The northern sector comprised the U-shaped territory between the mighty Jamuna in the west and Meghna in the east, with the Ganga forming the base. The Brahmaputra ran diagonally from northwest to southeast dividing the sector in two, with about one-third north of the river. A large number of routes led into the sector from India, but all these arteries led to the two focal communication centres of Jamalpur and Mymensingh towns lying across the Brahmaputra. a water obstacle about 1,000 feet wide.
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The roads and tracks from there onward ran from north to south and converged on Tangail, from where they led to Dacca. Terrain-wise, except for the Madhopur forest in Tangail district, the landscape was covered with paddy fields, punctuated with occasional lakes and marshes. A few villages stood here and there amid clusters of trees. Numerous streams interlaced the flat paddy lands in a zigzag manner, thus restricting free cross-country movement. Movement by wheeled and tracked vehicles off the main roads and byways was difficult except in the dry season.
“¦the role of the Indian force in the sector was to be mainly containment of the Pakistani troops deployed in the sector, while the thrust lines of the II and IV Corps converged on Dacca.
Maj Gen Gurbux Singh Gill, General Officer Commanding 101 Communication Zone Area based in Shillong, was made operationally responsible for this sector. Normally, the charter of his duties as an Area Commander was mainly confined to logistic support of the troops deployed in Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal, Nagaland and Mizoram, but he was appointed to this operational command for two main reasons. Communicationwise, this sector on the Indian side was comparatively underdeveloped, and its capacity to sustain any larger forces on the existing roads over a long haul from the nearest base at Gauhati was considered inadequate, thus restricting the size of the force which could be employed. In the overall context, the role of the Indian force in the sector was to be mainly containment of the Pakistani troops deployed in the sector, while the thrust lines of the II and IV Corps converged on Dacca.
The troops allocated to the sector consisted of 95 Mountain Brigade Group, moved to the area from Nagaland in September 1971, under a colourful character, Brig Hardev Singh Kler, who was later to join in the triumphant entry into Dacca. Later, one more infantry battalion was brought in from 23 Infantry Division to augment the sector resources. Before the outbreak of hostilities, intensive Mukti Bahini guerilla activity was going on in the sector, both along the international border and in depth areas of Tangail district under the redoubtable “Tiger” Siddiqi.’
Gurbux Singh was brought in to take over these onerous tasks. He was no ordinary general who was content with a chairborne job when the country was at war. Aggressive and brusque, he welcomed the opportunity and set about his task energetically”¦
Much coordination was required to dovetail these activities with military operations in the event of war and to relieve the brigade commander from logistic duties so that he could focus his attention on purely operational tasks. Gurbux Singh was brought in to take over these onerous tasks. He was no ordinary general who was content with a chairborne job when the country was at war. Aggressive and brusque, he welcomed the opportunity and set about his task energetically, stockpiling to carry the war beyond the original objectives set by the planners. In peace, he was sidetracked by our systems and was out to prove himself in war.
It appears that Niazi had also relegated this sector to a low priority. Initially, on the induction of Pakistan 9 Infantry Division into East Pakistan, its 27 Infantry Brigade was moved to Mymensingh to control the area and later eliminate the guerilla menace. Later, on post-monsoon reorganisation, this brigade was moved out of the area and ad hoc 93 Infantry Brigade was raised under the local Martial Law Administrator, Brig A. Qadir. This formation was created by grouping two regular battalions, 31 Baluch and 33 Punjab, with the paramilitary forces, consisting of two wings of the newly raised EPCAF and some Mujahid units, and a battery of mortars.
It was known that Qadir had planned to fight the main defensive battle from fortified battalion defences elaborately prepared behind the Brahmaputra obstacle of Jamalpur and Mymensingh with approximately a strength of one battalion. But he had pushed delaying positions north of the river along the expected routes of ingress right up to the border. Along the Kamalpur-Bakhshiganj-Jamalpur and Hitibanda-Sherpur-Jamalpur axes, Freedom Fighters were already in touch with the Pakistani-defended localities at Kamalpur and Hatibanda, and they had reported that both Bakshiganj and Sherpur were held in depth with one company each. These axes appeared to be the responsibility of 31 Baluch, while the Dalu Haluaghat-Mymensingh axis was the operational responsibility of 33 Punjab.
