Indian Defence Review

While Maoists have been slowly but surely spreading their hold over district after district, scoring a total of over 200 districts, the Indian state slept through this phase spanning over couple of decades. Maoists have been raiding police stations, police and Central Police Organisation (CPO) camps, prisons and ambushing small parties of policemen essentially to demoralize them and collect their weapons. Mining of roads is to limit police movement and to quarantine administration to district headquarters and terrorise the locals.

Though the Maoist depredations has been going on for quite some time, the Government of India and the public at large has suddenly come alive, to the emerging threat only after the three violent incidents taking place in quick succession. Starting with the attack on CRPF at Dantewada in Chhattisgarh, followed by blowing a civilian bus near Chingawaran on Sukma Road in the same area and finally the derailing of Gyanenshwari Express which has brought Maoists threat into focus.

Though the Maoist depredations has been going on for quite some time, the Government of India and the public at large has suddenly come alive, to the emerging threat only”¦

The growing power of Maoists is the outcome of complete failure of the Indian government, both at the centre and states, to offer residents of impoverished eastern states an alternative to rebellion. The Maoists don’t exist in a vacuum; they are the end product of inequality and failed governance that plague rural India in these parts and which underpins many of the world’s insurgencies. It is the legacy of criminal neglect, maladministration, corruption and mistakes spread over decades that has brought the country to this sorry pass. India has some-what succeeded to hold thus far, the Maoists menace, to over just 200 districts, because the development efforts and inclusive growth have to an extent, succeeded in other areas and the prevalence of modicum of governance there.

Naxal movement started in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal, in India’s extreme North East. In May 1967, a group of armed Maoists attacked police in that village following a land dispute. Later that year, the Naxals formed their own governing bodies and emerged as a distinct movement. Naxalbari and the surrounding area, inhabited by rural poor population, was fertile ground for rebellion. Their movement gradually expanded over the decades into adjoining areas. In recent times Naxals are being termed as Maoists. Sporadic Maoists violence has claimed thousands of lives, amongst locals, as well as police and CPOs, deployed in those areas. Violence is the way of such groups, which serves many ends and publicity is their very life blood.

‘The Maoists movement was described by the Indian Prime Minister, some three years earlier, as the most serious security threat faced by the nation and yet Delhi did very little to counter this threat. Maoist movement in its present incarnation is not a secessionist movement but appears to aim at capturing political power in states and eventually at Delhi, much as Mao did in China in 1949 and what is being attempted in Nepal.’

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Maoist movement has seen many ups and downs. It has now reached a stage where more than two hundred districts are in the grip of Maoists. This situation developed over a period of time and all this while state governments and Delhi’s half hearted efforts failed to gain control over the emerging scene, except perhaps in Andhra Pradesh where it has been possible to hold the Maoist movement somewhat in check.

Not only no heads ever rolled, but those who failed the state kept climbing the promotion ladder and along with others kept amassing wealth.

No workable solution to the problem can be evolved without analyzing the very causes and roots of this problem. In the states where Maoists are active, there is large scale, deprivation, extreme poverty and despondency amongst vast sections of the marginalized and dispossessed population, whom all development and poverty alleviation schemes have simply bypassed. For them there has been no ‘inclusive growth.’ No one in Delhi, Finance Ministry and Planning Commission etc bothered to find out where large funds being made available for inclusive growth were disappearing. Even though by mid eighties it was realized that not more than 15 percent of the development funds were reaching the intended targets, yet nothing was done to correct this malady.

In these areas, the most affected are the Adivasis and tribals who have suffered the maximum. Their small land holdings have been taken over by mining mafias (plundering the wealth below these lands, obtained through licenses obtained for a pittance) hydel projects, MNCs and some others, whose forest rights have been dissolved, leaving them no means of livelihood. Forced evictions from their dwellings and lands had become a routine affair, with inadequate and, in many cases, no compensation paid. No roads, no schools, hospitals, no healthcare centres, no jobs, nothing came up in these areas. At the same time these groups and others have undergone population explosion.

