The Government’s ‘White Paper’ relating to India-China Boundary issue, published between 1951 and 1960, clearly indicated the adversarial bilateral relations between India and China. The increasingly acrimonious exchanges on the boundary question indicated that it could precipitate matters and result in armed clashes. The incident in Longju on August 25, 1959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959 were pointers to the determination and political will of China to stake her claims even at the cost of a war. This should have been the turning point for India; she should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial integrity. Raising of additional Infantry and Artillery units and formation Head Quarters, raising of Headquarters IV Corps, augmenting the transport fleet, inducting additional helicopters and transport aircraft, constructing roads, and redeploying forces to meet possible contingencies should have been commenced in right earnest then. Such preparation was mandatory to support a strategic decision of the magnitude as was emerging.
“Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one who thinks he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear…….when there is mutual fear men think twice before they make aggressions upon another” —Hermocrates as attributed by Thucydides
This Report was ordered by the Chief of Army Staff to record the events of the 1962 War…
After fifty years the Henderson Brooks – Lt Gen PS Bhagat Report (herein after referred to as Report) has wormed its way into the public domain through a foreign source. It is intriguing that a copy of the Report was accessed by a foreign journalist who was evidently treated to a ‘personal’ copy of a highly classified document. It may be asked whether the copy with Maxwell was a draft copy or one of the final copies. How was it accounted for? Our desperate desire to please the ‘white man’ is so very clear from this episode.
As has always been stated by the Army, this Report was ordered by the Chief of Army Staff to record the events of the 1962 War as they unfolded and analyse the details of the course of tactical level of operations to draw relevant lessons. Unfortunately, the Government of the day did not think it necessary to order a similar inquiry into the decision making process which involved the Ministries of Defence (MoD), External Affairs (MEA), Home Affairs (MHA), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). After all, the MoD or the Cabinet Secretary’s office would have had the secretarial responsibility at all meetings at the highest level of government decision making. The cover up by the Government of India (GOI) includes the arena where the National Security Strategy was formulated and the decision to firstly, draw firm lines depicting the International Boundary with China was taken and secondly, the decision to establish posts as far up to our then stated International Boundary was taken.
It is intended to study the military lessons that emerge at various levels from the War. At the same time, the aim is to assess how these have been incorporated in the military operations planning process in the current scenario to increase the level of preparedness against any misadventure by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
India should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial integrity…
Strategic Decision Making Process
The Government’s ‘White Paper’ relating to India-China Boundary issue, published between 1951 and 1960, clearly indicated the adversarial relations between India and China. The increasingly acrimonious exchanges on the boundary question indicated that it could precipitate matters and result in armed clashes. The incident in Longju on August 25, 1959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, were pointers to the determination and political will of China to stake her claims even at the cost of a war. This should have been the turning point for India; she should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial integrity. Raising of additional Infantry and Artillery units and formation Headquarters, raising of Headquarters IV Corps, augmenting the transport fleet, inducting additional helicopters and transport aircraft, constructing roads, and redeploying forces to meet possible contingencies should have been commenced in right earnest then. Such preparation was mandatory to support a strategic decision of the magnitude as was emerging. Probably Nehru’s domineering persona suppressed any urge for dissent or disagreement and therefore, his was always the last word to become ‘policy’.
In the current systemic context, due to India’s basic security stance of ‘restraint’, the armed forces are kept out of the decision making process. Though the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is briefed, as and when required, by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) or the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), decisions pertaining to military matters are taken without the presence of the COAS or COSC. As noted from the Report, it appears that the Army was only given instructions for undertaking specific operations including even tactical objectives as identified in the meetings at the highest level. Unfortunately, the system is prevalent even today under the guise of ‘civilian control’ of the Services. On the Chinese side, the PLA had a key presence in formulating Chinese strategy then and has a fairly prominent role in decision making even today.
Intelligence and Surveillance
The IB was the sole intelligence agency providing the Government all types of foreign intelligence. At the field level, the Subsidiary IB (SIB) operated in the border areas and was reporting back directly to Delhi. In the 1950s, the pent-up anger of the Tibetans with regard to Chinese occupation of their country could have easily been exploited to cultivate sources providing HUMINT. We also could have exploited the knowledge of the locals from areas opposite Tawang who had escaped Chinese persecutions, to interfere with the build-up of the PLA. However, this was not done since Nehru had recognised Tibet as being an integral part of China and his political stance of non-interference in the affairs of another country clearly ruled out such an option.
In the current systemic context, due to India’s basic security stance of ‘restraint’, the armed forces are kept out of the decision making process…
In the present context, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) is responsible for gathering foreign intelligence, the IB for Counter Intelligence, the State CID for criminal Intelligence within the State and Military Intelligence exclusively for intelligence for military consumption. With the Indo Tibetan Border Police also now deployed all along the Northern border they would have also established their own network for their task of policing the border.