It was visualised that the destruction and capture of Pakistani 93 Infantry Br igade Group and other paramilitary troops under its command would deprive the Dacca fortress of its potential strength. If this was successfully achieved, it would contribute significantly to the campaign.
Delaying positions were known to have been prepared at Halwa ghat, Phulpur, Gobrakura, Sarchapur, as well as at Durgapur, Birisiri and Pureb Dhala, but actual occupation was confined to Haluaghat. No tanks, field or medium guns had been reported in the sector, which considerably reduced their defence potential. It was considered highly unlikely that Niazi would reinforce this sector in the battles of Jamalpur and Mymensingh. But the Pakistani force was expected to hold the Indian advance as long as possible and then fall back intact if possible on the Dacca fortress main defences. Should Niazi however decide to reinforce the sector, he would be doing so only at the cost of denuding the Dacca defences, and this would be welcome as it would facilitate the task of the II and IV Corps thrust lines from the west and the east.
In addition to its logistic, charter of duties, 101 Communication Zone Area was assigned the offensive tasks of destroying the Pakistani forces deployed in Tangail and Mymensingh districts within 14 days of the outbreak of hostilities. It was visualised that the destruction and capture of Pakistani 93 Infantry Br igade Group and other paramilitary troops under its command would deprive the Dacca fortress of its potential strength. If this was successfully achieved, it would contribute significantly to the campaign.
Gurbux Singh, a shrewd professional, quickly grasped the essence of the plan. He appreciated that although his own superiority was only marginal the weakness of the enemy lay in the division of his forces into two defended localities at Jamalpur and Mymensingh, held by about battalion strength each. Gurbax Singh cast his plan to exploit this weakness. He decided to develop the main thrust broadly along the less-expected approach, the Kamalpur-Bakhshiganj-Jamalpur axis, in strength with 95 Mountain Brigade Group while keeping the Pakistani forces engaged along the other two axes with subsidiary thrusts simulating a brigade group advance the more-expected approach of Dalu-Haluaghat-Phulpur-Mymensingh with one infantry battalion suitably augmented by Mukti Bahini elements under Brig Sant Singh, a fighting soldier of repute, and one BSF battalion working along the Baghmara-Jari Jhanjal-Mymensingh axis.
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Progress on the containment axes was to be deliberately retarded to facilitate the fall of Jamalpur earlier than Mymensingh to allow each garrison to be defeated in detail one after the other. But there was a snag. After its fall there was a possibility that the Mymensingh garrison might not wait in situ to fight but might withdraw instead towards Tangail and Dacca. Gurbux Singh therefore rightly calculated that he should rush for Tangail after the fall of Jamalpur instead of working towards Mymensingh. Tangail formed a critical bottleneck as all approches from Jamalpur and Mymensingh towards Dacca passed through it. Once this bottleneck was effectively choked, no force could fall back on Dacca, at least not as a cohesive fighting unit. The countryside around Tangail was completely dominated by Siddigi and his gallant Freedom Fighters, who could be relied upon to deal properly with stragglers making their way cross-country.
“¦it was decided that the Kamalpur post should be captured as a preliminary operation by the Mukti Bahini with the support of regular troops. The post was accordingly first attacked after saturated artillery bombardment”¦The attack had to be called off because of heavy casualties.
The quickest means of choking Tangail was by vertical envelopment. Since the required number of helicopters were not available to Gurbux Singh, he projected the use of paratroopers for the task. The importance of a timely linkup by the advancing troops necessitated a paradrop to coincide with the development of his land thrust lines approaching the bottleneck of Tangail. This meant speeding to Tangail after clearing Jamalpur or Mymensingh towns rather than waiting for them to be destroyed. On his insistence, the scope of the offensive was enhanced to capture Jamalpur in seven days, Tangail in eight and, depending upon the situation, to contact the Dacca fortress defences within 14 days of the outbreak of hostilities. The last task was considered feasible once the Pakistani forces deployed in Tangail and Mymensingh districts were either captured or destroyed.
