A Primitive Territorial Conflict
Nandigram is like any other town in Marxist West Bengal. Even the new in-your-face CPI (M) flags look familiar. Narrow proletarian streets, packed with walking feet; nothing betrays the town’s recent history, till one comes across a burnt two storeyed building. A freshly painted signage tells us, it is the CPI (M)’s office in Nandigram. The charred walls, fans twisted by a raging fire continue to remind the visiting CPI (M) cadres of a time not too long ago when anti-land acquisition activists mobilised by a political alliance led by the Trinamul Congress controlled this town and nearly all the villages that fell under its administrative jurisdiction.
From January 3rd to November 6th 2007 the Bhumi Uchched Pratirodh Committee or BUPC controlled Nandigram Blocks I and II. But now the Red Flag is back with vengeance, fluttering in all villages of Nandigram, signaling the end of the 11 month long siege by the anti-land acquisition activists under the banner of BUPC. The Central Reserve Police Force maintains a tenuous peace stretched to its limits by contesting claims. The CPI (M)’s leader in the region, Lakshman Seth, also the MP from Haldia, and the chairman of the Haldia Development Authority, under whose instructions the notice for acquisition of land for the Chemical Hub was issued in late December 2006, defended his party’s violent campaign to wrest control of Nandigram from BUPC: “We have answered in their own language they used to capture this area. I will not say any anything beyond this. It is understandable that State Government had a plan to set up a mega chemical hub. Govt wanted to acquire land. What is the fault of the CPI(M) party? Why will you attack and kill our supporters? You have the right to campaign against industrialisation, while we have the right to campaign for it. But why did they bring in firearms?”
The Union Governments version of events in Nandigram is yet to be made public.
Local level CPI (M) leaders unmindful of West Bengal’s CM’s flip-flop on the issue of letting loose armed CPI (M) cadres to recapture Nandigram backed the violent take-over. “We kept failing to make peace and so we decided to fight them in the same way they fought us,” said Ashok Bera, CPI(M) Zonal Committee, Nandigram. “They had weapons and were controlling the area. We had informed the government. But the government did nothing,” said Mohammad Yasin, CPI(M) Zonal Committee, Nandigram.
The BUPC’s leader Bhabani Prasad Das claimed that the CPI (M) organised armed cadres, arms and ammunition much beyond what was required to counter them. “We had simple country made weapons and they were not enough to fight back the CPI(M) militia,” he said. The Union Government’s version of events in Nandigram is yet to be made public. With the CRPF maintaining a strong neutral presence an enabling situation was created for the National Human Rights Commission and the Central Bureau of Investigation to conduct their independent investigations and assessments. They sought explanations from the local police and recorded testimonies of those displaced by the bloody battle between the mercenaries sponsored by the CPI (M) and the Trinamul Congress. At the NHRC and the CBI headquarters in Delhi, the investigators are joining the dots to figure out how the CPI (M) recaptured Nandigram.
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There is enough evidentiary material available to piece together the rather fascinating territorial conflict that took place between opposing political groups in Nandigram. This region is uniquely located, surrounded by the Haldi River, the Hoogly and the Talpathi canal. It is a Muslim dominated region with genetic lineage obtained from Arakanese Muslim populace of Burma. It is an under-developed, highly illiterate and completely agrarian oriented region. So despite Nandigram being close to the industrial hub of Haldia, its people have remained divorced from any spill-over benefits of industrialisation. With waterline boundaries on two sides, the Haldi River in the East and Hooghly in the South, the Talpathy Canal in the West dividing the CPI (M) controlled Khejuri block from the BUPC controlled Nandigram and so literally became the frontline between the armed cadres of the CPI (M) and the BUPC. That is the reason why over the 11 months of clash between CPI(M) and BUPC in 2007, the images relayed on television were that of the frequent skirmishes at these two locations—Bhangabera and Tekhali bridges—over the Talpathy canal. Surprisingly the police pickets deployed at these locations never intervened to stop the violence.
the armed BUPC militia blocked all road access to Nandigram. They were helped in large measure by the tactical support given by the presence of one tactical unit of the Peoples Guerilla Army of the Communist Party of India (Maoists).
