Russia who will jump into usa bed even if it means betraying her allies like iran and Syria China.
    China should be wars of India too which really has become an American vassal ( one amongst 100) and has been invited by Anglo American to open another front against China.
    My country India is in grip of traitors ever since that ugly sardar mm singh was installed as PM despite him not winning a single seat _not even for himself.
    Such is the democracy in India where a man could be pm for ten years despite having been rejected by the electorate in the general election. ! This fraudulent democracy was sustained by the corrupt connivance of English league media in India.
    So beware of this name “democracy” it is a pimpocracy for the oligarchy everywhere.
    _____”””””—–‘-”'””‘”‘”‘”-“-“-‘-“‘”-“‘”-“-“‘”-“‘””

  2. In an effort to move closer to the U.S., the Vajpayee government had considered sending troops to Iraq in 2003, but aborted the move after domestic opposition. that is Iraq which was a secular state and the most friendly state in middle east towards India was betrayed by Indians at the smallest bribery of west to change sides .
    India is an untrustworthy nation.Full stop.

    Narendra modi now gives bribes to usa in form of immediate decisipn to buy spy infested american junk weaponary costing billions of dollars all within 2 years without any tender.

    combat-operations-pentagon-report/ri18562

    “”””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””” CCCC

    Europe is failing from its own ineptitude
    and the China Russia alliance is convenient and healthy.

    In fact, looking at the whole picture, the USA beat the planet up very successfully and comes out the winner 10 to 1 between 2000 and 2016.

    The issue at stake is that the USA (and to a lesser extent UK, EU, Aus, Jap, Can) survives only by being able to force the planet to trade in dollars, which allows it to issue debt risk free and skim 60+% of world trade through its correspondent and Swift banking system. In 2008 nations that must exchange their real cash and services for that stinking pile of paper started to move away from the dollar. This is what the BRICS etc are about. The USA had to destroy this system rising against it, or die.

    To that end it endeavored to tear up the competition and remain with the dollar on top. In the 15 years since 9/11 the USA has successfully:

    1.destroyed the oil producers that wanted to trade oil in other than the dollar by bombing them into the stone age (Iraq Libya)
    2. torn the heart out of the BRICS
    3. taken over the governments of S America.
    4. Crushed commodities and sunk South africa
    5. Crushed emerging economies by ever strengthening the dollar as it did before in the late 90s
    6. Spread military bases into 46 of 52 African nations.
    7. Ringed the S periphery of Russia and China w

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