Kamalpur lay on the main thrust line no more than 1,000 yards from the international border. The Pakistani forces had developed it into a fortified locality of considerable defence potential, with concrete pillboxes covering all the approaches leading to it. The total perimeter, approximately 600 square yards, was reportedly occupied by one company of 31 Baluch augmented by paramilitary elements.
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In view of its proximity to the border, it was decided that the Kamalpur post should be captured as a preliminary operation by the Mukti Bahini with the support of regular troops. The post was accordingly first attacked after saturated artillery bombardment. The assaulting troops almost reached the mouth of the Pakistani bunkers, but when the supporting fire was lifted they were mown down by machine-gun fire. The attack had to be called off because of heavy casualties.
Maj Vatsa of the engineer company personally destroyed these mortars with the aid of landmines he carried. While preparing to blow up a fourth mortar, he was mortally wounded”¦
Thereafter, the post was put under siege by a tight cordon of about two battalions. Supplies and reinforcements on the way to it were interrupted by roadblocks to the south. Subsequently, the Pakistani bunkers were engaged by direct artillery fire, and the locality was subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire intermittently day and night.
Kler had been closely observing the enemy tactics and had noted that he kept his heavy mortars in a central position and moved them up to support any threatened sector. He therefore decided to go for the mortar battery. He infiltraed 1 Maratha Light Infantry into an area where the mortars were likely to be deployed in the event of an attack on Kamalpur. A feint attack was launched on it.
As expected, the heavy battery moved out of Bakhshiganj in thick early morning fog and deployed in the middle of the ambush. As the fog lifted, the ambush became alive and the mortar battery was mowed down. Four mortars were destroyed, their vehicles set ablaze and heavy casualties inflicted. Some of the enemy got away through sugarcane fields. Maj Vatsa of the engineer company personally destroyed these mortars with the aid of landmines he carried. While preparing to blow up a fourth mortar, he was mortally wounded by a stray bullet from a canefield.
Notes:
- A powerful group of Mukti Bahini guerillas were under Siddiqi, whose headquarters were at Tangail.
- The main tasks of the parabattalion were (a) to capture the bridge and the ferry site across the river to prevent the enemy from escaping towards the south, (b) to capture Tangail, (c) to link up with the local detachments of Siddiqi, and (d) after linking up with the Indian brigade, moving from Jamalpur to Dacca.
After accomplishing its task, 1 Maratha Light Infantry pulled back with just one casualty. It was then that Kler decided to lay siege to Kamalpur and break down its will to resist. Hoping that the intervening period would have worn down the enemy, it was decided to attack again. It was a silent attack from the northeast, and the assaulting troops had almost closed in on the bunkers when someone coughed or made some noise and the enemy machine guns came alive resulting in heavy casualties. Perhaps if the attack had been pressed home, and at the cost of many more casualties, the post might have been captured. But Kler was not prepared to write off one-third of his force even before the operation had begun, thus jeopardising his ultimate aim.
The third attack met the same fate. The failure of two successive attacks and the resultant casualties dispirited the attacking troops, and the higher command developed second thoughts about Kler’s ability to handle live operations, especially since he belonged to the Corps of Signals and considerable resentment existed against higher command appointment of other arms officers in the Indian Army.
The failure of two successive attacks and the resultant casualties dispirited the attacking troops, and the higher command developed second thoughts about Klers ability to handle live operations”¦
Kler had earlier distinguished himself as general staff officer of a division in the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965, and later as a brigade commander in charge of counterinsurgency operations in Nagaland. Getting wary because of casualties, successive failures and demoralisation among the attacking troops, he decided to starve out the garrison by a prolonged siege. The siege continued till its surrender on the evening of 4 December.
