Indian Defence Review

The Government’s ‘White Paper’ relating to India-China Boundary issue, published between 1951 and 1960, clearly indicated the adversarial bilateral relations between India and China. The increasingly acrimonious exchanges on the boundary question indicated that it could precipitate matters and result in armed clashes. The incident in Longju on August 25, 1959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959 were pointers to the determination and political will of China to stake her claims even at the cost of a war. This should have been the turning point for India; she should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial integrity. Raising of additional Infantry and Artillery units and formation Head Quarters, raising of Headquarters IV Corps, augmenting the transport fleet, inducting additional helicopters and transport aircraft, constructing roads, and redeploying forces to meet possible contingencies should have been commenced in right earnest then. Such preparation was mandatory to support a strategic decision of the magnitude as was emerging.

“Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one who thinks he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear…….when there is mutual fear men think twice before they make aggressions upon another”         —Hermocrates as attributed by Thucydides

After fifty years the Henderson Brooks – Lt Gen PS Bhagat Report (herein after referred to as Report) has wormed its way into the public domain through a foreign source. It is intriguing that a copy of the Report was accessed by a foreign journalist who was evidently treated to a ‘personal’ copy of a highly classified document. It may be asked whether the copy with Maxwell was a draft copy or one of the final copies. How was it accounted for? Our desperate desire to please the ‘white man’ is so very clear from this episode.

As has always been stated by the Army, this Report was ordered by the Chief of Army Staff to record the events of the 1962 War as they unfolded and analyse the details of the course of tactical level of operations to draw relevant lessons. Unfortunately, the Government of the day did not think it necessary to order a similar inquiry into the decision making process which involved the Ministries of Defence (MoD), External Affairs (MEA), Home Affairs (MHA), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). After all, the MoD or the Cabinet Secretary’s office would have had the secretarial responsibility at all meetings at the highest level of government decision making. The cover up by the Government of India (GOI) includes the arena where the National Security Strategy was formulated and the decision to firstly, draw firm lines depicting the International Boundary with China was taken and secondly, the decision to establish posts as far up to our then stated International Boundary was taken.

It is intended to study the military lessons that emerge at various levels from the War. At the same time, the aim is to assess how these have been incorporated in the military operations planning process in the current scenario to increase the level of preparedness against any misadventure by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Strategic Decision Making Process

The Government’s ‘White Paper’ relating to India-China Boundary issue, published between 1951 and 1960, clearly indicated the adversarial relations between India and China. The increasingly acrimonious exchanges on the boundary question indicated that it could precipitate matters and result in armed clashes. The incident in Longju on August 25, 1959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, were pointers to the determination and political will of China to stake her claims even at the cost of a war. This should have been the turning point for India; she should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial integrity. Raising of additional Infantry and Artillery units and formation Headquarters, raising of Headquarters IV Corps, augmenting the transport fleet, inducting additional helicopters and transport aircraft, constructing roads, and redeploying forces to meet possible contingencies should have been commenced in right earnest then. Such preparation was mandatory to support a strategic decision of the magnitude as was emerging. Probably Nehru’s domineering persona suppressed any urge for dissent or disagreement and therefore, his was always the last word to become ‘policy’.

In the current systemic context, due to India’s basic security stance of ‘restraint’, the armed forces are kept out of the decision making process. Though the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is briefed, as and when required, by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) or the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), decisions pertaining to military matters are taken without the presence of the COAS or COSC. As noted from the Report, it appears that the Army was only given instructions for undertaking specific operations including even tactical objectives as identified in the meetings at the highest level. Unfortunately, the system is prevalent even today under the guise of ‘civilian control’ of the Services. On the Chinese side, the PLA had a key presence in formulating Chinese strategy then and has a fairly prominent role in decision making even today.

Intelligence and Surveillance

The IB was the sole intelligence agency providing the Government all types of foreign intelligence. At the field level, the Subsidiary IB (SIB) operated in the border areas and was reporting back directly to Delhi. In the 1950s, the pent-up anger of the Tibetans with regard to Chinese occupation of their country could have easily been exploited to cultivate sources providing HUMINT. We also could have exploited the knowledge of the locals from areas opposite Tawang who had escaped Chinese persecutions, to interfere with the build-up of the PLA. However, this was not done since Nehru had recognised Tibet as being an integral part of China and his political stance of non-interference in the affairs of another country clearly ruled out such an option.

