Indian Defence Review

In the absence of any indigenously produced combat aircraft discounting the non-operational Tejas, India’s current aircraft are Russian (MiG-21, MiG-27, MiG-29, Su-30MKI), French (Mirage-2000) and the Anglo-French Jaguar. The IAF has learnt, nay mastered, the art of managing mixed fleets, even integrating Western and Indian avionics into Russian aircraft, but HAL has remained at the lowest point of the learning curve in terms of producing its own combat aircraft design. Thus, in future too, the IAF appears destined to live with mixed fleets although some rearrangement is foreseeable. So what are our foreign options?

National security, the ability of a nation to be free from external coercion while at the same time possess the aggressive capacity to deter an enemy from harming the nation’s populace, resources, integrity and territory, has aerospace power at the core of both offence and defence. The Battle of Britain was won essentially by use of aerospace power and World War II was brought to its messy culmination by using the medium of the air to deliver two atom bombs. In subsequent conflict situations during the Cold War, aerospace power remained important; but did not bring about any victory or defeat by itself. However, national air forces, the explicit hand-maidens of aerospace power, retain their relevance and crucial importance to national security for power projection as well as air defence of national territory.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is projected as the fourth largest in the world in terms of personnel and aircraft and has established itself as one of the most professional air forces in the world. However, in recent years, interrogatory marks have been raised from within and outside the IAF over its capability to perform its assigned roles and tasks in furtherance of the nation’s defence strategy. The present Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa is on record as having publicly stated last year when he was the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, that the IAF’s ‘numbers’ were ‘inadequate’ to fully execute an air campaign involving a two-front war. India is one of the world’s largest defence spenders but an apathetic approach by successive governments towards defence preparedness has led to some serious shortfalls in weapon systems and equipment. Recently, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence slammed the government for its ‘ad-hoc’, ‘casual’ and ‘lackadaisical’ approach towards the preparedness of the defence forces for war. In this context, the combat fleet of the IAF is one of the most critical areas where an acute breach exists.

Current Status of the Combat Fleet

The mission statement of the IAF as enshrined in its Doctrine document is, “To be a modern, flexible and professional aerospace power with full spectrum capability to protect and further national interests and objectives.” Air defence of the nation is the IAF’s role; but the essential characteristics of aerospace power are that it is strategic in nature and is primarily an offensive power. On both these counts, the IAF is on a weak wicket. Its ownership of restricted ‘strategic’ assets provides but very limited reach and its current strength of offensive aircraft is inadequate to the task of a ‘two-front war’ if China and Pakistan decide to collaborate at our borders.

The IAF is sanctioned a 42-squadron combat strength. This figure itself is under constant assault by analysts who point out that it does not cater for a worst case scenario of having to take on China and Pakistan at the same time. The 42-squadron figure is dated and, since its finalisation, there have been significant and ominous changes in aircraft holdings in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and their deployment in Tibet. However, while one does not hear many protests from the IAF or any think tank about the figure of 42 squadrons itself being a flawed and deficient one, there are countless disapproving noises about the fact that the current strength of 33 squadrons is far short of 42 squadrons.

In February 2009, the then Defence Minister, AK Antony told the Rajya Sabha in a written reply to a query, “During the period 2007-2022, the strength at the end of 11th, 12th and 13th Plan periods is expected to increase to 35.5, 35 and 42 squadrons respectively.” The 42-squadron build up was premised on a 126-aircraft MMRCA deal, 272 Su-30MKIs being inducted by 2019, a total of 120 Tejas aircraft entering service by 2026 with more to follow and 51 Mirage-2000s and 63 MiG-29s being upgraded. The Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which is under development, was to come in later (a total of 127). However, with the induction of Tejas delayed and the Rafale deal for 126 aircraft scrapped, the actual strength of the combat fleet is lagging behind these projections. The effectiveness is further reduced due to the poor serviceability of the Su-30MKI fleet. Moreover, the current holdings of MiG-21 and MiG-27 are ageing fleets which will fall out of service in the next few years. Thus the search is on for filling the widening gap with another type of aircraft, possibly a single engine, one less expensive than the Rafale.