Between January and November the armed BUPC militia blocked all road access to Nandigram. They were helped in large measure by the tactical support given by the presence of one tactical unit of the People’s Guerilla Army of the Communist Party of India (Maoists). Intelligence officers told this writer that the alleged presence of Ranjit Lal and his team of sabotage specialists and guerilla warfare trainers bolstered the armed cadres of BUPC. Roads were dug up, bridges broken, culverts destroyed and sand-bag fortifications made at critical entry points into the region. A self-styled commander of the BUPC militia, Swadesh Das Adhikari, explained why this was done: “To ensure that the motorcycle gangs of the CPI (M) militia do not enter Nandigram from Khejuri, the roads were dug up. The blockades were put up because the police were moving with the CPI (M) cadres and were helping them to get in. There was no other reason. This was done for self preservation.”
The Central Forces deployed in Nandigram confirm that though there is as yet no conclusive proof of Maoist presence in Nandigram, there is enough indicative evidence to show that Maoist tactical groups might have infiltrated into the region to organise logistics, tactics and training of the armed cadres of the anti-land acquisition group, BUPC. “What strategy the Maoists had in this area or whether they were not in this area, whether they just imparted training to some people in the area, this matter has to be looked into in detail. But the recovery of mines, Maoist literature, training manuals in Telegu language and other arms and ammunition definitely indicate their presence in the region,” said Alok Raj, DIG, CRPF. “There must have been some tactical-strategic support. It cannot be ruled out. But it needs further investigation for conclusive proof. But the trends show an indication, specially with the seizure of some literature,and some land mines the seizure of some landmines,” he added.
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The CRPF personnel are experienced in counter insurgency operations against the Maoists guerrillas. And they know that when in the line of fire the Maoists are known to fight back. But when CPI (M)’s armed militia launched Operation Nandigram on November 6, 2007, it hardly faced any resistance as it broke the siege of Nandigram by the Bhumi Ucched Pratirodh Committee, an organisation representing the anti-land acquisition protestors. “Had there been a very strong armed squad of Maoists in this area they would have definitely retaliated whatever attack that was taking place,” said DIG, CRPF, Alok Raj. With the CRPF discovery graves of unknown and unclaimed bodies, the last word on the Nandigram conflict is yet to be spoken and cast in stone. The West Bengal government has ordered the state CID to carry out DNA analysis to identify the persons whose charred bones and portions of skull were exhumed from five crudely-dug graves near Nandigram. Are these graves of CPI (M) supporters? Or are they Trinamul Congress activists? In Nandigram there are many unanswered questions. No wonder the Central Forces sees its role as a semi-counter insurgency operation or semi-CI Ops. “It’s definitely a semi-CI Ops situation along with inputs of law and order handling also,” said DIG Raj.
Lakshman Seth, MP, Haldia and Chairman of Haldia Development Authority is categorical: “I put a question to you. Recapturing is illegal, but capturing is legal? My house will be captured, but I will not be allowed recapture my house?
So what were the ingredients of CPI (M)’s Operation Nandigram plan? With revelations made by witnesses and victims of the violence, CPI (M) insiders, BUPC political leaders and armed cadres and intelligence officials, the author has pieced together an account of what happened in Nandigram between November 6 and 10, 2007. By November 5, police pickets at Takapara, Kamalpur, Ranichawk, Bhangabera, Tekhali deployed to keep the warring factions of CPI (M) and BUPC at bay were withdrawn. Even the strategically located police camp at Gokulnagar was wound up. This is where instances of large scale violence and rape were reported as CPI (M) armed cadres over-ran BUPC positions in Nandigram. “The CPI(M) brought in criminals in large numbers and when the police camp was removed we knew that a massacre is being planned,” said Bhabani Prasad Das, BUPC Leader. CPI(M) gunmen began firing as they entered Satengabadi between 10.00am and 10.30am on November 6th. They advanced through Gokulnagar and Maheshpur and reached Nandigram town by 9th evening. “The CPI (M) started firing and entered through Satengabadi and people fled in panic,” said Das.