In the present context, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) is responsible for gathering foreign intelligence, the IB for Counter Intelligence, the State CID for criminal Intelligence within the State and Military Intelligence exclusively for intelligence for military consumption. With the Indo Tibetan Border Police also now deployed all along the Northern border they would have also established their own network for their task of policing the border.

In these far-flung areas, a quaint situation manifests in that with limited number of persons operating as an intelligence source it is often the case where the same source works for two or more agencies. He judiciously manipulates the information into bits as exclusive ‘bytes’ to his controller. With these inputs ‘serious’ intelligence assessments are generated by each intelligence agency which, in turn, form the basis for formulating national security strategy. Often, the source is compromised and allowed to operate only if he provides the other side information too; such double agents are a reality. Thus, it is axiomatic that all information is counter checked and verified. Induction of technology in through ‘spy’ satellites, monitoring electronic and cyber communications and deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are now being co-opted to verify the HUMINT as also confirming inputs garnered through other technological means.

The creation of a Multi Agency Centre (MAC) has been a positive step in the direction of intelligence sharing and to identify aspects that requires further inputs as also to optimise effort. This has created a more robust format of intelligence assessment. However, technology needs to be further exploited to compensate for the lack of HUMINT sources in the India-China context.

Military Planning Process

As understood from the Report, the Army was not briefed of the political objective to be achieved by military means. Instead, they were merely given tactical objectives to be captured by the forces available. At no point does the Report mention of the Army asking for additional resources outside the services, for example, projecting a case for requisitioning civil aviation resources for move of men and material. Furthermore, while tactical objectives were being specified by Army HQ, commensurate resources were not made available even when XXXIII Corps was asking for it.

Similarly, dates for commencement of operations were arbitrarily set. It is rumoured that the date for attack to recapture Walong was fixed such that its successful capture would be announced as a gift to the beleaguered Prime Minister (PM) on his birthday to lighten the prevailing gloom in the environment. It speaks volumes of the attitude of the some senior Commanders of that time who were trying to reach out to the political masters. The trend can be attributed directly as a fallout of the favours received by Lt. General B.M Kaul due his intimate connections with the PM and Defence Minister.

The Report brings out numerous occasions where command channels were blatantly bypassed. Often Army HQ completely sidelined HQ Eastern Command and passed orders directly to IV Corps. Similarly, it is noted the Army Commander Eastern Command and the Corps Commander also bypassed Division HQ and even Brigade HQ in passing orders. All limits were crossed when the IV Corps Commander spoke directly with the PM and the Defence Minister. India’s China war became private social ‘drawing room’ affair between the PM, the Defence Minister and Lt. General Kaul.

Ostensibly, in Counter Insurgency/Counter Terrorist (CI/CT) operations there are times when the HQ has to reach out direct to the Division or even Brigade HQ to get inputs on an incident which is being flashed on the ticker of a 24×7 news channel. Improved communications and availability of mobile phones with high levels of penetration to even remote areas have led to an unhealthy trend in the form of ‘paid news’ by all and sundry. The military reporting chain is being short-circuited to respond to ‘Breaking News’ flashing on TV sets. The Army has to report authentically with every aspect needing to be verified. While the News Channels do not shoulder any such responsibility, the Army is pushed into breaking norms of functioning. There, in my view, is this questionable trend of placing TV sets in offices which are be beaming news round the clock. Military Intelligence, certain sections of the Military Operations Directorates may require them but not every office in the Service HQs. This trend must be reversed and curtailed expeditiously.

