Indian Defence Review

With all the churning and regurgitation on the national security canvas, as it gets closer and closer to every citizen in today’s world, how do we develop our national security awareness and its content and how do we contribute to a sturdy, bold, innovative development of our nation? How much of our past, our psyche, our culture, our inherited mental attitude are effectively helping us to forge, develop, hone and strengthen our nation and ourselves to assert our right and place in the international sun? How are we going to secure that development so hardily forged? Today’s national security development has delivered twin soldiers – a professional soldier and a civilian citizen soldier. How do they operate, co-operate or contribute?

Machines, communication, quick movement, increasing trade and commerce, interstate adjustments and dependence as also fast progressing world affairs have created strong pulls and competition among nations. Nationalism, national interest, national security and national progress have brought national assertion up front. That necessitates national strength, national power, the national will to assert, to compete with the rest of the nations and powers. This is not mere physical, mental or moral strength, but an amalgam of all these including, in the main, economic strength, diplomatic strength, techno-industrial strength, social strength and armed strength. All these are interdependent and mutual promoters. What is armed strength without economic strength, or diplomatic strength without armed strength, what can armed strength do without social strength; without technological strength? It is an intricate circle.

Armed strength is the last resort of the use of force and destruction or in collusion with other strengths when the situation so demands. Over millennia, it has virtually become the main force – not only in its actual use, but even in the very threat of its use. Two instances – we destroyed military facilities in Karachi through a naval attack in the 1971 war. Pakistan brought in China through seeking its help in developing the port of Gwadar and building a road from Sinkiang to Gwadar through its territory. In a future Indo-Pak confrontation, China’s entry has to be catered for. Second, Pakistan’s conventional military weakness in waging war with India has been mitigated by the former’s threat to unleash atomic weapons.

A brief review of our military past will be useful. Military force and its use are not merely one’s bravery, spirit, sacrifice, patriotism – all of them abstract and psychological factors – but very pertinently closely related to the thorough study and formulation of principles, theories, methodology, innovation and vision, technology and creative thinking on the use of force. This aspect has been noticeably missing in our civilizational philosophy on military matters.

The earliest thinker of note and content was Chanakya (300 BC), a wise, if also ruthlessly pragmatic, champion of Koota yuddha; followed by Manu (first century BC), Kamandaka (fourth century AD), with in between, Patanjali indicating the foreigner’s threat, and Panchatantra going on the premise of war being inevitable, then Kalidasa’s Raghuvamsha highlighting (Gupta contemporary) cavalry and its mobile warfare versus entrenched strategic defence, and then Bana’s Harshacharita indicating the use of various organisations and weapons in the seventh century AD. Shukra’s Neetisara of the ninth century AD deals with the art of fighting a battle with a three to one superiority (relevant even today) keeping reserves, and offering holding attack frontally and sending main forces on the enemy’s wings. He also refreshingly expounds the tactic of retreating to draw the enemy in unfavourable terrain and launching a counterattack. Kalyana Chalukya Someshwar’s Manasollasa almost follows the Chanakyan line – 12th century AD.

That brings Indian war thinking and cogitation on defence to an end. Enter Abdul Sarhindi of Delhi Sultanate – 12th century AD, Taimur’s record of 1405 AD, Babarnamah of early 15th century AD, the Akbarnamah of 16th century and the Jahangirnamah of 17th century AD. The last of the flashes is that of the strategy and tactic of Shivaji and Bajirao Peshwa of the 17th and 18th centuries which witnessed a brainy mix of static defence (forts) and mobile aggression (cavalry). Bajirao’s cavalry campaign that took his horse to water on the Indus near Attok and his Palkhed campaign against the Nizam find mention in the annals of the study of wars of the world. But we remember Bajirao only in the company of Mastani! That is our mental inclination.