Options for Raising Strength

In the absence of any indigenously produced combat aircraft discounting the non-operational Tejas, India’s current aircraft are Russian (MiG-21, MiG-27, MiG-29, Su-30MKI), French (Mirage-2000) and the Anglo-French Jaguar. The IAF has learnt, nay mastered, the art of managing mixed fleets, even integrating Western and Indian avionics into Russian aircraft, but HAL has remained at the lowest point of the learning curve in terms of producing its own combat aircraft design. Thus, in future too, the IAF appears destined to live with mixed fleets although some rearrangement is foreseeable. So what are our foreign options?

In the past, we have had no combat aircraft from the US but Indo-US relations are on the upswing and we have received transport aircraft and are in the process of procuring helicopters from the US Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). As a fallout of the decision to prune the 126 aircraft MMRCA deal to 36 aircraft, the IAF is now looking for cheaper, single-engine aircraft. Lockheed Martin’s F-16 had been one of the six contenders for MMRCA, but lost out to twin-engine platforms in the competition. Lockheed Martin, which was in the process of shutting down its F-16 assembly line at Fort Worth, offered to not only sell the F-16 to India; but also to shift its production to India and affect a complete transfer the technology to India (a decision has been taken now to shift it to South Carolina). However, there is understandable hesitation on the part of India on various counts. There is the issue of the F-16 being used by Pakistan with the implication that India would end up supporting Pakistani F-16 fleet. In terms of operational capability, one crucial disadvantage it has is that it has no side scanning radar which permits the tactical advantage of guiding a missile without having to fly directly towards it. Moreover, India is a bit wary given its past experience with the US. In any case, the Trump administration has made it clear that it will scrutinise any deal that may shift jobs overseas and has said it plans to take a ‘fresh look’ at the India deal. The F-16 thus looks like an unlikely candidate for adding to IAF’s fleet.

The Russian connection is the strongest of all foreign ones, as far as the IAF is concerned. The Soviet Union helped India set up three new factories for HAL at Nasik (aircraft), Koraput (engines) and Hyderabad (avionics) although transfer of significant technology remained elusive. A total of 125 upgraded MiG-21 ‘Bison’ are expected to be in service until 2022, while a slowly dwindling strength (from 160) MiG-27s plods on. Sixty three of the 80 MiG-29s procured are being upgraded currently. The most valuable Russian asset the IAF has, is the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, which was developed for the IAF after a joint design and development project in early 2000s and is being license-produced by HAL.

A total of 272 aircraft were contracted for of which 240 have been inducted. The aircraft will soon be upgraded as ‘Super Sukhoi’ with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and will be the backbone of the IAF’s fighter fleet for at least the next two decades. However, the whole deal is odorous; there is no Transfer of Technology and each aircraft license-produced by HAL costs Rs 100 crore which is more than a Russian-assembled one. Moreover, the serviceability rate has been alarmingly low. Introspection on the Su-30MKI deal has led to India insisting on full Transfer of Technology for the FGFA being jointly designed by India and Russia, not only so that future upgrades and avionics/armament modifications can be carried out indigenously; but also to gain technology benefits for the ongoing Advance Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) which, without FGFA technology, may end up into a too little too late exemplar like the Tejas. Russia has offered the MiG-35 to India.

Biting at the single engine bait is another former contender for the MMRCA contest – Saab Gripen E, claims for which project it as an aircraft better than the F-16 and a life cycle cost significantly lower than the F-16’s. It has an advantage over the F-16 in terms of its AESA radar which is being improved further, according to Saab. Accompanied with an offer for serial production in India and a complete Transfer of Technology, the is an object of desire for the IAF.