In these far-flung areas, a quaint situation manifests in that with limited number of persons operating as an intelligence source it is often the case where the same source works for two or more agencies. He judiciously manipulates the information into bits as exclusive ‘bytes’ to his controller. With these inputs ‘serious’ intelligence assessments are generated by each intelligence agency which, in turn, form the basis for formulating national security strategy. Often, the source is compromised and allowed to operate only if he provides the other side information too; such double agents are a reality. Thus, it is axiomatic that all information is counter checked and verified. Induction of technology in through ‘spy’ satellites, monitoring electronic and cyber communications and deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are now being co-opted to verify the HUMINT as also confirming inputs garnered through other technological means.
The creation of a Multi Agency Centre (MAC) has been a positive step in the direction of intelligence sharing and to identify aspects that requires further inputs as also to optimise effort. This has created a more robust format of intelligence assessment. However, technology needs to be further exploited to compensate for the lack of HUMINT sources in the India-China context.
Military Planning Process
As understood from the Report, the Army was not briefed of the political objective to be achieved by military means. Instead, they were merely given tactical objectives to be captured by the forces available. At no point does the Report mention of the Army asking for additional resources outside the services, for example, projecting a case for requisitioning civil aviation resources for move of men and material. Furthermore, while tactical objectives were being specified by Army HQ, commensurate resources were not made available even when XXXIII Corps was asking for it.
The Report brings out numerous occasions where command channels were blatantly by-passed…
Similarly, dates for commencement of operations were arbitrarily set. It is rumoured that the date for attack to recapture Walong was fixed such that its successful capture would be announced as a gift to the beleaguered Prime Minister (PM) on his birthday to lighten the prevailing gloom in the environment. It speaks volumes of the attitude of the some senior Commanders of that time who were trying to reach out to the political masters. The trend can be attributed directly as a fallout of the favours received by Lt. General B.M Kaul due his intimate connections with the PM and Defence Minister.
The Report brings out numerous occasions where command channels were blatantly bypassed. Often Army HQ completely sidelined HQ Eastern Command and passed orders directly to IV Corps. Similarly, it is noted the Army Commander Eastern Command and the Corps Commander also bypassed Division HQ and even Brigade HQ in passing orders. All limits were crossed when the IV Corps Commander spoke directly with the PM and the Defence Minister. India’s China war became private social ‘drawing room’ affair between the PM, the Defence Minister and Lt. General Kaul.
Ostensibly, in Counter Insurgency/Counter Terrorist (CI/CT) operations there are times when the HQ has to reach out direct to the Division or even Brigade HQ to get inputs on an incident which is being flashed on the ticker of a 24×7 news channel. Improved communications and availability of mobile phones with high levels of penetration to even remote areas have led to an unhealthy trend in the form of ‘paid news’ by all and sundry. The military reporting chain is being short-circuited to respond to ‘Breaking News’ flashing on TV sets. The Army has to report authentically with every aspect needing to be verified. While the News Channels do not shoulder any such responsibility, the Army is pushed into breaking norms of functioning. There, in my view, is this questionable trend of placing TV sets in offices which are be beaming news round the clock. Military Intelligence, certain sections of the Military Operations Directorates may require them but not every office in the Service HQs. This trend must be reversed and curtailed expeditiously.
At no point does the Report mention of the Army asking for additional resources…
Network Centric Warfare, propounded as the future form of warfare, is a brazen technologically enabled form of bypassing channels in the command and control chain. It makes no sense for a soldier deployed in a section post getting information of the ‘goings on’ in the neighbouring Brigade defended area. It makes the Section, Platoon, Company and even Battalion Commander irrelevant in the orchestration of the lowest level tactical battle. A tactical engagement is not about physical casualties and capture of ground but of defeating the enemy in his mind. Contrary to our thinking, the Chinese have always emphasized on deception, subterfuge, cunning and guise in their war-fighting techniques. It thus needs to be appreciated that every target appearing on a conventional battlefield is not to be eliminated. Tactical acumen, deception, cunning, training, leadership and tactical operational plan – all have a bearing on the outcome of a tactical battle.
The Army’s Battlefield Information System (BIS) is all set to severely disrupt this. The Battalion, Company, Platoon and Section Commanders will be forced only to react to situations as being played out by the enemy instead of executing a pre-prepared operational plan. It replicates the situation similar to the one prevailing in 1962. We need to harness technology to suit our existing organisations, procedures and terrain rather than blindly induct technology for the sake of technology. The “shooter to sensor” concept has its origins in CT operations undertaken by the US in Afghanistan. In the Iraq War, even the resource-rich US Forces could not wallow in the luxury of “shooter to sensor” across the board for all forces. In a conventional war, India cannot ever muster such resources as would be required for executing such an impractical concept by any stretch of imagination.
Please wait...
The writer has noted “The incident in Longju on August 25, 1959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, were pointers to the determination and political will of China to stake her claims even at the cost of a war” .