Another group of CPI (M) armed militia moved in from Bahargunj on the evening of November 8th. They moved through Ranichowk, Amdabad, Takapara and reached Nandigram town by November 11th morning. “The CPI(M) attack began at 10.00am from their stronghold of Khejuri. They opened two fronts. One along the Tekhali-Takapara axis and the other through Satengabadi-Maheshpur axis,” said Bhabani Prasad Das, BUPC Leader. The third front was opened by the CPI (M) mercenaries on November 9th morning at Bhangabera. They moved through Sonachura, Adhikaripara, Garhchakraberia and reached Nandigram town by 11th morning. Swadesh Das Adhikari, one of the self-styled commanders of the BUPC’s armed militia described how BUPC’s armed resistance was overpowered by the CPI(M) militia: “The assault began from Satengabadi. They gathered criminals in Khejuri. They fired heavily. This forced us to retreat. They came till Tekhali. The CPI (M) fighters again started firing on 8th at Gokulnagar and they chased us till Maheshpur. Whatever we could we did. Whatever weapons we had we used. But we did not have enough to put up resistance.”
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BUPC’s version of why its armed resistance failed is confirmed by CPI (M). “I think they failed to fight because they ran short of ammunition. If they had weapons they could have continued fighting with us,” said Ashok Bera, CPM Zonal Committee. Swadesh Das showed this author a bullet fired at him allegedly by men in police uniform ostensibly giving covering fire to the CPI (M) militia. BUPC leaders allege the CPI (M) was wary of involving the police after the March 14th police action to re-establish the government’s control over Nandigram in which 14 people died. That is why instead of using the police to break the BUPC siege of Nandigram, the CPI (M) pressed its armed cadres as an extra-constitutional force to do what a statutory law enforcement agency should have done. “Police did not want to repeat the March 14th incident and that is why the police with the tacit support of the state government used the cadres to recapture Nandigram,” said Bhabani Prasad Das, BUPC leader.
It is, of course, not clear yet why the law enforcement agencies in West Bengal allowed the BUPC to arm itself and enabled rudimentary training of its cadres by a tactical group of Maoists.
Out-gunned and outnumbered, a huge rally of BUPC supporters decided to confront the advancing CPI (M) militia on 10th November. “As we started from Sonachura and reached Maheshpur they started firing. Since the harvesting of paddy had not happened, the CPI (M) militia came through the paddy field and attacked from three directions. They fired blindly. Many women were raped. I saw them, they took 16 bodies in four vans.”
I have concrete information that they molested hundreds of women,” said Swadesh Das Adhikari, BUPC armed leader. The author met many women who claimed that they were victims of the violence unleashed by the CPI (M) cadres. “They put a gun on my head and pushed me into the house. They physically abused me. I have left my two children behind. If I don’t go back, even they will be abused,” said one such victim.
Sheikh Akram Lilpur was in the BUPC rally on Nov 10th when it was attacked by the CPI (M) militia. “They were wearing a black dress and their faces were covered. I was in the procession and they started firing,” he said. Asit Pradhan who was also participating in the BUPC rally says the CPI (M) gunmen rounded up those who could not run away and took them away to the adjacent Khejuri block. “They asked us to surrender and took us away in a group to Khejuri. I was beaten up. My knees were hit. My hand was broken,” he said. Ashok Bera, who heads CPI (M)’s zonal committee in Nandigram dismisses such overwhelming evidence of violence unleashed by its mercenaries. “We liberated Nandigram without shedding any blood. And we are proud of that,” said Bera. But, though Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya recently said he was sorry for what happened in Nandigram, his party colleagues are not willing to relent. Lakshman Seth, MP, Haldia and Chairman of Haldia Development Authority is categorical: “I put a question to you. Recapturing is illegal, but capturing is legal? My house will be captured, but I will not be allowed recapture my house?
