Lakshman Seth, MP, Haldia and Chairman of Haldia Development Authority is categorical: “I put a question to you. Recapturing is illegal, but capturing is legal? My house will be captured, but I will not be allowed recapture my house?
So what were the ingredients of CPI (M)’s Operation Nandigram plan? With revelations made by witnesses and victims of the violence, CPI (M) insiders, BUPC political leaders and armed cadres and intelligence officials, the author has pieced together an account of what happened in Nandigram between November 6 and 10, 2007. By November 5, police pickets at Takapara, Kamalpur, Ranichawk, Bhangabera, Tekhali deployed to keep the warring factions of CPI (M) and BUPC at bay were withdrawn. Even the strategically located police camp at Gokulnagar was wound up. This is where instances of large scale violence and rape were reported as CPI (M) armed cadres over-ran BUPC positions in Nandigram. “The CPI(M) brought in criminals in large numbers and when the police camp was removed we knew that a massacre is being planned,” said Bhabani Prasad Das, BUPC Leader. CPI(M) gunmen began firing as they entered Satengabadi between 10.00am and 10.30am on November 6th. They advanced through Gokulnagar and Maheshpur and reached Nandigram town by 9th evening. “The CPI (M) started firing and entered through Satengabadi and people fled in panic,” said Das.
Another group of CPI (M) armed militia moved in from Bahargunj on the evening of November 8th. They moved through Ranichowk, Amdabad, Takapara and reached Nandigram town by November 11th morning. “The CPI(M) attack began at 10.00am from their stronghold of Khejuri. They opened two fronts. One along the Tekhali-Takapara axis and the other through Satengabadi-Maheshpur axis,” said Bhabani Prasad Das, BUPC Leader. The third front was opened by the CPI (M) mercenaries on November 9th morning at Bhangabera. They moved through Sonachura, Adhikaripara, Garhchakraberia and reached Nandigram town by 11th morning. Swadesh Das Adhikari, one of the self-styled commanders of the BUPC’s armed militia described how BUPC’s armed resistance was overpowered by the CPI(M) militia: “The assault began from Satengabadi. They gathered criminals in Khejuri. They fired heavily. This forced us to retreat. They came till Tekhali. The CPI (M) fighters again started firing on 8th at Gokulnagar and they chased us till Maheshpur. Whatever we could we did. Whatever weapons we had we used. But we did not have enough to put up resistance.”
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BUPC’s version of why its armed resistance failed is confirmed by CPI (M). “I think they failed to fight because they ran short of ammunition. If they had weapons they could have continued fighting with us,” said Ashok Bera, CPM Zonal Committee. Swadesh Das showed this author a bullet fired at him allegedly by men in police uniform ostensibly giving covering fire to the CPI (M) militia. BUPC leaders allege the CPI (M) was wary of involving the police after the March 14th police action to re-establish the government’s control over Nandigram in which 14 people died. That is why instead of using the police to break the BUPC siege of Nandigram, the CPI (M) pressed its armed cadres as an extra-constitutional force to do what a statutory law enforcement agency should have done. “Police did not want to repeat the March 14th incident and that is why the police with the tacit support of the state government used the cadres to recapture Nandigram,” said Bhabani Prasad Das, BUPC leader.
It is, of course, not clear yet why the law enforcement agencies in West Bengal allowed the BUPC to arm itself and enabled rudimentary training of its cadres by a tactical group of Maoists.
Out-gunned and outnumbered, a huge rally of BUPC supporters decided to confront the advancing CPI (M) militia on 10th November. “As we started from Sonachura and reached Maheshpur they started firing. Since the harvesting of paddy had not happened, the CPI (M) militia came through the paddy field and attacked from three directions. They fired blindly. Many women were raped. I saw them, they took 16 bodies in four vans.”
I have concrete information that they molested hundreds of women,” said Swadesh Das Adhikari, BUPC armed leader. The author met many women who claimed that they were victims of the violence unleashed by the CPI (M) cadres. “They put a gun on my head and pushed me into the house. They physically abused me. I have left my two children behind. If I don’t go back, even they will be abused,” said one such victim.
Sheikh Akram Lilpur was in the BUPC rally on Nov 10th when it was attacked by the CPI (M) militia. “They were wearing a black dress and their faces were covered. I was in the procession and they started firing,” he said. Asit Pradhan who was also participating in the BUPC rally says the CPI (M) gunmen rounded up those who could not run away and took them away to the adjacent Khejuri block. “They asked us to surrender and took us away in a group to Khejuri. I was beaten up. My knees were hit. My hand was broken,” he said. Ashok Bera, who heads CPI (M)’s zonal committee in Nandigram dismisses such overwhelming evidence of violence unleashed by its mercenaries. “We liberated Nandigram without shedding any blood. And we are proud of that,” said Bera. But, though Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya recently said he was sorry for what happened in Nandigram, his party colleagues are not willing to relent. Lakshman Seth, MP, Haldia and Chairman of Haldia Development Authority is categorical: “I put a question to you. Recapturing is illegal, but capturing is legal? My house will be captured, but I will not be allowed recapture my house?
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It is now established with a fair representation of voices from both parties to the conflict that BUPC’s failure to put up an effective resistance could be because its armed cadres ran out of ammunition. If one strings together the considered views of the Central Forces and intelligence agencies, one can safely come to the conclusion that while the Indian Maoists did provide tactical support to the BUPC armed cadres like sourcing arms and ammunition from illegal country-made arms manufacturers in Munger (Bihar) and from suppliers in the Topsia/Tiljala areas of Kolkata city, there were no armed Maoist action groups inside Nandigram. Had that been the case, the nature of the conflict would have been vastly different.
“Ultimately the Maoists also joined the BUPC campaign. They trained some people how to fight back,” said Lakshman Seth, MP, Haldia and Chairman of Haldia Development Authority. “There is no Maoist here. And if they were here then why would they leave their weapons behind. CPM is planting it and then showing it as Maoist weapons,” said Bhabani Prasad Das, BUPC leader. “If we had so much weapons and Maoist support then there would have been so many casualties and so many policemen would have also been killed,” he added. “If Maoists had imparted training there would have been a militia that would have resisted the assault and defeated it. They would have preferred to die in the battlefield rather than withdraw,” said Swadesh Das Adhikari, BUPC armed leader. But local level CPI (M) leaders contest the BUPC view. “We believe that there was Maoist presence in the area. In Sonachura we found a house that had a small factory to produce weapons. We have also found some Maoist pamphlets and posters,” said Sheikh Abdul Razak, Sonachura CPI (M) Local Committee member
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