Indian Defence Review

Pakistan’s Power Structure

The army, for all practical purposes, is the government, while Zardari and the PPP led by Gilani are only there to show the democratic face! The army has a veto over most critical decisions affecting both foreign and security policies. During the Zia era, it expanded its reach into some areas of domestic politics as well, fomenting, and then containing, ethnic discord in Sindh and pandering to religious zealots. Civilian governments in Pakistan are of transient significance. The military, the higher echelons of the civil service, and the intelligence services are the permanent features of the state. The army rules on all the critical issues important to it, like the nuclear program, the budget, security policy, relations with key foreign partners and so on. Although civilian governments have room to play in other areas, their choices are crowded out by prior military preferences.

The essence of the Pakistani security establishment’s paranoia is that they view everything through an India-tinted lens and are convinced that their real enemy is India. Successive governments in Pakistan have exacerbated this by their anti-India policies, where anti-India propaganda commences in school text books. However, it may be incorrect to assume that anti-India sentiments translate to Talibanization. Even today, the majority of senior Pakistan Army officers and the literate civil society are moderate Muslims.

Since the formation of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army has raised and nurtured hundreds of thousands of jihadis to engage India (and Afghanistan) in asymmetric was, while acquiring nuclear weapons to make any conventional reprisals difficult. The Pakistan Army itself hardly fights. Instead, it directs others to do its bidding! The Pakistani generals consider the Taliban and other terrorist groups as the vanguard of the nation’s defense and their “strategic assets”. The generals are loath to give up these assets, even though they seem to recognize the damage that militancy is doing to Pakistan itself.

However, the civil society in Pakistan has a more nuanced view of India and the world. While a large portion resents being pushed into confronting the Taliban by the United States, the spate of bomb blasts and suicide attacks throughout the country are changing their thinking.

Modus Operandi

The Pakistan military is using heavy artillery, fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships in the operations. Collateral damage being caused is colossal. Such operations against own people, albeit misguided, need to be conducted wearing kid gloves. Experienced armies are convinced that such sub-conventional operations are best conducted by putting maximum ‘boots on the ground’, ensuring minimum collateral damage and conducting people-friendly operations. The root causes, be they social, economic, ideological or political have to be tackled simultaneously with military operations.

The operations of the Pakistani Army highlight a number of points, including the following:

The military operations in Swat have already resulted in the mass exodus of nearly 2.8 million people. This is in addition to 6,00,000 other Pakhtuns who had been forced out of their homes in earlier army operations from the tribal areas. The humanitarian situation is bleak. Only about a tenth of the displaced are living in proper refugee camps. The other three provinces of Pakistan have reportedly refused to permit the establishment of refugee camps in their provinces.

If the internally displaced Pakistanis are not properly cared for, public opinion, which has shifted dramatically in recent weeks to support the offensive against the Taliban, could once again turn in support of compromise.

Prognosis and Assessment

An unstable nuclear-armed Pakistan, torn apart by militant groups, economic woes and sectarian tensions poses an extraordinary danger to India because of spill-over effects, including effects on India’s economy and its very large Muslim population. The spill-over could be in terms of increased terrorist actions, influx of refugees and a concerted effort to raise the stakes in J&K.

Pakistan’s stability is important for India. A break-up of Pakistan, as predicted by some, will impact adversely on India’s security. Pakistan’s love-hate relationship with Islamist extremists is fueled by a false strategic concept — that somehow such groups provide a hedge against Indian dominance. There is a need to bring about an attitudinal change in the Pakistani Army’s perception of India. This is best done by dialogues at various levels, including at the military level. Dialogue conjures up visions of returning to the composite dialogue, but that would be premature at this stage. However, dialogue to build up trust is sorely needed. This would, in time, result in a more formal and structured dialogue.