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It is now established with a fair representation of voices from both parties to the conflict that BUPC’s failure to put up an effective resistance could be because its armed cadres ran out of ammunition. If one strings together the considered views of the Central Forces and intelligence agencies, one can safely come to the conclusion that while the Indian Maoists did provide tactical support to the BUPC armed cadres like sourcing arms and ammunition from illegal country-made arms manufacturers in Munger (Bihar) and from suppliers in the Topsia/Tiljala areas of Kolkata city, there were no armed Maoist action groups inside Nandigram. Had that been the case, the nature of the conflict would have been vastly different.
“Ultimately the Maoists also joined the BUPC campaign. They trained some people how to fight back,” said Lakshman Seth, MP, Haldia and Chairman of Haldia Development Authority. “There is no Maoist here. And if they were here then why would they leave their weapons behind. CPM is planting it and then showing it as Maoist weapons,” said Bhabani Prasad Das, BUPC leader. “If we had so much weapons and Maoist support then there would have been so many casualties and so many policemen would have also been killed,” he added. “If Maoists had imparted training there would have been a militia that would have resisted the assault and defeated it. They would have preferred to die in the battlefield rather than withdraw,” said Swadesh Das Adhikari, BUPC armed leader. But local level CPI (M) leaders contest the BUPC view. “We believe that there was Maoist presence in the area. In Sonachura we found a house that had a small factory to produce weapons. We have also found some Maoist pamphlets and posters,” said Sheikh Abdul Razak, Sonachura CPI (M) Local Committee member
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Mahbub Rehman Khan’s family in Garhchakraberia village in Nandigram is proudly showcased by the CPI (M) cadres to discredit allegations of their party’s brutal assault on BUPC supporters. Khan’s father, a staunch supporter of Bhumi Ucched Pratirodh Committee doubled up as a cashier for the anti-land acquisition militia, but escaped to a hideout when the CPI (M) mercenaries stormed Nandigram. “He was a cashier for BUPC. He would collect funds from shops for buying bullets,” he said. It is, of course, not clear yet why the law enforcement agencies in West Bengal allowed the BUPC to arm itself and enabled rudimentary training of its cadres by a tactical group of Maoists led by a senior guerilla leader by the name of Ranjit Lal, whose area of operation is the neighbouring state of Jharkhand. Whatever be the case, the fact is that the CPI (M) is shy of admitting that it considered an armed campaign by its cadres as the best possible way to end BUPC’s sway over Nandigram.
Such was the intensity of the simmering anger within the CPI (M) for having been ousted from its bastion of over three decades that the endgame couldnt have been anything but violent. Scraps of evidence recovered from the conflict zone show extensive preparations on both sides for the armed conflict.
“We are not defensive. CM has said they have been paid back in their own coin. Every action has a reaction. It is the theory of mathematics, physics. It is the theory of dialectical materialism. Every action has a reaction. If you kill me I will kill you,” said Lakshman Seth, MP, Haldia. The 11 months long siege of Nandigram by the armed activist of the BUPC became intolerable both for the restive CPI(M) cadres and as well as the party’s leadership. Several members of the armed militia from both sides of political divide lost their lives in the conflict. But what impelled the CPI(M) leadership to launch operation Nandigram? “There was tremendous pressure on our supporters and cadres to join the BUPC movement. Some of our local cadres did indeed join the movement…When the government failed to intervene we took the matters in our hand. It was a tit for tat method of solving the problem,” said Mohammad Yasin, CPI (M) Zonal Committee, Nandigram.