In short, the indigenous cogitation on war and soldiering came to an end in the tenth century AD and India handed over her security to successive Afghan, Iranian, Turkish, Moghul and British conquerors. Most of these conquerors right down to the Moghuls, fell prey to the charms of Indian indifference to matters of defence, to the grandeur of vast number and to the mental sluggishness caused by the ease and plentitude of the continental soil and climate. In fact, the ‘Moghulai Fauz’ became so slow moving as to cover five miles a day, something close to the sluggishness of Someshwara’s army in his Manasollasa. The Indian brawn and bravery remained alive, but the brain and enquiry fell off. The British grabbed the brawn and gave it their brain and leadership, to shape a formidable military power in their hands to subjugate the very Indian subcontinent and rule it for two centuries and also to assert their primacy in the two World Wars with its help.

What do we extract from the review of our past that is of military significance?

•  We lost out to every foreign conqueror and in our attempt to socialise with them and save our identity, we managed to absorb them in our religion and society, from Shakas, Parthians, Huns, and Kushans. Muslim and Christian invaders refused to be absorbed and there rose the present Indian socio-political problem, that, in my opinion, is affecting the nation’s security. The repeated characteristic of ours – unity in diversity has worked perhaps culturally, but far less effectively politically.

•  We have uniquely struggled to survive – we have bent over backwards to accommodate every invader and survived the storm. Like grass not being uprooted by even an earthquake or a tsunami; but also never growing tall. A desperate strategy of survival, hesitation to fight hard or to go for the kill, as a Pakistani author characterizes us. (So says Hasan Jawed in Husain Haqqani’s book- ‘Pakistan Between Mosque and Military’.)

•  We fought among our own kingdoms and leaders, but buckled in front of the foreigner, for we fell short of new ideas, did not extend our vision beyond our geographical confines, neglected military cogitation, aggressive spirit and assertive resolve. An observation on our national security vision is relevant here. The British, in order to secure India, the jewel in their crown, extended their hold on Afghanistan, Iran, Tibet, Burma, Sri Lanka, Aden, Kenya, Malaysia and Indonesia. We lost not only all of them but also Pakistan and Bangladesh.

•  And what about the birth of Pakistan? Through the 1920s, the British had sniffed the Indian urge for independence and in the 1930s, had almost come to acknowledge the near possibility of their having to depart from India. The astute strategic visionaries that they were, they had their eye on the Central Asian Kingdoms – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan, which were and still are, rich in natural resources, in addition to the Russian threat through them to Western India for an opening to the Arabian Sea. They were determined to retain control of Western India – the Indus sector – through any power that would replace them when they finally left India. For sure, they were convinced that the Congress-led government would not allow them this access. They then lent full support to Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan and Wavell, the Viceroy even partitioned India into two sectors. Through Pakistan in the West they could retain their influence in Central Asian lands. The Indian leadership had no such geopolitical awareness, leave aside vision! Looking beyond our cosy confines has never been our vision in matters of national security. Today, for a far delayed change, we are desperately trying to get access to Central Asian region through Iranian port of Chabahar and road-rail to Zahedan, bypassing Pakistan’s China-built Gwadar port. China has replaced Russia and has come South to the Arabian Sea and we are now attempting to go up North to Central Asia through the Arabian Sea.

We have developed a few of our typical Indian characteristics vis-à-vis our national security.

•  Socio-politically we have a cultural division among our polity –viz. Heartlanders and Peripherals. Heartlanders form UP, Bihar, MP, Bengal – the Ganges-Yamuna belt. Psychologically, spiritually, identity-wise, religiously, philosophically it virtually rules the entire nation. The Ganges is our ‘be all’. Even Sri Lanka is mesmerised by Ganges. Their main river is Mahaveli Ganga. Peripherals are of several genre:

• Territorially – Jammu and Kashmir, the North Eastern states, all those seven sisters, a time was when even Punjab and Tamil Nadu were on the brink.
• Socially – Dalits, SC-ST, BCs and Naxalites
• Religion-wise – Minority Communities – Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and animists.
• Anthropologically – Tribals of all hue
• Gender-wise – Women
• Linguistically – Dravidian and North Eastern animist linguists.

Almost all our internal security problems relate to these peripherals, neglected by the heartlanders and allow our enemies to exploit those.

Click to Buy: IDR Jan-Mar 2017

•  Second, we have nurtured an elephantine mindset of allowing a problem to solve itself on its own, or by somebody, sometime, somehow. Problems drag on for years and decades. The AFSPA, that draconian law has been in force in the North East for nearly 60 years and in Jammu and Kashmir for thirty years.