In fairness to Kler, it should be realised that his mountain brigade had no suitable weapons for tackling reinforced concrete pillboxes as were encountered at Kamalpur. The only artillery pieces available to him, 76-mm guns of Yugoslav origin, were like peashooters and had absolutely no effect on these defences. His request for a couple of 106-mm recoilless guns was turned down, like an earlier request for one medium gun. Higher headquarters kept reminding him that his was a dormant sector and such precious weaponry could not be wasted there. On the same grounds, two recovery vehicles allotted to him initially were shifted to IV Corps sector as that was considered more important.
Kler was further handicapped in as much as one of his battalions had just been organised from an I battalion, raised initially for counterinsurgency with no support elements. In tackling a weak platoon post, another battalion brought out some major weaknesses of leadership under fire. The battalion reached its objective with relatively few casualties. As expected, the enemy turned artillery fire on the objective. A mortar bomb landed on a trench occupied by four men close to the commanding officer. He saw limbs fly and lost his nerve.
Kler accordingly proceeded towards Bakhshiganj with the bulk of his brigade group, leaving one battalion to keep up the siege of Kamalpur under the direct supervision of the General. No attempt was made to capture the post by assault again.
His mortar officer also appeared to have fired on another position just captured by one of his own companies, causing casualties. In a moment Kler, who was in the forming up place (FUP), found the whole battalion falling back in complete disarray, led by the commanding officer and his subedar major. The two men were removed and Kler took some time to get this battalion in fighting shape once again. He therefore had only one regular battalion he could rely upon in war.
At the outbreak of hostilities, it was decided to contain Kamalpur while Bakhshiganj should be tackled by infiltration. Kler accordingly proceeded towards Bakhshiganj with the bulk of his brigade group, leaving one battalion to keep up the siege of Kamalpur under the direct supervision of the General. No attempt was made to capture the post by assault again. In the early morning of 4 December, exchange of wireless messages between the post commander and his battalion commander were intercepted. They indicated that the post had asked permission to withdraw, but this was refused. Gurbux Singh applied psychological warfare to the post by alternative use of the stick and carrot. About 0930 hours, after withdrawing his troops from close siege, he hammered the po st with seven sorties of MIG-21s firing rockets and cannon, and this was repeated twice later in the day.
After the first strike, Gurbux Singh sent a note to the post commander through a Mukti Bahini courier, saying: “You have during the last few days made frantic efforts to bring in supplies and ammunition, and you know you have not been successful. These supplies have fallen in our hands… The time of your post is up and whatever you decide to do we have every intention of eliminating Kamalpur post. It is to save you and our side casualties this message is being sent to you. Since yesterday we are at war with Pakistan, and we hope you are aware that our troops at this moment are operationg many miles to your south.”
There was a further exchance of wireless messages between the post commander and his commanding officer, who promised the post assistance in the way of reinforcements and a retaliatory air strike, but nothing materialised.
There was no response from the post commander except in terms of renewed intensity of machine-gun fire. The General ordered the second air strike and pounded the post once again about midday, and followed it with another note: “You did not take note of the first message sent to you. This is our last attempt to request you to see reason. You will get a taste of the medicine administrated a short while ago [a reference to the air strike on the post]. In case you decide to surrender, I give you assurance that you will be accorded honours due to an enemy who has put up a gallant fight…”
There was no reply to this note either except defiance shcwn by more fire from the post bunkers. There was a further exchance of wireless messages between the post commander and his commanding officer, who promised the post assistance in the way of reinforcements and a retaliatory air strike, but nothing materialised. The General was by then getting impatient and more belligerent. He ordered another air strike on the post in the afternoon and followed this up with his third and final message: “Please let me know definitely by 1600 hours whether you wish to surrender. I cannot give you more time for certain reasons. It would be much better if you come along with the messenger. I give you my word of honour that you will come to no harm.” In cold contempt, the post opened up with all its weapons with renewed vigour. This left Gurbux Singh fuming and frustrated.
Bakhshiganj was the next defended locality held north of the Brahmaputra along the Mahendarganj-Bakhshigang-Jamalpur axis. The Pakistani forces were holding Sherpur on the parallel axis, thus denying both axes effectively.
