Indian Defence Review

Mohammed Ali Jinnah is on record, claiming that he brought about Pakistan single-handedly. Had he not been born would Pakistan exist today?

Historians have always found the ‘Ifs’ of history very tantalising. Their speculations of alternative scenarios if history had run a different course at crucial moments are essentially exercises into the imponderables. For example, if a scourge of plague had wiped out early Christianity in Asia Minor, would Europe and perhaps the Americas today be followers of Mithraism? The culmination of Pakistan was indeed the result of one man’s effort and not so much the consequences of a chain of events. It is, therefore, relatively easier to examine what would have been the scenario in the subcontinent but for Jinnah’s two-nation theory and make an estimation of its costs to the two countries it created in terms of political, social, economic and other values.

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Two very different kinds of cultures have grown in Pakistan and India post partition. That which grew in India promoted democracy and federalism, secularism and tolerance, a welfare state with enforceable fundamental rights, decentralisation of power, free media and judiciary, individualism, attempts at distributive justice, etc. It is not surprising that India is seen by others as set to make the 21st century its own.

The culmination of Pakistan was indeed the result of one mans effort and not so much the consequences of a chain of events.

On the other hand Pakistan lives under a vastly different set of traditions, with minorities and women treated less than full and equal citizens with others, power essentially in the hands of those who wield a gun; control over free exercise of religion, speech and scientific enquiry; and forms of governments, lacking in democratic character. The blame for such a different turn in history’s march can be plausibly attributed to partition.

An undivided India would have escaped the horrors of partition, carnages, uprooting of millions from their homes, traumas of resettlement and division of families. No visas would be necessary to travel from one corner of the country to the other. The festering sore of J&K would not be there, nor problems like Tulbul Barrage, Sir Creek or sharing of rivers either in the west or east of India. The whole region, it can be reasonably assumed, would have been heir to the positive developments seen in India in various fields. Democracy would have taken firm roots all across the board.

Jehadis and armed sectarian groups will not have a free run in the country as they have in Pakistan today.

Representative institutions, respect for constitutionalism and federalism would have grown in other parts as they have developed in India. The military would have remained under firm civilian control and could not have played the hide and seek with democracy as it has been doing in Pakistan in the last fifty-three years. There would have been no need of participation in military or ideological blocks. Non-alignment would have been the foreign policy Mantra for the entire subcontinent. The convergence that the US now seeks with India to preserve peace and security in the world would have come earlier and would have spared the region which is now Pakistan the demeaning consequences of patronage and rejection after exploitation.

Search for security would have taken entirely new dimensions in the composite India. With little to fear from external predators, if any, the burden of defence budgets could perhaps have been halved, releasing enormous funds for economic growth, removal of poverty and illiteracy, health care and for all other social and societal development, which bring dignity and meaning to human life. With development indices spurting, and a population, which would have become the largest in the world, united India would perhaps already have become a powerhouse by now. National security would not be defined in military terms alone.

Pakistan maintains the seventh largest army in the world. For some years after partition, defence spending accounted for 85 per cent of central revenues.

A paradigm shift would have come about linking real security to non-military factors such as environment and ecology apart from growth indices already mentioned. It is a moot question whether under such circumstances thoughts in the region would have run towards establishing nuclear deterrence with all the possibilities of dreadful scenarios, which it now conjures up. Certainly there would be no role or need for an ISI with its philosophy of subversion and sabotage and no requirement of 5th columnists.

Composite India would most definitely have been a secular state as the present day India is. Communalism including communal disturbances could have been a continuing problem for some time since some notable Muslim personalities like Syed Ahmed Khan who wielded considerable influence had become pessimistic about the evolution of a composite Hindu Muslim culture. Some eventually did succeed in adding a political dimension, however minor, to the sense of separatism that had come about in the thought processes of some segments of the two communities in the 19th and the 20th centuries.

But if secularism is now firmly established in India, why should it be doubted that the same milestone would not have been reached in united India. Mahatma Gandhi did succeed in dousing the flames of communal passions in Calcutta and Noakhali on the eve of partition. And perhaps his life would have been spared if partition had not come about, and his healing touch would have been available for a longer period.

