Indian Defence Review

The Middle East has never been a picture of stability, much to the chagrin and worry of the world. The region, however, has had some semblance of order for the last seven to eight decades or so of the 20th century, held together as it was, by authoritarian regimes that despite their failings, managed to keep the region from erupting into outright chaos. The picture changed with the turn of the century and the infamous 9/11.

9/11 started the war on terror. The search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) further gave an excuse to USA to enter Iraq. The fall of Saddam Hussein gave Iran, the Middle East’s premier Shiite power, an opportunity to extend its influence from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. Its rise has galvanized the region’s Sunnis, led by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, against Iran in a series of proxy wars throughout the region. The confusion and disorder has given rise to some of the most violent extremist groups, which now have the space to operate; the area has all but seen direct intervention from outside powers like Russia and the US to intervene and exploit as they see fit. These powers may well intend to avoid the quicksand that is the Middle East, but competing agendas, transnational threats, and the fast evolving geo-political scenario could well challenge those intentions.

The Current Dispute

The land mass of Qatar occupies a tiny headland on the Arabian peninsula, sticking out like a sore finger; to the South it has a single land border with Saudi Arabia and is across the sea from Iran.

A former British protectorate, it gained its independence in 1971 and has often had some issue or the other with other nations of the region, even going for arbitration to the International Court of Justice against Bahrain, for possession of some islands. Since independence, the al-Thani family has ruled, making the tiny monarchy unbelievably wealthy on the back of massive oil and natural gas reserves, leading to the highest per capita income in the world. Tensions with its Gulf Arab neighbours have grown in recent years over support for Islamist movements that emerged from the Arab Spring, leading to criticism over its support of Islamists; Doha has long welcomed senior figures from Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia’s chief worry is the Muslim Brotherhood, the transnational Sunni Islamist political movement outlawed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which these nations feel is posing a threat to their system of hereditary rule.

The row came to a head on 05 June 2017, when Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – were joined by Egypt in severing diplomatic and trade ties with Qatar, which is also a member of the GCC. Following the action by the Arab nations, countries in and beyond the region began reassessing their diplomatic relationships with each party in the dispute to decide whose side to take. Yemen, the Maldives and Libya’s Tobruk-based government later followed suit, cutting their ties with Qatar, while Iran and Turkey supported it, by immediately despatching food supplies, which had been disrupted due to the closure of the only land border. Two members of the GCC, Kuwait and Oman, did not sever their relations with Qatar, with Kuwait offering to mediate in the dispute.

The current deterioration in relations between the Arab states and Qatar, had been brewing for some time and was now sparked by the remarks attributed to the Qatari Emir, who was quoted expressing support for Iran, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood at a military graduation speech in late May. The statements triggered a response from other Gulf nations that started banning Qatari media outlets, including Al Jazeera. A flurry of accusations flew back and forth through media outlets on both sides. A hacking group going by the name of GlobalLeaks, released emails allegedly from the UAE ambassador to the US, which suggested strong ties between himself and a neo-conservative pro-Israel think tank, further roiling the media environment. Ten days after the initial announcement, Saudi-led coalition put forth a 13-point charter for Qatar to follow; the charter includes severance of ties with Iran and closure of Al Jazeera, amongst others. Qatar has branded the demands as untenable.

Reactions

As mentioned, for the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain, pressuring Qatar was a common cause and hence, these nations joined Saudi Arabia at the very initiation. Their actions are part of a coordinated effort to push Qatar to align with the Saudi-led consensus on the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran. Saudi Arabia and these nations blame Qatar for fomenting regional instability and resent the criticism of their governments and political systems that emanates from Qatari media outlets. It would be interesting for the reader to know that Al Jazeera’s English language TV channel is comparatively very moderate as against the Arabic channel, which contains some scathing criticism of the neighbours of Qatar! Some Muslim-majority nations of Africa have also prioritised their relations with Qatar, while countries like Sudan and Pakistan, have their national interests to cater for and have maintained their neutrality so far.

Among the GCC’s other members, Kuwait and Oman pride themselves on their impartiality and reputations as mediators in regional disputes. To an extent, they do not favour Saudi Arabia’s efforts to control the GCC, though they do not overtly speak about their dissatisfaction, as Qatar does. These nations, which have hosted talks over the crisis in Yemen, are now attempting to soothe tensions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Outside of the GCC, Qatar has received support, which has helped it to dig in its heels. The country’s friendly ties with Turkey have not only enabled it to diversify its security partnerships but also provided it with reinforcement in the current dispute. Turkey despatched food supplies to the beleaguered Qatar, after the land border with Saudi Arabia was closed. On 07 June 2017, Turkey expedited its decision to send more troops to Qatar, where it has plans to build a military base. While Turkey has a productive relationship with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, its foreign policy objectives shared with Qatar, include support for regional Islamist groups. Qatar’s efforts to stand up to Saudi Arabia’s authority, also, align with Turkey’s ambition to contain Saudi Arabia and become the dominant Sunni power in the region. Turkey, however, is maintaining cordial relations with other GCC members; even as this piece is being written, the Turkish President is on a whirlwind tour of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar, in an effort to resolve the dispute.

