Military & Aerospace

Preparing India for a Protracted War
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Issue Vol 27.3 Jul-Sep 2012 | Date : 15 Aug , 2012

To sustain the capability to fight a protracted war, it is essential that a significant portion of India’s defence production gets exported. This requires dedicated support from the Ministry of External Affairs which should be made responsible for finding markets and meeting  sales targets, the Ministry of Finance for arranging financial support packages and the Ministry of Commerce for working out offsets and commodities barter. Waging a protracted war also requires setting up of a strong propaganda, psychological warfare and media management apparatus as  adjuncts to the armed forces within the MoD which should work in close coordination with the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting and Ministry of Home, all  under the supervision of the Cabinet Secretariat.

The Indian military machine as well as India’s political leadership is presently geared to fight an intense short-duration war. A war with Pakistan is not expected to last more than four weeks and that with China, a maximum of eight weeks. The reality, however, is that nothing is ever conclusively predictable about war. The vital and nameless bureaucratic echelons that control the purse strings lack strategic foresight or are accountable for the efficient management of national defence. They are answerable only to themselves and the responsibility for any failure has to be borne primarily by the Armed Forces.

A strong national defence does not imply escalating the defence budget to unmanageable limits…

The ‘Forty’ Secretaries of various grades manning the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Defence Finance are adept at delaying proposals through endless questioning. They regularly surrender allotted budgets thereby helping the government of the day to narrow down its burgeoning fiscal deficit. A strong national defence does not necessarily imply escalating the defence budget to unmanageable limits; it actually involves planning ahead to efficiently achieve what is practically attainable over the next ten years by removing all types of friction and inertia within the MoD as well as in the supporting ministries, in matters regarding national defence. There must be stringent provisions for sacking anybody not delivering results based on the recommendation or lack of confidence expressed by the Armed Forces Chiefs. It was primarily because this long-term strategic vision was lacking, that India lost out two vital decades of development after the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 and Indo-Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971, which caused sudden and unrealistic expansion of defence spending at the cost of everything else.

Had there been proper foresight and preparation of India to fight a ‘Protracted War’, after the 1948-1949 Indo-Pak War over Kashmir and the triumphant march of the Chinese PLA into Tibet and East Turkistan (Xinjiang meaning ‘New Dominion’) in 1950, we could have achieved spectacular economic development like South Korea, Taiwan or Israel, who also face high threat scenarios and emphasize heavily on national defence development and consolidation.

As a nation we not only practice ‘strategic indecision’ but also never learn from our past mistakes…

Clausewitz had described war as a trinity composed of the ‘policies of the respective governments, the activities and attitudes of their militaries, and the passions and typical national characteristics of their peoples.’ If this be correct, then it is a wonder as to why policy makers in India are so very complacent instead of being hard-nosed like Henry Kissinger who could make even Mao agree to his propositions, not because he was respectful but by dealing from a position of strength. Can any sane and responsible Indian planner expect the Chinese to give up their claim to Aksai Chin region through which their strategic Lhasa-Kashgar highway passes, or their claim in Arunachal to strengthen their fragile and forcible hold over the sensitive Xigatse-Lhasa-Bomi region?

Over the millennium, the Chinese have perfected the art of being patient, pragmatic and artful negotiators. There is no element of sentimentality in the conduct of their foreign policy and national aims have to be achieved without risking defeat. In the case of Pakistan, it considers itself to be the successor state of the Mughals and that it has the right to rule over the entire Indian subcontinent. The ‘liberation’ of Kashmir is only a smokescreen for their permanent agenda of dismembering India by whatever means or alliances. Permanent peace with Pakistan will remain a distant dream if we are militarily weak or can be trapped into a coercive situation by a combination of adverse factors. India’s geography and population dictate that it has to be a first rate land power and a reasonably strong naval power in order to safeguard its political stability and destiny.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Col JK Achuthan (Retd.)

8 GR was commissioned in June 1980. 

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