Aren’t similar incidents happening at present as reported very recently? Here is a link: indiandefencereview.com/news/lessons-from-the-henderson-brooks-report/0/
To quote: “Two Chinese helicopters entered Indian territory in Uttarakhand on two occasions in April and June after which the Army launched protests with the Chinese Army, the Rajya Sabha was informed on Tuesday.
“Due to differing perception of the Line of Actual Control by both India and China, transgressions do occur. Two Chinese helicopters transgressed the LAC on April 30 and June 13 in Uttarakhand,” Defence Minister Arun Jaitley said in written reply to a query.”Protests were lodged regarding the above transgressions with the Chinese side in flag meetings on May 5 and June 23 respectively,” he said.
The minister said the incidents of transgressions are taken up with the “Chinese side through established mechanisms such as flag meetings, Border Personnel Meetings and normal diplomatic channels like working mechanism for consultation and coordination on India-China border affairs etc.”
There have been many incidents related to transgression and face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops along the LAC in last few years.”
Hari your observation on PS Bhagat is correct. He was a Brigadier then. Incidentally coming from an Infantry Regiment of hill troopsof the Kumaon region, seem to have picked up from them this penchant for suffixing ‘Singh’ after every name. Sen became Sen Singh Sahib, Aiyappa became Aiyappa Singh Sahib. So truly Regimented.
It is true that the options were not wargamed at the tactical level. Every action taken was adhoc, whether it was induction of forces, selection of defences, and preparation for contingencies. A Corps Headquarter being raised when operations are imminent was ludicrous. Intelligence of the enemy was nix. Own patrolling to gain information was too limited and shallow. All these stemmed from the fact that we were not in the frame of mind for a war. So the lesson that to be prepared for war at all times is paramount. Armies are raised to fight wars and enforce peace violently. Forces are not deployed in border areas for ‘diplomacy’. If that is clear to all Commanders then upping the ante should be suitably calibrated.
The author of “Report” was Lt. Gen. Premindra Singh Bhagat, not Bhagat Singh as mentioned in this opinion paper.
A more critical analysis is needed that Indian army failed to defend other approaches to SELA Pass like trails which bypassed SELA and allowed the Chinese to appear behind indian lines, including Bomdila and farther beyond. That is military failure, not a civilian issue.
Writer after writer discuss at length the political failures of Nehru and Menon. There is very little time devoted to military matters which lead to haphazard withdrawal from SELA Pass. Chinese had appeared in strength behind Indian lines using trails etc. of which they had a complete knowledge, but carried very little supplies to sustain their troops for any length of time. Had SELA pass defences held and unnecessary withdrawal not ordered then, hungry and cold Chinese would be surrendering to Indian troops.
The issue of command failure is the worst in this debacle. Army lines of communications were bypassed. The command structure was ignored and soldier forced into a bad and open position, ultimately to be ambushed by the Chinese. Henderson-Brooks and PS Bhagat report (whatever is published) highlights this failure in a cursory way, blaming Gen Kaul for bypassing all command structure. It does not deal with complete brigade level failures in guarding the backdoor. There must also be failures at the Intelligence level that nobody thought that so many trails are still usable during october and November months which would give access to the Chinese behind Indian lines.
These type of issues which need to be thoroughly understood before we stand up to the Chinese next time. One lesson and foremost of all is that if you are not prepared then go for a fight. (Nehru did not understand that).
I am in full agreement with you. The failure in 1962 was not only at the highest political levels, but was also at the Army command structure. It has been noted that Gen Chaudhury, the Army Chief in the aftermath of the India-China war, spent most of his time and energy to cut out the dead wood to cleanse the Indian Army – to give an example, to retire Lt Gen Pathnia and his coterie in the Army. In my view something very ominous is happening at the Army at present which brings back in mind the pre-1962 mindset of the Army and the political masters (Modi as I write). I read again and again statements of Army Generals past and present, that 1962 will not be repeated. These are just hollow statements. Of course, 1962 cannot happen since we are in 2014 ! But something else is happening at the India-China border. The Chinese PLA is year by year nibbling away Indian territory by their aggressive posture and patrolling. Since year 2000, India has retreated from the boundary held, or better said lost, more than 800 sq km in Ladakh and the East. The Army hoodwinks the public, that the line of control is just a perception and hence as if the Chinese are entitled to encroach on the Indian side. Once I tried to take it up with a Maj Gen who served at the Chinese border, but I failed to extract from him that the Indian forces have also advanced their LAC in any sector. This is so poignant that at the time of 1962, Indian Army had posts right at the northern shore of the Pangong Lake. All these Indian posts fell one by one in Chinese hands in October 1962 ! At present only the southern section of the lake, at most one-third, is under India’s control. I was taken by surprise by a statement by Gen JJ Singh, Governor of Arunachal, that to settle the boundary India will have to trade in some areas in her possession. In the history of the world, boundaries between nation states have often been determined by fighting wars, but the Indian nation is coward to go to that length.