Indian Defence Review

Impact on India

From the Indian security point of view, the best case scenario is the stabilization of the current relatively modernist state in Afghanistan (albeit in a more ethnically inclusive form). The worst case scenario would be a takeover of the whole or the Pashtun parts of Afghanistan by the hardcore Taliban–Al Qaida combine. It could pose a serious threat to Indian and regional security. Emergence of a Pakhtunkhwa that straddles the Durand Line could lead to the splintering of Pakistan with unpredictable consequences for regional and global security. The prime global concern then would be the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. These then are the range of possible futures that could actualize in Afghanistan.

India must also coordinate its strategy and response options, in Afghanistan with Russia that is increasingly reasserting itself in this region

The best course of action for India therefore is to provide maximum possible assistance for the capacity-building of the Afghan nation state. There is a specific need to assist in the capacity building of the Afghan National Army (ANA). India must pull out all stops in this regards and offer to train and equip entire formations of the ANA. An Afghan problem needs an Afghan solution. A modern nation-state is premised upon the state’s sole monopoly of violence in its territory. For that the ANA needs to be rapidly built up to an optimal size of 550,000 strong. This was the size of the reconstructed Afghan Army left behind by the Soviets prior to their withdrawal in 1989. This refurbished Army had held its own against the Mujahideen for well over three years. It had unraveled only once Gorbochov had pulled out the economic plug.

India must also coordinate its strategy and response options, in Afghanistan with Russia that is increasingly reasserting itself in this region. It has reportedly provided weapons worth US$ 100 million to the Karzai regime and agreed to provide alternate supply routes to the ISAF. Iran would be highly averse to the idea of the return of the Taliban in Kabul and India needs to urgently revive its cooperation with Iran in this regard. India thus needs to harmonize a regional response in concert with Russia, Iran and the Central Asian States.

Pakistan is keen to see the US and its allies exit from Afghanistan. It has been stridently advising against further US troops build-up in Afghanistan. It is keen to see the US fail so that its Military–ISI complex can emerge as the centre of a new Jihad Caliphate in South–West Asia. India must advise the US to accept the common sense advice of its field commanders and stay the course in Afghanistan. An US withdrawal could generate unwarranted hubris in the Jihad belt on the Af–Pak border and create a security disaster not only for the region but also for the USA and the West in the mid to long term. The hope that a triumphant Taliban would ditch Al Qaida is irrational in the extreme. It could prove to be downright disastrous not just for regional, but global security per se.

Recommended Thrust

Capacity Building of the ANA. The key to victory in Afghanistan therefore lies in a rapid capacity building of the ANA. The proposed size of 134,000 straight legged infantry force, is far too unrealistic. At the very least there is an urgent case to raise it to the level of the Afghan Army left behind by the Soviets in 1989 (550,000 strong). The Americans have spent over US$ 250 billion in Afghanistan so far. The bulk of it has been spent on sustaining their small military contingent and its cost of operations. It would have been far more cost-effective to rapidly expand the size and capacity of the Afghan Army and let it do the bulk of the heavy lifting. This was the core of the largely successful Soviet counter – guerilla policy.

In the absence of adequate boots on the ground there is simply no way that the US/NATO forces can reduce their reliance on airpower.

It is of paramount importance that the conflict be nativised at the earliest. The cost of expanding the ANA to triple its current grossly inadequate size, would, in real cost-benefit terms, be far less than the comparative cost of sustaining US/ NATO troops. Besides it would greatly dilute local hostility. This alone can provide security to the population and enable the actualization of the ‘clear, hold , build’ strategy. Nativizing the conflict is the key to victory. It is here that India can help by rapidly raising and equipping upto two ANA Divisions

Border Fencing: Key to Ammunition Management. Indian military experience in CI operations indicates that a key component of the defeat mechanism is curtailing the ammunition supply of the insurgents and their free movement to and from their sanctuaries. This can be achieved by physical barriers like fencing. This solution had worked very well in the Punjab and later in J&K. The disruption of the LTTEs ammunition supply was a key component of its defeat mechanism. It would assist greatly if the Americans could prevail upon Pakistan to fence the border with Afghanistan. It could in fact prove to be a battle winning factor.

Replicating the Soviet Strategy. It is important to closely study the Soviet strategy simply because it had been largely successful. The Soviets focused on holding the cities and key lines of communication and rapidly rebuilding the Afghan Army and secret police. They mentored it for four to five years in actual operations, and when they were confident of its combat capabilities; increasingly shifted the bulk of ground combat to the Afghan Army and then withdrew. This is precisely what the Americans need to do. They will have to strengthen the surge to put the Taliban under severe military pressure. Without this there is simply no way that it can be compelled to negotiate. These negotiations themselves will serve to curtail its activity levels and create the conditions for a rapid expansion of the Afghan Army. A rapid capacity-building of the ANA alone will lead to victory and a stabilsation of the Afghan state.

The Role of Air Power. In the absence of adequate boots on the ground there is simply no way that the US/NATO forces can reduce their reliance on airpower. This serves to increase collateral damage and further alienates the population. However, if the Americans are not willing or capable of such troop accretions, they will have to continue to rely upon air power despite its constraints. For the sake of national prestige and long term security, the Americans will have to stay engaged in Afghanistan. Any premature attempts to thin out ground troops and rely unduly upon Predator operations could lead to a long term security disaster.