Geopolitics

Pakistan's Islamic Odyssey : dangers ahead
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Issue Vol 25.3 Jul-Sep2010 | Date : 06 Oct , 2010

This new Jihad was to be carried in all Islamic centers of trouble by volunteers drawn from various parts of the world but trained under Pakistani auspices, to emphasize the inherent strength of Islam and to inspire the Muslim Diaspora to remain relentless in their struggle wherever Muslim interests were being targeted or threatened.

Identifying the US as the main target of this Jihad has landed Pakistan in a complex problem. Firstly, Pakistan was forced to join the US war on terror against the Talibans. This step leads to a pervasive and widespread anger against the US in Pakistan, displacing India as the main enemy of Pakistan in public mind. Secondly, withdrawal of support to the Talibans went against the fundamental instincts of Pakistan and upset its strategic calculus.

Following the new US war in Afghanistan, Afghan Talibans and their foreign supporters had been given refuge and shelter by Pakistani Pushtoons in the tribal regions of the Northwest as they themselves had been Talibanised in thinking and practice by the fall- out of Afghan war I. Compliance of Pakistan to the new US strategy was secured by threats of stoppage of financial aid.

However, the Pakistani Establishment, past masters in duplicity, and deception, had no intentions of accepting fully the US dictates. They now followed a policy of hunting with the hound and running with the hare. However, such a policy has had dangerous consequences for Pakistan this time. The American pressure on Pakistan is for action against the entire spectrum of Talibans living in Pakistan including Baluchistan as well as the Pakistani Talibans themselves. The US also engaged in independent action in the frontier regions of Pakistan using drones and Special Forces against Taliban targets hiding there.

Will the confrontation between the two governments reach a breaking point? Will the US troops themselves actually enter Baluchistan and North Waziristan to clear these areas of Talibans?

The difficult question facing the Pakistani military and intelligence authorities is to what extent they should accommodate the US demands. They have deployed their forces in Swat, Malakand, South Waziristan and certain other tribal regions to take out foreign Taliban elements allied to Al Qaida and to establish control over the territory but they have so far refrained from moving into North Waziristan and Baluchistan where key Taliban leadership and ISI’s own powerful infrastructure of a support mechanism for Talibans are sheltered.

The US appears to have privately made it clear that failure on the part of Pakistan to take action in these areas will compel them to move into these areas themselves for counter insurgency and counterterrorist operations. North Waziristan is home to the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, deadly enemy of the US but regarded as an invaluable strategic asset by Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, the Pakistani COAS.

The Pakistanis have been very obdurate in the past in their responses to American demands. Often the US has had to back down from pursuing its objectives in order to preserve what they considered to be their more important larger interests. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq’s rejection of President Carter’s offer of aid of $64 m as ‘peanuts’, is famously known. During the entire course of Afghan war I, the repeated efforts of the CIA to get a foothold in the distribution of funds, arms and equipment to Mujahideen were consistently turned down by Pakistan despite the reality that CIA was the original source of most of the supply and funding. In this war the US needs to humor Pakistan was so intense that they looked the other way while Pakistan was developing its nukes and proliferating nuclear technology and equipment to many of its friends.

Now, however, the situation is qualitatively and dramatically different. The US feels directly threatened by the terror of Al Qaida philosophy which seeks to reawaken the somnosolent impulses and aspirations of Islam, and has a self imposed deadline of July 2011 to quit from Afghanistan.

The US had once threatened Pakistan to bomb it to the Stone Age for refusing to fall in the line.

The US now well recognizes that Pakistani tactics and strategic objectives are proving counter-productive but compelling Pakistan to strike at the Taliban leadership hiding in Baluchistan and Haqqani network in North Waziristan has proved till now almost impossible.

Will the confrontation between the two governments reach a breaking point? Will the US troops themselves actually enter Baluchistan and North Waziristan to clear these areas of Talibans? At the moment these are imponderable questions but the moment of truth seems to be fast approaching. A turning point is perhaps being reached demanding a public re-evaluation by US of its relationship with Pakistan.

The US had once threatened Pakistan to bomb it to the Stone Age for refusing to fall in the line.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani Talibans have reacted by taking up arms against the Pakistani armed forces not only in the tribal regions but also in the heart of Punjab in cities like Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The resultant situation is akin to a civil war which is inflaming public opinion, resulting in deepening radicalism. Punjabi radicals, mostly belonging to extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and perhaps Lashkar-e-Taiba, by engaging in terror strikes against the state, have already demonstrated that their sympathies lie with the Pak Pashtoon tribals.

The Pakistani ISI had been the patron of such groups and the terror syndicates and continues to be so. These surrogate outfits had been recruiting Jihadis for Afghanistan and Kashmir in their largest numbers from Punjab as compared to other provinces of Pakistan. Their leaders, though nurtured by ISI for covert proxy wars in J&K and Afghanistan, have now slipped away from their control and no longer obey the authority of the ISI. These leaders dominate a vast tract of area between Jhang and Bhawalpur in Punjab.

 A stage may also be reaching for doubts to arise whether the Pashtoon elements of the Pakistan Army, comprising 20 to 30 percent of its strength, and its other extremist fringes, could continue to be counted on for loyalty towards the state.

With their large militias they will play a crucial role if the rebellion against the state reaches this heartland. A stage may also be reaching for doubts to arise whether the Pashtoon elements of the Pakistan Army, comprising 20 to 30 percent of its strength, and its other extremist fringes, could continue to be counted on for loyalty towards the state.

Religion had created a nation but never succeeded in creating a composite nationalism or a new identity in Pakistan. The country was kept unified by its Armed Forces but if they splinter what happens to Pakistan? There are many observers of the Pakistani scene who worry that a Jihadi or Islamist take over of Pakistan is not an unrealistic fear. Such fears take into account the fact that Islam alone can not prove integrative or overcome completely the pulls of ethno-nationalism. Further, multiplicity of interpretations of scriptures allow also in practice contradictory definitions of religion.

The overarching threat that looms ahead for Pakistan apparently is of a likely fragmentation. Western countries and China can be expected to jump in to save Pakistan and prevent its nuclear arsenal from falling into the wrong hands. US have already intensified its war against the Talibans in Pakistan through massive increases in the number of US Special Forces. Recent statements indicate its readiness to move deeper into Pakistan if driven by circumstances. If these steps also fail to stem the tide of radical Islam the US might be willing to recommend more drastic remedies to the Pakistan establishment such as re-imposition of the Army rule and to allow counter insurgency campaigns by it within Pakistan.

The Indian policy makers should remain well tuned to the nuances of the surge of radical Islam in the neighborhood and its possible repercussions across the border in our country. Another alarming situation like the rise of Naxalism in the country should never be permitted.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Anand K Verma

Former Chief of R&AW and author of Reassessing Pakistan.

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