Military & Aerospace

Quest for the Golden Hind
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Issue Vol. 28.2 Apr-Jun 2013 | Date : 13 Sep , 2014

India’s Strategic Nuclear Arsenal?

India is presently mastering Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile technology with 5,000-kilometre range. This meets our geo-political threat perception. We have not yet mastered the ‘Multiple-Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles’ technology which is an essential ingredient of ICBM-class missile technology. Thus, each strategic missile of ours can deliver only one nuclear warhead onto a selected target. Therefore, we need to have more missile delivery systems and our response capability is purely punitive and defensive in nature. This requires a high level of deceptive deployment patterns and frequent change of location to beat satellite tracking and hostile local intelligence networks in order to survive first strike by potential foes.

The government has got no control over its military, and the Pakistan Military dictates the country’s foreign policy…

Keeping the constraints of nuclear delivery assets in mind, India needs to make much greater advancement in both fusion and fission warheads design and efficacy over the next decade. Great urgency has to be given to the development of a ‘W-88 type’ nuclear warhead which has to be carried in our indigenous nuclear submarine and mated with seaborne missile launch systems. Only then can our national security be guaranteed. The W-88 nuclear warhead developed by the USA in the late 1980s weighs only 360kgs and is 0.55 metre in diameter yet it packs a yield of 475 KT. The Chinese had developed a copy by the late 1990s and successfully mated it with the Dong Feng-31 long range strategic missile system. Due to design and technology constraints, their warhead is reported to weigh as much as 700kgs. Further design improvements have been recently reported to meet the requirements of placing it onto their Jin class nuclear submarine launched Ballistic Missile System.

India’s Nuclear Warhead Design Programme has to make significant improvements over the next few years. Any degree of computer simulated tests is of no use if the device fizzles out during actual use. Unanticipated design flaws, mathematical calculation errors and peculiar characteristics of nuclear materials plague miniaturization efforts of nuclear warheads. Just as the quality of a firecracker has to be proved during the Diwali season, there is no escape from actual nuclear testing to freeze the basic ‘Bharat Bomb’ warhead design. This is a tricky proposition as the foreign policy repercussions have to be fine-tuned to reduce the adverse impact factors. We can surely expect Pakistan to go for similar nuclear testing immediately thereafter. So the question is which would be more beneficial to India and more adverse for Pakistan on the economic front – whether the sooner option or later option. India badly needs a stockpile of 150-odd reliable W-88 type nuclear warheads by 2022.

2013 would be an ideal year for carrying out nuclear warhead testing by India as in 2014, the Lok Sabha elections are due and the Americans have to withdraw from Afghanistan without suffering loss of face or complicating matters. The Chinese are preoccupied with their decennial change of guard and consolidation of the new leadership. In the present circumstances they do not foresee any military threat from India and if they over-react, it would push India into the anti-China strategic camp. The Israeli strikes on the Iranian nuclear facilities can be expected in 2014 and the security environment would get immensely complicated thereafter.

The Pakistan Military respects strength and instinctively attacks the weaknesses it perceives.

However, India has to explore the possibility of having an alternative nuclear test site in order to maintain surprise and even contemplate carrying out the tests during the monsoon season to negate satellite surveillance. India also needs to urgently develop a ‘W-70’ type Enhanced Radiation Warhead, which has a blast effect of only 2KT and can neutralise all living beings in a local impact area of 1400M diameter. This can be easily deployed with our existing missile delivery systems. Besides the US and UK, France perfected this technology in 1980 and China in 1988.

We have sufficient stocks of Tritium for making such devices. Imagine if our country’s political leadership had given the ultimatum of a Neutron Bomb strike and called for the civilian population of Kandhahar to be evacuated during the tense IC-814 Indian Airlines plane hijack situation in end 1999 – if the plane and hostages were not safely released. The whole world including the US and Saudis would have been outraged but after 24 hours they would have applied pressure on Pakistan to heed to reason and rein in the ISI. For that to have happened, India should have had the capability and option in the first place, and political will thereafter. This worst instance of national capitulation after 1962 should not have happened. Even today, our national covert intelligence agencies have not hunted and eliminated the perpetrators.

Tackling the Menace of Pakistan

The challenge that we face is what do we do with a state that is like North Korea, and is a permanent menace to its neighbours? Unfortunately, we cannot remove Pakistan from our neighbourhood. But the contradictions within Pakistan have to be clearly understood. The Pakistan Government and the Military are two separate establishments. The government in Pakistan has got no control over its military, and the Pakistan Military dictates the country’s foreign policy. Therefore, there is no point in carrying out a dialogue with the Government over security related matters, which is the mistake the Indian Government is repeatedly making. The contacts with the Pakistan Government should be restricted to people-to-people relations, trade, sports and cultural matters.

Over security and foreign policy matters, it would be better to deal with the Pakistan Army Chief through back channels and Intelligence Services contacts. Retired Pakistan Army Corps Commanders are very useful for Track II diplomacy as they are amenable to reason and wiser after retirement and they understand better the futility of resorting to force to settle issues. All of them have interests and relatives in England and USA. Therefore, a bi-annual closed door security dialogue attended by senior retired generals and diplomats from both sides needs to be held abroad, away from media glare. This would be the best confidence building measure possible under the circumstances. Pakistan today has become the true ‘running dog’ of Chinese hegemony and the ‘collaborator’ of the Western Crusaders. The ruling elites have lost sight of the advantages of peace, good governance and rule of law and what the Muslim population of South Asia can achieve under enlightened rule and a co-operative atmosphere.