•  We have a sentimental affinity for dead soldiers and honouring them, but hardly any concern for living soldiers’ combat readiness in terms of their modern weapons, equipment and infrastructural facilities to fight opponents, especially on the Northern and Eastern borders.

•  Our education system and public awareness and communication system, pay insignificant attention to the science and art of matters, military and the use of force. One can realise it when we consider that we, a nation of 110 crore population 40 per cent of it of young people, 12 lakh army and with a nuclear arsenal have permitted our opponent who is less than a tenth of our strength, to inflict a thousand cuts on us and bleed us, an indicator of our inability to use force effectively to ensure our national security.

What about the present state? Our lack of national security vision, lack of know-how in using force, obsessive clinging to the obsolete Nehruvian ideology of neutrality and appeasement to the Gandhian ahimsaic dispensation and to the unreliability of belief in our civilisational spiritual high pedestal in the ruthlessly competitive world forum, have come to surface in the last half century, post-1962 debacle. It is a ruthless world, surging rapidly ahead, unmindful of our past glory. Presently, military strength and determination to use it have been gaining relevance and urgency. Old ideologies have not been able to keep abreast in today’s human race. Time, technology, interactive needs have changed the pace and texture of survival.

Large scale open wars have no place in the present day world. Economic wars, indirect wars of the flea, wars of insurgency, proxy wars and the like are the order of the day, under the umbrella of a hanging nuclear sword. That is what Pakistan in collusion with China is doing against us. China apart, Pakistan draws upon the USA, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic powers for proxy war. It is using terrorists, religious fanatics, motivated technologists and fundamentalists from even other sympathetic countries, without having to use its own regular army troopers. Fundamentalism and fanaticism of the extreme have resulted in self-sacrificing, death-squads who are ready to die while eliminating others.

Our religious, social and ethnic diversities have been of help to the opponents. Their infiltrators find shelter among our diverse populace. Diversity in this instance includes drug traffickers and smugglers. These mini wars or proxy wars, low level wars have indeed become the people’s war. Without at least some of our people’s sympathy, if not help under various circumstances, proxy wars are difficult to be waged successfully. Our mental mode and ability to reciprocate are far more circumscribed and far less determined. Do we have that kind of ruthless intent and commitment? I don’t know, I am doubtful. Just to lend verbal support to Baloch people’s struggle against the Pakistani government, it took us nearly seven decades, whereas Pakistani efforts have reached the heart of our country and other parts, several decades earlier since Independence.

Our softness is another boost for our opponent’s proxy wars. See the Kandahar highjack of our aircraft and Azher’s release who is now back like a thorn in our flesh with a vengeance. To save the 150-odd rich passengers, we let our country’s credibility go down the drain. See our quiet stand-down of a six month military buildup after the attack on our Parliament. See the virtual unconditional release of 93,000 POWs after the 1971 War. See the slow attritional push back of Kargil infiltration, without any other Pak – hurting action elsewhere that could have expedited Pak vacation in that sector. See Nehru’s reference of the Jammu and Kashmir War in 1947-‘48 to the Security Council even when the situation was in favour of our military progress. We did nothing of note after Pakistan’s adventure in Gurdaspur or Pathankot.

For the first time post-Independence, a bold enough counter step in retaliation has taken place in POK across the LOC. A surgical strike is not the right description, for it has been a small effort at striking precisely at some enemy targets chosen deliberately to create a wider and strong enough impression. Surgical strikes involve deeper targets, bigger damage and greater impact, but yet short of leading to war or wielding profound influence on an ongoing covert war. (Witness Israeli raids on Entebbe and Iraqi atomic station.) Nevertheless a strong riposte, with wide publicity to create a suitable impact on the enemy and perhaps on our own people too has been delivered, to impress the comity of nations. Something like politicisation of the strike has led to the revelation that such strikes took place during other party regimes also. But what did all those strikes achieve is the question. Did they deter Pakistani action? Or change its method of operation? If not, then it is just bashing each other regardless and has little meaning. Such a strike or a clutch of strikes, should produce some tangible result or else it will remain only self congratulatory.