Added to that has been the gradual withdrawal of governance from district after district capped by the all pervasive corruption. Political class found it more profitable to keep these people in a state of poverty, ignorance and deprivation to stay in power. Turmoil and unrest in these areas made siphoning of funds that much more easy. Consequently there were the vested interest to maintain status quo. At the same time these conditions created fertile grounds for the Maoist groups to spring to life and find wide ranging support amongst the dispossessed. As governance kept shrinking, the Maoist kept enlarging areas under their control. They terrorise locals, set-up peoples courts to dispense instant justice, collect revenue and retaining money from those operating mines and toll from transport vehicles. Terrorised, disillusioned and alienated the populace extended support to them and denied the same and intelligence to the police.

As governance shrank, police high-handedness increased leading to further alienation of locals. District officials never stirred out and functioned from within their high security residences and offices and on return to Delhi, became experts in dealing with Maoist menace. State governments abdicated their basic function of governance and created Salwa Judum to supplement police, which on its part indulged in excesses and in many cases joined the Maoists taking weapons with them. This abdication of governance also led to many helpless poor being coerced into joining the Maoists armed groups. Some others found exercising power through the gun a heady experience.Given such conditions, Maoists kept enlarging their armed groups and area of influence, while Delhi and affected states adopted lackadaisical attitude: took no corrective action nor held any one accountable for this slide and consequently the descent to the present state, where the call to bring in the weapon of last resort (Army) has become shriller.

There appears to be no one accountable for the current state of affairs. Not only no heads ever rolled, but those who failed the state kept climbing the promotion ladder and along with others kept amassing wealth. Now when the Home Minister named some police officers who had failed policemen at Dantewada and wanted action against them, we are told that these officers are the very best. If they, even after Dantewada are considered so good what of the others! Pray, then how did we reach this sorry state, where policemen, state and CPOs have become such easy targets.

How have the police, both state and CPOs in the ‘Red Corridor’ descended to such a pathetic state of low morale. Does this state of affairs reflect on the quality of leadership in these forces! There has been no accountability and therefore no sackings, while at the same time more and more senior level posts are sanctioned, making the police and bureaucracy extremely top heavy.

Home Minister claims that he does not have the mandate and yet does not spell out that mandate! If this mandate is the deployment of the army, then he has obviously come to the conclusion that every other means at his disposal has completely failed and is seeking weapon of last resort to tackle this menace. Decidedly such a point has not been reached. Surely, this exceptionally large body of CPOs and states special forces cannot be so very helpless to tackle this rag-tag group of Maoists.

Those who clamour for deployment of army and air force seem to forget the scale of collateral damage air strikes did against insurgents in Aizwal in 1996. Army if deployed would attempt to produce quick results. Given the poor state of available intelligence, lack of knowledge of ground and language, the possibility of innocent people, parched and famished due to long years of neglect, injustice and repression, getting buffeted between the Maoists and the army is very much there. Moreover deploying a couple of RR battalions with an amorphous nature of command and control and general lack of coordination between the army and police forces (of all hues) and lack of free flow of actionable intelligence in such a setting will hamper operations and could lead to targeting wrong people.

The call for talks with the Maoists is misplaced and inopportune. Such renegade groups should be invited to the table for talks when they have been driven against the wall.

Then there is the issue of deploying army (and air force) against own people. The army and air force chiefs appear to have advised the government against the use of their forces in the present situation. Defence Minister AK Antony too appears to agree with the recommendations of the service chiefs. The army chief has rightly assessed that the situation is not desperate enough to call in the army and that it is well within the capability of the state and central police to handle the situation provided they are sufficiently energized. Further the existing commitments of the army both in counter-insurgency operations in the North East and J&K as also the imperatives of maintaining adequate defensive posture in the North and along the LoC in J&K must have weighed on his recommendations to keep the army out of another heavy commitment. The DGP who conducted the inquiry into the Dantewada incident too has expressed his opinion against deployment of military. He fears, that poor Adavasis and Tribals will suffer all the more. Rightly the government, for the present, has decided against deploying the army.