In Pakistan instead, the turmoil in the society and the question marks over the nature of governance are proving to be disincentives for foreign investments and pushing it more and more into isolation.

The role of religion in the life of polity would not have become such a troubling question in the region which became Pakistan had India remained united. Ahmedias need not have been excommunicated from Islam, which is a highly regrettable violation of human rights; nor Shias threatened with the same fate by the so-called conscience-keeping Mullahs of the Sunni sect. Military incursion into spheres of power and governance lies at the roots of rise of influence of the Mullahs in Pakistan and the havoc they are creating there. The full story is, however, yet to reveal itself. The clergy is hoping to rule in Pakistan in days to come.

They rule only in two other countries, Iran and Afghanistan and in both countries medieval horrors have been revisited. In undivided India, the citizenry would have been spared this fate. No Taliban scourge will arise in India. Jehadis and armed sectarian groups will not have a free run in the country as they have in Pakistan today. Political and religious authorities will operate in their own separate domains. In India, unlike Pakistan, Islam has developed a soft face, comparable to Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia. In Pakistan, Islam is extracting a much severer cost from the society, with its anti-blasphemy and Hudood laws. In united India too, Islam would be having a benign face much like what existed in British times.

India today is an attractive destination for foreign investments and is fast ‘becoming a vibrant part of the global village. The potential of the undivided India would have been even more attractive. In Pakistan instead, the turmoil in the society and the question marks over the nature of governance are proving to be disincentives for foreign investments and pushing it more and more into isolation.

Lowering the Quality of Life

Moving over from the abstract to the concrete, empirical evidence suggests that the cost of the two-nation theory to the two nations it created has been enormous, The two countries have been in a state of confrontation from the beginning. Four wars have been fought in 1948, ’62, ’71 and ’99. Besides, Pakistan is engaged in a low cost proxy war against India in J&K state from 1989. This conflict situation imposes very heavy burden on the resources of the two countries and leaves disproportionately small sums for allotment to social sectors and human development programmes. It is, therefore, not surprising that poverty, illiteracy and lack of health care exist at unacceptable levels in both these countries.

Being the smaller of the two, but displaying a higher degree of confrontation and belligerency, Pakistani defence expenditures are not sustainable by its economy. Pakistan maintains the seventh largest army in the world. For some years after partition, defence spending accounted for 85 per cent of central revenues. For the past ten years according to Sipri Yearbook 1999, (Page 284), the figure has hovered around 25 per cent annually. Seen in the context of debt servicing which the Pakistani budget for 1997-98 placed at 45 per cent of central revenues, the nature of the unsustainability of Pakistani economy becomes self evident.

Pakistan is engaged in a low cost proxy war against India in J&K state from 1989. This conflict situation imposes very heavy burden on the resources of the two countries”¦

Currently Pakistan’s foreign debts are estimated at US $38 billion at the end of December ’99, according to World Bank indicators 2000.1 With defence expenditure pegged so high, there is no way the debt will reduce. A debt trap seems to be Pakistan’s destiny in coming years, unless it drastically reduces its defence outlays.

This confrontation produces trends that run contrary to the world trends in defence expenditure and changes in force structures. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report on World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1996 (Page 3) notes that whereas the overall military expenditures for the world between 1985 and 1995 declined annually at the rate of 4.9 per cent, those for South Asia rose 3.6 per cent annually. According to the same report, the same year, force strength fell 3 per cent annually for the world, but the figures for South Asia disclosed an annual increase of 1.3 per cent.

The Sipri report mentioned earlier claims that the military expenditures of India and Pakistan account for 90 per cent of the total expenditures in the South Asia region. With major chunk of resources thus transferred to what must be treated essentially as non productive sectors, the social indicators of development, as disclosed by the World Development Report for 1998-99 of the World Bank, for India and Pakistan rank among the lowest in the world on important counts such as per capita income, literacy, poverty, energy consumption, accessibility to drinking water, etc. Pakistan’s level of defence spending rules out any upgradation of its social conditions in the foreseeable future and thus will constantly be eroding its comprehensive national strength which has to be measured on the basis of its social development indices.The attitude of confrontation colours all major national policies in Pakistan. The infrastructure development within the country has remained hostage to military priorities. Membership of Western military pacts like SEATO and CENTO were sought, not because Pakistan had a basic interest in the cold war politics of 1950s and 60s, but because it helped Pakistan to strengthen itself militarily against India.

