Indian Defence Review

It is not uncommon to get a file back from the lower bureaucracy while negotiations are in progress, seeking an explanation for an observation raised two or three years ago”¦

In our system there is no possibility of simply ignoring such complaints. The staff, which is already overworked beyond any established parameters of office routine, spends hours explaining the lack of merit in the complaint. Sometimes these complaints can get very personal and demoralizing. These complaints are routinely processed, sometimes repeatedly, up to very high levels. We need an organization to quietly investigate an allegation and decide once for all that it needs to be ignored or acted upon. Individual accountability must be established systemic failures corrected to allow the system to function efficiently.

Lack of Familiarity with matters Military

The acquisition team of a service has representation of MOD, MOD (Fin), servicemen as Technical Managers and the Service Representative, who heads the concerned directorate. While all other members have their respective charters, roles of two members of this team merit a mention. Any failure to acquire the new systems, irrespective of the reasons, is the failure of the service representative to get his service the long awaited modern systems. In this team it is the bureaucrat, who gets inputs from all other members and is the link with higher decision making bodies in the MOD.

Sometimes this important link simply has no idea of the services hierarchy, the service working ethos and above all the significance of the acquisition that is being processed. There is a need for a short familiarization tenure for all bureaucrats, prior to a posting to the acquisition wing of the MOD. They need to know the aspirations and expectations of the services and relative significance of the major acquisitions that are being planned so that necessary attention can be paid to these projects.

Primacy of Procedures

Procedures are established as means to an end. In the acquisition process the procedure, ever so complicated, with control over bits and pieces by different agencies, some of which are not answerable if the money remains unspent, has become the end itself. For the fear of committing an error all deviations go to very high levels for approval.

Repeated failure of the acquisition wing of the Ministry of Defence, which includes the acquisition directorates of the three services and Coast Guard to spend the funds allocated for modernization, needs to be viewed with concern. Our model of the acquisition has evolved over a period of time and it does not need to be changed.

At times a deal on the verge of finalization is dropped because, despite the system to be acquired being fully compliant, a minor unapproved deviation is detected just before possibly the price negotiations are scheduled to commence. It is not uncommon to get a file back from the lower bureaucracy while negotiations are in progress, seeking an explanation for an observation raised two or three years ago with the possibility of calling off the deal if the same is not settled.

In the past there have been attempts to simplify the procedures but a lot more needs to be done. What we need is a fully automated system, accessible to a handful of appointments who can manage it on their own, without any clerical intervention till the final contract is to be signed. It will also ensure the much needed confidentiality in the process.

Transparency

Transparency is the current ruling mantra in the acquisition process – an offer rejected in the TEC, inform the vendor – a system performance below the expected parameter, inform the vendor. A clear and clean information feedback is a laudable system of working. Regrettably the recipients who are aware of our system of never rejecting any complaint, instead of accepting the feedback gracefully, may, in some cases, start a barrage of no holds barred complaints, which can be wasteful, exhausting and completely unwarranted. We have one of the most exhaustive trial procedures, with so many agencies testing the same equipment that it is well nigh impossible to influence or predict the outcome. We need to simply ignore these complaints,

Delegation of Financial Powers

Delegation of financial powers to the services is one tool, which can really expedite the process of acquisition. These powers though recently raised, will not achieve any aim if all accompanying procedures continue to be in vogue. After all the steps as in the normal acquisitions sometimes getting the financial clearance can bring the time frame to the routine acquisitions. These delegated powers are exercised by the Vice Chiefs, who have the necessary staff and resources to ensure expeditious acquisition of items required by the services. The financial powers can really contribute to modernization if the amount is substantial and exercise of powers, with simple procedures is permitted.

Conclusion

Repeated failure of the acquisition wing of the Ministry of Defence, which includes the acquisition directorates of the three services and Coast Guard to spend the funds allocated for modernization, needs to be viewed with concern. Our model of the acquisition has evolved over a period of time and it does not need to be changed. What we need to do is create conducive working environment isolated from extraneous influences, based on automated systems and manned by people who understand the requirements of the armed forces. We need to seriously review our attempts at too much of transparency. The delegated powers of the services should be further enhanced backed up by procedures, which do not face the usual bottlenecks faced by the acquisition process.