The British linkage to the IAF includes the Folland Gnat, an aircraft so determinedly single pilot that it did not even have a trainer version in India and pilots who intended to fly solo on the Gnat, flew training sorties on the Hawker Hunter, another British type of aircraft. The SEPECAT Jaguar, an Anglo-French Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) has been in service with the IAF since 1978. A total of 120 were built under license by HAL and some significant avionics updates affected since then. Currently, the IAF has 125 of these aircraft. RollsRoyce, a British company, has been making noises about producing fighter jet engines in India. While that may not directly contribute to the IAF’s combat capability, in the long run, some technology related benefits may accrue for the Indian aerospace industry. This could be very significant, given the fact that our own Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) has not been able to produce an engine for the Tejas.

French company Dassault gave the IAF Ouragans in 1953 and Mirage-2000s in 1984; the latter have been modified to Mirage-2000-5 Mk II and are expected to continue in service until 2030. While HAL overhauls the Mirage in India, there is no Transfer of Technology and all the components and spares are of French origin. Waking up a little late, much after announcing a government-to-government deal for 36 Rafale jets, India is now insisting on full Transfer of Technology; the French, still chaffing from the cancellation of the 126 Rafale deal under the MMRCA project, are insistent that that can happen only if the minimum order is for 100 Rafale jets. India, rightly, is not in the mood for procuring more than 36 of these expensive aircraft and is looking for cheaper options. The only good thing that might come out from the Rafale deal is the formation of Dassault Reliance Aerospace to handle the 50 per cent offsets inherent to the deal.

Israel, which has had over two decades of aerospace relations with India, has recently offered Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such as Eitan and Heron for stand-off and long-range strategic strike roles. If consummated, such a deal could add to the combat potential of the IAF. A decision on a deal with IAI under ‘Make in India’ programme with complete Transfer of Technology, would be taken in July when Prime Minister Modi is to visit Israel.

Prognosis

In July 2007, the then CAS, Air Chief Marshal FH Major reportedly stated the IAF’s intention to reduce its combat aircraft inventory to three aircraft systems only – the Tejas as the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the new MMRCAs as the Medium Combat Aircraft (MCA) and the SU-30MKIs as the Heavy Combat Aircraft (HCA). The intervening years have seen the Tejas delayed further and the MMRCA deal whittled down to 36. There are other factors too that make this simplistic projection impracticable. So what is the prognosis? Can the IAF get 42 squadrons by 2022?

The indigenous LCA story is distressing. The Tejas Mk I handed over to an unwilling IAF with just an Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) and an underpowered engine (F404-GE-IN20) in 2015 amidst much fanfare, is not a combat aircraft and can at best be used for training. Forty of these are on order even while they move sluggishly towards a Final Operational Clearance (FOC) which ought to have preceded induction into service. The final objective of a Mk II with an upgraded GE engine (F414-GE-INS6), an AESA radar and air-to-air refueling is a distant dream yet with a nebulous timeline.

Meanwhile, the Mk IA, with the Mk I engine and some upgrades (including AESA radar), was thrust down the throat of the IAF and 83 were ordered. Delivery is expected to commence in 2018-19 at the rate of 16 units per annum. By 2024, the IAF should have 40 Tejas Mk I and 83 Mk IA but no Mk II. Meanwhile, the attrition of MiG-21 and MiG-27 fleets, which is expected to be around 200 aircraft by 2024, dictates that new inductions take place as soon as practicable. Thus, what is required is that the IAF gets at least 200 Tejas Mk II between now and 2024 to replace all the MiG-21 and MiG-27 fleets retired by then. The total projection of 294 LCAs (based on 14 squadrons with 21 aircraft each) is unlikely to mature by 2022 or even 2024, given HAL’s track record.