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It did not matter to it if in the process it acquired the status of a vassal state.

Casualties of Lack of Cooperation and Coordination

Regional issues go uncoordinated at world bodies like the World Trade Organisation or the United Nations because of its antagonistic posture towards India.

Pakistan objects on the ground that the required storage of water in the Barrage amounts to a violation of the Indus River Water Treaty.

Some lesser issues between the two countries have remained in a limbo because of a lack of desire to work out solutions. The Sir Creek issue is one such problem. It involves the demarcation of the maritime boundary between Sindh and Gujarat along the Sir Creek on the Indian Ocean. There is no doubt that the movement of the coastal boundary by a few kilometres this way or other could result in a change of possession of a few hundred square kilometres of exclusive economic zone. If a spirit of give and take had existed, this problem, festering since 1964, would have been sorted out long ago.

The Wullar Barrage is another such issue where the interpretation over a technicality has been the cause for it to remain unresolved despite several meetings. India needs the Barrage to keep the Jhelum. River navigable between Baramulla and Wullar Lake. Pakistan objects on the ground that the required storage of water in the Barrage amounts to a violation of the Indus River Water Treaty. In reality only humanitarian and not security interests and the basic concerns in this navigation project but opposition is expressed just for the sake of opposition.

Trade within the region is another casualty of the two-nation theory. During British days, the entire subcontinent had served as a compact for trade, commerce and movement of industrial goods. These complementarities were maintained for a couple of years after partition. In 1948-49 56 per cent of Pakistan’s exports were destined to India and 32 per cent of the imports originated in India.2 Policy changes by Pakistan choked this trade and reduced it practically to a standstill after the 1965 war. However, trade, illegal or through third countries, continued to flourish and is estimated at $2 billion annually.

“¦the bomb technology could leak from Pakistan to some other Muslim countries or to some terrorist groups like Al-Quaida of Osama bin Laden.

The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) has sought to promote intra-regional trade. These efforts led to the SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) in 1991 for facilitating liberaltsed intra-regional trading. SAPT A came into force in 199 but has remained just a dead letter because Pakistan remains fundamentally opposed to a liberalised trade regime with India even though studies by trade bodies in Pakistan and elsewhere generally agree that enormous economic benefits will flow to both countries through bilateral trade. Estimates are that such trade can quickly jump to the annual figure of US $5 billion.

Threats from Unpredictable Nuclear Policy

The nuclear genie would not have probably been released in the subcontinent had India remained united. Pakistan has linked its nuclear weapon programme directly to threats perceived from India. Beginning from 1972 when the Kanupp nuclear power plant was completed with Canadian assistance the weapon development programme was kept continuously on track until weapon testing was publicly accomplished in 1998. The programme would not have succeeded without direct assistance in technology, designing and blue prints of their own early weapons by the Chinese who saw this as an opportunity to develop Pakistan as their own Israel, and without winking by the United States who needed Pakistan as a frontline state for confrontation against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

“¦the possibility of an American air strike against Pakistani nuclear installations to prevent the nuclear weapon devices reaching the radical Islamists.

Some West Asian or North African Muslim states also appear to have promoted the project envisioning it as the making of a ‘Muslim Bomb’. Apart from the Chinese, the only other foreigner ever allowed a visit to its Uranium enrichment facilities at Kahuta was the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, in May ’99. It is conceivable that the bomb technology could leak from Pakistan to some other Muslim countries or to some terrorist groups like Al-Quaida of Osama bin Laden. Proliferation of this kind, if it takes place, will be a serious fall out from the consequences of the two-nation theory. The prospects disturb the Americans deeply. One of their think tanks visualised the possibility of an American air strike against Pakistani nuclear installations to prevent the nuclear weapon devices reaching the radical Islamists.3

The Pakistani nuclear weapons programme has been under very close scrutiny by the Americans ever since it made its appearance. It was estimated that by 1983 the programme had forged successfully the components of a nuclear weapon device and was in a position to field test it by 1984. The main source of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) on which it was based, was the Bagalchur mines but by 1998, the mines had exhausted their Uranium content. By this time the HEU produced from their materials was said to be in the region of 500 to 800 kilograms.

