Indian Defence Review

Narrative on Proxy War

Having reconciled – in spite of the bombast of their racial and religious superiority – to not being able to wrest Kashmir through conventional wars, Pakistan’s rulers devised an undeniably competent strategy of ‘warfare through proxy means’. It was a strategy that brought heavy monetary contributions from their co-religious clients and marshalled heavily armed fanatics to promote their agenda at no cost to themselves. On the other hand, the narrative purports that India’s options of making Pakistan pay for the Proxy War is negated by the internal fissures within India and her ‘hollowed’ military capability, so to say. The narrative further propounds that Pakistan’s nuclearisation and her brandishing of ‘nuclear irrationality’ has removed whatever vestige of military retribution that could still be considered by the hapless Indian government. No doubt it is a ‘win-win’ albeit illusionary situation for Pakistan.

Emboldened by India’s restraint during the Kargil War, Pakistan has taken to proclaiming that her nuclearisation has finally and conclusively closed the prospects of India militarily responding to her sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. What is disconcerting, however, is that many among the Indian analysts have fallen for that misinformation. Thus both groups have, by default or design, failed to acknowledge that the real reason for India not opting, so far, to exercise the military option in response to Pakistan’s complicity in terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, Mumbai, Samba, Varanasi and Delhi was that such a step did not promise conclusive achievement of the desired political purpose at the particular juncture.

Indeed, India withholding herself from launching military retribution against Proxy War has nothing to do either with Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence or the limitations of India’s conventional military capability. Determined by time and occasion, this is a decision of political prudence that may well undergo revision.

Narrative on Nuclear Deterrence

Much of the India-Pakistan nuclear equation is viewed through the prism of the ‘Cold War’. This is an obvious mistake because situations and issues are completely different; even the West-East nuclear equation has evolved with time. Besides, there are many incongruities between the West-East and India-Pakistan nuclear postulations. Relevant issues in this context, therefore, call for some discussion.

Pakistan propagates that her nuclear weapons are ‘weapons of war’, meant to counter India’s superior conventional military power. India, on the other hand, declares that her nuclear weapons are not meant for political messaging, not for war-fighting. Both stances are, and have to be, fluid. For Pakistan to use nuclear weapons cannot be what is described as ‘war’ because nations do not go to war to destroy themselves – that, after all, is what is promised in the Indian nuclear doctrine. Similarly, for India to recess her nuclear arsenal into ‘just for show’ category is unlikely to lift her credit-rating with either the enemy or the global observers. For effective deterrence, there has to be a clause of ‘usability’. Certainly, that is the case. Why else would Pakistan continue to build up its second-strike arsenal?

Presently, there goes on a ‘motivational’ campaign to suggest that after being nuked for breaching an unspecified Pakistan-determined ‘threshold’, India may yet be persuaded to desist from executing her doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’. The arguments to buttress that suggestion range from imposition of international pressure or even implied threat from world powers, absence of India’s political ‘will’ to go ahead, and her cultural respect for life, property and humanist propriety (Vasudaiva Kutumbakam), even a cliché that “in nuclear war there are no victors” (sic) is professed in that context.

It is obvious that these suggestions are but banal. India’s record of running the gauntlet of international sanctions (securing Kashmir in 1948-‘49, counter-offensive in Pakistan in 1965, liberation of East Pakistan in 1971 and nuclearisation in 1998) are testimony of her resolve when she is driven beyond a point. In any case, international pressure, which would have failed in preventing Pakistan from resorting to nuclear ‘first use’ in the first place, should not be expected to be acceded to by India.

Similarly, the prophesy of ‘no victor in a nuclear war’ is misplaced, because given her geography and natural assets, India will survive albeit battered, through a nuclear exchange while Pakistan may not. The Western powers that have shied away from warning Pakistan in clear terms to state that her use of nuclear weapons will be unacceptable should not expect to succeed in cowering down India’s deterrence.

Maybe this is a method of testing waters with the good intent of preventing use of nuclear weapons and arresting Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. But the flaw in this method is that it places the onus of peace on the intended victim of Pakistan’s nuclear ‘first use’ – India, alone. It permits a universally acknowledged rogue ruling clique to resort to brinkmanship, to hold the world to ransom and dictate terms to its stronger but circumspect neighbour thereby deterring him from using his power to resist the rogue’s unlimited, unending hostility. It will be disastrous for India to entertain such banality.