Network Centric Warfare, propounded as the future form of warfare, is a brazen technologically enabled form of bypassing channels in the command and control chain. It makes no sense for a soldier deployed in a section post getting information of the ‘goings on’ in the neighbouring Brigade defended area. It makes the Section, Platoon, Company and even Battalion Commander irrelevant in the orchestration of the lowest level tactical battle. A tactical engagement is not about physical casualties and capture of ground but of defeating the enemy in his mind. Contrary to our thinking, the Chinese have always emphasized on deception, subterfuge, cunning and guise in their war-fighting techniques. It thus needs to be appreciated that every target appearing on a conventional battlefield is not to be eliminated. Tactical acumen, deception, cunning, training, leadership and tactical operational plan – all have a bearing on the outcome of a tactical battle.

The Army’s Battlefield Information System (BIS) is all set to severely disrupt this. The Battalion, Company, Platoon and Section Commanders will be forced only to react to situations as being played out by the enemy instead of executing a pre-prepared operational plan. It replicates the situation similar to the one prevailing in 1962. We need to harness technology to suit our existing organisations, procedures and terrain rather than blindly induct technology for the sake of technology. The “shooter to sensor” concept has its origins in CT operations undertaken by the US in Afghanistan. In the Iraq War, even the resource-rich US Forces could not wallow in the luxury of “shooter to sensor” across the board for all forces. In a conventional war, India cannot ever muster such resources as would be required for executing such an impractical concept by any stretch of imagination.

The malady of breaking up coherent units and sub-units is a fallout of interference from higher HQ in the tactical operations arena. In any Infantry battalion today no Commander can confidently claim to deploy a coherent section which has trained together and has a well-identified leadership. A similar situation exists with regard to platoons too. Trying to implement a ‘buddy’ system remains an exercise on paper only. Colonial practices such as residential guards for Commanders aggravate the problem. This form must change and the task of providing guards for non-combat functions must be entrusted to Defence Security Corps.

Similarly, the Corps of Military Police (CMP) has been created for a specific role. However, ad hoc Garrison Military Police (GMP) is mustered as a local arrangement to augment the strength of the CMP. However, this results in CMP becoming the managers of the GMP who are doing their task. The GMP is mustered by pooling in manpower from garrison units which is highly detrimental to the structured cohesion of the sub-units of the battalion/regiment from where the manpower is mustered. The practice in the Army has always been to deploy coherent sub-units for any task unlike the police or para-military forces where employment is specified by physical numbers. The system followed by the Army is basically to retain the cohesiveness of a sub-unit built around a clearly identified command and control hierarchy catering for a leadership element, communications, equipment and administrative support.

Execution of Operational Plans

Plans were made off large-scale inch maps. Remoteness of the areas and the level of cartography existing in the 1930s-1940s when the maps were prepared made them inherently inaccurate. Adequate time was not made available to battalions and formations to familiarise themselves with the ground where they were to undertake defensive operations. Interestingly, the Report has, at a number of places, mentioned of action by Chinese outflanking the defences held by Indian troops. It is indeed an indication of the familiarity with the terrain in the area of operations, level of training, cohesion of the units and the level of communications available with the PLA that enabled them to operate cross-country deep inside enemy territory with alacrity and ease. How did they get such detailed inputs of the terrain? Had they been carrying out physical reconnaissance all the while that India was complacently insisting that the “Chinese will not react”? This is intriguing and noteworthy.

Since there were no roads the field, artillery and mortars which had very limited range per force had to be deployed well forward to be in a position to provide defensive fire support. Mules and air drop of mortars and Howitzers were resorted to. As a matter of interest, a Howitzer of one of the units dropped at Hathungla was retrieved recently a few years ago after a detailed search. Dropping a weapon with crew is only the beginning of the problem. Mortar/Howitzer tubes without ammunition are mere worthless junk of metal. For meaningful fire support, ammunition for any operations requires a constant stream flowing forward. The limited range of these mortars/Howitzers made the concentration of fire from a number of fire units, as is the practice, non-existent. Similarly, due to these limitations, the weapons could not undertake any counter bombardment to neutralise enemy artillery. Thus, the PLA artillery was targeting Indian troops in their hastily prepared defences without interference.