The 28/29 September strike on some seven selected Pakistani terrorist camps was reportedly well planned, crisply executed after careful planning and coordinated. This time over it has been publicised widely, even internationally, to produce the desired effect – that of highlighting Pakistan’s perfidy, convincing the international community of this perfidy and cautioning the world of the danger of Indo-Pak conflict escalating to high flood-mark, which in itself will dangerously disturb international peace and prosperity. All major powers have high economic stakes in both the countries.

India has the power but is unsure of using it or reluctant to use it as it has not developed a reliable and strong enough international clout in its assured support these seventy years. Pakistan lacks that kind of power but has developed clout and support that emboldens it to use it aggressively in order to successfully compete with India as an equal. India’s socio-political problem of its peripherals, its diversity, its weak and restrictive strategic vision and its cultural reluctance to go for the kill have helped Pakistan to weave its strategy around India’s foibles and the Islamic principle of using terror as a strategic weapon (See Pakistani Brigadier Malik’s Quranic Concept of War, a book with President Zia-Ul-Haq’s foreword).

The strike was a short, crisp, cross border penetration of a couple of kilometres only like any other previous local ingress. But this time it was spread wide covering seven target areas, with specific stated aim of deterring further Pakistani mischief and not popularly bandied public exercise converted by the TRP-hungry media into a super Pakistan basher, as a revenge, as a self congratulating celebration. It became a two-day celebratory media bonanza over a four-hour armed action of a two-kilometre deep raid into enemy territory.

The million dollar question over the raid is, has it made any difference to the enemy camp? The same question needs to be asked of the rush of other previous governments who claim such earlier strikes. If so many strikes had been carried out as claimed, what effect did they have on our policy of military deterrence? There has been no let up in clandestine operations by Pakistan. One reason is the liberal availability of terrorists in Pakistan, fundamentalists and fanatics who are ready to sacrifice themselves and who need just the help of Pakistani regulars for training, arming and sustenance. This strike doesn’t seem to have hurt the Pakistani army to any notable degree, except the normal opprobrium of their being surprised and not denying the opportunity to the Indians, that is actually contesting on the spot.

Tit for tat has started in royal earnest i.e. Pakistan’s terrorist raider’s mayhem versus Indian soldier’s surgery. If our raids or strikes have to create the necessary deterrent effect on the Pakistani army, then they have to hurt the Pakistani army, their soldiers, their pride and their sensitive areas. Mere pecking at the periphery won’t do. Remember Pakistani raiders so deep in Mumbai, Parliament in Delhi, Pathankot, Kaluchak and Gurdaspur? Our doing anything close to that is unthinkable for now and, we fear, it will result in open war with the Pakistani atom bomb hanging overhead. But will it be unleashed at all? And when? There lies the future of the recent strike on the LOC, the dangerous game of testing Pakistani resolve and our innovativeness and determination to execute it.

People and the government going gaga in competition with the TRP-hungry media over the present baby step taken by the government only feed our self-praise and inflates our ego. Earlier, I mentioned our mental softness in dealing with dangerous crises. Add to this softness the travails and hardship of the border brethren who have to vacate their home and hearth, their fields and crops every time a border crisis erupts. How do we deal with them? Ensure their security and peaceful life?

With all the churning and regurgitation on the national security canvas, as it gets closer and closer to every citizen in today’s world, how do we develop our national security awareness and its content and how do we contribute to a sturdy, bold, innovative development of our nation? How much of our past, our psyche, our culture, our inherited mental attitude are effectively helping us to forge, develop, hone and strengthen our nation and ourselves to assert our right and place in the international sun? How are we going to secure that development so hardily forged? Today’s national security development has delivered twin soldiers – a professional soldier and a civilian citizen soldier. How do they operate, co-operate or contribute?

This strike is only a retaliatory step. What part it plays in deterring Pakistan from trying to keep up or escalate the intensity of confrontation, is yet to be seen. Equanimity and wisdom lie in curbing our over-enthusiastic celebratory mode and lending united support to the need of coping with the enemy’s inimical activities. We have a long way to travel in developing our national security fabric.