Indian Defence Review

Post 9/11, homeland security got fast tracked in the US and it is generally believed that the mainland has not suffered any terrorist incident since then aside from the Boston bombings of 2013 and periodic ‘lone wolf’ attacks. Most countries have come to realise that homeland security has a much wider canvas than protection from acts of violence. Within India, the fabric of homeland security apparently comprises a host of dots that are yet to be fully connected; integration of the security sector, intelligence, surveillance, national net-centricity et al. Homeland security involves pro-active policies and implementation in terms of analysis, reorganisation, diplomacy, intelligence gathering, building and synergising the security sector, or whatever it takes to proactively defend the homeland. It goes far beyond civil defence.

To say that India has seen internal turmoil since just a decade after Independence would be an understatement. As insurgency brewed in the North East, the Indian Parliament was forced to debate and enact the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in 1958. Sowing of Communism in West Bengal (initially by the Soviets) and surrounding areas began another movement that took to arms – Naxalism or Left Wing Extremism (LWE) simultaneous to China engineering Maoists movements in Nepal and Myanmar along with similar movements such as the New People’s Army in Philippines, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Japanese Red Army, and Shining Path in Peru.

Pakistan, which had tasted the power of irregular forces through the Taliban experience in Afghanistan, was waiting in the wings. By a quirk of fate, Pakistan got its chance in 1987, when the Jammu and Kashmir elections were fudged kick-starting the insurgency. It is also on record that Zhou-en-Lai had suggested to Ayub Khan in early 1960s that instead of short term wars, Pakistan should prepare for a prolonged conflict with India by raising a militia force to act behind enemy (Indian) lines.

According to a former Intelligence Bureau (IB) official in 1992-1993, “the process of ‘transplanting armed modules’ in the heartland of India had started taking cognizable shape. Some of these cells were identified in Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Kota/Ajmer region of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala. SIMI had already started deputing ‘volunteers’ to Pakistan for training along with the mujahedeen, Taliban and Al Qaeda cadres. They established firm linkages with Islamic Chhatra Shibir, Al Qaeda-affiliated HUJI, Al Badr, Al Jihad and other organisations in Bangladesh. They were trained in facilities located inside Bangladesh and under the very noses of DGFI and BDR.”

Much water has flowed under the bridge since then. India has been subjected to cross-border terrorism for over two decades now. The episode of the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814, bombings of trains in many parts of India, attack on the Parliament and other religious places as well as a major terrorist strike, the infamous 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack have taken place. China and Pakistan are both exploiting the asymmetric battlefield that we have provided to them on a platter. Paresh Barua and other ULFA hierarchy have been traced to Ruli in China.

LWE has become the biggest challenge to internal security, striking at will and causing random mayhem. Government policies over the past decade were more of status quo, content with giving periodic intelligence and additional forces to the affected States. LWE continued to be viewed as a state-level ‘Law and Order’ problem despite deployment of an Army Division in 1967 to crush armed rebellion. With the new government in place, indications of a holistic cogent response appear bright with the NSA outlining a focused response against the LWE and the Home Minister directing the IB to infiltrate LWE organisations.

Decades of Apathy

Government apathy in dealing with insurgencies and terrorism, particularly the LWE is characterised by the following features: one, failure to recognise this insurgency through transnational dynamics has assumed strategic proportions; two, failure to recognise that irregular and unconventional warfare has emerged with greater strategic value over the conventional in the era of decreasing wars and this is what China and Pakistan are applying to us; three, despite the PM labeling the LWE as the biggest threat over successive years, dealing with it has been left to state level administration except for measures like dishing out Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) units, IAF helicopter and UAV support and routine intelligence inputs.

Four, failure to recognise the politico-social-economic nature of the problem and drawing up immediate, mid-term and long-term strategies holistically to counter the insurgency; five, failure to establish efficient intelligence system with real time dissemination; six, failure to cut off external support to insurgents – money, arms, ammunition and warlike stores; seven, failure to energise the Security Sector beyond raising more and more CAPF units and eight, failure to improve governance and ensure benefits of poverty alleviation schemes reach intended beneficiaries, amongst many other factors. As far as terror attacks go, an extremely disturbing fact has been the politician nexus with terrorist organisations and insurgents. Former R&AW officials have also scripted the fact that politicians who had used havala for black money were under ISI blackmail, and people in authority were going slow on terror cases on that count.

