Geopolitics

Prospects for Democratization in Myanmar: Impact on India
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Issue Vol 24.4 Oct-Dec2009 | Date : 27 Nov , 2010

One must note, however, that amending the constitution requires a 75 percent approval of the legislature, which means that the military would have to agree to any limitations of its powers, which seems unlikely during the first term, and slightly less unlikely later.6 ASEAN, the UN, and the Japanese are likely to maintain that progress has been apparent after the 2010 elections, but more needs to be done to implement to human rights provisions of the new constitution. India will accept the new government, and will continue to work with it to counter Chinese influence. The US and the EU are unlikely to accept unambiguously the results of the elections even though they may begin the process of dealing with the new government with a certain degree of skepticism, and in part motivated and justified by humanitarian concerns.

A possible but highly unlikely alternative result before the elections of 2010, could be a revolution in the streets that could bring the National League for Democracy (NLD), an emasculated but existing opposition group whose most famous figure is Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, to some sort of power-sharing with elements of the military. Such a scenario is as unlikely as it would be unstable, for the NLD is held together by its essential criterion of getting the military out of power, rather than by an accepted set of shared premises beyond that goal. Coalitions are exceedingly fragile because of the personalization of power.

“¦the NLD is held together by its essential criterion of getting the military out of power, rather than by an accepted set of shared premises beyond that goal. Coalitions are exceedingly fragile because of the personalization of power.

Aung San Suu Kyi, who was partly brought up in India when her mother was Burmese ambassador there, would in all likelihood have a more favorable attitude towards India, but this may not result in any profound shift of policy. The NLD is effectively a Burman party, and claims it would deal with minority issues after achieving political control. It has called for some sort of federalism for the state.

Should, however, real representative government take place under a democratic system, and the military retire to the barracks (although one must stress this scenario is highly unlikely), there could be significant developments that could affect Indian security in its Northeast. No such democratic Burmese government would be able to exist without some form of federal system, a system that has been anathema to the military since at least 1962. But in the unlikely event of it happening, it is instructive to examine what the Chin have wanted in a draft constitution they prepared illegally outside of Myanmar. It is the most autonomous and radical of such drafts that various minorities have formulated.7 Among other provisions, Union troops could not be stationed on Chin territory without the expressed approval of a Chin legislature, which would have extensive powers.

Although the central government would make foreign policy, the Chin would have jurisdiction over the stationing of foreign troops on its soil, and all powers not expressly designated to the center would be the province of the periphery. Under such an extreme version of federalism, one could easily imagine Myanmar Chin and Naga support for their co-ethnic brethren on the India side of the border (and the reverse as well), and even for the possibility of a pan-Mizo (Chin) and pan-Naga homeland that could create extensive instability in the area. The 2010 Burmese constitution expressly prohibits any and all secessions from the Union of Myanmar. However, the lessons of previous irredentist movements and the past possibility of a Pashtunistan model (Afghan-Pakistan Pashtun tribal homeland) should not be completely dismissed. This might have repercussions for other parts of India as well.

Domestic factors would also affect how any democratization in Myanmar would alter policies towards India. It should not be assumed that a democratic or civilian Burma/Myanmar would be any the less nationalistic (although perhaps less strident) than the military, for a review of the civilian period (1948-58, 1960-62) would indicate the opposite.

First, are the residual attitudes toward Indians (all those from the subcontinent) in Myanmar. Having been ruled until 1937 in the colonial era as a province of India, Burma was subject to massive Indian migration. Indian control of credit, and following the great depression of 1929-32, the foreclosure of land to the Indian Chettyar money-lending caste produced strong antipathies towards Indians that is still part of the residual memory of the Burmese. Rangoon was an Indian city before World War II, and the movement of the capital to Naypyidaw is in part an attempt to eliminate this shameful heritage. Some 200,000 people from the subcontinent were expelled from the country following the coup of 1962.

Under the Citizenship Act of 1982, which was directed against the Indians and Chinese, all those not a member of one of Burma/Myanmar’s indigenous “races” (ethno-linguistic groups), and who cannot prove that their ancestors resided in Burma before 1823 (the first Anglo-Burmese War was 1824-26) are “associate citizens” and have significantly truncated rights.8 These negative attitudes, possibly reinforced by an increasingly politicized sangha, could become more manifest if there were political space for debate in Myanmar. Now, they are held in check by authoritarian rule.

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