Homeland Security

Preserving the Military Institution
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Issue Vol. 27.1 -Mar 2012 | Date : 06 Apr , 2012

Military leaders at all levels have to girdle up to protect the exclusivity of the military establishment from attempts of misguided, even if unintentional, dilutions from within the fraternity as well as from the environment. Within the army fraternity, stress would have to be laid on its unique characteristics and the ethos of soldierly ‘calling’ while repudiating the comfort of compromise. Similarly, in relation to the state, the hierarchy has to stand up to steps that might weaken the military edifice. In short, the army hierarchy needs to revisit practices that lead to its ‘goal displacement’.

“Disorders and weaknesses which might have passed unnoticed in civil life emerge with potentially catastrophic consequences in wartime.” —Eliot A Cohen.

The Burden of Military Administration

Even at the best of times, when the political and military goals of a nation are clearly defined, homing in onto the right course of military management is a challenge of extreme complexity. Thus, even the most experienced governments have found the exercise of seeing through the unpredictable future course of politico-economic developments and focus on preparing their armed forces accordingly, as a daunting challenge that requires visionary approach.

Homing in onto the right course of military management is a challenge of extreme complexity.

In the Indian context, this challenge has so far been managed only tentatively – bouts of disorientation often subsuming foresight. Such disorientation has caused our military institution to go through diverse phases of incarnations since independence. Thus, we had the armed forces marginalised during the first fifteen years, strengthened after the debacle of 1962, then left to atrophy between the early 1990s to mid-2000s before being infused with incremental modernisation schemes that would take some years yet to make any reckonable difference in the army’s operational capability. Notwithstanding such ‘ups and downs’, the army leadership did not allow dilution of the hoary fundamentals of soldiering and so preserved that institutional character which could turn a defeated army of 1962 to a victorious one in just three years. The situation had a re-run in the 1990s when the army was rendered to a state that prompted the then Army Chief to state while briefing his political masters that, “the spirit is strong but the flesh is weak.” The Kargil War followed soon enough, when gallant young officers led their men to clear the mess with their blood.

Indeed, anomalies of military-specific policy making in our state-apparatus need no emphasis. These anomalies impose self-inflicted adversity in the nation’s ‘military power-to-cost-effectiveness’ while injecting avoidable weakness into its power of ultimate resort: the Army. However, even if the governing establishment may have, in good faith or innocence, extended John Stuart Mill’s concept of democratic dispensation i.e. governance by compromises and consensus – in management of its military institution too, when such misconceptions find way into military fraternity’s thinking, it is time to wake up and apply control measures – drastic ones, if necessary.

Prosecution of warfare transcends well beyond the application of force and weaponry.

While the anomalies in military administration at the national level have been discussed (See July-September 2011 Issue of IDR) and this lacunae must remain a concern, the focus is on an even more sensitive issue – a dismal growth of disorientation within the Indian military establishment that abets institutional ‘self-depredation’. But prior to discussing these cases of disorientation, it would be in order to reiterate the aspects of cultural orientation in military policy-making.

Cultural Dimensions of Soldiering

Prosecution of warfare transcends well beyond the application of force and weaponry; it is an exercise in articulation of military intellect and material resources under the most trying circumstances. These two constituents of military institution, however, do not coalesce to secure victory unless firmly ensconced within virtues of military culture and the soldier’s code of conduct. We understand that soldiering is a spiritual ‘calling’ that requires overcoming the natural human instincts of avoidance of danger, deprivations and the ‘fear of unknown’, and at the same time, developing an intrinsic urge to perform beyond the bounds of specified call of duty. Furthermore, we also know that this soldierly ‘spirit’ is moored to the intrinsic sense of commitment to the cause, truth, honour, sacrifice, professionalism and camaraderie – gentlemanship to be exact. Obviously, it is this spirit that is more complex to foster as compared to its tangible material dimensions, and for that a firm and effective back-up of unique institutional practices and procedures is imperative. These are the sacrosanct twin conditions for the armed forces to deliver.

“Selection and Maintenance of Aim” as the first ‘Principle of War’.