At 25 kg of HEU per nuclear weapon device, the stockpile of bombs from the Uranium route could be anywhere from 25 to 32. The weapon programme could now have shifted to the Plutonium route with the Khushab reactor having reached criticality by mid 1998. Weapons’ grade Plutonium will be available from the New Labs Reprocessing Facilities at Pinstech and Chashma Reprocessing Plant near Khushab and together they could make available annually about 5.5 kg of Plutonium from the beginning of this millennium. Some small quantities of Uranium are expected to be available form a new mine at Leghari which can perhaps contribute annually 4 to 5 kg of HEU.

It is clear that the thought of use of nuclear weapons against India has crossed the minds of Pakistani leadership several times in the past.

Pakistan will, thus, be able to add 4 to 5 nuclear devices to its stockpile every year from 2000-2001. The numbers already available together with those to follow in coming years constitute a threat, which cannot be ignored, since the principle of No First Use is given a go by. The Pakistan Air force has already modified its planes for nuclear deliveries. Its F-16, Mirage V and A5 combat aircraft have been tested for deliveries through free fall, low-level ejection, loft and toss.4

Thanks to Chinese assistance and North Korean collaboration, Pakistan outstrips India in missile development and acquisition. The missile programme made dramatic strides form early 1990s after the Chinese agreed to come to their help with their technologies. Thoday Pakistan has missiles which can strike India anywhere with a nuclear payload. The missiles have accurate guidance systems. The options available in terms of propulsion, range and varety are comprehensive. They are the bedrock of Pakistan nuclear doctrine. The name chosen like Ghauri are intended to recall what Mohamed Ghauri did to India centuries ago. Each missile is an answer to India’s own missile system. Hatf missile counters the Prithvi, but Ghauri and Shaheen, with their second-strike capability and mobile mountings, are yet to be matched on ground on the Indian side. Agni can counter Shaheen but is not in serial production.

The Americans also worry about a possible pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan in the subcontinent and have on a number of occasions given expression to their apprehensions in fora such as the US Congressional hearings. Such fears are not of recent origin. In May 1990 a special emissary of US Presideft, the then Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates/had been sent to Pakistan to warn its leadership against a nuclear adventure against India. The American assessment was based on what the CIA had believed to be definitive indicators of Pakistani intentions.

Kargil represents joint Pak Mujahideen action in what official circles describe as Jehad in Kashmir. Neither is in a mood to accept any solution on Kashmir short of accession to Pakistan.

This American assessment has for long been disbelieved in India but it seems now a fresh look at the evidence5 is called for as it has come to light that Pakistan was able to make components for a nuclear bomb by 1983 and was ready for a nuclear blast in 1984. The joint article captioned ‘Securing Nuclear Peace’, published in the News of 5 October 1999, by two former Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan, Agha Shahi and Abdul Sattar (the latter is now the Foreign Minister) and former Air Chief Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, had made the point that the value of nuclear capability for Pakistan had been under consideration on at least three occasions as given below:

It is, thus, clear that the thought of use of nuclear weapons against India has crossed the minds of Pakistani leadership several times in the past. Military control over these weapons and an inherent instability in the political and economic situation in the country together constitute a potent combination that can cause Pakistan to lurch into a desperate decision on launch of nuclear weapons against India. Kashmir does provide a backdrop to such a possibility.

