Geopolitics

Maritime Ambitions of China
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Issue Book Excerpt: Rise of China | Date : 19 Feb , 2013

China’s Maritime Objectives

From the foregoing, China’s maritime objectives can be summarised as:

  • Enabling the reunification of Taiwan.
  • Protecting shipping and SLOC to assure the flow of energy resources and strategic materials.
  • Enforcing settlement of maritime territorial disputes and ensure safety of offshore economic interests.
  • Providing security and logistic support for overseas assets and Diaspora.
  • Ensuring freedom from foreign interference by becoming the dominant maritime power in the region, neutralising US naval domination of Asia-Pacific.
PLAN Programmes

The PLAN has improved its Over the Horizon targeting capability with both sky and ground-wave radars.

In order to attain its objectives of protection of SLOCs and overseas assets the PLAN must develop what is loosely called “blue-water capability.” This is much more than merely the ability to travel long distances. It implies the ability to put to sea a composite fleet that has offensive capability as well as long endurance. At the same time the Fleet must have ships that span the full spectrum of naval capability — anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-missile, sea lift, integrated air power and logistics.

Construction of Ships and Submarines: With the aim of attaining such a capability China embarked on a massive process of transformation to convert what was essentially a coastal navy in to a navy that would be able to dominate the region, deny access to a superior force, carry out offensive operations, and undertake distant deployments to protect its SLOCs. In this process of transformation it has scrapped its obsolete ships and built a phenomenal 39 modern missile-firing destroyers and frigates in the last 15 years. It has added 42 new submarines to its order of battle between 1995 and last year, of which no less than 30 have been built in its own yards, at the rate of one every six months. In the same period it has built three nuclear submarines, and has as many more under construction. In August this year it completed the preliminary sea trials of its first aircraft carrier.6 In the year 2000 the PLAN budget was USD 14 billion; the budget for this year is reported to be USD 90 billion which would comprise a six-fold increase.

Sea Lift Capability: Whereas its earlier amphibious capability comprised of over 500 ships, most of these were converted river-boat designs intended main for an invasion of Taiwan. Today China has about 85 amphibious ships, of which the largest is over 17,000 tons. Its total lift capability is estimated at three infantry divisions and two mechanised divisions, numbering over 50,000 personnel and nearly 900 amphibious vehicles.

Development of the Dongfeng ASBM: Knowing that it cannot hope to match the US in numerical superiority, China has followed a policy of asymmetrical countermeasures. In a move that has severely disconcerted the US it has developed an ASBM which threatens to deny access to US CSGs up to a distance of 2,000 kms of the Chinese coast.7

China views the US and its sea power as the main impediments to its strategic aim of regional domination and attainment of world status.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Capability (C4ISR): According to the Congressional Research Report on China’s military strength in October this year, The PLAN has improved its Over the Horizon targeting capability with both sky and ground-wave radars. These are supplemented by UAVs, space-based sensors and EW aircraft which gives the PRC the capability of carrying out long range precision strikes, including by ASBMs.

Shipping and Shipbuilding

A country’s maritime strength is not determined by its warships alone. The shipbuilding industry, the port facilities, and the merchant fleet are vital and integral part of its maritime strength. In these aspects China has made remarkable progress. China has 176 ports, more than any other country. Shanghai ranks first among the world’s ports in cargo handling. Chinese ports today handle 25 per cent of the world’s cargo by TEU, or 20 foot equivalent units.8

It has made huge strides in shipbuilding. From a negligible share of the world market in 2000, China came up to third position behind S. Korea and Japan in 2005, with 18 per cent of global ship deliveries. This figure grew to 39 per cent in 2010, placing China above all other shipbuilding countries in the world.

Conclusion

China’s maritime ambitions have been fuelled by many factors — historic, economic and political. Behind them is an implacable Chinese determination to erase the memory of its century of humiliation, when its backwardness and poverty resulted in its domination and exploitation by Western countries. China views the US and its sea power as the main impediments to its strategic aim of regional domination and attainment of world status. This is the immediate driver of its maritime surge.

India cannot be indifferent to China’s aggressive growth. While China’s economic and military strength are currently far ahead of India’s, the Indian Navy enjoys superiority in the Indian Ocean region.

The second major factor driving Chinese maritime ambitions is the vulnerability that it perceives as a result of its dependence on external sources of oil and strategic materials, and the need to protect its overseas assets. To address these concerns China is making tremendous progress in the transformation of its navy into a modern oceanic fleet with the ability to deny access, exercise local sea control and project power.

The massive flows of strategic materials and oil will demand that the SLOCs be protected — this may well see a further expansion of the Chinese Navy, the stationing of Chinese task forces in the Indian Ocean, and the acquisition of bases in the Indian Ocean.

It is inconceivable that China would invest so heavily without the intention of protecting its assets on land in different. There will almost certainly be a demand for deployment of troops and warships for the protection of its citizens and the defence of its investments overseas.

China insists that its rise will be peaceful. But its actions when thwarted belie such asseverations. It has adopted a hectoring stance with smaller countries and there is unease among the countries of region about its intentions. Far from being a recent inspiration, China’s maritime ambitions are the logical result of the evolution of a strategy that has been shaped and refined over the last four or five decades.

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India cannot be indifferent to China’s aggressive growth. While China’s economic and military strength are currently far ahead of India’s, the Indian Navy enjoys superiority in the Indian Ocean region. We have a vital stake in maintaining our predominance in the region, and must be more vigorous in the implementation of our own military modernisation. In our assessments of the Chinese threat we must be guided by its capabilities and history, not by its stated intentions and our optimism.

Notes

  1. Shanghai News cultural website: retrieved on December 16, 2011 from www.cultural-china.com; “Hai jin” (literally “ocean forbidden”) was a ban on maritime activities during China’s Ming Dynasty and again during the Qing Dynasty.
  2. “China cannot afford to be too gloating;” Sydney Morning Herald; Peter Hartcher; August 09, 2011 retrieved on December 16, 2011 from http://m.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/china-cant-afford-to-be-too-gloating-20110808-1ij3x.html In the famous strategic guidance he gave his comrades in the Communist Party, the father of China’s modernisation, Deng Xiaoping, said: “Hide your strength, bide your time, and do what you can.”
  3. You ji, The Armed Forces of China. (London ib Tauris, 1999), p. 8.
  4. Global Security. Org: Home:Military: World: China: EEZ; retrieved on December 16, 2011 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/eez.htm  “China has an expansive view of its rights in the EEZ, treating the area as fully sovereign territory in a manner not consistent with International Law.”
  5. “Don’t shun the idea of setting up overseas military bases”; By Shen Dingli; China.org.cn, January 28, 2010: retrieved on December 16, 2011 from http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-01/28/content_19324522.htm  “It is true that we are facing the threat posed by terrorism, but different from America, it is not a critical issue. The real threat to us is not posed by the pirates but by the countries which block our trade route.”
  6. The data in this part were obtained from: China Naval Modernisation: Implications for US Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress; Ronald O’Rourke; October 20, 2011: retrieved on December 16, 2011 from http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
  7. “China’s Anti-ship Ballistic Missile: Game Changer in the Pacific Ocean;” S Chandrashekhar et al; International Strategic and Security Studies Programme; (National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India; 2011).
  8. “Ranking of Container Ports of the World 2010;” published by the Marine Department of Hong Kong, retrieved on December 16, 2011 from: http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/publication/pdf/portstat_2_y_b5.pdf
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