He was planning a night attack when Capt Ahsan Malik, the post commander, came out with a white flag at about 1900 hours and offered the surrender of his garrison. He said he was doing so on the instructions of his superiors and not on account of the notes sent by the opposing commander. He had put up a courageous stand throughout the siege and had surrendered after holding a brigade of besiegers for 21 days with a company strength of a mixture of Regulars, Rangers and Razakars totalling about 140 men. Hardly any casualties had been suffered as a result of the Indian artillery bombardment and air strikes. The brave stand by the courageous Baluchi captain was recognised by his adversaries. Manekshaw sent a personal congratulatory message to Malik, commending his defiant stand. He instructed the concerned formation commander to treat the Kamalpur prisoners of war with the respect and kindness due to brave soldiers.
The next day, Kler came back from Bakhshiganj to meet the young Captain who had kept his brigade at bay for almost three weeks and to see the fortifications for himself. The air attacks had not even made a dent on the concrete pillboxes. On the way, he collected Gurbux Singh and was driving with him in a jeep near the post when they hit a stray anti-tank mine. The jeep blew up under them and the General had one of his feet shattered, thus becoming the first general officer casualty of the war in Bangladesh. Kler got away lightly with damage to his knees and spine, but was badly shaken. The General was evacuated from the sector and it fell on Maj Gen Gandharav Nagra to take over operations the next day. Nagra was moved from 2 Mountain Division, which was stationed in a dormant sector against the Chinese. He brought with him his skeleton staff advisers and some signal and services detachments.
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Bakhshiganj was the next defended locality held north of the Brahmaputra along the Mahendarganj-Bakhshigang-Jamalpur axis. The Pakistani forces were holding Sherpur on the parallel axis, thus denying both axes effectively. It was reported that the outer defences at Bakhshiganj were based on concrete fortifications on the periphery of the village and spread over a perimeter of about 800 to 600 yards, and the inner defences on the builtup area. 1 Maratha Light Infantry group, based on manpacks and bullock carts, proceeded towards Bakhshiganj along the village track bypassing Kamalpur on the night of 3 December. By first light the following morning, they had managed to establish a firm base northeast of the village and created a roadblock cutting off Bakhshiganj from Sherpur, and were poised to attack the village.
Some 50 assorted small arms were found in the village, but all the Pakistani troops managed to get away intact.
Similarly, 13 Rajputana Rifles Battalion Group followed a dirt track two kilometres east of Kamalpur and established itself north of the village, cutting off the Kamalpur-Bakhshiganj road. By dawn, the Bakhshiganj defences were effectively cut off from the north, northeast and southeast by regular troops, while the south was covered by the Mukti Bahini. The siege of Bakhshiganj defences was ostensibly complete. The garrison tried to tackle the roadblock, but was promptly dealt with by the Maratha roadblock company, as a result of which some vehicles were destroyed and nine men, including the company commander, Maj Ayub, were killed. The rest got away. Throughout the day of 4 December, the garrison remained surrounded and subjected to artillery and long range machine-gun fire, and it retaliated in a rather half-hearted manner.
The garrison commander had presumably been in touch in the day with happenings at Kamalpur and was aware that he would be subjected to the same treatment. Night descended, but there was not much exchange of fire. In the early hours of 5 December, Indian patrols discovered that Bakhshiganj had been abandoned. The garrison had withdrawn at night along the southern road towards Jamalpur through Mukti Bahini roadblocks without interference, as the Mukti Bahini felt that the strength of the withdrawing columns was far greater than they could cope with.
Some 50 assorted small arms were found in the village, but all the Pakistani troops managed to get away intact. Questioned later, Kler revealed that he had no heart in the deliberate reduction of the locality and that he did not intend attacking Bakhshiganj unless it was absolutely necessary. His aim was to hustle the troops out of their prepared defences and trap them en route. With that in view, pressure was mounted on Bakhshiganj and an escape route, lightly guarded by the Mukti Bahini, was left open for him. This plan worked, but the mine accident delayed the pursuit operation almost 20 hours.
Continued…: Liberation of Bangladesh: War in Northern Sector – II
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