Homeland Security

Post 9/11, homeland security got fast tracked in the US and it is generally believed that the mainland has not suffered any terrorist incident since then aside from the Boston bombings of 2013 and periodic ‘lone wolf’ attacks. Most countries have come to realise that homeland security has a much wider canvas than protection from acts of violence. Within India, the fabric of homeland security apparently comprises a host of dots that are yet to be fully connected; integration of the security sector, intelligence, surveillance, national net-centricity et al. Homeland security involves pro-active policies and implementation in terms of analysis, reorganisation, diplomacy, intelligence gathering, building and synergising the security sector, or whatever it takes to proactively defend the homeland. It goes far beyond civil defence.

The buzzword is preemptive mitigation of threat by actually preventing an attack/incident in the first place. It is important to distinguish homeland security from related terms such as national security, anti-terrorism, disaster preparedness, hazard management, emergency services, crime prevention, strategic coordination, threat mitigation and risk assessment. Homeland security consists of all these things and more. It is a broad concept relevant to safety and security to be sure but at its heart, the concept must include the idea of balancing security and citizen liberty.

Security Sector

The role of the Security Sector should be to provide an atmosphere for the total citizenry to enjoy full benefits of a safe, secure and resilient nation state, ensuring national security, rule of law and social, political and economic prosperity in the process. Militaries alone cannot cope with new threats to internal security because of their transnational nature. Therefore, the ability to conduct integrated operations with other components of Security Sector is necessary. The Security Sector should comprise the armed forces, Para Military Forces (PMF), Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), police, Coast Guard, intelligence agencies, private security services, government ministries of Defence, Home, Law and Justice, Human Resources, immigration services and even the citizenry, if the latter are being used as HUMINT under the ‘billion eyes on the ground’ concept, plus if their possible contribution in de-radicalisation programs is to be optimised.

Former Army Chief, General VP Malik says, “My long involvement with counter-terrorism in the North East, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir makes me believe that civil society usually contributes more to the cause of preventing and countering terrorism than encouraging terrorism. Wherever active, it generates awareness and provides a constructive outlet for the redress of grievances. It gives voice to the marginalised and vulnerable people, including victims of terrorism, and plays a critical role in ensuring that counter-terrorism measures respect human rights and the rule of law”. In addition, non-traditional actors such as NGOs, foundations, charities, Public-Private Partnerships and private businesses are capable and credible partners in local communities for de-radicalisation.

Technology

Rapid advances in technology must be continuously optimised and integrated into the Homeland Security infrastructure to incrementally upgrade security levels. Aside from facilitating national net-centricity, technology can effectively counter intrusion while solutions include surveillance and radio frequency identification. By 2018, India’s Homeland Security market is expected to be worth $16 billion and growing annually at 35 per cent against the global average of seven per cent. India’s share in global expenditure in the sector is also expected to rise to six per cent by 2020 from 3.6 per cent now, of which, government expenditure constitutes about 30 per cent of the spending within the country.

Modernisation

Modernisation efforts of the Security Service have been disjointed and erratic, even in context of force development. Modernisation for response to homeland security threats requires a holistic approach, major nuances of which are given in succeeding paragraphs.

Organisation

The NSA and Home Minister have talked of righting the police-citizen ratio plus providing additional CAPF to the LWE-affected areas. The CAPF and police forces also need to be modernised on priority, as recommended by various studies and commissions. They must be provided modern navigation and surveillance equipment, adequate fire power, mobility, wherewithal to operate by day and night, foolproof communications, anti-mine/IED equipment, survival equipment and rations.

Analyses of past incidents also indicate there is need to reorganise the CRPF units battling LWE on lines of the Assam Rifles/Rashtriya Rifles so that these units are administratively self-contained including medical cover, which in turn provides mental security to the rank and file. There is also a need to provide CRPF units their own officers rather than providing the IPS officers in order to provide better officer-soldier camaraderie which is essential in counter-insurgency environment. Modernisation of CAPF units battling insurgency and terrorists would need to be incrementally upgraded along the lines of infantry modernisation in the Army. CAPF units in CI operations should eventually be equipped with capabilities akin to the Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (Tac C3I) System being developed by the Army, in order to have a fully networked fighting element of the Security Sector.

Command and Control

The NSA has clarified that Article 355 of the Constitution unequivocally affirms that, “it shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.” Therefore, a threat of the magnitude cannot be treated as simply as a ‘Law and Order’ problem. It is logical that the Centre assumes control and has a 24×7 Operations Centre under the MHA. This needs to be connected to state-level Unified Headquarters (UHQ) and gradually further down to District HQ levels through the NATGRID. Other entities of the Security Sector would need to be inter-connected through the NATGRID.