As far as the medium category is concerned, the 36 Rafale deal is also in suspended animation and the datelines still in areas of uncertainty. Unarguably, the Rafale is an expensive option. Should India go for more Rafale? Should we opt for another 90 aircraft and let Dassault and Reliance manufacture these in India so that complete Transfer of Technology can take place? There is a strong case for doing so in the interest of the future of indigenous aerospace industry. However, the cost is high and budgetary constraints are already choking the defence services.

Whether the 36 Rafale deal gets consummated or not, India should hasten the search for a combat aircraft and home onto one type. The sense of urgency that the ominous writing on the wall dictates is somehow missing the government’s attention. The lumbering bureaucratic methodology used for defence procurement is engaged in ‘marking time’ – the process of showing visible activity, stomping energetically and consuming considerable energy without moving ahead. The MMRCA selection process which started in 2007 and culminated in 2015 in an anti-climactical cancellation has not amused any of the contenders, least of all the French.

It was reported in October last year that Indian embassies in the US, Russia and Sweden had written to companies in their respective countries to ask whether they would be interested in partnering one or more Indian companies in building a medium multi-role combat aircraft of the single engine variety. Given the imperative of the IAF’s precarious state as far as its combat aircraft strength is concerned, juxtaposed with the fact that the leading contenders have already been tested and evaluated under the ill-managed MMRCA selection process, the delay in taking a decision is incomprehensible.

What is required is a quick finalisation of the final MMRCA that we need and then a speedy setting up of an assembly line with the foreign OEM partnering a private company and not the inveterately inefficient public sector. The first order itself should be for at least 126 aircraft which was the original requirement as envisaged in 2007, possibly followed by more to cater for further peacetime attrition of the IAF’s Jaguars, Mirage-2000s and MiG-29s. It may be mentioned en passant that the Indian AMCA can be discounted as far as the next two decades are concerned, given the LCA’s design and development history.

The only silver lining in the otherwise gloomy picture is the Su-30MKI in the heavy combat aircraft space. A total of 272 are on order with the last 32 still to be delivered. A follow on order for 40 aircraft has been placed taking the total to 312. Serviceability has been low and an agreement was signed recently between HAL and Irkut Corporation for improving that situation. The Su-30 MKIs are slated to be upgraded to Super Sukhoi which will make the aircraft more combat capable over the next five years. The future of the FGFA, as mentioned earlier, remains uncertain but it could complement the Su-30MKI in the distant future, if the deal comes through.

If the IAF gets 294 LCAs, 126 MMRCAs and 312 Su-30MKIs the expected attrition could be compensated adequately. Unfortunately, only the Su-30MKI figure appears to be achievable.

Concluding Remarks

The arithmetic of numbers outlined above is incomplete without a mention of the price tags. The Tejas was expected to cost (after amortisation of the development cost, and pursuant to the IAF and Navy buying 294 and 50 aircraft respectively) Rs 209 crore per unit. With the Navy discarding it, the cost to the IAF will go up higher. The MMRCA (to treat Rafale as the benchmark) costs around Rs 800 crore each while the Su-30MKI is tagged at Rs 450 crore each as the HAL-produced aircraft costs Rs 100 crore more than the one produced in Russia by the OEM.

Then there are the ongoing upgrades constantly being undertaken to keep up with technology. The upgrade programme for 51 Mirage-2000 is around Rs 344 crore each and that for 63 MiG-29s around Rs 100 crore each. The point being made is that, added to the delays in procurement and production, there is an interrogatory mark over the budgetary allocations necessary to support the revamping of the IAF fleet. The fresh, ongoing search for a single engine combat aircraft shows all the signs of dragging on inexorably and indefinitely; it is possible that the dragging of feet by the government on the new aircraft is on account of the huge price tag attached to a possible future acquisition.

Nonetheless, the need to bring the IAF to a 42-squadron strength as a first step and then to revisit the sanctioned strength, remains an imperative if India wishes to forestall an ignominious performance in a future aerial campaign involving either or both of our inimical neighbours.