Narrative of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)

Pakistan has developed TNWs and is, reportedly, building up the numbers. Ostensibly, it is meant to counter to India’s so-called ‘Cold Start’ doctrine by preventing Indian military forces from surprising Pakistan and penetrating deep enough to threaten the latter’s core interests. Purportedly having thus taken away that one recourse, which India still had to make Pakistan pay for her misdeeds, Pakistan’s rulers are a smug, pleased lot. But then there are problems bought by them in the process.

TNWs of nominal kilo tonnes of TNT equivalent and short ranges have to be deployed very close to the intended target point and maintained at a high state of readiness. The intended target may be within or across the India-Pakistan border – the jury favours the former option. Considerations of range, protection against Indian attack and redundancy would necessitate multi-point deployment, high mobility and elevated state of readiness of the TNWs. These matters, as any student of nuclear warfare understands, are fraught with self-triggered dangers such as invitation to pre-emptive attack, fratricide, failure of command, control and communications and radiation fallout over own territory.

The most glaring flaw in brandishing TNW, however, is in the availability of equally effective option of use of modern conventional weaponry. Considering the fact that there would be many thrust-lines of the purported Indian offensive and the tactical deployment of attacking forces on ground would be rather well-spread, the number of TNWs to be deployed and used to cause decimation of the Indian forces would be rather large. In a setting like that, the degree of damage caused by low yield, small range TNWs may well be achieved by conventional means also, even if in the latter case the number of strikes have to be many more. In sum, to annihilate the attacking forces before they breach the ‘threshold’, there would be many uncertainties to be catered for.

Obviously, it would be foolish to expect that India would sit over her stated response of ‘massive retaliation’ – ‘massive’ being a matter of conjecture – against that kind of outrage against her soldiery, even if that occurs in Pakistan’s territory. It is in that sense that the talk of viewing TNW as a trigger for India to deploy and mate her nuclear assets need not be conceded to. We need not be impressed by Pakistan’s TNW toy.

India’s Considerations  

India’s strategic demeanour has many nuances. Her peaceful struggle for independence was an asymmetric strategy against British power that found fruition by the fallout of World War II. Her wisdom of peace is obviously and rightly, aimed at concentrating on nation building. Yet, as it must be, she has used force when absolutely necessary. Since 1990, as reports indicate, her conventional military capability is below par for assured political victory in full scale conventional war. Therefore, the talk of India’s supposed overwhelming conventional superiority, that supposedly prompted Pakistan to go nuclear in 1998, is a bit of misinformation.

To reiterate, Pakistan went nuclear – much before her venturing into Proxy War or the end of Cold War or the talk of Cold Start – to find a shield to hide behind after perpetrating attacks in various forms on the foundation of Indian nationhood. At the same time, no nation, revisionist at that, would ever claim that nuclear weaponisation could replace, even to some degree, their conventional arsenal. That is why Pakistan remains engaged in build up of either capability. As for the matter of launching punitive attack operations under particular circumstances, India most certainly has that capability. However, the decision to do so must remain contingent to appreciation of political objective.

In sum, Pakistan’s nuclear hobgoblin may not deter India from protecting her interests, by conventional military force if necessary. Further, India need not dilute her deterrence by falling for Pakistan’s nuclear bluster, nor does she need to make such frivolous statements like “nuclear weapons are not for war-fighting” and “war is not an option”. These are but pleasing pronouncements that are neither true nor taken seriously unless made from a position of strength. India would be wise to take note of that.

Tactics of Lunacy

Pakistan’s ruling class seem to have come out as better strategists, even if its strategies are marred by uncontrollable instability and mayhem within. Its well-to-do class live ostentatiously; class disparity is palpable, feudalism thrives and yet there is no popular uprising; its economy and military are propped up by the USA, yet it thumbs nose to its benefactor’s concerns; even attacking American interests and promoting rabid anti-American terror outfits. In its relationship with the PRC, it is fast becoming clear that Pakistan is using China as a bulwark of its destabilising agenda even while sheltering East Turkistan rebels. Pakistan’s unabashed duplicity compels the international community’s leading nations to humour her by rationalising with her terror agenda, the Western powers having to cuddle her while cursing under their breath and China choosing to express solidarity to prevent her from turning totally rogue, as the Chinese policy makers sheepishly inform us.

In the eighteenth century, Muhammad Shah’s appeasement of Nadir Shah only led to the barbarian’s indulgence in the massacre and loot of Delhi. Nearly two hundred years later, Chamberlain’s efforts to satiate Hitler only made firm his territorial agenda before the outbreak of World War II. The US has now been plying Pakistan with weapons and funds in the fond hope of making Pakistani rulers see reason. All appears to have failed miserably. India need not fall into pusillanimity. To be able to progress in peace, she has to take up the cudgel of swiping out Pakistan’s nuclear hobgoblin.