The broken and burnt house of Mohammad Yasin is the reason for his anger against the Bhumi Uchched Pratirodh Committee. His house was ransacked and destroyed by armed BUPC militia a week before CPI (M)’s armed attack on Nandigram. In fact, between January and November, 153 houses of CPI (M) party members were looted, vandalized, broken, or set on fire, by the BUPC activists. All of them could only return to sift through the remnants of their house, like Prashanto and Radharani, after the CPI (M) recaptured Nandigram. “They came with lathis and started breaking everything. We were so scared,” they said. Clearly, one of the reasons that the CPI (M) gives for the armed action is to enable hundreds of their cadres evicted by BUPC to return home.
Samerun Bibi and her husband Sheikh Abdul Razak, both local CPI (M) leaders, paid a heavy price. Their house was one of the first ones to be targetted by the anti-land acquisition protestors after the West Bengal government decided in December 2006 to set up a Petrochemical and Petroleum Investment Region (PCPIR), in Nandigram. On January 3, 2007 Samerun Bibi, who also happens to be the Panchayat Pradhan of Kalicharanpur in Nandigram called a meeting at the Gram Panchayat office. She wanted the Panchayat to discuss the arrangements to receive a scheduled visit of a central team to evaluate Nandigram’s excellent record in sanitation. A mob of anti-land acquisition protestors gathered at the Panchayat office, fueled by rumours that the Panchayat meeting will approve the proposed land acquisition in Nandigram. Kalicharanpur, unwittingly became the epicenter of the Nandigram conflict when on Januuary 3rd a group of protestors attacked the Gram Panchayat office. “The Trinamul Congress gave false information to the villagers, that their land will be taken away without any compensation, and that they will become poorer. By spreading such untruths they successfully won over the CPI (M) party’s supporters in Nandigram,” said Sheikh Abdul Razak, Sonachura CPI (M) Local Committee member. His wife, Samerun Bibi, said she feels “like crying whenever I look at my house. We have no place to stay and we are currently staying with our relatives.”
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Kalipada Mondal and his family were amongst the 3,000 CPI (M) party members who were driven out of their homes by the BUPC activists. Their houses were ransacked and burnt down by BUPC arsonists, cupboards and boxes were dragged out of the houses and set on fire. “There were 15 camps housing 3,000 people. Nandigram was liberated on the morning of 11th November and we entered in the evening,” said Kalipada Mondal, Sonachura Local Committee Member. All the CPI(M) members and local leaders who lived as refugees for 11 months, between January and November, after BUPC seized control of Nandigram were told three days before the CPI (M) mercenaries launched the attack on Nandigram on November 6 that the party is making arrangements for their homecoming. “All of us who had run away from our homes were told to assemble in Khejuri on November 6th. We were told that we would be returning home on November 10th… First the party gunmen entered and then we entered behind them… We, a couple of kilometers behind… I could hear the firing but we could not see anything,” said Prashanto Sit, CPI (M) Panchayat Committee member.
The fact is that these developments widen the political divide and deepen the conflict. Not surprisingly, therefore, the political conflict between CPI (M) and the Trinamul Congress over territorial assertion of political power in Nandigram is not over yet.
Such was the intensity of the simmering anger within the CPI (M) for having been ousted from its bastion of over three decades that the endgame couldn’t have been anything but violent. Scraps of evidence recovered from the conflict zone show extensive preparations on both sides for the armed conflict. There is conclusive evidence to show that ammunition was bought from the Ammunition Factory, Khadki, in Pune. Both CPI (M) and BUPC brought in gunmen from outside Nandigram. CPI (M) leaders made candid revelations to the author that the party was worried about Trinamul Congress’s likely triumph in the impending Panchayat Elections in Nandigram and surrounding areas if BUPC’s consolidated its 11 month-long siege and control over Nandigram. “They wanted to use Nandigram as an example to take over power in West Bengal. They wanted to take over the Panchayat Samiti in Nandigram, and then take over MLA and MP constituency,” said Ashok Bera, CPI(M) Zonal Committee. A view affirmed by CPI (M)’s strongman from Haldia, Lakshman Seth: “Political game plan to capture our ground. Our political field. Their intention is to oust our CPI(M) party from Nandigram. If this model had succeeded they could have used this model elsewhere.”