There is a flood of solutions on offering to tackle Maoist menace. These range from ‘quick fix’ types to the more nuanced approach of combating Maoists on the one hand and on the other undertaking development of the affected districts, in other words, ‘clear, hold and develop,’ concept — constituting co-operatives of tribals etc to manage forests. Then there is the call inviting Maoists to lay down arms and come forward for talks. Yet another proposal is to get ex-servicemen, on short term contract, to join CPOs, as also engage sappers (ex-engineers) to clear roads of mines etc. Yet a comprehensive and viable solution seems to elude the planners.

Elimination of Maoists has become the top priority without regard to means and methods. Terms like revenge, enemy and war are being freely bandied about. What may follow are excesses by the police: provincial and CPOs. Arrests, interrogations, torture and torching of villages, dislocations and fake encounters etc will become common occurrence, more so when senior leadership stays away from the field and leadership in the field and intelligence continues to be poor. Troops with low morale, poor discipline and ineffective leadership are more prone to brutalities. Remember, My Lai massacre in Vietnam.

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Some arm chair strategists have tried to argue that the police forces available are totally inadequate, drawing ratios between population and policemen and relating the two with the square kilometers of area per policeman. As an example the Bastar division of Chhattishargh, (spread over an area of 40,000 square kilometers) where, besides the state police, (5000 policemen) there are 14 battalions of CRPF, (1000 men each) 5 battalions of BSF, 7 battalions of armed police and this large force is considered inadequate! These figures are being related to troops in the Kashmir valley, forgetting that in J&K security forces face well trained hardcore insurgent from across the border, border that has to be defended, while Maoists in their present state are a rag tag group. It is further argued that the ratio of security personnel to Maiosts be 12:1 if not more! But it is not realized that by themselves numbers alone are of little consequence.

“¦the higher hierarchy in the CPOs and the affected state police have no ground level experience in such operations and have never led policemen from the front”¦

The call for talks with the Maoists is misplaced and inopportune. Such renegade groups should be invited to the table for talks when they have been driven against the wall. Only then there can be hope of arriving at a viable and acceptable solution. To expect them to shed arms when they are winning is a bit unrealistic. Often, as has been our experience in the past too, this period of cease-fire and talks is used by the insurgents to regroup and reorganise themselves. We should therefore seek talks once we have put them completely on the defensive and in a bind. Yet keep the door for talks open, even while we go whole hog after them.

CRPF has 210 battalions and many more are now being raised. Most of these units, along with others from the remaining CPOs, have been operating in the Red Corridor long enough, so they ought to have acquired sufficient experience in fighting the Maoists, build a viable intelligence grid and create own schools for counter insurgency training. The answer to this intriguing question perhaps rests in the fact that, the higher hierarchy in the CPOs and the affected state police have no ground level experience in such operations and have never led policemen from the front, there is no accountability and there is little central and state policy or doctrine on the subject.

Fighting insurgency is a serious business and leadership in the forces has to lead from the front, setting example in discipline and risk taking. Military has been in this business for a long time and the casualty ratio between officers and troops in these operations is 1 to 13.4.. The figure of officer killed in the last decade and a half is, by now, well over 575. These are commissioned officers, from Lt to Cols and in a few cases even of higher ranks. Military has been combating motivated, well trained and hard core insurgents in the North East and J&K, whereas the Maoists are a ‘rag – tag’ force in its present state. Yet success has eluded the police and there are hardly any casualties amongst the IPS officers while policemen (including those from CPOs) have died in thousands.

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To achieve results police leadership will have to be upfront and run the same risk their subordinates routinely face. During the Punjab problem in the eighties, it is only, when the army was deployed that the police emerged out of its secure places and started operating in a meaningful manner, though their excesses were conveniently overlooked. Such a system should not become a pattern and CPOs and state police should not require military crutches every time. Else there would be little justification to have such large bodies of CPOs and state armed police etc.

To achieve results police leadership will have to be upfront and run the same risk their subordinates routinely face.