Iranian relations with most member nations of the GCC have long been uneasy, especially with Saudi Arabia, when the latter executed the Shia cleric, Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016. In the current imbroglio, while urging the GCC nations to resolve the issues amicably, Iran has rallied to Qatar’s aid, offering the tiny nation, the use of three of its ports to import supplies as its neighbours seek to isolate it. Iran has also been reportedly sending more than 1,000 tons of fruits and vegetables to Qatar daily, ever since supply was cut by Saudi Arabia.

Strong support by the US for the Saudi-led alliance would likely have bolstered the confidence in making the move to isolate Qatar to this degree. However, this rift also complicates the US policy towards the region, since it counts on a tight Sunni coalition to manage regional threats like the Islamic State (IS). Even as Saudi Arabia tries to undermine the trust US has placed in Qatar, it will not be easy as Qatar hosts the second-largest US military presence in the region, including the command centre that coordinates the fight against the IS, and the al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which is the largest regional US airbase. To add to the complication of its policy towards the current diplomatic crisis in the Gulf, USA also signed a $12bn deal to supply F-15 jets to Qatar, notwithstanding the recent accusation by President Trump on Qatar’s “high-level funding” of terrorism. For its part, the US military has announced that it would not intervene in the current diplomatic row; this support gives an immediate reassurance to Qatar, which could prolong its ability to hold out against GCC pressure.

On the farther side, Russia is another valuable source of support for Qatar. The countries’ business ties have blossomed over the last few years, particularly since the current Emir assumed power in 2013. Qatar has funnelled roughly $2.5bn to Russia and recently acquired a sizeable share of Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company. Russia, like Turkey, would like to maintain its ties with the GCC nations, as it navigates the crisis in the Gulf; nevertheless, Russian support has given Qatar the extra muscle in the diplomatic dispute.

Qatar and Pakistan enjoy strong ties based on mutual understanding and respect. The relations between the armed forces of the two countries are of special significance. A large number of veterans of Pakistan Armed Forces are rendering services in Qatar Armed Forces (QAF), while QAF officers and personnel regularly train in Pakistan. A potentially prolonged Saudi-Qatar rift would force Pakistan to face the dreaded choice of choosing sides, with Saudi Arabia already asking Pakistan to do so. The answer could have severe ramifications for Pakistan, especially vis-à-vis the multipronged security and energy crises that the country is in at present.

Indian Reaction and Effect of the Crisis

The Indian Government has termed the current crisis as an ‘internal matter’ of the GCC, not posing any challenge to relations between India and Qatar, or the other GCC nations. These developments, however, could have significant implications for India, given that its citizens make up the largest expatriate group in the region. India’s ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE, Qatar and Israel have strengthened in the recent past, giving the GoI a more self-assured approach in handling the current diplomatic crisis, and the growing opportunities and challenges in the region that may arise from it.

India has robust defence and energy ties with Qatar. India is the third largest export destination for gas from Qatar (behind Japan and South Korea). It is also the largest supplier of LNG to India, accounting for over 65 per cent of India’s global import and 15 per cent of Qatar’s export of LNG. In the event of an extended crisis, prices of food items and essential commodities in Qatar could increase and affect the lives of 700,000 odd Indians, which could result in increased insecurity, reduced economic activity and stress the total inward remittances that India receives. Continued confrontation or uncertainty in Qatar, or the wider Gulf region, can then have serious adverse implications for India.

Concluding Thoughts

Beyond a point, India cannot stay aloof. Given the span of India’s interests and its rapidly expanding political, economic and strategic profile, India will have to get more vigorously engaged in dealing with developments in this crucial region.

USA has complicated its policy towards the region. President Trump raised eyebrows by making his first overseas visit to Saudi Arabia. He then mentioned Qatar as a ‘fund-raiser’ for terrorist groups, and then, a few days later, gave his nod for a major sale of F-15 aircraft, all the while maintaining a large US military presence in Qatar. USA has also appeared to express implicit support for the Saudi-UAE-led move.

Russia and China have thus far maintained their neutrality, but for how long. USA and Russia are on the opposite sides in Syria, where Iran is also involved. While Russia would like to maintain equidistance in the current dispute because it is involved with the quarrelling parties in some way or the other. China, on the other hand, would like to maintain the same side with USA, if USA were to side with Saudi Arabia and UAE, to thwart any threat to its Belt-Road initiative and the Economic Corridor through the troubled region of Baluchistan, in Pakistan. Such a move on the part of China is yet not visible, but is very much possible.

Qatar is in a serious squeeze, and the Emir has blinked. How long this isolation of Qatar would last, is unclear. All of Qatar’s important diplomatic and economic partners are cautious of what, from now on, could constitute an enduring political risk in trading with, or investing in, Qatar.