The Pakistan Army operations are gradually getting the support of political parties and the civil society. However, the troops currently engaged in the offensive lack adequate strength to increase the area of operations and to consolidate in the cleared areas. Pakistan could easily transfer forces from its eastern border for this purpose, provided its anxiety about actions by Indian forces are allayed. In reality, there is no reason for such anxiety, but the baggage of decades prevents it. A military to military dialogue to build trust and confidence, as mentioned above, may succeed but this can only come about if India’s political leadership and its bureaucracy shed their own fears first!

A Taliban setback may produce a reverse effect in the neighboring tribal areas and serve as a catalyst for binding together the loose confederation of militants operating in FATA and thus produce a more united fighting force.

The Taliban warriors are essentially Pakhtuns, but their nexus with Punjabi-based militant groups is deepening and increasingly many Punjabi dominated terrorist groups are aligning with the Taliban. Some analysts are already calling them the ‘Punjabi Taliban’. It is these groups that are responsible for most bomb blasts and suicide attacks in various locations in Punjab. India must not remain oblivious to this threat as their objectives can change and may well get directed at India.  Pakistan needs to be weaned away from their thinking that somehow such groups provide a hedge against Indian dominance.

The neutralizing of the Taliban and other terrorist groups by the Pakistani military needs to be encouraged; nothing will be achieved if the Pakistani military continues to think and plan in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Talibans or other groups.

Failure of the Pakistan Army to decisively defeat the Taliban may well prompt the Pakistani military, especially the ISI, to divert attention in their well-tested method of increasing terrorist attacks against India. Should the Taliban presence become even partially effective in Punjab and Sindh, it would lead to a human exodus in the millions. As a counter, India needs to initiate action at many levels. Prevention is a viable course to adopt. This requires effective structures, high-grade intelligence and well institutionalized response mechanisms. We would have to ensure much better policing and sealing of our borders or else we will be faced with very serious security concerns.

Actions in Afghanistan are directly linked to events in NWFP. India needs to increase its support to Afghanistan, by incorporating assistance to the Afghan Army and police. At present it is confined to training a few personnel at the Indian Army’s training establishments. A quantum jump would be training and equipping entire units and formations. Such tasks are well within the current capability of the Indian Army and the dividends likely to accrue would be very high.

Kashmir continues to be a target of both the Pakistan Army and the various militant and terrorist groups. As the Pakistani Army has reportedly withdrawn two brigades from the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K and may withdraw more, it is quite capable of using it as an excuse for increased infiltration by terrorists. The US, while pursuing its own interests, is riding rough-shod on the sensibilities of India. It is trying to bring the Kashmir issue up front at the behest of Pakistan. India must resist this, as there is no change in the attitude of the Pakistani establishment. In addition, it only pays lip service to termination of Jihadi infiltration in Kashmir and in other parts of India. Trust is not only lacking but has been exacerbated by the Mumbai terrorist attack and the continuing ‘denial mode’ adopted by Pakistan.

Before India agrees to any overtures by USA, it must get guarantees relating to complete cessation of terrorist attacks against it from Pakistan. India can no longer afford to be held hostage to Mumbai-like terrorist attacks emanating from Pakistan by groups like LeT and JeM.

Conclusion

The Taliban are in an emboldened state today, despite the recent successes claimed by the Pakistani military. The Taliban have unfortunately been allowed to become too strong. Across the entire swathe of tribal areas along the Afghanistan border, the Taliban are rapidly consolidating power by activating their cells, regrouping and are challenging the army.

The Pakistan Army may well be treating the current anti-Taliban operations as a temporary phase, to please the United States and obtain the much needed funds. However, if they are not serious in pursuing the Taliban menance and the riposte weakens, the very viability of Pakistan would be at risk.

Any deterioration of the situation in Pakistan can have grave repurcussions for India. Our overall policy for meeting security related threats needs to be revamped. We need to strengthen our intelligence set up and hasten our decision–making processes. The need of the hour is to prepare a series of contingency plans, to meet the situations that are likely to crop up.