It would be inappropriate to replicate the North East, J&K or Punjab template in the Red Corridor. Nor can the Malayan experience in dealing with communist insurgency be applied here. Dealing with the Maoist menace in the Red Corridor is going to be a different ball game. It calls for out of the box thinking, planning and action.

While law and order remains a state subject, the present situation cannot be taken as mere law and order problem. Though centre would extend all help to the states to combat Maoists, the states will have to show greater involvement. To take this challenge ‘head-on’ there is need to bring in legislation where centre can take direct control over operations against Maoists in the Red Corridor , create central controlling authority which co-ordinates intelligence and operations of CPOs with the state police and administration. Grey Hounds, Cobras, Vipers and Wasps: all should join the fight in a coordinated and planned manner. India can ignore the Maoist threat at its own peril. Combating Maoists requires the most energetic steps, leadership which operates up front and firm action while avoiding collateral damage: at all costs.

There is much talk of better equipment and weapons for the police and CPOs. This is perhaps an alibi for poor performance. It is more an issue of training, effective leadership which is willing to face the same set of risks and dangers encountered by their men and their motivation which is of relevance. There is no need for mortars and machine guns foliage penetrating radars etc to deal with Maoists.

The suggestion to draw on the experience of ex-servicemen (including officers) merits pragmatic and detailed discussion. Undoubtedly ex-servicemen are in a state of penury and are badly in need of financial support. They have the skill but there is no motivation for taking up such a job! They may be desperate enough to take up any job but certainly not as mercenary soldiers to be used as cannon fodder and then once more discarded when the deed is done.

Create a central authority to coordinate anti-Maoist operations in various states and sharing of intelligence. Similarly create such bodies at the state level too.

Such suggestion spring from another wrong notion that they by themselves will perform at the same level they did during their stint with the military, if they do come forward and accept this absurd offer of contract of two or three years. They did well and met all challenges during their active service with the military, because they formed part of well knit, highly motivated units with high morale and above all ably commanded by officers who led them from the front. These officers ran greater risk and took far more casualties (in percentage terms) than their men. When these veterans are now called upon to come forward and join the CPOs and if at all they do so, it would be wrong to expect them to do as well as they did while with their units in the military. Infact they are more likely to fall in line with the culture, ethos, ways, means and methods of the CPOs.

Another factor to bear in mind is that they are a disillusioned lot who were retired in the very prime of their lives ( at ages 35-37 years ) denied the compensation for this early retirement, which was in all fairness due to them. Now the same government which has treated them so shabbily and with disdain, turned deaf ear to their pleas for justice and fair play and retracted from all promises call them to take on yet another heavy burden, burden which the much pampered and home ministry’s very own forces’ are unable to carry, what can be veteran’s response! Are they to be once more exploited and then discarded!

Incase ex-servicemen are to be roped in, they need to be assured of fair play by granting them OROP as a first step. Re-engage those below 42 years age on a 12 year term. They will have to be offered an acceptable package in pay, perks and second pension and given proper insurance cover etc. These ex-servicemen should be grouped into units, where possible retaining their old groupings and these units/sub units should be officered by military officers (similarly engaged) and preferably from the same groups. These units should then be grouped into brigades and so on and given three months to organize themselves. Brigade and divisional headquarters and support services may have to be provided by the army, may be by taking good percentage of ex-servicemen in these headquarters. Further, AFSPA must come into play in their case

The Maoist threat cannot be ignored any longer and has to be dealt on war footing. At the same time excesses by security forces must be avoided at all costs and collateral damage minimized.

To tackle Maoists it would be essential to take some or all of these steps, but before that, it needs to be clearly understood that this problem will not go away in a hurry and would take over a decade of concerted effort on all fronts to resolve. Some of the recommended steps are:

The Maoist threat cannot be ignored any longer and has to be dealt on war footing. At the same time excesses by security forces must be avoided at all costs and collateral damage minimized. It is imperative to re-establishing friendly, sympathetic and purposeful administration which can undertake development in all its facets, with dedication and expeditiously. Political class needs to keep national interest in focus, overriding parochial and personal compulsions.