Intelligence

With terrorism being a major threat to Homeland Security, it requires a blend of both foreign and domestic intelligence. Administrative lines of separation and geographical boundaries of agencies if not eliminated through integration result in poor intelligence – a fact that is capitalised on by terrorists. While advance warning of terrorist acts may not always be possible, a hundred per cent effort must go towards the rapid transit of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, with the analytic process being a synthesis or fusion decision support processes based on all source intelligence.

The new government has stated its resolve of going ahead with the National Counter Terrorism Centres (NCTC). The NCTC should have actually come a decade back but had to be shelved for fear by the States of the Centre misusing it. The NCTC again should be linked through the NATGRID to State Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTC) and beyond to District levels. It is obvious that the fighting elements of the Security Sector plus other entities would need to be in the loop, for two-way flow of intelligence including short, medium and long term assessments, on as required basis. It would be prudent to also incorporate an automated Decision Support System (DSS) for obvious operational advantage.

With relation to counter-insurgency operations, bulk of the hard actionable intelligence will come from ground level which quickly needs to be shared with the Security Sector plus affected States in the region. In case of terrorist threats which are trans-national in nature, NATGRID will need to be linked with the Global Intelligence Grid (GIG) to speedily receive inputs and act accordingly.

Geographical Intelligence (GEOINT)

Accuracy and updating of maps by the Survey of India is extremely poor. In April 2012, after careful study of Google Earth satellite imagery, a CRPF task force zoomed in on a couple of structures they identified as a ‘Naxal camp’ in Abujhmad jungle, which straddles the border of Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra. However, when they arrived in the area, the 15 to 20 thatched huts seen for the first time on Google Earth were actually the homes of Muria tribals of a village named Bodiguda discovered for the first time since Independence, the closest civilization being the town of Behramgarh, 29 kilometres away.

The importance of GEOINT in CI/CT operations requires no emphasis considering the information advantage. GEOINT comprises imagery, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial information. Today, UAVs are covering LWE but forces on ground cannot receive the latest intelligence in or near real time. At the apex level, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the central repository for all intelligence inputs pertaining to the three Services including Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). However, we are yet to integrate the aspects of topography with the DIA. Within the existing set-up, adequate resources in terms of remote sensing, ELINT payloads and cartography are not available to produce high quality fused data. Similarly, much more is required at the national level in terms of integration of various government agencies.

While isolated linkages between certain government agencies are already in place, this connectivity has to be extended to all necessary arms of the government over NATGRID for optimal exploitation of various multi-layered data sets. Ideally, a comprehensive GEOINT data set should be able to generate large scale maps, surface models to include natural and man-made structures, walk-through of critical infrastructure/buildings, computer models to predict and manage disasters and many other functions required to support aspects pertaining to national security.

CBRN

A significant report put under wraps was the recovery of a 1.5 kg Uranium mine by the Army in Assam in January 2013. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks have occurred in Japan in 1995 (Sarin Gas attacks on Tokyo Subway) and Anthrax attack in the US in 2001. Terrorists would have no compunctions in conducting CBRN attacks in India, which can be even more lethal if coupled with suicide bombing.

Our National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) has little specialisation to cope with such threats. The manpower for the NDRF is through three year deputation from the CAPF, primarily from the CRPF. Not only is there total lack of specialisation, the equipment for disaster relief in the event of a CBRN strike is little to say the least, both in terms of warning, detection and post-strike assistance. The magnitude of such a terrorist strike requires appreciation of likely target areas, holistic efforts to stymie it including the foreign roots, deployment of resources for detection and post-strike assistance, public education and rehearsals.

Placement of resources, public education and periodic rehearsals incorporating the citizens is an essential part, conveniently avoided in India under the euphuism of not wanting to cause panic, which is an excuse actually to not do anything and blame it on fate once disaster strikes.

Deterrent to State-Sponsored Terrorism

India has failed to establish credible deterrence against state-sponsored terrorism. We must do so using our Special Forces as the core of our asymmetric response, employing them covertly on politic-military missions at the strategic level.

Conclusion

The increased importance of Homeland Security requires little emphasis with the security environment in our neighbourhood likely to deteriorate further as the US/NATO pull out from Afghanistan post-2014 and evidence of Chinese and Pakistani links with terrorist/insurgent outfits operating in India, directly or by proxy, is confirmed. We need to speedily modernise our Security Sector along with periodic reviews of Homeland Security, a roll on the road map and its speedy implementation.