While the build-up of tangible trappings of military power may take some years or more, depending on political will, to be visible, display of distinct military ethos and practices are but eternal societal phenomena. Preservation of spiritual and practical dimensions of the military institution, therefore, continues to remain in national focus even when the façade of military structure is kept dormant or downsized in tune with the need of the day. This is an observable practice in all mature nations. Indeed, it was so in India too until the British rule excluded Indians from higher hierarchy of political and military leadership. Post-Independence, the national leadership, bereft as it was of exposure to the soldiery, wisely chose to let the army handle its internal management with odd exceptions. As a result of that choice, the nation reaped benefits and continues to do so. Thus, while on account of some other reasons, the Indian Army’s potential for war-fighting capability is presently somewhat straight-jacketed, it is one of the few institutions that stands tall today. Indeed, the army is looked up to, not because of its weapons and accoutrement – that comes later – but because of the values and practices it espouses. Preservation of our military standards, therefore, must remain in continuous focus. Arguably, it is for the military hierarchy to play the role of unflinching custodian in upholding that distinct institutional character which is necessary for the greater good of the nation howsoever archaic or draconian it might appear to those who are uninitiated to matters military. Let us see how well that role is being played.

Recruitment and training practices favour the urbane against the hardy and the defensive against the spirited.

We go by “Selection and Maintenance of Aim” as the first ‘Principle of War’. Considered in totality, the aim of an army is to win wars and at any cost. This, after all, is the fundamental compulsion for the state to maintain an army as its ultimate political recourse. Therefore, all aspects of military management must be focused on that singular aim and religiously maintained thereafter. The paradox is that while no military commander can ever think of compromising with this First Principle when it comes to operations, when it comes to military administration, the Indian Army has, in many recent cases, acquiesced with its dilution – possibly under duress but avoidable nevertheless. Viewed from this perspective, it appears that many of the compromises that have sneaked into administration of our army might have been countered by sound articulation of military logic yet this has not happened. Though past recourses may not be rightfully contested, self-scrutiny is also inherently necessary for an institution to evolve, to learn. Hard introspection, may therefore, help in convergence of appropriate focus among the contemporary military fraternity; this is imperative for the Indian Army to preserve its distinct and haloed institutional identity.

The stage is now set to discuss some of the glaring anomalies that weaken our purpose by the methods we adopt.

Disorientations Within: Purpose vs Methods

Enthused by the licence of democracy, votaries of potentially dangerous ideas seem to have emerged within the military establishment. Misplaced articulations of these groups are exemplified by a succession of developments that have gained ground in the recent years – matters which have negative fallouts on the army’s mandate of winning wars. These glaring cases of diversions from the right focus need to be discussed. In so doing, it would be wise to keep to the terms of reference – that is we are in India.

Quality of Soldiery

We profess dependency upon the quality of soldiery to cover our material and technological constraints. We appreciate the need for fully committed, physically tough, mentally alert and technically competent soldiers who must be young, audacious and unencumbered with social concerns yet we are goaded in the opposite direction by the powers-that-be and fail to find quality candidates to carry the nation’s excruciating mandate. Thus, we recruit the barely literate, acquiesce to fall in physical standards and absorb aged or medically unfit ‘rank and file’ in the name of ‘welfare’ rather than asking the state to undertake that sanctified charter. Second, our recruitment and training practices favour the urbane against the hardy, the clever against the ingenuous, the officious against the adventurous and the defensive against the spirited. We speak of an ‘honour code’ and yet encourage trainees to be crooks; we talk of the importance of ‘initiative’ in warfare and then proceed to kill that quality. Third, our solution to the need for better educated soldiery has been to raise the age of intake instead of recruiting younger candidates and then moulding them through in-house education – so as to foster a personality that is distinct not just in form but also in character.

The cliché that “when it comes to national security, no cost is ever high”, is no more sacrosanct

Lastly, we have saddled the army with such a top-heavy hierarchy of grossly upgraded appointments that it diverts rather than ensures its mandate to fight. No doubt, the military administration must submit to the greater wisdom of the policy-makers, but the least one could do is to abstain from ready acquiescence with such distractions from the army’s ordained mandate. It may be noted that in tune with the call of the day, a great re-moulding of the state-apparatus is underway today; this may be the right time to articulate the concerns and ask those at the helm to determine effective solutions to the army’s problems. In all likelihood, that suggestion would be heard.

