The Wullar Barrage is another such issue where the interpretation over a technicality has been the cause for it to remain unresolved despite several meetings. India needs the Barrage to keep the Jhelum. River navigable between Baramulla and Wullar Lake. Pakistan objects on the ground that the required storage of water in the Barrage amounts to a violation of the Indus River Water Treaty. In reality only humanitarian and not security interests and the basic concerns in this navigation project but opposition is expressed just for the sake of opposition.
Trade within the region is another casualty of the two-nation theory. During British days, the entire subcontinent had served as a compact for trade, commerce and movement of industrial goods. These complementarities were maintained for a couple of years after partition. In 1948-49 56 per cent of Pakistan’s exports were destined to India and 32 per cent of the imports originated in India.2 Policy changes by Pakistan choked this trade and reduced it practically to a standstill after the 1965 war. However, trade, illegal or through third countries, continued to flourish and is estimated at $2 billion annually.
“¦the bomb technology could leak from Pakistan to some other Muslim countries or to some terrorist groups like Al-Quaida of Osama bin Laden.
The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) has sought to promote intra-regional trade. These efforts led to the SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) in 1991 for facilitating liberaltsed intra-regional trading. SAPT A came into force in 199 but has remained just a dead letter because Pakistan remains fundamentally opposed to a liberalised trade regime with India even though studies by trade bodies in Pakistan and elsewhere generally agree that enormous economic benefits will flow to both countries through bilateral trade. Estimates are that such trade can quickly jump to the annual figure of US $5 billion.
Threats from Unpredictable Nuclear Policy
The nuclear genie would not have probably been released in the subcontinent had India remained united. Pakistan has linked its nuclear weapon programme directly to threats perceived from India. Beginning from 1972 when the Kanupp nuclear power plant was completed with Canadian assistance the weapon development programme was kept continuously on track until weapon testing was publicly accomplished in 1998. The programme would not have succeeded without direct assistance in technology, designing and blue prints of their own early weapons by the Chinese who saw this as an opportunity to develop Pakistan as their own Israel, and without winking by the United States who needed Pakistan as a frontline state for confrontation against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
“¦the possibility of an American air strike against Pakistani nuclear installations to prevent the nuclear weapon devices reaching the radical Islamists.
Some West Asian or North African Muslim states also appear to have promoted the project envisioning it as the making of a ‘Muslim Bomb’. Apart from the Chinese, the only other foreigner ever allowed a visit to its Uranium enrichment facilities at Kahuta was the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, in May ’99. It is conceivable that the bomb technology could leak from Pakistan to some other Muslim countries or to some terrorist groups like Al-Quaida of Osama bin Laden. Proliferation of this kind, if it takes place, will be a serious fall out from the consequences of the two-nation theory. The prospects disturb the Americans deeply. One of their think tanks visualised the possibility of an American air strike against Pakistani nuclear installations to prevent the nuclear weapon devices reaching the radical Islamists.3
The Pakistani nuclear weapons programme has been under very close scrutiny by the Americans ever since it made its appearance. It was estimated that by 1983 the programme had forged successfully the components of a nuclear weapon device and was in a position to field test it by 1984. The main source of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) on which it was based, was the Bagalchur mines but by 1998, the mines had exhausted their Uranium content. By this time the HEU produced from their materials was said to be in the region of 500 to 800 kilograms.
At 25 kg of HEU per nuclear weapon device, the stockpile of bombs from the Uranium route could be anywhere from 25 to 32. The weapon programme could now have shifted to the Plutonium route with the Khushab reactor having reached criticality by mid 1998. Weapons’ grade Plutonium will be available from the New Labs Reprocessing Facilities at Pinstech and Chashma Reprocessing Plant near Khushab and together they could make available annually about 5.5 kg of Plutonium from the beginning of this millennium. Some small quantities of Uranium are expected to be available form a new mine at Leghari which can perhaps contribute annually 4 to 5 kg of HEU.
It is clear that the thought of use of nuclear weapons against India has crossed the minds of Pakistani leadership several times in the past.
Pakistan will, thus, be able to add 4 to 5 nuclear devices to its stockpile every year from 2000-2001. The numbers already available together with those to follow in coming years constitute a threat, which cannot be ignored, since the principle of No First Use is given a go by. The Pakistan Air force has already modified its planes for nuclear deliveries. Its F-16, Mirage V and A5 combat aircraft have been tested for deliveries through free fall, low-level ejection, loft and toss.4
Thanks to Chinese assistance and North Korean collaboration, Pakistan outstrips India in missile development and acquisition. The missile programme made dramatic strides form early 1990s after the Chinese agreed to come to their help with their technologies. Thoday Pakistan has missiles which can strike India anywhere with a nuclear payload. The missiles have accurate guidance systems. The options available in terms of propulsion, range and varety are comprehensive. They are the bedrock of Pakistan nuclear doctrine. The name chosen like Ghauri are intended to recall what Mohamed Ghauri did to India centuries ago. Each missile is an answer to India’s own missile system. Hatf missile counters the Prithvi, but Ghauri and Shaheen, with their second-strike capability and mobile mountings, are yet to be matched on ground on the Indian side. Agni can counter Shaheen but is not in serial production.
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