Kargil represents joint Pak Mujahideen action in what official circles describe as Jehad in Kashmir. Neither is in a mood to accept any solution on Kashmir short of accession to Pakistan. Anything else would create a rebellion.6 Such is the belief in some quarters in Pakistan.What has creation of Pakistan meant to the people who live in its territory? Has it been a boon or a handicap? In the words of a scholar, since its inception Pakistan has faced intensively “crisis of political development”, i.e. the crisis of identity, legitimacy, integration, penetration, participation and distribution? This description provides ail answer to the question.

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Another scholar Myron Weiner observes that national integration comprises five tasks, the creation of a sense of territorial nationality, the establishing of a central national authority, the bridging of the elite-mass gap, the creation of a minimum value consensus, and devising of integrative institutions and behaviour. The objective is to bring about a national identity among people who are divided by ethnicity, religion, language, culture and history8. Going by these criteria, it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that the “crisis of political development” continues in Pakistan and complete national integration is yet to be accomplished. The split in 1971, leading to Bangladesh, was an eloquent commentary on the state of affairs there. Continuing social, regional and ethnic tensions may suggest that the final chapter is perhaps yet to be written.

With a Taliban victory in Afghanistan, a new form of fundamentalism has started stalking Pakistan, which is vocal about its preference for a Taliban like state in Pakistan.

Instead of being the basis for a common identity and nationalism, Islam in Pakistan has proved to be quite divisive. It discriminates against minorities, reduces them to the status of lesser citizens and makes a mockery of their political rights by creating a climate for fostering separate electorates. While Islam became a tool for seeking legitimacy in the hands of usurpers, Islamisation was seen to be an opportunity by Islamic groups to transfer political power into the hands of the believers through occupation of as many positions of authority as possible in order to pave the way for the establishment of a doctrinaire Islamic state. The influence of this brand of Islam has continued to grow in the corridors of power resulting in step-by-step increase in religio-political mobilisation. The electoral results prove that such groups have not caught the fancy of the general masses of the people but the objective of seizing ultimate political power in the country continues to guide their programmes.

This politicised and activised form of Islam has little to do with piety or religiosity. It also practically contributed nothing to the promotion of cardinal Islamic values of social justice, equality, brotherhood, freedom, tolerance and democracy. On the other hand, its narrow interpretations by sectarian groups have spawned heavy sectarian violence. Shias and Sunnis now maintain their own militant forces ‘that often engage in murderous attacks against each other. With a Taliban victory in Afghanistan, a new form of fundamentalism has started stalking Pakistan, which is vocal about its preference for a Taliban like state in Pakistan.

Portents point to a repetition of Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt in Pakistan, where government and religious forces are battling it out on the streets and elsewhere, making the ordinary citizen insecure about life and property.

Supporters of this fundamentalism are engaged in a Jehad in Kashmir but they want to carry out a Jehad within Pakistan also. The military rulers are unable to control the hardliner extremists and are on the defensive. They have had to roll back measures aimed at controlling the fundamentalist outfits such as placing restrictions on collection of funds in the name of Jehad and a display of weapons at meetings and congregations. The balance of forces between the fundamentalists and the military regime seems to be tilting against the latter since the Maulavis and the Mullahs are gaining in strength each year through the addition of about 40,000 graduates from Madrassa schools.

Government spokesmen are already sounding despondent over the turn of events and speak about the inability of the regime to annoy religious parties for fear that they will direct their guns at them.9 Portents, thus, point to a repetition of Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt in Pakistan, where government and religious forces are battling it out on the streets and elsewhere, making the ordinary citizen insecure about life and property.

Repudiation of Past

A nation, which denies its past, is condemned to remain rootless for long spells. History and culture cannot be repudiated but this is exactly what the educational system and history books in Pakistan have been doing. They define Pakistan in negative terms and talk of Mughal times, excluding other milestones of history. Aurangzeb is their greatest hero. True identity is sought to be denied and therefore, the question of identity remains unresolved to this day.

Pakistans isolation in the world areas, and the new found general tilt towards India in their attitudes, reinforce these impulses and create a hope that even though seen as a failing state Pakistan will not yet be a failed state.