Discipline

Notwithstanding our conviction on observance of unflinching discipline to tackle adversities, the dilution of the military laws has been permitted under misplaced notions of fairness and justice. We forget to appreciate that the socially mandated call for sacrifice imposed upon the soldiery is in itself fundamentally unfair when measured in terms of democratic liberty and human rights of rest of the citizenry – and that howsoever unpalatable, it is a necessity for the sake of survival of the nation. The underlying principle, that the army’s severe mandate requires immediate, exemplary and pre-emptive stricture against infringement of military law and its exacting customs, seems to have been lost sight of. Thus, over the years, dispensation of military justice has become so cumbersome that its fundamental characteristics has been lost, more or less. For instance, instead of rationalising the system of ‘field punishments’ this simple provision has been completely done away with. As a result, soldiers who could be let off after some ‘pack drills’ or ‘extra duties’, now have to face the severity of trial while commanders are expected to master legal intricacies and engage in voluminous paper work to administer law rather than focusing on training and leading troops with élan.

Within the Indian defence structure, there is redundancy such as overlapping headquarters and duplication in training institutions.

Influenced by civil norms of jurisprudence, court-martials today take as much time as civil court proceedings do. The results are disconcerting – misdemeanor against the code of soldierly conduct, manipulation of postings, taking liberty of orders, acts of indiscretion, corruption and plain lying are assuming serious proportions by the day. Meanwhile, enthusiastic armchair rights activists professes dilution of the Summary Powers delegated to commanders. Of course, these champions of ‘individual rights’ do not have to lead troops on excruciating exercises or under fire and yet demand from them whole-hearted commitment in the naturally detestable task of grappling with death and deprivations. If such misplaced tinkering with military law is not checked with alacrity, it will not be long before lying patrol leaders, shirking assaulters, malingerers and petrol-selling soldiers would be allowed to set examples. Of course, measures to prevent stray cases of high-handedness have to be instituted without diluting the severity of military law. In true context, soldiers, as the sacrificial guardians of our nation, have to repudiate the misplaced application of democratic ideals on the military institution even if it is unpalatable to the ideologues for the sake of the nation.

In Preparedness for War

Another disconcerting development is the farcical make-believe that seems to have found place in professional articulations among the fighting formations with regard to operational objectives, plans and even training. While conscious of constraints in terms of manpower, level of training, weaponry, warlike equipment and efficient mobilisation of defence production and transportation resources, our planning and tasking continues to be theoretical and over-ambitious. Operational planning and field manoeuvres are based on an idealistic notion of a hundred per cent availability of personnel, weaponry, ammunition and equipment even when commanders at the cutting edge hardly ever get to practice deployment of their full complement of troops and resources.

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Besides, banal expectations of ideal response from backup civil institutions – the railways, oil companies, road transportation and labour-impressment – within a matter of few hours are taken for granted. Thus the dictates of practical military wisdom, that makes commanders conscious of their constraints and so promotes an urge to search for winning formulae through ingenious tactics, remain dormant. History is replete with examples of armies living in such make-believe world of their own and letting themselves down at the time of reckoning – the Iraqi Army being the latest example. It is time we recognise ‘a spade as a spade’ even if it deflates the ‘feel good’ factor, and infused with tactical acumen, prepare ourselves to seek success within the actual resources at hand. Indeed, as history shows us, it is possible to do so.

The Caveat of Cost-effectiveness

The cliché that “when it comes to national security, no cost is ever high”, is no more sacrosanct in open and assertive societies; the well-being of people is equally important, particularly when the concept of ‘national power’ encompasses wider range of factors in today’s world.

Therefore, it is incumbent upon the military planners to devise such strategies that secure political aims in the most cost-effective way – the term in military connotation also includes better efficiency and affordability in war. Unless this condition is appreciated, national collapse may occur when military expenditure subsumes the exchequer – as it happened with the USSR and many others. Accordingly, military planners have to examine each scheme in terms of economic justification in the end and adopt such ‘joint’ inter and intra-service options that avoid redundancy and so limit the cost of operational preparedness.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee

former Commandant Officers Training Academy, Chennai.

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