The myth of the ISI’s invincibility and reach should be shattered using resolute measures.

The Pakistan Military respects strength and instinctively attacks weaknesses it perceives, in relation to India. This is their psyche, similar to the Nazi SS or Japanese Army during WW-II. The Military leadership’s mindset is like that of the medieval Moslem Sultanate rulers anywhere. They have great contempt and hatred for India. Therefore, they will continue to be a perpetual nuisance and cannot be trusted to keep their word. They have to be handled psychologically using the swift and overwhelming response to bullying method. Every ‘adventure’ that the Pak Military or the ISI launches should be subjected to unwavering and resolute response so that it ends up as a guaranteed ‘misadventure’. For this to happen, we have to be prepared, faster in decision making, alert and in anticipatory mode to pounce on them.

Our covert operations capability to create unrest in various parts of Pakistan should be built up so that the Pakistan Army’s internal security commitments multiply and become a perpetual headache. The Pakistan Army’s penchant for mischief across the LOC in J&K should be met with retaliation at the local level to the extent that the border zone in POK should resemble a ‘No Man’s Land’. There should not be a single over ground military structure left standing within five kilometres of the LOC in that sector after a serious ceasefire violation occurs. The costs of bad relations should be painfully visible. Other major policy measures which should be put into effect are:-

Apply the ‘Reagan Doctrine’ with Pakistan. India should go for a 25 per cent hike in defence spending over the next ten years, and keep the Pakistan economy stressed in the effort to play ‘catch up’. This does not require a shot to be fired.

In retaliation for serious Pakistan-supported terrorist attacks and ceasefire violations, let us surreptitiously curtail water flowing into Pakistan by five per cent in clear violation of mutual agreements. More dams need to be completed over the next ten years on the rivers flowing from our side into Pakistan. Let this be the penalty for hostile actions.

The Afghan Pashtuns resent the Pakistan Military. They should be helped whenever the opportunity arises.

The Iranian Ayotollahs resent US military presence in Pakistan, the shoddy treatment of Pakistani Shias, and the close military linkages and foreign policy tie-up with the Saudis. They also would not like the Pakistan military to dominate the scene in Afghanistan after the US pull-out. Therefore, closer economic and security cooperation with Iran is essential without annoying the US too much as this is an existential reality for India, similar to what Israel does when its interests conflict with that of the US.

The myth of the ISI’s invincibility and reach should be shattered using resolute measures. It must be ensured as one of our national priorities that all ISI’s forays and adventures outside Pakistan end up in failure, even if it does not concern India directly.

To become a great nation, India has to be militarily strong always.

Let us show firmness in dealing with the Pakistan military but no hatred towards the Pakistani people. Even while dealing with the military, we must scrupulously adhere to the internationally accepted norms and not stoop to their levels of barbarity. The proper conduct of the Chinese towards our POWs during 1962-1963 should be a guideline, as this had helped to make a fresh beginning with them as time passed.

Conclusion

The Indian military might today is at its nadir with neither vision nor drive to achieve quantifiable goals. The Indian Army has become similar to a national ‘militia’, good only in numbers, but lacking in punch or strong logistics backing. More than two decades of focus on counter insurgency and the deceptive jargon of ‘Low Intensive Conflict’ have blurred its prime requirement of being ever prepared to fight an all-out War. If the Army stops asking for the necessary resources to fulfill its mission, then who else is to be blamed – the ‘survival instinct’ minded bureaucracy or the ‘next hustings-minded’ political class?

To become a great nation, India has to be militarily strong always while following the well-thought out current national policy of peaceful co-existence with neighbours and expecting non-reciprocity in voluminous trade and greatly enhanced people-to-people contacts. India is today at the crossroads for a momentous leap into a future full of opportunities. It cannot shy away from the responsibilities of the world. Armed might is the best insurance for democratic and secular governance. The people of other countries look up to us for guidance, humane values and to emulate our spirit of tolerance and freedom of conscience. What our country sorely lacks today are the strong managerial skills and work culture required to forcefully achieve the goals laid down by the political leadership, without allowing for delays to creep in. Heads of Departments should be empowered to even cancel holidays, if priority work is pending. ‘Delay’ should be treated as a sin equivalent to non-compliance of orders.

References

  1. Wikipedia.
  2. American Nuclear Society website.
  3. Security Research Review Vol. 4, No. 1 – October 2009 : Paper on Indian Nuclear Tests by Shiv Sastry.
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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Col JK Achuthan (Retd.)

8 GR was commissioned in June 1980. 

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2 thoughts on “Quest for the Golden Hind

  1. I entirely disagree with the conclusion reached in this article. Is there a shortfall in leadership, manpower, weaponry, training or morale? The author starts with the nuclear doctrine, shifts to Pakistan and then concludes that the Indian army is at its nadir! He also seems to suggest that an increase in defence spending by 25% will resolve the problem. Why not 35%? A disjointed article which surprisingly has been published.

  2. “Quest for the golden hind” flawlessly depicts the conspicuous loopholes in our mindset up regarding military preparations. this loophole continues from the post independence period when chines attack caught us bu surprise and our government conceded a vast territory before Chinese army.
    The narrow mindedness of leaders on the fores is shrinking the very idea of Indian Pride. If someone talks ardently in favor of huge military budget, they are just said to be jingoists.
    If all these things not corrected in time, the day is not very far when our interest and freedom would be on stake.

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