The Bihari Muslim left behind in Bangladesh after 1971 is no longer recognised to have a right of residence in Pakistan even though he had moved out of the heartland of British India, choosing to live in Pakistan. The Mohajir in Pakistan is demanding to be accepted as the fifth nationalist group because as a Mohajir he feels he has no identity in Pakistan. The Punjabi domination in major sectors of political and economic life of the country makes the Sind his, Pathans and Baluchis focus on their own distinctive characteristics and requirements. They place their own ethnic identity before the Pakistani identity.

The awakened awareness about political, cultural and social identity extends the frontiers of all kinds of volatility in the system, adding to the fragility of the state. Adequate political or democratic institutions are yet to be forged where the grievances could be objectively addressed. Governance is still in a state of experimentation with several models having been tried at one time or another, and found wanting. The military was accepted as the only dependable and stable institution in Pakistan and was earlier given credibility for being an efficient manager.

But the. Hamoodur Rehman Commission report about the 1971 debacle has shattered many of the illusions held by the Pakistanis about their Armed Forces. The report charged the Army Brass with perversions (sexual excesses, debauchery, drunkenness, etc.) and willful subversion of public life and held them directly responsible for the dismemberment of Pakistan.10 The civil society in Pakistan now firmly believes that evils like corruption, obscurantism and mismanagement have made deep inroads into its Armed Forces and that they are no better than a failing political institution.

But the civil society is no longer entirely silent about the aberrations in the Pakistani polity and governance. There is a certain vibrancy in it, which articulates calls for a thorough overhaul of the system. Women and civil rights activists refuse to be silenced. Pakistan’s isolation in the world areas, and the new found general tilt towards India in their attitudes, reinforce these impulses and create a hope that even though seen as a failing state Pakistan will not yet be a failed state. There is much that is still functioning in Pakistan such as its judiciary, bureaucracy, armed forces and media. The overall situation is best summed up in the CIA report, ‘Global Trends: 2015′.

The citizens of Pakistan, thus, seem to be paying a heavy price for the two-nation theory.

“Pakistan will not easily recover from decades of economic and political mismanagement, divisive politics, lawlessness, corruption and ethnic friction. Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change in face of opposition from an entrenched political elite and radical Islamic parties. Further domestic disarray will benefit Islamic political activists who may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the make up and cohesion of the military, once Pakistan’s most capable institution in a climate of continuing domestic turmoil the Central Government’s control will probably be reduced to the Punjab heartland and the economic hub of Karachi. Pakistan will ‘be more fractious, isolated and dependent on international financial assistance”.11

The report card on Pakistan is not very bright. The citizens of Pakistan, thus, seem to be paying a heavy price for the two-nation theory. The prophets of doom predict a future for Pakistan akin to that of the erstwhile Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Should such predictions come true, these costs would have been paid in vain.

Notes

1. POT 4th Aug. 2000, Page 3220.
2. Dr Ijaz Nabi, Integrated Report and Summary of Findings, Pakistan India Trade Study, Ministry of Commerce, Govt of Pakistan, Sept. 1996 P. 2, as quoted by Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani (Retd), 'India and Pakistan', The John Hopkins University Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, P. 42.
3. Mehdi Masud, Dawn (8/2), as quoted in POT, 16 Feb., Page 899.
4. Rais Mohammad Saleh Azam, 'Where Mountains Move': The Story of Chagai, The Nation 28 May, 2000. The article was also reproduced by The Pakistan Institute for Air Defence Studies.
5. ibid.
6. Arif Jamal, a commenter in News (9/7), as quoted in POT, 4th Aug. 2000, P. 3223.
7. Kalim Bahadur, 'Democracy in Pakistan, Crises and Conflicts, 'HarAnand Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1998 PI 14.
8. Jason N Finkle and Richard W. Gable(ed.s), 'Political Development and Social Change', New York, 1971, P. 643-654.
9. News, (23/9), quoting Minister for Religious Affairs, Abdul Malik Kasi, as reported in POT, 17 July 2000.
10. India Today, 2 Aug 2000, P. 37-38.
11. Quoted by Mehdi Masud, Dawn, (8/2), as reported in POT, 6 March 2001, P. 899.