Prospects for Democratization in Myanmar: Impact on India

By David I Steinberg

Issue Vol 24.4 Oct-Dec2009 | Date : 27 Nov , 2010

China has supplied some US$3 billion in arms and equipment, has or is building 30 hydro-electric dams, has provided major economic assistance, and is the site of much of Myanmar’s overseas training.3 Yet Myanmar is not a Chinese client state, as witness its opening to India, and India’s supply of naval vessels, aircraft, military hardware, and economic aid, and indeed to Russia as well (MIG-29 sales, extensive training, and an experimental, small nuclear reactor).

Myanmar, however, is not insensitive to Chinese penetration. It regards the control or even the extensive Chinese presence, or that of any other state, in the Burmese economy as subversive of its interests internationally and its internal control over the economy. It was, after all, this foreign economic exploitation that prompted the Burmese to introduce the socialist system. Anti-Chinese riots took place in 1967 reflecting this antagonism and the export of the Chinese cultural revolution to Rangoon; many were killed and Chinese shops looted.

On Indian Relations

India’s response to the Burmese coup of 1988 was virulently negative. India was probably the most vociferous critic of the SLORC until the early 1990s. India even employed U Nu’s daughter as the head of all India Radio’s Burma service. This changed in the early 1990s when the Indians recognized the strategic role that China was beginning to play in Myanmar, and India’s policy was reversed to attempt to compete with China’s growing influence that extends to even illegal immigration, now informally said to approximate two million people.4

Although there were rumors that India was providing support to Kachin and Karen insurgents after 1988, this was never confirmed. India has, however, provided a refuge for Burmese dissidents and refugees, supposedly some 50,000, not including Rohingyas.5 Dissident Burmese organizations still operate from Indian territory.

Burmese domestic policy and its ideology of not being dependent on any one foreign influence also prompted the Burmese to encourage Indian assistance and support. There has been an array of higher level military delegations in both directions. The first visit by a Burmese head of state since independence in 1948 occurred in October 2004. Transportation road links between India and Myanmar have been upgraded and supported by an Indian aid program, and increased trade has been on both states’ agendas, although the target of US$ one billion in two-way trade has yet to be realized. India has bid for access to the off-shore gas reserves in western Myanmar off the Rakhine coast near the Bangladesh border, but China has succeeded in obtaining the rights to much of that area and will construct a gas pipeline across Myanmar to Yunnan Province, as well as a separate pipeline to bring in crude oil from the Middle East, thus easing its strategic dependence on the Straits of Malacca.

The insurgencies that have plagued India in its remote Northeast Region, together with the Burmese rebellions on its side of the border, and the movement of all groups back and forth to effective sanctuaries has also prompted agreements for the development of those regions. Both India and Myanmar are using each other for their own national interests. India has developed a Kaladan River Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project that would begin at the port of Sittwe (Akyab-modernized with Indian support) through the Chin State of Myanmar, and allow more intensive economic development of the Northeast, and help mitigate ethnic revolts there. Myanmar wants to control Naga and Chin unrest in the region as well.

At present, there is considerable smuggling taking place between India and Myanmar. Chemicals used in the preparation of heroin and metamphetamines are said to be imported from India, and heroin exported to India, some of which has been confiscated by the Indian government. Intravenous drug use has produced 70 percent HIV rate among users in the region. All the borders of Myanmar are smugglers’ havens, for local officials also benefit. Under the military government, and even with borders porous to smuggling, Myanmar is able militarily to manage its border areas. It has increased the size of its military forces in these regions.

Administrative changes in Myanmar are planned. Under the disciplined system of the new constitution that is to come into effect following the elections of 2010, a special self-governing Naga area will be created out of the present Sagaing Division (to be known as a “Region” under the new constitution) on the Indian border that will give a modest degree of local government to those peoples.

The Chin (Mizo) people just to the south of the Naga area now have, and will have, a special State. All these will have local legislatures. Because active duty Burmese military will occupy 25 percent of the Naga local legislature and the local Chin legislature, these administrative changes should not greatly affect the capacity of the tatmadaw to control its borders. Antagonisms among the Chin against the Burmans run high because about 90 percent of the Chin are Christians, and many feel discriminated against by the Buddhist Burman military.

The newly elected legislature in 2010 will have a five-year term, and it is possible that during that period some space may develop between the state and its citizens that would allow greater freedom and a relaxation of the stringent rules of enforcement and censorship that are an aspect of life in contemporary Myanmar. Over the medium term, it may be possible to see a more balanced approach to foreign policy as the internal tensions between the military and civilian Burmese are assuaged, and perhaps even the constitution amended. This might allow more civilian influence on foreign policy. This is a slight and somewhat distant ray of hope for positive change.