Military & Aerospace

Liberation of Bangladesh: War in Northern Sector - I
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It was known that Qadir had planned to fight the main defensive battle from fortified battalion defences elaborately prepared behind the Brahmaputra obstacle of Jamalpur and Mymensingh with approximately a strength of one battalion. But he had pushed delaying positions north of the river along the expected routes of ingress right up to the border. Along the Kamalpur-Bakhshiganj-Jamalpur and Hitibanda-Sherpur-Jamalpur axes, Freedom Fighters were already in touch with the Pakistani-defended localities at Kamalpur and Hatibanda, and they had reported that both Bakshiganj and Sherpur were held in depth with one company each. These axes appeared to be the responsibility of 31 Baluch, while the Dalu Haluaghat-Mymensingh axis was the operational responsibility of 33 Punjab.

It was visualised that the destruction and capture of Pakistani 93 Infantry Br igade Group and other paramilitary troops under its command would deprive the Dacca fortress of its potential strength. If this was successfully achieved, it would contribute significantly to the campaign.

Delaying positions were known to have been prepared at Halwa ghat, Phulpur, Gobrakura, Sarchapur, as well as at Durgapur, Birisiri and Pureb Dhala, but actual occupation was confined to Haluaghat. No tanks, field or medium guns had been reported in the sector, which considerably reduced their defence potential. It was considered highly unlikely that Niazi would reinforce this sector in the battles of Jamalpur and Mymensingh. But the Pakistani force was expected to hold the Indian advance as long as possible and then fall back intact if possible on the Dacca fortress main defences. Should Niazi however decide to reinforce the sector, he would be doing so only at the cost of denuding the Dacca defences, and this would be welcome as it would facilitate the task of the II and IV Corps thrust lines from the west and the east.

In addition to its logistic, charter of duties, 101 Communication Zone Area was assigned the offensive tasks of destroying the Pakistani forces deployed in Tangail and Mymensingh districts within 14 days of the outbreak of hostilities. It was visualised that the destruction and capture of Pakistani 93 Infantry Br igade Group and other paramilitary troops under its command would deprive the Dacca fortress of its potential strength. If this was successfully achieved, it would contribute significantly to the campaign.

Gurbux Singh, a shrewd professional, quickly grasped the essence of the plan. He appreciated that although his own superiority was only marginal the weakness of the enemy lay in the division of his forces into two defended localities at Jamalpur and Mymensingh, held by about battalion strength each. Gurbax Singh cast his plan to exploit this weakness. He decided to develop the main thrust broadly along the less-expected approach, the Kamalpur-Bakhshiganj-Jamalpur axis, in strength with 95 Mountain Brigade Group while keeping the Pakistani forces engaged along the other two axes with subsidiary thrusts simulating a brigade group advance the more-expected approach of Dalu-Haluaghat-Phulpur-Mymensingh with one infantry battalion suitably augmented by Mukti Bahini elements under Brig Sant Singh, a fighting soldier of repute, and one BSF battalion working along the Baghmara-Jari Jhanjal-Mymensingh axis.

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