Geopolitics

Pakistan: The Anti-India Identity
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Vol. 23.4 Oct-Dec2008 | Date : 25 Nov , 2010

In 1947, when the first US Ambassador quizzed Jinnah on the future of Indo-Pak relations, Jinnah was quite sanguine that relations between the two countries would acquire the character of US-Canada relations, which is characterised by soft borders and brisk trade. Jinnah had probably chosen to ignore the fact that there were not less than nine territorial disputes between the two countries. And today, after 60 troubled years, the Indo-Pak relationship stands hostage to the Kashmir issue. Many of those who are in position or power in Pakistan, ignore the significance of the economic complementarities between the two countries. The eminent Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi maintains: “The dividend from peace and trade with India was spurned in favour of sponsoring jihad in Kashmir. The dividend from oil and gas pipelines from Iran and Central Asia was wrecked on the altar of the Taliban in Afghanistan.”5

The anti-India and anti-Hindu rhetoric may temporally galvanise the Pakistan military and some segments of the population in times of war, but for the jihad in Kashmir, it has little endurance and is counter-productive.

Noted analyst B Raman, a former Additional Secretary at Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has pointed out that the Sindhis, Mohajirs and Balochs do not share the negative perceptions about India and its peoples, as do the FATA tribal, Punjabis and the Punjabi speaking populace of the POK. Even the Pashtuns, the Seraikis of southern Punjab and the Shias and Ismailis of Northern Areas are found to be moderate in their views. The rural areas of central and northern Punjab, some areas of NWFP, and FATA (where the anti-India feeling is most pronounced) – contribute 75 percent of the recruits to the Pakistan Army. These areas are also the major source of ‘jihadis’ because of the strong presence and influence of Islamic organisations and clerics. In respect of to the pattern of jihadi casualties in J&K between 1989 and 2005, Raman quotes a study by Ms. Rubina Saigol: that “About 8000 Pakistani Punjabis, 3000 from the NWFP and about 500 from Sindh are estimated to have died in J&K”. whereas only 112 Balochis have died in jihad. In the various Indo-Pak wars, the maximum number of causalities belonged to these areas.6

During the campaign for a Pakistan, the Muslim League had to contend with the Indian National Congress, whom it accused of being pro-Hindu and pseudo-secular. Throughout the four decades of Congress rule, it attracted the same condemnations from the Pakistani ruling elite. In this regard, they do not draw any distinction between the Congress and the rightwing parties like the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Therefore, the anti-Hindu and anti-India rhetoric is not predicated upon the type of dispensation in New Delhi and India-Pakistan peace process have similar prospects. Both Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf did active diplomatic business with A.B. Vajpayee and there has been no major change in Islamabad’s stance after the Congress came back to power.

The anti-India and anti-Hindu rhetoric may temporally galvanise the Pakistan military and some segments of the population in times of war, but for the jihad in Kashmir, it has little endurance and is counter-productive. Pakistan has geopolitical and strategic interface not only with India, but with Afghanistan, Iran and China too. Besides narrowing down, the vision of the leaders and the people, it becomes a resource and psychological handicap when responding to the challenges posed by other countries (especially Islamic), and its own ethnic groups. This has been reflected in the establishment’s failure in dealing with insurgencies and Islamic terrorists in Balochistan, NWFP and FATA.

The still persisting doubts among a significant number of Indians about the logic of partition is resented by many in Pakistan. This questions the very legitimacy of the country’s existence. The military exploits this sentiment simply by painting it as a part of India’s aggressive designs. The so called theme gained prominence after Pakistan’s split and, in fact serves as a robust logic for the military to perpetuate its primacy on the specious ground of preserving the country from further balkanization attempts by India. Jean Luc Racine, a French scholar on South Asia gave his view that “the doubts expressed now and then in India (outside official circles) on the viability of Pakistan and the hypotheses foretelling its breaking up into independent provinces give rise to added rancour, even though some Pakistanis themselves also conjure up the danger of the implosion of their country.”

Notes

  1. Amarjeet Singh (ed.), Jinnah and Punjab, Shamsul Hasan, Collection and Other Documents 1944-1947, (New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2007), p.275.
  2. B K Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, (New Delhi: Penguin Books), pp.204-205.
  3. Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections, (Oxford University Press, 2006), Second Edition, p.71.
  4. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, From My Death Cell, (New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks), p.53
  5. Najam Sethi, “Does the Political Economy Needed?,” Friday Times, Vol. 14, No. 12, May 17-23, 2002 (Internet Edition).
  6. B.Raman, India and Pakistan ‘Can Mindsets Change’, Paper No. 2057, http//www.saag.org December 16, 2006.
1 2
Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

RSN Singh

is a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research and Analysis Wing, or R&AW and author of books Asian Strategic and Military Perspective, The Military Factor in Pakistan and The Unmaking of Nepal. His latest books are Know the Anti-Nationals (English) and Know the एंटी-नेशनल्स (Hindi).

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left