Geopolitics

Pakistan: The Same Old Story - I
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By B Raman
Issue Book Excerpt: Mumbai 26/11 | Date : 13 Apr , 2011

Pakistans attempt was to project the conspiracy as mounted by non-State elements of which the Pakistani intelligence agencies had no inkling till after the attack.

This was exactly the same modus operandi (MO) which the Pakistanis had followed after the thwarted attack by a group of terrorists belonging to the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) on the Parliament House in New Delhi in December, 2001. Musharraf banned these organizations on January 15, 2002, arrested their leaders and ordered an enquiry into their activities. A few months later, they were quietly released and the enquiries discontinued.

While we were right in welcoming the changed Pakistani stance — even if it be only a change in tactics — as seen on February 12, 2009, we should avoid nursing illusions that the seeming change in the Pakistani stance marked a watershed in Pakistani attitude to anti-India terrorism. We have to wait and see whether Pakistan really means business this time, or is it merely pretending to co-operate while not sincerely co-operating as it has always done in the past — whether against anti-India terrorism or against the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan or against Al Qaeda.

Pakistan’s new stance of seeming co-operation in the investigation of the Mumbai attack did not respond to the remaining two questions posed above. There are no indications at all that it is having second thoughts about the wisdom or inadvisability of continuing to use terrorism as a strategic weapon against India and that it might now act against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in its territory and the role of the ISI in keeping this terrorism sustained. Threats of new terrorist attacks against Indian and foreign targets in Indian territory mounted from Pakistan remain as high as before.

This was exactly the same modus operandi (MO) which the Pakistanis had followed after the thwarted attack by a group of terrorists belonging to the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) on the Parliament House in New Delhi in December, 2001.

Subsequent developments relating to the house arrest of Sayeed, the Amir of the JUD, justified India’s suspicions regarding the sincerity of Pakistani assurances of co-operation in the investigation of the Mumbai attack. After the Mumbai attack, the Government of Pakistan took two actions. It ordered the arrest of five members of the LeT against whom specific evidence of their involvement had been produced by the Government of India. It was reported that the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had also collected independent evidence against them. A case against them was registered for investigation and prosecution and their judicial remand was being extended from time to time by an Anti-terrorism court of Islamabad.

The second action was the placing under house arrest of Prof Sayeed, Col. (retd) Nazir Ahmed and some others not on the ground of their involvement in the Mumbai attack, but on the ground that they belonged to an organization, which had been designated by the anti-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council as a terrorist organization. While placing them under house arrest, the Government did not officially ban their organization as a terrorist set-up.

The Review Board set up by the Government to review the legality of the house arrests had upheld the Government decision. However, Prof Sayeed and Nazir Ahmed had challenged their house arrest as illegal before the Lahore High Court. Their lawyer appealed to the court to set aside their house arrest on two grounds. The first was that they were not supplied with the grounds of their house arrest as required under the law within the time-limit laid down. This vitiated the procedure followed, they claimed. The second ground was that the Government had passed its order of house arrest purely on the basis of the resolution of the UN Sanctions Committee, without any independent evidence of its own necessitating their house arrest.

In response to these arguments, the Government contended that it had independent evidence, including evidence of the LeT’s links with Al Qaeda, and showed the evidence privately to the Bench without sharing it with the lawyers to Sayeed and his associate. The lawyers held this also as illegal since their clients had been deprived of their right to know all the grounds for their house arrest including the evidence on which they were based.

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After considering these arguments, a three-member bench of the Lahore High Court held illegal on June 2, 2009, the house arrest of Prof Sayeed and his associate Col.(retd) Nazir Ahmed and ordered their release.

The final order explaining the release issued by the Bench on June 6, 2009, made the following observations: “The Government’s decision to detain the Dawa leaders was not based on solid evidence and the material provided by the Government against them was incorrect and even prepared after their detention. The Government had no evidence that Sayeed and Nazir had any links with Al Qaeda or were involved in anti-state activities, except the ‘bald allegations’ leveled by the Indian lobby that they were involved in the Mumbai attacks. The material against the petitioners was mostly based on intelligence reports, which had been obtained after four months of their detention.

Threats of new terrorist attacks against Indian and foreign targets in Indian territory mounted from Pakistan remain as high as before.

Moreover, these reports were found to be incorrect as nothing apprehended in the reports actually took place. Several intelligence reports were obtained during the period when the petition was pending, apparently to cover the lacunae, but there was no solid evidence or source to supplement the reports. About the Dawa leaders’ involvement in the Mumbai attacks, not a single document had been brought on the record that Dawa or the petitioners were involved in the said incident. There was no evidence that Dawa had links with Al Qaeda.

The security laws and anti-terrorism laws of Pakistan were silent on Al Qaeda being a terrorist organization. Even after the perusal of these documents we do not find any material declaring that the detention was necessary for the security of the petitioners and there was no evidence that the petitioners had any links with Al Qaeda or any terrorist movement.”

Thus, according to the court, no evidence was produced before it linking the JUD and its Amir with the 26/11 attacks. It has not only given a clean chit to the Amir, but also to his organization, namely, the LeT and held that there was no evidence of their being linked to Al Qaeda or any other terrorist movement. The Government has appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Court. If it concurs with the observations of the Lahore High Court, the criminal case filed separately against five members of the LeT for their involvement in 26/11 might also ultimately fail.

Mumbai_26_11_CoverFrom the way the case was handled from the beginning, it was evident that the Government, while acting against those LeT operatives whose involvement in the Mumbai attack was not deniable, wanted to protect Prof Sayeed, his organization and their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. The whole case was handled in such a manner as to make their release by the court inevitable and to weaken the case against the others facing prosecution before an anti-terrorism court.

To be continued

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

B Raman

Former, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai & Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. He is the author of The Kaoboys of R&AW, A Terrorist State as a Frontline Ally,  INTELLIGENCE, PAST, PRESENT & FUTUREMumbai 26/11: A Day of Infamy and Terrorism: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.

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