Of late, there has been much hype on the possible induction of Ultra Light Howitzers (ULH) of 155mm calibre from USA. To exploit the light weight of this weapon which gives it the ability of being carried under slung a medium-lift helicopter; deployment areas for the guns need to be prepared in peacetime. Arrangements have to be made to stock ammunition in secure, hardened bunkers/caves dug into mountain sides, particularly, in areas where the road is not likely to reach in the next half decade/decade. Gun positions can be prepared at additional locations with ammunition dumped ab initio to cater for contingencies of side-stepping the ULH to areas so prepared without being handicapped for want of ammunition and need to divert utility helicopter resources during the battle. To do so would entail purchase of larger quantities of ammunition than in normal circumstances.

In every operation, the Report highlights the paucity of availability of reserves. Mountains are suited for defensive operations due to the attackers’ express need for opening an axis for maintenance to progress operations in depth. Well-prepared, stocked and defended localities can hold out numerous enemy attacks that will severely constrain the momentum and progress of any attacker’s plans. The enemy, in his preparation for an attack will seek maximum information of the defender’s deployment and location of his automatic and support weapons. The layout of a defended locality can be obtained by patrols and military appreciation, though actual position on ground of sub-units, his automatic weapons and support weapons may be concealed and measures for limited deception undertaken. Uncommitted reserves, however, can create a decision dilemma for the enemy, since he will not know the strength and location of the force. Considering the nature of the terrain and the high altitude of the tactical battle areas, pre-locating reserves well forward, duly acclimatised, was an essential aspect of the operational planning but was not done by the formations. Knowing the difficulties imposed along our Northern borders, in a future war, allocating uncommitted reserves to Brigades, Divisions and Corps as reserves, ab initio, maybe a more pragmatic option that will be need to be actively considered vis-a-vis holding a strategic reserve in the form of the Mountain Strike Corps (refer to IDR Oct-Dec 2013).

Air Support

From the Report, it appears that in meetings at the Government level, where the Chief of the Army Staff was invited to attend, the Air Chief and Naval Chief were not invited. This reflects the level of strategic thinking and planning at the highest echelons of the Government. The potential of the three services to further the interest of the country was not comprehended. The coordination of effort between the Army and the Air Force at the Eastern Command HQ level also seems to be just marginal. In the high level meetings, of the Command HQ, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was represented by ‘an officer’ whose rank or appointment has not been specified. Consequently, his contribution could only be limited to indicating availability of serviceable assets and the ‘meteorological’ forecast of the next 24 hours. The incident where the Eastern Army Commander was left stranded at Tawang by IAF pilots when the helicopters took off without him is militarily ridiculous. The pilots acted as though they were the staff of a commercial airline and not a combat force in a live battle situation.

Close air support, communication flight support and casualty evacuation are essential ingredients of tactical operational planning. To base a plan on such support which is available based on priorities dictated by another service compels the Army to make plans from within its own resources. As a result air assets are not fully exploited. Dedicated air resources for operations can only be planned for when assets such as attack helicopters, armed helicopters, utility helicopters are under the command of the Army. It is a moot point as to why the Air Force needs to control all flying assets in the air space from the ‘nap-of-the-earth to outer space’. Army Aviation ought to control all air assets over the Tactical Battle Area.

Comprehensive National Power

As the scope of the Report did not include commenting on the planning process at the higher levels, future conflicts and wars will require all elements of national power to be employed at appropriate stages. At the political level, the CCS and at the bureaucratic level, the National Security Adviser and Cabinet Secretary will need to be organised so as to orchestrate the deployment of various elements of power to synergise their potential with the sole aim to secure national interests.

The act of the then Government in not maintaining any minutes of meetings was to escape accountability. The decision making process in the Government is as it is because it is an elaborate enactment choreographed to defuse accountability and responsibility. The Opposition in Parliament, too, failed abysmally in forcing the issue of augmenting the strength of the Armed Forces and ensuring that they were suitably equipped in order to be prepared for a military conflict. As a result, the PM had to shoulder all responsibility for errors of commission and omission of others.

The Report, unwittingly, has given the Nation an opportunity to introspect. No scapegoats at this juncture will redeem what, we as a Nation, collectively lost. Simply drawing lessons from these failures without rancour or recrimination will enable us to emerge wiser and stronger.