Indian Defence Review

Pakistan’s diversity of nuclear arsenal, variety and ranges of delivery systems indicates that it is now proficient in this technology. It is contemplating use of this weapon for all types of battlefield. Its planning to offer nuclear solutions to all operational problems that may confront its armed forces. It also signifies the prominence of its Strategic Planning Division (SPD) in country’s strategic planning.

Land based missile delivery system will form the backbone of its nuclear weapon delivery system and its expansion will continue. It’s likely to raise six to twelve Strategic Missile Groups(SMGs) by 2025. This gives credence to its pursuit of large stock of fissile materials. The Land based system would consist of 200-250 missiles of all yield and ranges, besides gravity weapons, sea-based systems and tactical nuclear devices.

The ongoing relentless expansion of its nuclear weaponization, addressing all spectrums of warfare, points towards Pakistan’s shift from “minimum deterrence to “full spectrum deterrence”. With this it aims to either deter or dominate India at every level of conflict. Pakistan’s “full spectrum nuclear deterrence” is its counter to India’s superiority in conventional strength and the advantages of its vast landmass. It intends to inflict incalculable harm on India, forcing termination of conflict before its own existence is threatened.

Towards this end, its race to stockpile more fissile materials, to build weapons for complete spectrum of warfare, to expand its delivery systems and to organise effective command and control appears sensible.

Command and Control

Expansion of its nuclear arsenal and delivery system has necessitated Pakistan to set up a foolproof Command and Control structure for its nuclear forces. The need is further required due to the de – mated status of its nuclear weapon from its delivery systems and therefore encompasses technical and operational controls.

Pakistan aims to deny India “first use” and seeks to be the first to retaliate with nuclear weapons, when faced with conventional threat beyond a threshold level. Its small landmass and need of survivability dictates that it disperses its weapons while at the same time be agile and prepared to use it first. Pakistan has organised a tested system of command and control that coordinates actions between nuclear weapon storage sites and military units nominated to deliver them, in accordance with the structured response system, dictated by the course of the war.

Pakistan’s communication system, weapons integration, codes to arm and orders to fire are separated from its conventional forces. Unlike India, where civilians dominate most of the stages of preparation, Pakistan relies on its armed forces .

The National Command Authority resides with the Prime Minister who presides over a civilian- military decision apparatus but in practise it’s the Chief of Army Staff and his SPD who retain the powers to decide. The Armed Forces view nuclear weapons as a usable and a preferred option against the conventional superiority of India and therefore retain a positive control over them.

Conclusion

It has been difficult to visualise through available literature as to how Pakistan, with its declared first use policy as per the war gamed escalation ladder, will be able to coordinate and conduct both conventional and nuclear war simultaneously. Empirical data from NATO suggests the difficulties of this coordinated war. Full integration, though appealing, is a difficult proposition, especially when tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed/ used.

The impact of its first use and to anticipate and negate, to the extent possible, the counter response, has significant impact of Pakistan’s conduct of strong offensive and defence. It’s unclear whether the Pakistan Armed Forces have found a solution to this conundrum. Even if Pakistan emphasises on discrete nuclear use, even then implementing efficient conventional- nuclear war integration is critical for Pakistan.

Unlike China and India, Pakistan till now has not invested in acquisition of strategic defences such as the S 400. It has preferred to focus on its “nuclear first use” as means of dissuasion of conventional war, above ascertain threshold. “Deterring” war remains the primary objective of Pakistan. It is pragmatic enough to realises that its chances of success in both conventional and conventional- nuclear conflict with India are slim.