The implications of using extra-constitutional and political party sponsored armed militias to settle political conflicts has serious internal security implications. Whether it’s the armed militias of the Hindu Right or newly formed Tribal and Dalit militant outfits in Assam and Maharashtra, backed by political parties, the fact is that these developments widen the political divide and deepen the conflict. Not surprisingly, therefore, the political conflict between CPI (M) and the Trinamul Congress over territorial assertion of political power in Nandigram is not over yet. “Our cadres were not afraid. On November 10th we recaptured Nandigram it was day of festivity and celebration,” said Ashok Bera, CPM Zonal Committee. But fear still stalks in Nandigram. When CPI (M) cadres went on the rampage all the policemen deployed at Nandigram were holed up in the town’s police station. Now when the CPI (M) is expecting retaliatory attack from the Bhumi Uchched activists they expect the police to be vigilant and to counter it.
So the wheel has come a full circle in Nandigram. All the CPI (M) village party offices were demolished in Nandigram by BUPC between January and November. When the CPI (M) recaptured Nandigram they literally paid back in the same coin. Houses of BUPC sympathizers were looted and set on fire. “We are TMC supporters. Our house was used for TMC meetings. That is why when CPI (M) recaptured Nandigram our house was targetted,” said Usha Pal, a TMC supporter. On the surface, the conflict in Nandigram appears to be over, but the violent conflict between the CPI (M) and Trinamul Congress is rapidly metamorphosing, unseen and in unknown ways, into a deep and dangerous retaliatory conflict. “The BUPC will retaliate. They will regroup and certainly hit back,” said Ashok Bera, CPM Zonal Committee. “Yes they have a plan. But I hope people will have the last word. They have understood the consequences of terrorism,” agreed Lakshman Seth. The CRPF presence is keeping the simmering conflict from exploding. “There might be some incidents of clashes…our sons, mothers and fathers have been tortured by them and how can anyone forget it,” said Bera. On the other hand Swadesh Das Adhikari, BUPC armed leader said, “Our movement will continue. The CPI (M) cannot kill this movement by force. The people are with us. In fact, let me tell you we are going to strengthen and intensify our movement.”
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The move by the Left Front government in West Bengal to acquire land in Nandigram without informing and consulting the villagers or even putting a full-scale rehabilitation plan in place backfired. It sparked a rebellion that was manipulated and politicised both by the CPI (M) and the Trinamul Congress. So in the final analysis, the conflict in Nandigram is not really about industrialisation but simply a primitive war for control of political territory, which has serious internal security implications not only for the state but for the entire country. The party in power is expected to be non-partisan in governance and in dealing with internal security situation. If it takes sides, it only gives impetus to the cycle of violence. Political parties which promote armed cadres, in effect, strike at the very roots of democracy. The resultant lack of governance and consequent instability is an invitation to inimical external powers to fish in troubled waters.
What we are essentially witnessing in the underdeveloped part of India (Singur, Nandigram, Orissa) is a clash between agricultural wave and industrial wave which has to be astutely managed. Failure to do so will be an invitation to armed clash between anti-industrialisation and pro-industrialisation forces leading to internecine wars and long drawn insurgencies. As it is, the proliferation of small arms in rural India is a matter of acute concern. When insurgencies grow, they invariably seek linkages with other insurgent and terrorist outfits. The linkages between the Maoists and the BUPC, Maoists and ULFA, and Maoists and LTTE, vindicates it.
In the case of Nandigram, the affected population were largely muslims. It had Islamic fundamentalism angle as well. No sooner Nandigram was recaptured by the CPI (M) carders, there was sudden and shrill clamour by some Islamic organisations to oust Taslima Nasrin from Kolkata. The secular CPI (M) state government caved in. The central government was confused and defensive, and Indian secularists still appear confounded and cornered. The state government may have won the battle, but the credibility of Indian democracy and secularism has taken much beating.
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