Indian Defence Review

Top: Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, Bottom Left: IL-76, Bottom Right: IL-78 Airborne

Areas of Concern

China’s use of its military in the ‘disputed territories’ to continually flag its territorial agenda is a distressing thorn in India’s side. Although the civilian establishment tends to play it down perhaps to avoid the action it would be forced to take if the whole extent of the intrusions and transgressions into Indian territory became public, the military establishment faces affront incessantly.

The brazenness and frequency of Chinese aggressive encroachments is on the increase. It is this author’s prediction that the PLAAF flights over Indian territory using manned and unmanned craft, as an analogous extension to misdemeanours on the ground, are a distinct and near proximity. The concern is that such over flights are unlikely to be countered by India on the basis of decisive rules of engagement due to lack of a political will.

The gradual militarisation of Tibet and the building of infrastructure there is another area of concern for India. The rail head at Lhasa, connecting it to Xining, the capital of Qinghai province, over a distance of 1,956 km, has stated economic motivations. However, its strategic import cannot be ignored. There are 14 airfields in Tibet which can support operations in the Himalayan region. Their significance to any PLAAF operations against India is self-evident. Air-to-air refuelling capabilities of the PLAAF render operational ranges menacing for India.

Top: BZK-005, Bottom: S-400 Triumf SAM

Meanwhile, China’s manufacturing industry in the military and commercial aviation domain has made significant advances. It would be imprudent to treat this capability with scorn just because it is based on reverse engineering or industrial espionage. Notwithstanding such criticism, Chinese indigenous capability to develop and produce improved versions of older aircraft and new designs of modern fourth and fifth generation fighters and attack helicopters, is a cause of concern. This is especially so as Indian growth in this area remains stunted. The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and National Aeronautics Limited (NAL) are yet to produce an aircraft design of note. The only passenger aircraft design (Saras) is on a “time out” after the crash of its second prototype while the Tejas, the only modern fighter design by HAL, is delayed by over two decades. All indicators are that when it finally does enter service with an IAF reluctant to accept it, it will be a type best described as “too little, too late”.

The Dhruv is yet to draw appreciative remarks from any of its users. HAL’s contribution to Indian manufacturing industry can be best described as “licensed production”. China, on the other hand, has invested in high-precision and technologically advanced machine tools, avionics and other components that can also be used in the production of civil and military aircraft. Infrastructure and experience for the production of large-body commercial and military aircraft are believed to be limited but growing steadily. China is developing fourth and fifth generation aircraft that incorporate stealth and low observable technologies including carbon composites. Perhaps the only area it lags in is the production of reliable high performance aircraft engines. Given its track record and its single minded pursuit of self sufficiency, it is only a matter of time when that capability is also attained by China.

Implications for India

Although a quantitative comparison is not the best way to evaluate contending air forces, one cannot ignore the numbers altogether. According to a 2012 Pentagon report, the PLAAF has 1,570 fighters, 550 bombers, 300 transport aircraft plus another 1,450 older aircraft in its inventory. Of the fighters, more than 400 are in the fourth generation class and by 2020, this number is expected to go up to 1,000 which would be around half of the combat aircraft holding. The PLAAF has always had more aircraft than the Indian Air Force (IAF). However, in the early years of the PLAAF, the quality of aircraft on its inventory was poor and ineffectual. In recent years, the quantitative edge has continued to be in favour of China while the qualitative advancements made by it have rendered it that much more potent. As India has produced no aircraft of its own, it has been dependent on Russian and Western sources. The purchase of these aircraft has not given any technological education as a benefit and licensed production has been the norm.

Even the ongoing negotiations for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) Rafale, despite the new defence procurement policy, may not achieve a high score on the relevant technology transfer. As long as HAL continues to exist in its present avatar, India is unlikely to approach the leading edge of aircraft design and technology. The establishment does not seem capable of comprehending the obvious fact that an Indian state-managed Public Sector Unit (PSU) is not capable of achieving what the Chinese aviation manufacturing industry has achieved. Privatisation of aviation manufacturing could have been a solution but an unlikely one due to the strong lobby HAL enjoys at the centre which has allowed it to exist despite patent inefficiencies and incompetence. The Indian military aviation industry has suffered long on this count and future confrontations with PLAAF are guaranteed to bring to the fore our failure as a fairly advanced nation to produce an inexpensive, indigenous and potent aircraft.

)”]The IAF’s vision for what it wants to be is clear but its execution is clouded by India’s apparently flawed national policies. The MMRCA is a long suffering story the IAF would like to forget. The travesty therein is that while the IAF is responsible for the air defence of the country and offensive roles against belligerent neighbours, what aircraft and equipment it gets for doing its job is tempered by a bureaucracy that is more concerned with the process of procurement than the speed and efficacy with which the right hardware is made available to the IAF. The consequence of delays in the procurement of the MMRCA and the entry of the Tejas into service will be that the IAF would become woefully inadequate to meet with the task of engaging the PLAAF in an honourable contest. Should aerial confrontation accrue between India and China in the near future, it is almost certain that the IAF would suffer the same fate of ignominy that our ground forces did in 1962.

Conclusion

The ‘inscrutable’ sobriquet for the Chinese is not so much because of their unsmiling faces but on account of their unpredictable actions. Military action against India may not come in the form of a full-fledged war. Small pin pricks in ‘disputed territories’ may keep increasing in magnitude and frequency until even the submissive and cautious Indian government is constrained to react. Should that happen and a larger military confrontation become inevitable, the PLAAF would be a major instrument of damage to our forces, assets and national pride.

Some writings on the 1962 conflict include views that the IAF could have done considerable damage to the Chinese as the PLAAF had outdated aircraft and equipment then. The same is not true about the PLAAF today. The continuing delays in updating capabilities of the IAF relentlessly bring us closer to the possibility of a humiliating experience at the hands of the PLAAF.